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Summary 
This dissertation aims to clarifiy (1) the internal structure of social intelligence (SI) and 
auditory intelligence (AuI), (2) their relationship to academic intelligence (AcI), and (3) their 
relationship to one another. The framework of Süß (1996, 2001) was applied in order to 
investigate SI and AuI with respect to their degree of generality and their position within the 
nomological network of established constructs. In addition, performance measures requiring 
only basic knowledge were developed in order to be able to produce test data. The Social 
Intelligence Test of Magdeburg (SIM) relies on written, auditory, pictorial, and video-based 
material to measure the cognitive operations social understanding, social memory, and social 
perception. The Auditory Intelligence Test (AuIT) based on the work of Stankov and Horn 
(1980) was further developed to assess the cognitive operations reasoning, memory, and 
discrimination using auditory nonverbal, and auditory speech material. Two experiments 
tested the assumption that SI and AuI can be measured reliably and that they are separable 
from but positively related to AcI, represented by the Berlin Intelligence Structure model (BIS, 
e.g. Jäger, 1982). The first sample consisted of 126 students (53.5% female) of different 
faculties, 21 years old (SD=3.06). In the second study 182 subjects (58.8% female), 23-40 
years old (M=28.69; SD=5.57) with different levels of education and proficiency, participated. 
Besides the SIM and AuIT, the test takers worked on the BIS-4 Test (Jäger, Süß, & 
Beauducel, 1997), working memory capacity tasks (see Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & 
Wittmann, 2003), and selected sentences of the Geneva Vocal Emotion Expression Stimulus 
Set (GVEESS, see Banse & Scherer, 1996). The SI subconstructs social memory and social 
understanding were moderately correlated and could be confirmed in both studies. In the 
second study, the social perception factor split into three minimally to moderately 
intercorrelated parts: written, auditory paraverbal/emotion, and nonverbal perception. Both 
studies provided confirmation for the content structure of AuI (nonverbal vs. speech), while 
the operation structure could not be confirmed. Social understanding and nonverbal AuI were 
completely independent from AcI and working memory, whereas the remaining 
subconstructs were related to AcI in different degrees. Social/emotional auditory perception 
including the GVEESS was independent from nonverbal auditory ability but correlated with a 
spoken language factor consisting of auditory speech tasks, auditory social understanding, 
and auditory social memory tasks. The results indicate that parts of social and auditory 
intelligence are promising candidates for useful ability constructs. Future research has to 
show whether they remain stable with time and can make an incremental contribution to 
predicting appropriate external criteria when compared to established ability constructs. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Theoretical and Practical Relevance  
Intellectual abilities have always fascinated people. Whole branches of industry deal with the 
question of which talents and gifts a person has and how they can be used effectively. 
Despite the variety of suggested ability constructs, research has concentrated on classical 
academic intelligence, namely reasoning, memory, speed and creativity measured visually 
with verbal, numerical and figural-spatial material. Although academic intelligence is an 
important predictor of educational and professional success, it is limited in predicting 
successful functioning in everyday life (Brody, 1992; Stankov, 1999). In order to cover the 
spectrum of human cognitive abilities more broadly, several authors began to integrate other 
intelligences and abilities in their models and tests (see Dulewicz & Higgs, 2000). Gardner 
(1983) added to classical academic intelligence by including musical-, kinesthetic-, and intra- 
and interpersonal intelligence. Guilford (1967) integrated social intelligence as well as 
auditory abilities in his Structure-of-Intellect Model (SOI model). Further approaches 
widening the intelligence construct include practical intelligence (Sternberg & Wagner, 1986); 
emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995); success intelligence (Sternberg, 1997a, 2005); 
operative intelligence (Dörner, 1986); learning ability (Guthke, 1972); cultural intelligence 
(Early & Ang, 2003; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2006); and, recently, sexual intelligence, 
psychosomatic intelligence, spiritual intelligence, network intelligence and intuitive 
intelligence (see e.g. Furnham, 2005). According to Weber and Westmeyer (2001), the many 
new intelligence constructs proposed in the last few years may make the construct of 
intelligence non-functional. The authors point to the important fact that in differential and 
diagnostic psychology there is a relative carelessness concerning the introduction of new 
constructs that lack empirical evidence. However, there is still no consensus about the 
conditions that have to be met in order to propose a valid construct. Construct validity (CV) 
concerns the extent to which a measure reflects accurately the variability among objects as 
they are arrayed along the underlying (latent) continuum to which the construct refers 
(Sechrest, 2005). Since an underlying variable cannot be directly observed, there are no 
hard and absolute criteria telling us that CV is established. Nevertheless, indications for 
construct validity do exist, for example when a potential audience believes that the construct 
has been defined in a satisfactory way, that the measure captures what is implied by the 
definition and that scores on the measure are related to broader phenomena implied by the 
idea of the construct (see Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Sechrest, 2005). Many of the just 
mentioned attempts to widen the intelligence construct neither make use of the just specified 
and additional (see chapter 1.2) indications that indicate CV nor do they examine them and 
proved their fulfillment. However, there are theoretical as well as practical reasons not to 
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extend the general criticism of the so-called “inflation of intelligences” to constructs like social 
and auditory intelligence. In this dissertation I will use a framework to examine the CV of both 
constructs. 
 
According to Cronbach and Meehl (1955), to be judged as valid, a construct has to 
demonstrate its place in the nomological net of related and empirically established 
constructs. In order to consider a domain of intelligence as truly separate from general 
intelligence there must be theoretical justification and empirical support. I will argue that 
social intelligence and auditory intelligence meet these criteria. Social intelligence (SI) can be 
understood via many sensory avenues, including auditory functions among others (e.g., 
vision). Auditory intelligence (AuI) can be understood as a sensory avenue that can be 
expressed via other intelligences, including social intelligence (e.g., also general 
intelligence). See Figure 1-1 for a visual conceptualization of social intelligence, auditory 
intelligence, and how they fit within the broader context of general intelligence.  
 
 
Figure 1-1: Conceptualization of Intelligence 
 
In contrast to other new constructs (e.g., emotional intelligence), social intelligence has quite 
a long research tradition since it was first introduced by Dewey (1909, cited in Landy, 2006), 
not long after research in academic intelligence began. Recognition of the importance of 
social abilities has increased enormously during the last few years and they are now 
identified as among the most success-relevant characteristics in different jobs (e.g., 
Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung, 1998; Frey & Balzer, 2003; Huffcutt, Conway, & Roth, 2001; 
Nigsch, 1999; Porath & Bateman, 2006; Rosenstiel, 2001; Schmidt, 2002; Schuler & Funke, 
1995; Seyfried, 1995), as well as in private life (e.g. Kanning, 2002). Because of increasingly 
complex tasks and their higher demands, modern jobs often require more certifications, 
greater responsibilities and more teamwork skills in the context of globalization. According to 
Social
Intelligence
auditoryvisual
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Intelligence
auditory visual ……
…
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a study carried out by the German Institute of Job Education (Bundesinstitut für 
Berufsbildung, BIBB), social competences were rated as highly important in about three 
quarters of 4000 job offers (BIBB, 1998). Social competences are required in nearly every 
situation that concerns interactions with other people. Such situations include introducing 
new people to a group, educating children, and avoiding misconceptions during email 
reading or talking to people on the phone. Both basic and complex social abilities are 
important. Remembering what another person said in a conversation about a friend’s 
problems is an example of a basic social ability. Asserting one’s own position while 
respecting others’ opinions is an example of a complex social ability. Both basic and complex 
social abilities require cognitive abilities. Such cognitive abilites include perception (e.g. 
perceiving a certain mood when meeting new people), memory (e.g. remembering the faces 
of school children in a class), understanding (e.g. understanding the feelings, thoughts and 
relationships of a certain person) and creativity (thinking about possible ways to resolve a 
socially difficult problem, e.g. an inheritance dispute). The diversity of social abilities and their 
applications indicates that social intelligence is likely to be a multidimensional construct 
consisting of dimensions such as perception, memory, understanding, and creativity. In 
addition, both vision and audition appear to be important for the expression and reception of 
social intelligence.  
 
The most direct and obvious means of communication between people is spoken language. 
People impart social information not only through the content but also in the way things are 
said. The voice helps to reveal if someone is lying or telling the truth, if speakers feel 
sympathy or antipathy for each other, and if the implicit message corresponds to its content 
(e.g. Giles, Mulac, Bradac, & Johnson, 1987; Kramer, 1963; Shintel, Nusbaum, & Ok, 2006). 
Effective interpersonal relationships and social performance require that individuals 
accurately decode nonverbal expressions of emotions in other people. However, the ability to 
decode prosodic emotional cues in voices has not received much attention in literature when 
compared to the investigation of emotion recognition in faces (Baum & Nowicki, 1998; 
Scherer, 1986). Auditory communication has major importance for work settings like 
telephone counselling and other situations in which the interaction concentrates on the 
auditory channel and the person’s emotional state has to be recognized (Wallbott, 2003). 
Auditory abilities play an important role in basic tasks (discrimination, memory and 
reasoning), for example, within conversations (especially on the phone) or while listening to 
the radio. The existence of a performance bottleneck, e.g., while driving an emergency 
vehicle or piloting a plane, places additional demands on the auditory channel (see Kallinen 
& Ravaja, 2004). Auditory abilities are also especially relevant for the acquisition of foreign 
languages. Better auditory discrimination and memory abilities should lead to a better 
pronunciation (minimization of accent), ensure a quicker and more accurate acquisition, and 
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enable a person to adjust quickly in a foreign country (Albrecht, 2005; Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung, 2006). Besides their practical relevance, auditory abilities have a 
rather long research tradition, particularly within the domain of musical abilities (see Carroll, 
1993). It is therefore surprising that existing ability and intelligence tests present stimulus 
material almost exclusively visually (Carroll, 1993; Horn & Stankov, 1982; Shuter-Dyson & 
Gabriel, 1981).  
 
Despite their apparent importance, the question of whether social and auditory intelligence 
are useful constructs remains unanswered. Attempts to separate social intelligence from 
academic intelligence, especially from verbal academic intelligence, have been problematic 
and mainly unsuccessful (e.g. Brown & Anthony, 1990; Ford & Tisak, 1983; Hoepfner & 
O’Sullivan, 1986; Keating, 1978; Probst, 1975; Tenopyr, 1967; Thorndike & Stein, 1937; 
Walker & Foley, 1973). As early as 1958, Wechsler called into question whether social 
intelligence differs from “general intelligence applied to social situations“ (p. 57). The domain 
of auditory intellectual abilities is even less developed than the domain of social intelligence. 
Clear definitions of auditory abilities and of how these can be separated from general 
intellectual abilities (e.g., verbal comprehension) are hard to find in the academic intelligence 
literature. Carroll (1993), who based his conceptions on studies implemented by Stankov and 
Horn (1980; Horn & Stankov, 1982), and research in music psychology (see chapter 2.5.4) 
are an exception. 
 
For several reasons, reliable results and convincing evidence for both constructs are still 
missing. Social intelligence instruments were often developed without being based on a 
theoretical model, methods were often inappropriate (e.g. performance subconstructs were 
examined with questionnaires), tasks were oriented mainly towards classical academic 
intelligence tasks (see Asendorpf, 1996), and the social context of the situation was 
neglected. Instruments that attempt to cover the whole spectrum of the purportedly 
multidimensional SI construct are rare and outdated (e.g. Moss, Hunt, Omwake, & 
Woodward, 1955; O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1966, 1976). Using realistic material for test 
development was difficult because it was expensive and there was a lack of appropriate 
technique. But although today reasearchers do not have to deal with technique and quality 
problems any more, the very commendable studies assessing SI with Multi-Trait Multi-
Method (MTMM) designs (e.g. Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995) still rely on the 
aforementioned test batteries. Auditory intelligence research has been sparse, and a broad 
and at the same time thorough measure of the construct does not exist. Test batteries are 
only available for limited domains, e.g. auditory perception (Surprenant & Watson, 2001; 
Watson, Johnson, Lehman, Kelly, & Jensen, 1982) or have not been fully developed and 
published (Horn & Stankov, 1982; Stankov & Horn, 1980). An exception is the Woodcock-
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Johnson III battery (Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001), which also includes a plethora of 
auditory tests. What they actually measure and how they can be classified theoretically 
needs further research (see also chapter 2.5.2). Results obtained in musical psychology 
have rarely been integrated into academic auditory intelligence research (for exceptions see 
chapter 2.5). One of the primary factors limiting previous work on intelligence constructs was 
the expense and limitations of early computer software. The early software could not handle 
the extensive calculations and statistical models necessary to address complex causal 
models adequately. 
 
Redressing these shortcomings in research on social and auditory intellectual abilities will be 
the next important step to advance the field of research on intelligence. These can be 
overcome with (1) a clear construct definition of social and auditory intelligence, (2) an 
underlying theoretical model, (3) a suitable design, (4) a representative selection and 
development of tasks, and (5) the use of modern techniques for media presentation. The 
current set of studies addresses all five areas. 
 
 
1.2 Purpose of This Dissertation 
This dissertation has three primary objectives. The first objective is to examine aspects of 
validity in auditory and social intelligence. The second objective is to contribute to the 
clarification of the position of auditory and social intelligence within the nomological network 
of human intellectual abilities. With the third objective, the relationship between auditory and 
social intelligence should be clarified. 
 
According to Süß (1996, 2001), several conditions must be met in order to argue for an 
ability construct. These conditions are:  
1) an empirical foundation with test data (T-data; Cattell, 1957),  
2) the construct should be measured by performance-based tasks,  
3) the ability should require only basic knowledge,  
4) the ability should have a high degree of generality (that is, can be operationalized 
across different tasks),  
5) the construct should demonstrate construct validity that is evident through partial 
autonomy in the nomological network of established models and constructs,  
6) the construct should be stable across time, and, finally, 
7) the construct should show evidence of incremental criterion validity when compared 
to established constructs.  
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In this dissertation, this framework will be used to investigate whether social and auditory 
intelligence are coherent and useful constructs (see 5). In order to examine the validity of 
measures of both constructs, an empirical foundation is laid using test data (see 1). 
Performance-based tests (see 2) are developed requiring only basic knowledge (see 3). The 
measures include different types of tasks and assess different groups of people (see 4). The 
domains of the purportedly multidimensional SI construct should emerge regardless of the 
kind of material (e.g. auditory or visual) used in a test. Similarly, following the facets of 
academic intelligence, auditory abilities are hypothesized to split into discriminative, memory 
and reasoning abilities and make up at least two content domains: a tonal (nonverbal) 
domain and a speech (verbal) domain. Subsequent steps examine the separability of social 
intelligence and auditory intelligence from academic intelligence. Shortcomings of past 
investigations (lack of theory-based studies, unsystematic method application, ignoring social 
context) are addressed. The final steps include combining the social and auditory constructs 
and examining the overlap and distinctiveness of social auditory intelligence and general 
auditory intelligence, controlling for the variance of academic Intelligence. It is important to 
mention that construct validation depends on the measure we use as an indicator of the 
construct and on the conditions of the use of the measure (see Sechrest, 2005; Süß, 2006). 
Therefore, instruments have to be developed carefully and the investigations should be 
planned and implemented with as little disturbing influences as possible. Conditions 6) and 7) 
are not addressed in this dissertation but should be examined in subsequent studies. 
 
This dissertation was carried out within the broader context of the goals and aims of a 
collaborative research group. Conceptual development and implementation of tests of social 
intelligence were carried out by Susanne Weis, Heinz-Martin Süß and me. The auditory 
intelligence work was carried out together with Jenny Papenbrock and Heinz-Martin Süß. 
Therefore, I use the first person plural to present our common views and ideas. 
 
 
1.3 About Terms and Concepts  
Literature on intelligence research differentiates among terms and concepts related to 
intelligence, ability, aptitude, or skill, and these terms are often used interchangeably. 
Spearman (1927) states: “In truth, intelligence has become a mere vocal sound, a word with 
so many meanings that finally has none” (p. 14). This overall confusion highlights the 
importance of bringing order into the chaos of terms and concepts within intelligence 
research. However, it is not within the scope of this work to address the totality of definition 
problems in intelligence research. Therefore, I pick up the thread of Snow who did a great 
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deal of work in defining “aptitude” and related terms, and beginning with his definitions, 
describe how I will use terms within the context of this dissertation. 
 
Snow (1996) regards intelligence as an organization of aptitudes for learning and problem 
solving. Intelligence is required in situations with novel or complex information that is also 
meaningful information, particularly when the information available in a situation is partial or 
incomplete. Cognitive abilities, in his view, are more specialized than intelligence. 
Intelligence and abilities are subsets of the category labeled “aptitudes.“ The original 
meaning of aptitude was aptness, appropriateness, and suitability for performance in a 
(learning) situation. Snow (1986) relates aptitude to any measurable person characteristic 
that is needed as preparation for future achievement. In his view, aptitude is not limited to 
intelligence but includes personality and motivational differences, styles, attitudes, and 
beliefs. Though stable, aptitude can be modified by education and learning.  
 
There has been an aversive reaction within the academic community toward the term 
"intelligence” in the last few years (see Schmidt, 2002). Predetermined abilities are not very 
popular in a world in which self-actualisation, self-control, and self-influence gain increasing 
importance. Therefore, the idea that an intelligence may determine success in training, 
profession, and life in general is not welcome. In the United States, and with 
industrial/organizational (I/O) psychologists in general, it is more acceptable to speak of 
cognitive abilities, general cognitive ability (GCA) or general mental ability (GMA) rather than 
using the term “intelligence” (Schmidt, 2002). With this controversy comes the even more 
controversial view that there are group differences in intelligence (see VanRooy & 
Viswesvaran, 2004). Jensen (2000) describes the possibility of introducing group norms. 
However, group norms predominating over individual rights does not solve the problem and 
would not necessarily diminish the adverse impact of psychological intelligence testing. A 
change of wording (e.g., intelligence versus cognitive ability) does not change the problem, 
which was also recognized by Horn (2006) writing about Spearman who changed the label of 
the term “intelligence” to “g” to avoid the problematic connotations. However, the g-labeling 
did not free Spearman from the definitional and conceptual difficulties associated with 
“general intelligence”. Is there one (academic) intelligence or should the concept of 
intelligence be extended beyond the scope of academic intelligence? Is intelligence mainly 
predetermined or do we consider intelligence open to modifications? As soon as we take a 
clear perspective on our view of that what we mean by “intelligence”, it does not really matter 
whether we call it general mental ability or academic intelligence. In this dissertation, I will 
use the term “intelligence” as specified below. 
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Another distinction concerns the differentiation between the terms “competence” and 
intelligence. The following conceptual distinctions are mainly based on a detailed literature 
review (Süß, Weis, & Seidel, 2005). We regard “competence” as the potential to show the 
required behavior in a specified situation. Competence is seen as domain- and situation-
specific and can be modified through learning processes. The term “competence“ can cover 
a spectrum of features varying in broadness, subsuming only one variable (e.g. conflict 
management) or several interacting variables in highly specific social situations (e.g. dealing 
with a low-self-esteem leader whose company merges with another one and who is involved 
in a family conflict) (see Süß et al., 2005). On the contrary, intelligence can be seen as a 
precondition to acquire competences and describes cognitive abilities that can be used to 
deal with very different tasks and problems (Carroll, 1993). Compared to competence, we 
see intelligence as more stable and genetically determined to a higher degree (see Süß et 
al., 2005).  
 
Similarly, the terms “skills” and “abilities” often are not used systematically and sometimes 
are even used as synonyms. As outlined above, abilities are less open to modifications and 
learning processes and comparatively more predetermined. Skills concern the concrete 
practice of complex behavior sequences and the acquisition of cognitive operations for 
concrete problems. Cognitive and behavioral skills are situation specific and are almost 
entirely automatic. Skills are acquired in several steps. Within this process they are 
automated successively, requiring high cognitive resources and being associated with more 
faults and less speed in the first cognitive stage and growing quicker and less faulty in the 
course of proceduralization (Ackerman, 1987). 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I take the position that intelligence has its genetic 
predispositions, is rather stable, and is restricted to the cognitive domain. This position 
corresponds to the results we observed in the literature review (see e.g., Ackerman, 1987; 
Carroll, 1993; Greif, 1987; Schneider, Roberts & Heggestad, 2002) In addition to genetic 
influences on intelligence, there are proxies for environmental enrichment influencing its 
expression (e.g., parents’ education and family background). I conceptualize intelligence as 
narrower than the concept of aptitudes because aptitudes include noncognitive abilities like 
attitudes and motivation. Second, I consider intelligence to be different from the concept of 
(general) abilities that may also include arts, sports, music, teaching, and leadership. Abilities 
can be specific and tailored whereas intelligence is a more basic and general concept. 
However, intelligence in my view can subsume several explicitly cognitive abilities also 
treated as intelligence subconstructs. Many more specific cognitive abilities (or intelligence 
subconstructs) -but fewer broad and general intelligences- seem to exist. See Figure 1-2 for 
the relationship between aptitude, intelligence and cognitive abilities. 
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Figure 1-2: Relationship between Aptitude, Intelligence and Cognitive Abilities 
 
The third major position I take is that social and auditory intelligence are located at the most 
fundamental level of understanding. These intelligences can be seen as preconditions for 
developing more specific social and auditory competences that are open for modifications. In 
addition, I regard social and auditory intelligences as generalizable across different situations 
that require cognitive effort and, therefore, these intelligences have to be distinguished from 
cognitive and behavioral skills. In spite of these rather clear distinctions, it is obvious that 
transitions are imprecise and sometimes it will be not as easy to differentiate amongst 
intelligence, abilities etc. 
 
Some notes are necessary regarding the position I take on incremental validity in the context 
of condition for valid constructs (see chapter 1.2). In comparison to the already mentioned 
problems we have in establishing construct validity, there is not a single criterion validity. The 
data produced by a specified academic intelligence test that was applied to a certain group of 
subjects may predict success in academic studies but does not have to be related to dealing 
with patients in a hospital. A measure that is taken to predict “success,” the definition of 
which is also important, in a specified proficiency should always be related to the demands 
that are placed on that proficiency. In other words, the predictor and the criterion must be 
symmetrical (see Wittmann, 1988). I acknowledge the empirical results that although leaving 
a large portion of 75% variance unexplained, found academic intelligence to be unmatched in 
predicting training and proficiency success (see e.g. Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Schmidt, Ones 
& Hunter, 1992; Jensen, 1986; Olea & Ree, 1994; Van Rooy, Dilchert, Viswesvaran & Ones, 
2006). However, there may be further predictors that will be even more successful in 
predicting other (or more specific) criteria (e.g. a social intelligence test predicting social 
behavior in dealing with patients) with different methods (e.g. different from supervisory 
ratings that have been widely applied, see Schmidt, 2002). Therefore, additional instruments 
belief
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introduced in this dissertation should not be regarded as in competition with academic 
intelligence tests and their already well-established results but rather as complementary in 
providing possibilities to cover an intelligence domain in order to make predictions for criteria 
that differ from those summarized and analyzed by the just mentioned authors. In the same 
way, I regard social and auditory intelligence as complementary, not competitive, constructs 
to academic intelligence. However, both constructs have to show incremental validity against 
academic intelligence in predicting adequate symmetric criteria. Social and auditory 
intelligence will be defined in further detail in chapter 2.2 and 2.5. 
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2 Theoretical Background  
This chapter starts with a short insight into the already established academic intelligence 
construct. It continues with a literature review including the theoretical conceptions, the 
empirical findings, and the relationships to other constructs for both social intelligence and 
auditory intelligence, and their combination (social/emotional auditory abilities). I present my 
own perspective at the end of each section. The chapter concludes with objectives for the 
development of measures for social intelligence and auditory intelligence I derive from the 
conclusions of past research.  
 
 
2.1 Academic Intelligence 
Intelligence has long been defined in several ways. The following definitions reflect the 
variability: mentally effective coping with changing environments (Anastasi, 1986); dealing 
with actual situations (Binet & Simon, 1905, cited in Amelang, 1996); mental self-government 
(Sternberg, 1986); an ensemble of abilities that is common to successful people in one 
culture (Wechsler, 1964); compound ability to act wisely, to think sensible and to deal 
effectively with the environment (Hofstätter, 1957); adaption to new tasks (Stern, 1911) or 
situations (Rohracher, 1965); and thinking in an abstract or concrete way within language, 
numerical, or figural-spatial relations (Groffmann, 1964). Differences in the definitions of 
intelligence are based on models or theories that differ according to the number of 
dimensions/factors they distinguish and according to the levels of hierarchy they include in 
their models. Carroll (1993) remarks that “the long-discussed problem of defining intelligence 
is transformed into one of defining the various factorial constructs that underlie it and 
specifying their structure,” (p. 627).  
 
2.1.1 Overview of Intelligence Approaches 
There are several possibilities for classifying conceptualizations of intelligence into different 
kinds of approaches (e.g., Amelang, 1996; Davidson & Downing, 2000; Kail & Pellegrino, 
1988). I chose the classification of Davidson and Downing (2000), who distinguish between 
four different approaches, namely biological, psychometric, contextual, and complex system 
approaches. The biological approach is based on the neural efficiency hypothesis and 
assumes that intelligent people have brains that operate more quickly and accurately than 
those of people who are less intelligent (e.g. Hendrickson, 1982; Deary & Stough, 1996; 
Haier, Siegel, Nuechterlein, Hazlet, Wu, Paek, Browning & Buchsbaum, 1988; Reed & 
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Jensen, 1991). Representatives of this approach use evoked potentials, inspection time 
tasks, cerebral glucose metabolic rates and nerve conduction velocity in their work. This view 
is also known under the label “mental speed hypothesis” (e.g., Vernon, 1983; Kail & 
Salthouse, 1994; Neubauer & Bucik, 1996). In contextual approaches, it is assumed that the 
meanings and instantiations of intelligence are culture and context dependent (e.g. Berry & 
Irvine, 1986; Berry, Irvine & Hunt, 1987; Ceci & Roazzi, 1994; Das, 1994). Representatives 
argue that intelligent behavior in one culture is sometimes rather idiotic in another culture and 
that different conclusions about the nature of intelligence are drawn depending on the 
context intelligence is assessed in. According to psychometric approaches, the structure of 
intelligence can be discovered by analyzing the interrelationship of ability test scores (e.g. 
Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1943; Spearman, 1927; Thurstone, 1938). This approach makes use of 
statistical techniques (e.g. factor analysis) applied to data from a large number of people. 
Complex system approaches assume intelligence to be dynamic and changeable depending 
on the predominant conditions (Sternberg, 1985, 1997b; Gardner, 1983, 1998; Ceci, 1996). 
These approaches combine the biological, psychometric and contextual approaches and 
lead to a broader view that is more successful in reflecting the complexity of intelligence and 
enlarging it beyond a static and narrow conception (Davidson & Downing, 2000). As an 
example, Gardner (1983) extends the conception of conventional academic intelligence and 
includes musical, bodily-kinesthetic, intra- and interpersonal and naturalist intelligence in his 
model (see also chapter 2.2.2 and 2.5.2). Gardner also attaches great importance to the 
context in which intelligence is measured. It can be viewed as positive that he includes tasks 
that are performed in real-world settings and avoids paper-pencil measures; however, 
Gardner’s work is not confirmed through empirical findings. Empirical foundation is a general 
problem with contemporary approaches since it is not yet clear how they can be validated 
completely. Until now, only parts have been tested empirically.  
 
This dissertation is based on the empirically testable psychometric approach of intelligence 
research. However, it extends the psychometric approach in the direction of contemporary 
models in assuming intelligence components (e.g. social intelligence and auditory 
intelligence) that are only minimally addressed in well-established models of intelligence. An 
important aim of this dissertation is to include the context in the measurement and to use 
new media instead of relying only on paper-pencil measures. In the present work, 
intelligence is seen as a composite of different component abilities, and is regarded as a 
complex, latent (hypothetical) and open construct that can be differentiated and enlarged.  
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2.1.2 Intelligence Theories in the Psychometric Tradition 
Sternberg and Powell (1982) describe the development of psychometric intelligence theories 
in an evolutionary model. They suggest that theories of intelligence undergo an evolutionary 
process that leads to a deeper level of construct understanding. Three stages represent 
successive degrees of complexity. These stages are (1) monistic vs. pluralistic theories, (2) 
hierarchical vs. non-hierarchical theories, and (3) integrative theories. The first stage 
differentiates monistic theories of intelligence from pluralistic theories. In monistic theories 
(i.e., Spearman, 1914), a single instantiation of the given unit of analysis dominated thinking 
about intelligence. Spearman (1914) assumes a general factor (g) that permeates 
performance in all varieties of tests. In pluralistic theories, many independent instantiations of 
a given unit influence thinking about intelligence. As an example, Thomson (1939) sees 
general intelligence as a composition of many independent structural bonds including 
reflexes, habits and learned associations.  
 
The second stage differentiates between hierarchical and non-hierarchical theories. In 
hierarchical theories, instantiations of successively lower orders are nested within 
instantiations of successively higher orders. For example, Cattell divides a superordinate “g-
factor” into two higher order factors, crystallized and fluid ability, which in turn subsume 
several lower order factors. Carroll’s (1993) Three-Stratum Model is another example of a 
hierarchical second stage model (see below and chapter 2.5). Thurstone’s (1938) Theory of 
Primary Mental Abilities (PMA) can be classified into the category of nonhierarchical theories. 
Thurstone regards intelligence as the sum of relatively independent constructs (=PMA) 
extracted by means of factor analysis. He could find and justify seven abilities. Perceptual 
speed, word fluency, and memory are seen as rather specific abilities whereas verbal, 
spacial, numeric and reasoning ability are regarded as more general abilities.  
 
In the third stage, the competing views of hierarchical and non-hierarchical theories (stage 2) 
are merged. Representative of this stage is Guttman’s Radex Theory (1954, 1958). In 
addition, Guilford’s Structure of Intellect Model (1967, see section 2.1.4) can be classified 
within this stage. A radia extension of complexity unites two distinct notions in a single 
theory, namely different kinds of tests and degrees. Guttman’s radex is the basis for the so-
called facet theories. Integrative models that combine facet theoretical and hierarchical 
approaches into a superordinate theory can be regarded as an advancement of the third 
stage (e.g. Jäger’s Berlin Intelligence Structure Model, BIS, 1982, 1984, see section 2.1.5). 
This work is based on an integrative theory and makes use of both facet and hierarchical 
models. Therefore, representative hierarchical and facet models and their backgrounds will 
be described in the following sections. 
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2.1.3 Hierarchical Models of Intelligence 
About Hierarchical Models 
Most current psychometric models propose a hierarchical structure of intelligence since 
empirical results have not yielded verification for non-hierarchical models (e.g. Thurstone), 
monistic models (Spearman), or pluralistic (Thomson) models (Davidson & Downing, 2000). 
Hierarchical models place one or more factors at the top and delegate specific factors to 
lower hierarchical levels. Higher level (second order) factors are expected to explain the 
correlations of lower level (first order) factors. The higher a factor is in the hierarchy, the 
farther it is removed from people’s actual performance on psychometric tests (Davidson & 
Downing, 2000).  
 
Advantages of Hierarchical Models 
Hierarchical theories comprehensively depict general as well as more specialized abilities 
and their interrelationships, and this research has empirical support (see Carroll, 1993; 
Davidson & Downing, 2000; Sternberg & Powell, 1982). In addition to having stimulated 
extensive research, hierarchical approaches have, in contrast to other types of models 
(contemporary and context models, some types of radex models, see Ackerman, 1989 and 
this chapter), the advantage of being empirically testable. However, the nature of the factors 
extracted or found in a given study is influenced by the intelligence tests that are applied and 
by the choice of factor analytic techniques used. This is especially true with regard to a 
general academic intelligence factor (g), which often lacks comparability across studies. 
 
Applications of Hierarchical Models 
The two most widely acknowledged hierarchical models are the Three-Stratum Theory 
(Carroll, 1993) and the Theory of Crystallized (Gc) and Fluid (Gf) Intelligence (e.g. Horn & 
Cattell, 1966). With respect to the latter, Gf is defined as innate reasoning ability using 
culture reduced material, Gc as knowledge due to formal education and acculturation. In the 
view of Cattell (1971) Gf is the precondition to acquire Gc, which is also described as 
invested intelligence. Indicators of Gf were mainly figural tasks (considered as culture-
independent measures). Gc was assessed with numerical and verbal tasks (culture-
dependent measures). On a second hierarchical level, the broad cognitive factors of 
perception (auditory and visual), memory (short- and long-term), speed, and knowledge were 
added in an extension of the theory (see e.g. Horn, 1994; Horn & Noll, 1997). The latest 
empirical findings do not support the Gf-Gc Model but instead argue for three factors: 
perceptual, verbal, and image rotation (see Johnson & Bouchard, 2005). 
 
2  Theoretical Background 
 15 
The Three-Stratum Theory of Intelligence (Carroll, 1993) is based on the reanalysis of more 
than 460 available datasets reported in the psychometric literature applying statistical 
procedures thoroughly and consistently. Carroll (1993) distinguishes three levels that differ in 
generality, or stratums (The model is illustrated in the context of auditory intelligence, see 
Figure 2-9). On the top, the third stratum, Carroll describes a general intelligence factor “g” 
that underlies all aspects of intellectual abilities. The second stratum is comprised of eight 
subconstructs, namely (1) fluid and (2) crystallized intelligence, (3) general memory and 
learning, (4) broad visual perception, (5) broad auditory perception, (6) broad retrieval ability, 
(7) broad cognitive speediness and (8) processing speed. These subconstructs are listed in 
descending order according to the degree to which they are influenced by the third stratum g-
factor. On the first stratum, altogether 68 primary order factors are further specifications of 
the secondary order factors on the second stratum and are dominated by the respective 
second order factor. They represent specialized skills reflecting the acquisition of particular 
strategies or specific types of knowledge. According to Carroll, the three strata are open for 
extensions, for example concerning additional (intermediate) strata. The Three-Stratum 
Model is supported by the research of Bickley, Keith, and Wolfe (1995) who performed a 
hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis on tests scores obtained in a study with more than 
6000 participants. Although the three-stratum structure was supported, a competitive model 
with an additional intermediate stratum between the third and the second stratum provided 
an even better fit. Factors on the intermediate level were interpreted as Gf and Gc.  
 
The Three-Stratum Theory (Carroll, 1993) and the Theory of Gf and Gc (Horn & Cattell, 
1966) were recently integrated into a common Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) Theory (see 
McGrew & Evans, 2004). CHC Theory maintains Carroll’s Three-Stratum structure with a g-
factor at the top (stratum III), broad cognitive abilities (stratum II), and narrow cognitive 
abilities (stratum I). The broad cognitive abilities include nine second order factors very 
similar to the Carroll factors: fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc), visual 
processing (Gv), auditory processing (Ga), long-term retrieval (Glr), processing speed (Gs), 
decision/reaction time/speed (Gt), reading and writing (Grw), and quantitative knowledge 
(Gq). The nine factors subsume about 70 narrow cognitive abilities. They are seen as 
positively intercorrelated but independent through structural evidence (best-weighted linear 
combination of any set of the eight factors does not account for the reliable covariance 
among the elements of the ninth factor). However, Horn and Carroll do not agree with regard 
to a general “g-factor”. According to Horn (2006), most of the empirical analyses do not 
support “g-theory” (p. 43). Different curves of development with age confirm this assumption, 
since Gc and Glr increase with age whereas Gf, short-term storage (STM), and Gt decline 
with age. The CHC theory underlies the Woodcock–Johnson Test Battery III (WJ-III) as one 
of the best known tests in the USA, and influenced others, for example the revised Binet-
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Simon Tests and the WAIS-III. In empirical analyses (see Lohman, 2003; McGrew & Murphy, 
1995; Woodcock, 1998), selected factors could be confirmed. Instead of studies reporting 
support of the whole CHC factor structure with one test, confirmatory factor analysis revealed 
four higher order factors (Woodcock, 1998): STM, stores of knowledge, thinking abilities and 
automatic processing speed. Thinking abilities are regarded as the core “classical 
intelligence” applied in novel and difficult tasks and requiring reasoning. I will refer to this 
theory again in the context of auditory intellectual abilities (see chapter 2.5.2).  
 
2.1.4 Facet Models of Intelligence 
About Facet Theory 
According to Guttman (cited by Gratch, 1973; see also Borg, 1976), facet theory is a 
“hypothesis of a correspondence between a definitorial system for a universe of observations 
and an aspect for the empirical structure of those observations together with a rationale for 
such a hypothesis.” Facet theory can be regarded as a general research methodology in the 
social sciences containing instructions for the implementation of studies and a composition of 
principles often called “metatheory” (Canter, 1985; Holz-Ebeling, 1991). Facet theory 
assumes that human behavior is a function of situations and person characteristics. The 
major aim of facet theory is to define the relevant facets that describe a specified research 
domain completely and economically for a certain field of research. A facet can be described 
as a set (C) involved in a Cartesian product of a finite number of sets (A and B). C contains 
the combined elements of A and B (Guttman, 1954, 1958). The combination of different 
types of facets and their elements are the foundation of a facet design. The design is 
specified through a “mapping sentence,” which links facets of a definitional domain “person” 
and ”stimulus” with a complex variable range “reaction” (or result). Qualitative and 
quantitative categories are distinct and supplement each other in addition to characterizing 
the facet in further detail. The use of general already existing and commonly accepted 
ranges is preferred rather than creating new mapping sentences for every kind of study. 
According to Guttman (1965), among the most important facets are the communication 
modes. Guttman distinguishes between the five senses sight, sound, touch, smell and taste. 
Each mode of communication may define a different kind of intelligence. After the 
specification of a facet into its main characteristics, it should be possible to describe every 
observation in terms of the basic characteristics. Within such a system, prognostic 
statements regarding the empirical similarities between the observations are possible (Holz-
Ebeling, 1991). With the formalization of the assumptions of a facet design, it is also 
specified under which conditions it is valid. Any theory could benefit from being enunciated in 
facet-theoretical terms and tested using the facet approach to data analysis (Canter, 1985). 
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Advantages of Facet Models  
A plethora of advantages and corresponding methodological applications exist concerning 
the application of facet models. To begin with, facet models allow a systematic description of 
a field of research that make a transfer into an empirical operationalization easier (Holz-
Ebeling, 1991). Facet theory leads to multifactorial measurement designs that have an 
important impact on the content and construct validity of a measure. With regard to content 
validity, at the stage of test development, facet theory allows the theoretical understanding of 
the construct serving as a basis for the item development. A rational for item construction 
ensures the representativeness and completeness of the item universe for the construct to 
be measured. If test items correspond to the facets, positive correlations between test items 
are expected, whereas, if there is no correspondence, there should be no positive manifold. 
Items that share more similarities concerning their conceptual definitions should be more 
similar empirically (principle of contiguity) (Brown, 1985). The combination of scores 
according to the facets leads to a relatively large number of ability measures with a relatively 
low number of scores and therefore provides efficient tools for psychological assessment 
(Süß & Beauducel, 2005). Concerning construct validity, the application of facet theory helps 
to guarantee internal and external validity of the construct. Tests that share two facets 
require the same cognitive operation and apply the same content. In addition, they are 
assumed to correlate higher than tests sharing only one facet (e.g. same content but different 
cognitive operation). The lowest correlation is expected between tests having no facets in 
common. As a very general approach, facet theory can be related to construct validation 
(e.g. Ridgway, 1980) similar to the Multi-Trait Multi-Method approach (MTMM, see Campbell 
& Fiske, 1959). The MTMM approach describes a validational process that makes use of a 
matrix presenting all of the intercorrelations resulting when each of several traits is measured 
by each of several methods. Measures of the same trait should correlate higher with each 
other than they do with measures of different traits involving separate methods. Moreover, 
these validity values should be higher than the correlations among different traits measured 
by the same method. However, these criteria are seldom met. The MTMM approach can be 
regarded as a special form of a facet approach in which the contiguities of the construct facet 
should be more pronounced than the contiguities of the other facets (methods). 
 
Facet theory is very flexible, can cope with virtually any content area, and has been applied 
successfully in a wide context of ability research: in working memory capacity, (Oberauer, 
Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000; Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003; Süß, 
Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002), in intelligence (Beauducel, Brocke, & 
Liepmann, 2001; Guttman & Levy, 1991; Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984), and in a facet 
approach that integrates working memory, intelligence and knowledge (Kyllonen, 1994). Two 
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applications of facet theory in the domain of intelligence research that are theoretically 
relevant in the context of this dissertation are described in the following section. 
 
 
Applications in Academic Intelligence 
a) Radex Model (Guttman, 1958) 
Guttman (1958) developed hypotheses regarding the correlations between tests according to 
their common characteristics. He first introduced the “level of complexity” as a facet of tests. 
This facet is regarded as a continuum: the more components a test includes, the more 
complex it is. More complex tests, therefore, include the components of simpler tests plus 
additional components. The more components tests have in common, the higher their 
correlation should be. The order of correlations is called a simplex. In similarity structure 
analysis (SSA), correlations are represented as distances between points. Points that are 
close together indicate high correlations, points that are far from one another indicate low 
correlations. Tests of similar complexity though should form a circular array, a circumplex, in 
SSA. Tests of the same content but different in complexity should be located on a straight 
line array in SSA (simplex). The combination of simplex and circumplex forms a radex –a 
disc or sphere in two- or three-dimensional SSA– divided into verbal, numerical and figural 
content areas. In contrast to Guttman, who expected complex tasks to be located at the 
periphery of the radex, empirical analysis showed that complex tests were located at the 
center of the radex (Marshalek, Lohman, & Snow, 1983; Schlesinger & Guttman, 1969; Snow 
et al., 1984). Marshalek et al. (1983) assumed that the shorter the average distance of a test 
from all other tests in the universe, the closer a test would be located to the center of the 
radex. Tests measuring rather general abilities thus would be located in the center whereas 
tests that represent more specific abilities would be more peripheral (see Figure 2-1). As 
SSA differs from traditional factor analysis, an evaluation of the radex model is rather difficult. 
Results obtained with SSA could not be compared with structural models of intelligence 
based on factor analysis. Consequently, the model and its empirical results received only 
minor criticism but were also not sufficiently integrated in the process of theorizing in 
intelligence. Adler and Guttman (1982) replicated Guttman’s radex structure of intelligence 
tests, having 200 school children work on 13 intelligence tests that were defined within a 
framework containing four facets: rule type (inference, application, practice), modalities of 
expression (verbal, figural, numerical), language of communication (paper-pencil; manual), 
and dimensionality of object portrayed (two, three). SSA revealed the hypothesized facets. 
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Figure 2-1: Radex Model of Intelligence (Marshalek et al.,1983) 
Note. The level of generality is indicated by the resolution of the pattern. High resolution indicates a 
high level of generality; low resolution indicates a low level of generality. 
 
 
b) The Structure-of-Intellect Model (Guilford, 1967) 
Guilford (1967) postulated an information-processing model that should describe and sort but 
also explain intellectual functioning. Guilford cross-classified mental abilities into three facets: 
Operations (mental processes), content (kind of information) and products (form of 
information). In terms of the information-processing approach, the contents represent stimuli, 
the operations represent processes and the products represent responses (Süß & 
Beauducel, 2005). The three facets were arranged in a cube representing the Cartesian 
product of all elements of all facets, the Structure of Intellect Model (SOI Model). The 
operation facet contains the following elements: evaluation, convergent production, divergent 
production, memory and cognition. The content facet consists of the five elements: visual, 
auditory, symbolic, semantic and behavioral. The products contain the elements, namely 
units, classes, relations, systems, transformations and implications. Each of the postulated 
150 basic abilities (5 contents x 5 operations x 6 products) is identified by its unique 
conjunction of one element of each of the three facets. In 1988, Guilford added another 30 
abilities to his model when he decided to split up the memory operation into memory 
recording (immediate recall) and memory retention (recall after a period of time). However, 
the statistical procedures Guilford used were rather problematic (inadequate factor rotation, 
no availability of fit indices, use of random hypotheses), hence the empirical status of the 
model is not clear. Guilford did not expect a general intelligence factor but several second 
and third order factors emerging according to the facet elements the tests have in common. 
Even though Guilford claimed to have identified more than half of the 85 second-order 
abilities, empirical investigation indicated that the identification of the higher order factors, 
especially the product factors, was problematic. Nevertheless, the SOI model provides a 
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large map of potential factors and stimulated the identification of new factors (e.g. social 
intelligence, see chapter 2.2) and the development of new tests (Süß & Beauducel, 2005). 
 
2.1.5 Integrative Models of Intelligence 
One of the most important integrative theories, especially in the domain of German language, 
is the Berlin model of Intelligence Structure (BIS; Jäger, 1982). The BIS model combines a 
facet structure with a hierarchical component and adopts the advantages of both types of 
models. The purpose of the BIS development was to explain the differences between most of 
the competing models (Jäger, 1967). Jäger ascribed the differences between these models 
to different tasks (generality), different subjects (universality), and different techniques of 
data analysis (Pfister & Beauducel, 1993). Therefore, in a first empirical-inductive stage, 
Jäger used about 2000 intelligence tasks he found up to the year 1973 in the literature in 
order to develop his integrative model. 191 tasks that contained marking variables for 
principal components of competitive structure models of intelligence were selected according 
to the maintenance of diversity and were then administered to an age homogeneous (16-21 
years) German-speaking sample of 545 high school students in Berlin. Data were analyzed 
and interpreted by means of factor and cluster analysis. Stability was tested with a retest 
study after four years with 347 of the previously tested high school students. Exploratory 
factor analysis revealed four unambiguous operational factors: processing capacity 
(equivalent to reasoning), processing speed, memory, and creativity. Jäger (1984, p. 30) 
defines the operations as presented in Box 2-1.  
Box 2-1: Operations of Academic Intelligence According to the BIS (Jäger, 1984) 
PROCESSING SPEED (S) 
Processing speed refers to the ability to perform simple tasks quickly and accurately. 
 
MEMORY (M) 
Memory refers to the ability to recognize and recall lists and configurations of items a few 
minutes after learning them. 
 
CREATIVITY (C) 
Creativity refers to the ability to produce fluently many different ideas. 
 
PROCESSING CAPACITY (= REASONING, R) 
Processing capacity corresponds to reasoning factors in other models. It refers to the 
ability to process complex information including inductive and deductive reasoning, 
construction, judging and planning. 
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Jäger and colleagues predicted that there would be seven primary order factors. However, 
when they ran the initial model, they did not find the typical content factors -verbal, numerical 
and spatial-figural- as originally predicted. Jäger and his colleagues assumed that they were 
hidden by the operation factors because the highly educated sample could have overlearnt 
the use of words and numbers. In a second quasi-experimental stage, Jäger and his 
colleagues used a special aggregation technique (Jäger, 1982, 1984). Following a 
suggestion of Humphreys (1962), tests heterogeneous with respect to operations but 
homogeneous concerning their content were aggregated to so-called parcels. Verbal, 
numerical and figural parcels were formed. Only those 48 tasks that were pure with regard to 
their content were used for further analysis. Four tasks were available for each of the 12 cells 
(4 operations x 3 contents) and consequently four parcels could be formed for each content 
domain. The facet model was replicated very clearly. The hypothesis that the content 
variance was masked by the operation variance could be confirmed. Jäger (1984, p. 31) 
defines the content domains as follows (see Box 2-2). 
 
Box 2-2: Contents of Academic Intelligence According to the BIS (Jäger, 1984) 
 
Parceling technique was also applied in order to reveal a general intelligence factor 
(academic intelligence, AcI). Parcels heterogeneous with regard to their content as well as 
their operation were formed and analyzed. AcI was identified which explains the correlations 
between content and operation factors. One should note that empirical investigations have 
shown that parceling did not produce a result where there is no empirical basis in the 
correlation matrix (Jäger & Tesch-Römer, 1988; Süß & Beauducel, 2005) and therefore the 
data was not conducive to manipulation. Figure 2-2 represents the structure of the BIS 
model. 
 
To summarize, the BIS has a hierachical structure with a general intelligence factor on the 
top. It can also be described as a facet model with seven principal components at the same 
level arranged in two facets, contents and operations. The twelve cells should be regarded 
as multifactorial conditioned performances rather than as primary ability factors as in 
Guilfords SOI model. The facets and classes of the BIS model do not have to be 
independent from one another (Jäger, 1982, 1984). Until now, only two facets have been 
specified but the model is open to the integration of new facets (Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 
VERBAL (V):  Ability to deal with language. 
 
NUMERICAL (N):  Ability to deal with numbers. 
 
SPATIAL-FIGURAL (F): Ability to deal with figures and space. 
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1997). The completion of the model can concern additional operations and contents, facets 
and performances. The BIS has been replicated several times and with different methods 
(e.g. Beauducel & Kersting, 2002; Bucik & Neubauer, 1996; Jäger et al., 1997; Jäger & 
Tesch-Römer, 1988; Süß et al., 2002). 
 
Figure 2-2: Berlin Model of Intelligence Structure (Jäger, 1984) 
Note. The model is adapted according to Jäger (1984, p. 26) 
 
2.1.6 Conclusions from Academic Intelligence Research 
Integrative models combining the advantages of both hierarchical and facet models are 
expected to be empirically most valid. They provide an approach that can be empirically 
validated. Therefore, the BIS model is chosen within this dissertation as a foundation and 
reference model in order to contrast academic, social and auditory intelligence. The BIS 
model has been validated extensively and is well-established in theoretical context and 
practical application. However, neither social nor auditory intellectual abilities, which are 
included in some widely accepted intelligence models (e.g. Carroll, 1993, broad auditory 
perception; Guilford, 1967, social intelligence), are taken into account within the BIS model. 
Attempts (see Jäger et al., 1997) to add a social content domain were never implemented. In 
the following chapters, research with regard to definitions, conceptions, models and 
measurement of social and auditory intelligence is reviewed. Both constructs are related to 
constructs within their nomological network with a focus on academic intelligence.  
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2.2 Social Intelligence 
Hendricks (1969, cited in Probst, 1982) already wondered whether academic intelligence is a 
sufficient precondition to solve social problems. In his view, “A quite different kind of 
intelligence is most needed for that purpose, namely a kind increasingly recognized as social 
intelligence.” (p. 201). Sternberg, Forsythe, Hedlund, Horvath, Wagner, Williams, Snook, & 
Grigorenko (2000) argue that these differences are obvious in our daily lives: “We see people 
who succeed in school and fail in work or who fail in school but succeed in work. We meet 
people with high scores on intelligence tests who seem inept in their social interactions. And 
we meet people with low test scores who can get along effectively with practically anyone.” 
(p. 32). Whereas this chapter explicitly focuses on social intelligence, the next two chapters 
(2.3 and 2.4) explore the position of social intelligence within other currently popular 
concepts of social competences, including emotional and practical intelligence, as well as 
empathy and wisdom.  
 
Among laypersons as well as in work and clinical contexts, the concept of social 
competences is more common than social intelligence. It is not easy to maintain an overview 
about the many concepts that are similar to or overlap with social intelligence and 
competence. In English-speaking countries, words such as empathy, clinical intuition, person 
perception, social perception, social understanding, social sensitivity, social judgment, 
accuracy in judging, social skill and predictive skill were used as conceptions for social 
intelligence (Probst, 1998). It is often unclear as to exactly what people mean when they 
speak in terms of these concepts (see chapter 1.3). Confusion even increases when popular-
science books such as the recently published social intelligence book of Goleman (2006) 
help to shape public opinion. This dissertation focuses on social intelligence as an intellectual 
ability domain that can be classified within a broader conceptualization of social 
competences (see also chapter 2.3). Similarly to academic intelligence, in social intelligence 
several approaches exist, leading to different models and measurement strategies. The 
psychometric approach (how socially intelligent is a certain person) can be differentiated 
from an approach that focuses on general cognitive structures and processes (how do the 
processes and structures determining social intelligence develop over the life course and 
how do they influence social interactions). This work deals with the psychometric approach. 
Definitions, models and instruments are presented and discussed in the following sections. 
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2.2.1 Definitions and Conceptualizations of Social Intelligence  
Social intelligence (SI) was first introduced by Dewey (1909, cited in Landy, 2006), who 
defines social intelligence as “the power of observing and comprehending social situations” 
(p. 43). E. L. Thorndike (1920), however, was the first person who included SI in a model of 
human intellectual abilities. Thorndike distinguished between abstract intelligence (ability to 
understand and manage ideas), mechanical intelligence (ability to understand and manage 
concrete objects), and SI. He defined SI as “the ability to understand and manage men and 
women, boys and girls -- to act wisely in human relations" (p. 228). In his definition, 
Thorndike refers to two aspects of SI, cognitive (e.g., to understand) and behavioral (e.g., to 
act wisely). Table 2-1 provides an overview of additional well-known definitions of SI. In the 
far right column, the component the definition focuses on is listed. Besides concentration on 
cognitive and/or behavioral SI, knowledge is a possible defining component. 
 
The existing definitions seem to reveal three major characteristics of SI: it depends on (1) 
cognitive preconditions (basic ability) and/or (2) knowledge that can be transferred into (3) 
socially intelligent behavior. Moreover, some of the definitions are based on or include 
knowledge (or the former experience of people within social situations). Thorndike’s definition 
of social intelligence in the SI literature is considered to be one of the broadest, which 
served, and still serves, as a basis for many former and topical studies. With regard to the 
distinctions concerning the term “intelligence” I made in chapter 1.3, only the cognitive part of 
the definitions are candidates for the status of “intelligence.” Social behavior and social 
knowledge in particular cannot be evaluated separately from the social context. If a certain 
behavior is evaluated as socially intelligent, it will depend on the culture we live in, on the 
values and norms and the social reference group within the specified culture. In Japan, for 
example it is socially intelligent to slurp one’s soup because it shows appreciation for its 
quality, whereas in Germany this would be regarded as impolite and rather inappropriate 
behavior. As another example, whether behavior is regarded as socially intelligent seems to 
depend on the people’s occupation. For example, a socially intelligent manager is one who 
deals effectively with people and who can handle complex relationships. Nurses, however, 
are regarded as socially intelligent if they support their patients and establish a positive and 
warm atmosphere (Probst, 1982). Correspondingly, social knowledge is also cultural- and 
situation-specific knowledge and depends on the behavior rules, the “dos and don’ts” of a 
certain culture and/or situation. Therefore, it is rather remarkable that only one of the 
mentioned definitions (Wong et al., 1995) explicitly takes the social context into view. 
However, regarding operationalizations not referring to the social context, validity problems 
should arise because the effectiveness and acceptance of social behavior cannot be 
evaluated apart from taking the social context into account. 
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Table 2-1: Definitions of Social Intelligence 
Author Definition Component 
Thorndike (1920) s.o. cognitive and 
behavioral 
Vernon 
(1933, p. 44) 
"ability to get along with people in general, social 
technique or ease in society, knowledge of social 
matters, susceptibility to stimuli from other 
members of a group, as well as insight into the 
temporary moods or underlying personality traits of 
strangers" 
cognitive and 
behavioral 
Moss & Hunt 
(1927, p. 108) 
"ability to get along with others" behavioral 
Wedeck 
(1947, p. 133) 
“ability to judge people, with respect to feelings, 
moods, and motivation of individuals” 
cognitive 
Cantor & Kihlstrom 
(1987, p. 71) 
Social intelligence “can be construed as 
declarative and procedural expertise for working 
on the tasks of social life in which social goals are 
especially salient.” 
knowledge 
O’Sullivan, Guilford, 
& deMille 
(1965, p. 6) 
“ability to judge people with respect to feelings, 
motives, thoughts, intentions, attitudes, etc.” 
cognitive 
Kang, Day, & Meara 
(2005, p. 99) 
“availability, accessibility, and richness of social 
and emotional knowledge (e.g., Kang & Shaver, 
2004) and the ability to entertain multiple 
pespectives and hypotheses about unusual 
social/emotional behavior or behavior in unfamiliar 
social/emotional situations”  
knowledge and 
cognitive 
Kaiser 
(1998, p. 231) 
“ability to deal with tasks that emerge throughout 
social life, considering both the own interests, aims 
and orientations as well as the interests of the 
community.” 
behavioral 
Ford (1982, p. 323) “attainment of social goals in specified social 
environments, using appropriate means and 
resulting in positive developmental outcomes” 
behavioral 
 
The reason for concentrating our work on social cognitive intelligence rather than on 
behavior or knowledge will be explained in the folllowing. Social cognitive intelligence is seen 
as a necessary but not sufficient precondition for socially intelligent behavior. Whether a 
certain behavior is regarded as socially intelligent depends on the social context and the 
current social situation. Social knowledge should also mainly result from the experience a 
person gains while behaving in social situations. Knowledge can also be acquired by learning 
theoretically how to behave (e.g., in school), or how to adapt to the specific culture of a 
company. However, the main learning occurs as a consequence of behavior. In order to 
explore the construct “social intelligence” systematically, it makes sense to start with the 
cognitive social intelligence as a potential for future social behavior and accumulated social 
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knowledge. In our view, the cognitive potential for socially intelligent behavior and the 
resulting knowledge has to be clear before starting research about the conditions required to 
turn that potential into social action and gain knowledge. This straight focus on social 
cognitive intelligence is particularly important as former studies often confused the underlying 
cognitive abilities with the actual behavior resulting from these abilities. As a next step, after 
having specified the research domain, an adequate model has to be found. 
 
2.2.2 Models and Classification Systems of Social Intelligence 
Guilford’s Structure of Intellect (SOI) Model 
Most factor analytic intelligence models do not include social intelligence (e.g. Kit of factor-
referenced cognitive tests, Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976; CHC Theory, see McGrew & 
Evans, 2004; Spearman, 1927; PMA, Thurstone, 1938, 1947; Humphreys, 1962; Vernon, 
1950). However, there are some exceptions. Within Guilford’s (1967, see also chapter 2.1.4) 
SOI Model, the domain of social intelligence is covered the most thoroughly. Interestingly, 
Guilford considered his model to be an expansion of Thorndike’s classification of intelligence. 
The symbolic and semantic content domains correspond to Guilford’s abstract intelligence, 
the figural domain to practical intelligence, and the behavioral content domain to social 
intelligence (see Figure 2-3). In contrast to Thorndike, however, who regarded SI as a unity 
Guilford regarded SI as a multidimensional construct and suggested many ways to be 
socially intelligent. Social intelligence is composed of 5 (operations) x 6 (products) = 30 
different subconstructs. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Social Intelligence in Guilford’s Structure of Intellect (SOI) Model 
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Measurement instruments were devised for six SI subconstructs (O'Sullivan et al., 1965; 
Hoepfner & O'Sullivan, 1969) and six divergent production abilities (Hendricks, Guilford, & 
Hoepfner, 1969) and cover 12 of the 30 cognitive abilities that were proposed by Guilford 
(1967). Six cognitive abilities that were assumed for social intelligence have been confirmed 
in a factor analysis with 229 high school students including 23 experimental tests of social 
intelligence and 24 tests of other well-established intellectual factors (O’Sullivan et al., 1965). 
However, besides the lack of confirmation of the complete model, Guilford’s analyses were 
criticized with respect to the factor analytic technique he applied (Prokrustes rotation, which 
specifies the solution that is strived for in advance and approaches it as far as possible) (see 
Kail & Pellegrino, 1988). In later revisions, Guilford also accepted higher order factors and 
approached the hierarchical models without accepting them completely. 
 
Gardners “Frames of Mind” 
Howard Gardner (1983, 1998) viewed intelligence as the capacity to solve problems or to 
fashion products that are valued in one or more cultural setting (Gardner & Hatch, 1989). His 
contemporary intelligence theory (see also chapter 2.1) should be an account of human 
cognition in its fullness. According to Gardner, human beings are organisms possessing a 
basic set of intelligences, everyone having a unique blend. Gardner initially formulated a list 
of seven intelligences that rarely operated independently and tended to complement each 
other during skill development and problem solving: linguistic intelligence, logical-
mathematical intelligence, bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, spatial intelligence, interpersonal 
intelligence, intrapersonal intelligence, and musical intelligence. Later on, he added 
naturalistic intelligence to his model and reflected on existential, spiritual, and moral 
intelligence. According to Gardner, interpersonal intelligence is concerned with the capacity 
to understand the intentions, motivations and desires of other people. It allows people to 
work effectively with others. Educators, salespeople, religious and political leaders and 
counselors all are assumed to need a well-developed interpersonal intelligence. Gardner’s 
methods to prove his model were psychological rather than traditional psychometric. For the 
identification of an intelligence, he used the following criteria: isolation by brain damage; 
anchoring in phylogeny, history and ontogeny; suitability for symbolic coding; discernable 
core-functions; confirmation through experiment and psychometry and exceptional cases 
with extremely high or low levels of ability. His approach stems from personal experience and 
literature research rather than empirical confirmation (see Gardner, 2002).  
 
Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory of Intelligence 
Another rather eclectic theory is Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory of Intelligence (Sternberg, 
1985). In his view, intelligence consists of analytical, creative and practical cognitive abilities. 
Social intelligence is included in the practical domain. According to Sternberg, the 
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measurement of all types of intelligences depends on the context in which it is assessed. 
Sternberg regards all intelligences to be independent from each other. 
 
Concluding Remarks to Social Intelligence (SI) Models 
Thorndike, Guilford and Gardner conceptualized social intelligence as independent from and 
at a comparable level to academic intelligence. Although social intelligence is represented in 
some of the broader (facet and contemporary) models of intelligence, a generally accepted 
independent model of social intelligence does not exist. Therefore, most of the studies were 
not based on any SI model, and consequently the expected subconstructs were examined 
without an explicit theoretical reference. It is also surprising that in most of the SI conceptions 
auditory material is not included. In the summary of Probst (1982, p. 204/205), auditory 
material is not even mentioned; only written, pictorial, and videobased material as well as 
behavioral methods are considered.  
 
Classification Systems of Social Intelligence (SI) Subconstructs 
Despite the problems concerning definitions and models of SI, there seems to be some 
consensus about the multidimensionality of SI (e.g. Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Ford & Tisak, 
1983; Jones & Day, 1997; Lee, Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Thorpe, 2000; Lee, Day, Meara, & 
Maxwell, 2002; Marlowe, 1986; Mayer & Salovey, 1993; O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1975; 
Schneider et al., 2002; Wong et al., 1995). Thus, there are several ways to be socially 
intelligent, leading to some dimensions that have been repeatedly mentioned. In an 
extensive literature review, Orlik (1978) identified five major components of SI: perception of 
others’ internal states and moods, ability to deal with people, knowledge about social norms 
and rules, insight and sensitivity in complex social situations, and use of social techniques to 
manipulate others (Orlik, 1978). Kosmitzki and John (1993) added perspective taking, social 
adaptation and social memory to that list (Walker & Foley, 1973; Moss et al., 1955; Berg, 
1986). Kosmitzki and John (1993) suggest a classification into the SI domains capacity, 
motivation and social-cognitive. Schneider et al. (2002) differentiated between social 
knowledge, social memory, social insight (or understanding) and social appropriateness as 
parts of the purportedly multidimensional SI construct. With the exception of social 
appropriateness and social knowledge, the mentioned dimensions are cognitive. The specific 
role of social knowledge was already described. Social appropriateness contains an 
evaluation of aims on which behavior is based. In some studies (e.g. Wong et al., 1995) 
social flexibility and social perception were suggested as additional social intelligence 
dimensions.  
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Preliminary Model of Social Intelligence (SI) 
With regard to theoretical and operational definitions in the literature, four cognitive SI 
dimensions can be assumed: social perception, social memory, social understanding, and 
social creativity (or flexibility). These dimensions are integrated into a preliminary SI model, 
described in Süß et al. (2005, Weis & Süß, 2005). In addition, a social knowledge domain is 
assumed. Since social knowledge is acquired throughout learning, it differs from other 
operations that rather focus on the potential of a person to perceive, to remember and to 
understand. The potential as well as the acquired and imparted social knowledge have an 
impact on actual social behavior. Just as academic intelligence is only a precondition to 
demonstrate (academically) intelligent behavior, social cognitive intelligence is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to show socially intelligent behavior. Besides motivation and 
personality characteristics, situational demands, values and norms as well as moods, 
interest, aims and experience influence whether and how the potential is transferred into 
action. Figure 2-4 illustrates the dimensions described in the following. 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Preliminary Model of Social Intelligence 
 
We define social perception as the ability to quickly perceive social information. Analogous to 
perceptual speed in academic intelligence, we handle this ability as social perceptual speed 
(see Carroll, 1987). This dimension was also proposed by Wong et al. (1995).  
 
Social memory is seen as the ability to intentionally remember and either recognize or recall 
social episodic and semantic information of a given social situation that differs in complexity 
(Weis, Seidel, & Süß, 2006). Moss et al. (1955) define and operationalize social memory as 
the ability to remember people’s names and faces. Kosmitzki and John (1993) found that the 
ability “social memory” as it is defined in Moss et al. (1955) is of little relevance to people’s 
conceptions of social intelligence. 
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Social flexibility or creativity is the ability for a flexible production of ideas that can be used for 
interpretation, solution or management of social situations (e.g. entertaining different 
hypotheses of what is going on at a party, considering different options for how to behave in 
novel social situations, for example when meeting the parents of the boyfriend for the first 
time). Jones and Day (1997) defined social flexibility as the flexible application of social 
knowledge in order to solve novel problems. They separated it from declarative and 
procedural social knowledge. 
 
Social understanding can be regarded as the central dimension and is defined as the ability 
to identify social information in a given situation and to understand and judge it correctly. 
Social information varies according to its complexity, its implications for the given situation 
and the underlying characteristics (Weis et al., 2006). This dimension was also suggested 
and found by Wong et al. (1995) as well as Lee et al. (2000). In our view, it is important to 
regard existing definitions of the core dimension social understanding carefully because they 
differ in meaning and broadness. Figure 2-5 classifies the most important definitions of the 
social understanding dimension. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Definitions of Social Understanding 
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The first category deals with recognition of, decoding of and sensitivity to social information 
(e.g. recognition of a certain emotion in a voice during a conversation). In our view, this 
category is difficult to separate from social perception (for a definition see above). In the 
second category, complexity increases because more than one element has to be taken into 
account. For example, a certain person is presented in a social context. Moods, motives, 
thoughts, intentions, attitudes and personality traits are possible contents of tasks that have 
to be identified, interpreted or judged. The third category can be differentiated from the 
second insofar as it deals with really complex social abilities, which require not only 
perception but also understanding and flexibility (e.g. social problem solving, role-taking 
ability). Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, and Jarvis (1968) describe five conditions that have to be 
met to be able to showing role-taking behavior: (1) recognition of the existence of 
perspective; (2) recognition of the need for an analysis of the perspective of the other and 
recognition that such an analysis is useful in obtaining one’s goal; (3) the ability to carry out 
this analysis or predict with accuracy the relevant role attributes of the other; (4) the 
maintenance of cognitions yielded by the analysis in the face of conflicting cognition 
representing one’s own point of view; (5) the application of these cognitions to the end at 
hand. It is obvious that even the preconditions are quite complex and include parts of the 
other SI subconstructs already mentioned. Role-taking ability is therefore assumed to be a 
compound ability requiring social understanding but at the same time clearly exceeding it. 
Regarding meaning and content, it is difficult to separate the third category from social 
flexibility. 
 
With respect to the social understanding subconstruct, we decided to focus on the middle 
category and to exclude recognition and identification abilities (first category), since they 
overlap with social perception. Social understanding compared to pure perception and 
discrimination is seen as more complex. Although intuitive understanding and heuristic 
information processing are not intended to be critical for the task solution, they may be partly 
used in order to come to a judgment about a person or situation. Therefore, the clear 
separation between the operational SI domains cannot be enhanced but only limited by the 
use of appropriate test material and instructions (see Probst, 1982). We also exclude 
role/perspective-taking ability and social problem solving (third category) as these domains 
are only vaguely defined and can also be treated as compound abilities (see Hough & Ones, 
2001; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Dilchert, 2005). In order to measure social understanding 
properly, enough context information has to be provided to make the judgment of a persons’ 
feelings, thoughts and relationships possible. Consequently, for test construction it is 
important to bear in mind that the presentation of the relevant persons has to be long enough 
to allow identification and interpretation of the relevant stimuli. It also implies providing 
background information, allowing assessment in different situations with different people. 
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Social understanding has also been mentioned in a different research perspective, the 
Theory of Mind (ToM). According to this theory, a relationship between external states 
(expressions, gestures, signals, etc.) and internal states of mind is established. The capacity 
to predict behavior, namely to recognize emotions, intentions, and thoughts of other 
individuals in various settings, arises as a consequence of this relationship. Well-known 
mind-reading accuracy tasks are, e.g., (1) personality traits ratings, the ability to make 
judgments about (2) the mental state (both affective and nonaffective), (3) behavior, and (4) 
roles, identities or status (Davis & Kraus, 1997). In addition, (5) metaperception (i.e., the 
ability to know what others think about oneself) is included in this concept. For further 
information see chapter 2.4.1. 
 
Social knowledge takes on a special role. It can only be measured in a manner dependent 
upon cultural conditions and influences (Weber & Westmeyer, 2001). For the implementation 
of social knowledge at the same level as the other SI dimensions, an exhaustive 
classification of social situations and culture-dependent norms and values has to be basis for 
the construct. That contradicts the cognitive nature of the remaining SI dimensions. 
Nevertheless, social knowledge is assumed to influence the other cognitive SI dimensions 
and vice versa. On the one hand, someone who is able to perceive socially relevant stimuli 
quickly, who can remember them and judge the feelings, thoughts and relationships of 
different people is able to gain social knowledge more quickly and accurately than a person 
whose socially cognitive abilities are developed to a lesser extent. On the other hand, a 
person with a wider social knowledge (e.g. how to deal with administrative services, how to 
deal with a school class, how to deal with superiors, how to behave at a gala dinner) will 
interpret the behavior of others differently than a person without that knowledge. According to 
Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987; see also Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000), social knowledge consists 
of declarative and procedural parts. Declarative knowledge again consists of semantic and 
episodic memory, which emphasizes the relationship between social memory and 
knowledge. Bye and Jussim (1993) differentiate between three types of social knowledge: (1) 
fact knowledge about human interactions (appropriateness in social life), (2) procedural 
knowledge (how to [re-]act in social life, knowledge about role-behavior and prototypical 
behavior), and (3) self-knowledge (knowledge about one’s own history, one’s abilities and 
limitations). Despite this great variety of different types of social knowledge, until now 
operational definitions only operationalized social knowledge as knowledge of etiquette and 
tacit knowledge. Etiquette knowledge could be subclassified neither beyond declarative nor 
beyond procedural knowledge. Tacit knowledge could be clearly separated from memory 
(Lee, Day, Meara, & Maxwell, 2002; see also chapter 2.3.2 and 2.4.3. A social knowledge 
factor could be identified in the MTMM studies of Wong et al. (1995, measuring social 
knowledge through a test of etiquette), Jones and Day (1997) and Lee et al. (2000, 2002). 
For further information, see chapter 2.2.4. 
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2.2.3 Measurement of Social Intelligence 
"Convenient tests of social intelligence are hard to devise.... Social intelligence shows itself 
abundantly in the nursery, on the playground, in barracks and factories and salesroom (sic), 
but it eludes the formal standardized conditions of the testing laboratory. It requires human 
beings to respond to, time to adapt its responses, and face, voice, gesture, and mien as 
tools" (Thorndike, 1920, p. 231). Thorndike foresaw the problems the measurement of social 
intelligence would be confronted with. Nevertheless, there were several attempts to measure 
social intelligence in different ways, with performance measures, behavior-oriented 
measures, knowledge tests and self- and peer reports. Instruments should be designed 
depending on the particular definition of the SI (sub-) constructs and the purpose of 
measurement (see section 2.2.1). Performance measures are recommended in order to 
measure the potential of a person to react in a socially intelligent manner. To obtain an index 
of the actual social behavior of a person, behavior-oriented instruments should be taken into 
account. In self- and other-report measures the person him- or herself or a peer judges the 
person’s social intelligence. Social knowledge should be evaluated with a knowledge test. In 
the following, different types of instruments are classified within five tables: broad 
performance test-batteries (Table 2-2), performance instruments for trait measurement 
(Table 2-3), behavior-based instruments (Table 2-4), self-/other report (Table 2-5), and 
knowledge tests (Table 2-6). Within each table the author and test, underlying definition 
and/or model (if existent) and its postulated dimensions as well as some important results 
concerning convergent and divergent validity are presented. With respect to performance 
tests, researchers used different materials that can be classified into four categories: written 
and spoken language, pictures, and videos. The type of material is also presented in one 
column of the table presenting performance measures (see Dimensions/Material). The 
instruments are related to the dimensions that were defined in Süß et al. (2005; see also 
Weis & Süß, 2005). As already mentioned, the terms social intelligence and competence 
often were not applied systematically. Therefore, in the table, instruments that are sought to 
measure social competence are included, if they are similar to “SI measures.” The tables do 
not claim to be complete. The source of the validity results is the corresponding test manual 
if no other reference is mentioned. Social/emotional auditory measures that were developed 
in the tradition of emotion research can be found in chapter 2.6.5.  
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Table 2-2: Social Intelligence Performance-based Test Batteries   
 
Test name 
Definition/ 
Model 
Dimensions/ 
Material 
Scales 
(mentioned in the test) 
Studies/Results 
Six and Four 
Factor Test of 
Social 
Intelligence  
(O’Sullivan & 
Guilford, 1966, 
1976) 
“ability to 
understand the 
inner feelings or 
affect states of 
other persons” 
(Hoepfner & 
O’Sullivan, 1968, 
p. 340) 
SOI Model, content: 
behavioral 
 
- cognition: ability to 
judge people  (p. 4) 
-convergent  
production: "doing 
the right thing at the 
right time" (p. 5) 
- divergent 
production: coping 
with the behavior of 
other people 
-memory: ability to 
remember the social 
characteristics of 
people 
 - evaluation: ability 
to judge the 
appropriateness of 
behavior. 
Dimensions: 
understanding, 
flexibility 
 
Material: 
pictorial, verbal, 
auditory 
Tests were realized for  6 
cognitive and 6 divergent 
production abilities (of 30 
predicted factors). 
 
Examples of tasks: 
- classes: expression 
  grouping  
- systems: missing pictures; 
  missing cartoons 
- transformations: picture       
  exchange; social          
  translation 
- implications:cartoon prediction 
Reliability: 
  -  internal consistency of all subtests: (.32 - .85)  
  -  internal consistency of auditory tests: inflection   
     (Alpha=.26, items k=27); sound meaning (Alpha=.36,  
     items k=27); reflections: (Alpha=.43, items k=18) 
 
Convergent validity:  
- separable factors: cognitive and divergent production, no 
  common SI factor 
- factor structure regarding “behavioral cognition” and  
  “divergent production“ could be replicated with 306 and 252 
  high school students, respectively (PCA) 
 
Divergent validity: 
- independence from academic intelligence (Probst, 1982) 
- substantial correlations with AcI, particularly verbal 
  (Riggio, Messamer, & Thockmorton, 1991; Shanley, Walker, 
   & Foley, 1971) 
- no correlations with SI self-report measure (Social Skills 
  Inventory, SSI, Riggio, 1989) 
George 
Washington 
Social 
Intelligence Test 
(GWSIT; Moss, 
Hunt, Omwake, 
& Woodward, 
1955) 
Ability to get along 
with others (p. 108) 
(behavioral) 
Dimensions: 
social flexibility (1); 
social memory (2); 
social knowledge 
(3); social 
understanding (4; 
5; 6) 
 
Material: 
pictorial, verbal 
Tests: 
 
(1) Judgment in social   
     situations 
(2) Memory for names and 
     faces 
(3) Observation of human  
      behavior 
(4 + 5) Recognition of the  
      mental states behind  
      words / facial expression 
(6) Social information 
(7) Sense of humor 
 
Later on, tests 5 and 6 were 
excluded and test 7 was added.  
  Reliability: 
  - satisfying reliability around .80 
 
  Convergent validity: 
- no convergent validity proof, no relationships to other SI  
  measures (Walker & Foley, 1973) 
 
 Divergent validity: 
  - aggregate GWSIT score correlated r = .54 with aggregate 
    score on GWMAT an early IQ scale (Hunt, 1928; see also    
    Broom, 1928, r=.60)  
  - no separate AcI and SI factors (Thorndike,1936)   
  - test variance is mainly explained through verbal AcI    
    measures (Orlik, 1978, p. 346) ? AcI-SI correlations up to .70 
- correlations with introversion around .53 (Guilford, 1934) 
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Conclusions from Performance-based Test Batteries 
Table 2-2 presents two broad performance-based SI test batteries that are rather old but 
nevertheless exemplary. I am going to direct attention to some particularities of these 
approaches. Concerning the Six and Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence (O’Sullivan & 
Guilford, 1966, 1976), the authors assumed that "expressive behavior, more particularly 
facial expressions, vocal inflections, postures, and gestures, are the cues from which 
intentional states are inferred" (p. 6). The investigators recognized the value of assessing the 
decoding ability in real-life contexts with real people. Economic constraints forced them to 
rely on photographs, cartoons, drawings, and tape recordings that were not available in high 
quality. Nevertheless, Guilford and his colleagues were successful in devising measures of 
two rather different SI domains: understanding the behavior of other people (cognition of 
behavioral content), and coping with the behavior of other people (divergent production of 
behavioral content). The success of the tests is attributed to the rather low portion of words 
(Hoepfner & O’Sullivan, 1968). Therefore, people with low verbal IQ have a chance to show 
their social intellectual abilities. However, the studies of O'Sullivan et al. (1965) and 
Hendricks (1969, cited by Probst, 1982) went only part of the way towards establishing the 
construct validity of social intelligence. Additional research within the other suggested SI 
domains as well as evidence for the tests to predict external criteria of SI are needed.  
 
Although the authors of the George Washington Social Intelligence Test (GWSIT; Moss et 
al., 1955) clearly address the behavioral aspect of SI in their definition (ability to get along 
with people, ability to deal with people, Hunt, 1928; Moss & Hunt, 1927), their subtests focus 
on the cognitive aspect. In the subtests of the GWSIT, subjects have to choose among four 
alternatives to judge social situations, remember several faces and the accompanying names 
and choosing them from among a range of photographs and names after some time, and 
judge statements about human behavior as right or wrong. The test clearly follows the 
tradition of AcI testing in focusing on verbal material. According to Anastasi (1954) “it is 
doubtful, for instance, whether, the George Washington Test measures abilities not covered 
by tests of abstract verbal intelligence with which it correlates highly.” (p. 503)   
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Table 2-3: Social Intelligence Performance Measures 
 
Test name 
Definition/ 
Model 
Dimensions/
Material 
Scales 
(mentioned in the test) 
Results/Studies 
Couples Test & 
Supervisors Task 
(Barnes & Sternberg, 
1989; Sternberg & 
Smith, 1985) 
Measures 
nonverbal 
decoding ability 
(SI=accurate 
decoding of social 
information) 
Dimensions: 
understanding 
 
Material: 
pictorial 
Pictures of heterosexual 
couples have to be judged (is 
it a false or a true couple?) 
Reliability: a) confidence rating; b) proportion correct 
(1) Couples: a) .49/.34, b) .81/.87 (40 Items, N=24/24 Items, N=40) 
(2) Supervisors: a) .92 /.47, b) .92/.84 (40 Items, N=24/24 Items, 
N=40) 
- median scale intercorrelations: .33 
Convergent validity: 
- significantly related to social competence self-report inventories 
Discriminant validity: 
- discrimination from AcI not significant 
Chapin Social Insight 
test (Chapin, 1967; 
Gough, 1968) 
Recognition of 
psych. dynamics 
underlying a 
particular behavior, 
the stimulus, 
compromise or 
innovation 
necessary to 
resolve the 
situation or to carry 
it through to a 
constructive 
conclusion (across 
situations) 
Dimensions: 
understanding 
 
Material: 
verbal 
 
- 25 Items which describe a 
  social situation 
- subjects have to select an 
  appropriate explanation/  
  solution for a problem out  
  of 4 alternatives 
Reliability: 
- low reliability (Alpha: .64 - .78, N=100) and validity coefficients 
Convergent validity: 
- no convergent validity (Keating, 1978) 
- no consistent factor structure (was criticized to measure reading 
comprehension rather than SI) 
Divergent validity: 
- correlations with AcI: .20 -.40 (especially verbal); Md= .36 
  (Gough, 1965) 
- low reliability (.42; Weis & Süß, 2005) 
- zero Md correlation with California Psychological Inventory  
 (Gough, 1965); MMPI: Md=.19 
Incremental validity: 
- no incremental prediction of social behavior and perception 
  (measured with peer-reports) in addition to AcI 
Interpersonal 
Perception Task (IPT-
15, Costanzo & 
Archer, 1993) 
Measures 
perception of 
verbal and 
nonverbal behavior 
and its 
interpretation  
Dimensions: 
understanding 
 
Material: 
video 
- 15 real situations are shown 
- one out of two options has to 
  be chosen as the right   
  interpretation of the situation 
- target  scoring 
Reliability: 
Retest (5 Wochen): .73 (N = 52) 
Internal consistency (KR-20): .38 (N = 530) 
Construct validity: 
- correlation with peer-rating  (N=18 College students) concerning  
interpersonal sensitivity r = .65 
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Table 2-3: Social Intelligence Performance Tests continued
Test name 
 
Definition/ 
Model 
Dimensions/ 
Material 
Scales 
(mentioned in the test) 
Results/Studies 
Test of Implied 
Meaning 
(Sundberg, 
1966) 
Implicit meanings Dimensions: 
understanding 
 
Material: auditory  
Recognition of implicit messages 
(40 statements displayed 
auditory). Statements are spoken 
half by a male, half by a female. 
Excerpts similar to those 
frequently made by patients in 
clinical interviews were read to 
express a particular meaning. 
Subjects have to choose the 
correct meaning from a list of four 
alternatives. Example: I don’t 
have a headache! Subjects have 
to decide if it means a) simple 
fact, b) “And I mean it!”, c) “But I 
know someone who does.”d) I 
want your sympathy!” Each 
statement is presented twice in 
succession, between items there 
is an interval of 12 seconds. 
Reliability: 
- Retest reliability: .89 (N=85, several weeks, see manual) and  
- .83 -.87 Hood (1962, cited by Sundberg, 1966) 
Convergent validity: 
-  no relation to ratings of interpersonal sensitivity (40 male trainees) 
- .61 with communicating rating scale among counsellors (N=12) 
-  significant correlation (.67; N=20) with “Socialization” (California    
   Psychological Inventory) and intellectual efficiency (.72) 
Discriminant validity: 
- significant relation to the Ohio Psychological Test (no values  
  presented) 
- .40 with verbal aptitude test 
- .26 with Modern Language Aptitude Test (MLAT, N=40) 
Criterion validity: 
Experienced therapists were significantly better than undergraduates. 
Group differences:  
- significant sex differences in favor of women 
Videosimulation 
(Schuler, 
Diemand, & 
Moser, 1993) 
 
Social 
competency, 
especially 
customers orien-
tation and ability to 
work in a team 
Dimensions: 
behavioral and 
cognitive 
 
Material: 
video, verbal 
Seven different tests that arise 
from the possible combinations 
of stimuli (video or verbal 
situation description) and 
reaction (written, oral, role-play) 
Convergent validity: 
- correlation between the two dimensions: r=.32 
- two factors: social behavior competence and social judgment  
  competence 
Discriminant validity 
- correlations with verbal AcI (possible reason: open answers) 
Videobased 
Identification of 
Social 
Intelligence- 
Online 
(VISION, 
Runde & Etzel, 
2003) 
 
Social competence 
(private and work 
life); advanced into 
ISIS-Interactive 
System for 
Identification of 
Social 
competences 
 
Dimensions: 
understanding 
 
Material: 
video/audio 
Five facets of interpersonal and 
management competences:  
social perception, conflict and 
criticism ability, management of 
relationships, team competence, 
management competence 
Conflict situations are based on  
the following situation taxonomy 
contents (job, family, friends, 
public life); structure (dyad, 
group); quality (competitive,  
cooperative) 
 
Psychometry: 
Cronbach’s Alpha (scales): .69 -.78 (students, N=198); ISIS: .58 - .75 
Convergent validity: 
-correlation with Interpersonal Competence Questionnaire (ICQ, 
Riemann & Allgöwer, 1993): r=.30 (relationship), r=.20 (management) 
(Bastians & Runde, 2002) 
- correlation with assessment center global score: r=.35 
Discriminant validity: 
- IST-70: no significant correlations 
- personality (NEO-FFI): openness: r=.44, no other correlations 
Criterion validity: 
 success in assessment center: .65 and .54 
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Conclusions With Regard to Performance Measures 
The results of the presented studies do not lead to a clear statement about the validity of SI 
measured with performance tests. Verbal and also some pictorial performance measures 
were not clearly separable from AcI (e.g. Couples Test, Barnes & Sternberg, 1989; Sternberg 
& Smith, 1985; GWSIT, Moss et al., 1955, Thorndike, 1936; Orlik, 1978; Riggio et al., 1991, 
Shanley et al., 1971; Chapin Social Insight Test, Chapin, 1967; Gough, 1968; Weis & Süß, 
2005). The use of nonverbal SI indicators suggests that a social cognitive ability domain 
separable from AcI exists (Six and Four Factor Test, O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1967; Hoepfner & 
O’Sullivan, 1968; Probst, 1982). However, these results were not confirmed in every study, 
which may be due to the similarity of cognitive requirements in tasks of both social and 
academic intelligence. In particular, social verbal tasks seem to fulfil characteristics of 
abstract reasoning tasks, since they deal with novel and complex stimuli that do not 
correspond to our expectations and consequently result in separation problems. However, 
the correlations between verbal AcI measures and SI instruments are not necessarily the 
result of bad scale construction. There is indeed an overlap between language ability and the 
ability to deal with social situations. Both abilities are acquired in social situations and are not 
only mediated through nonverbal but mainly through verbal communication (see also Kaiser, 
1998). Thorndike (1920) already mentioned that a genuine situation with real people is 
essential. In order to keep a situation as realistic as possible, direct observation of people in 
social situations would be best. However, this method is susceptible to mistakes, not 
standardized or replicable, and costly. Alternatively, social situations can be approached as 
closely as possible by including dynamic auditory and video-based material instead of using 
static pictures and written language. 
 
Issues of Scoring 
In a performance test, scoring should be as objective as possible. This seems to be easier 
with regard to social perception and social memory tasks than for social understanding tasks 
(SU, i.e., interpreting and judging another person’s feelings, thoughts and relationships). The 
latter dimension does not have a veridically determined correct answer (see also Roberts, 
Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001) since the items of SU tasks measuring, for example, social 
understanding approach the complexity of real-life situations. Rules cannot be applied as 
easily as in more simple, static and structured problems. Therefore, alternative scoring 
procedures have to be taken into account, namely (1) target scoring, (2) consensus scoring, 
and (3) expert scoring. These procedures are described in the following. 
 
In target scoring, the target (creator) of the item stimuli determines the correct answer (e.g., a 
person’s voice was recorded, and the person him- or herself decides about the emotion that 
2  Theoretical Background 
 39 
is expressed). The problem with target scoring is the reliability of the target person’s answer 
and the well-known social cognition effects, for example the actor-observer bias. 
 
Consensus scoring reflects the opinion of the majority, in most cases the opinion of the group 
of test takers (laypersons). Usually, proportion scoring is applied. That means if the group 
chooses alternative A in 30% and alternative B in 50% of cases, all test takers who chose 
alternative A will get a value of .30 and all who selected option B will receive .50. According 
to MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts (2003), proportion scoring results in artificially 
inflating internal consistency estimates. In addition, distributions of total test scores cannot be 
both normally distributed and internally consistent. In a reliable test, subsets from the same 
group reflecting the group’s opinion (who form a majority) choose the most popular option on 
most items. That results in skewed distributions on the item level being accentuated at the 
total score level. The resulting distribution of test scores will be highly negatively skewed and 
most scores will form a highly peaked cluster at the top end of the distribution (MacCann, 
Roberts, Matthews, & Zeidner, 2004b). Another problem is that people with an exceptionally 
high ability in a certain task different from the majority answer would get a lower score than 
they deserve.  
 
Expert scoring occurs when experts determine the correct answer. However, criteria for 
being an expert are usually not defined. Zeidner, Matthews, and Roberts (2001; see also 
Roberts et al.; 2001) propose that there may be multiple domains of expertise besides 
academic knowledge (e.g., understanding and managing people’s relationships and goals, 
where experts might be coaches). Empirical results revealed that test takers with similar 
characteristics to the experts showed better results compared to others. Roberts et al. (2001) 
could show that white males scored more highly using expert scoring when the experts were 
white males in an emotional intelligence test (MEIS, see chapter 2.3.1). In the view of 
Legree, Psotka, Tremble, and Bourne (2005), in some instances, an expert is no more than a 
reliable indicator of the group; thus one could use the groups (consensus) mean and save 
time and money in test development and validation. The authors report a correlation of .72 
between expert and consensus scoring. However, even if this procedure works in some 
cases, it may not apply to every expert and may not apply when the target has extra 
information that is not available to the outside observer (own feelings, thoughts, knowledge). 
In this case, in the opinion of Mayer and Geher (1996), the target can be considered to be a 
special case of the expert whose knowledge extends beyond what the group knows and is 
not reducible to the group consensus.  
 
It appears that target scoring has the fewest negative implications. One could argue that 
other scoring methods should be applied to support the findings obtained with target scoring. 
However, results on the agreement between the two scoring procedures can be summarized 
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ranging between 0% and 60% (see Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Levenson & Ruef, 
192; Ickes et al., 1990; Mayer & Geher, 1996) and thus in most cases do not exceed chance 
level. Possible reasons for the unexpected low relations may be the lack of modern 
technique (older studies), unreliability of the target person’s information (e.g., because of 
social desirability or a lack of self-awareness), and because of highly complex and/or specific 
stimuli/situations. The lack of a positive relationship between the group consensus and the 
target’s reports in the Mayer and Geher (1996) study may also be attributed to the restriction 
to written material. I assume that using written material instead of dynamic video-based 
and/or auditory material does not provide as much information about the person and the 
corresponding situation. (Internal) processes of the target person thus are not transferred 
into cues that are visible to or able to be heard by the group. That makes an agreement 
between group and target harder. 
 
There are only a few instruments that make use of target scoring, since the effort is much 
higher compared to consensus scoring. The IPT-15 is an example of a test that makes use of 
target scoring. Each scene has one (of two or three) correct answer, for example one of two 
interacting players indeed won the basketball game the two persons are talking about in the 
presented video scene (see Archer, Costanzo, & Akert, 2001). Other measures that apply 
target scoring are the Test of Implied Meaning (TIM, Sundberg, 1966) and the Emotional 
Accuracy Research Scale (EARS, not listed in the table). The EARS requires the 
participant’s accurate identification of others’ emotions. Participants were asked to describe 
three situations that most strongly reflected their mood. They had to provide information 
about the situation (e.g., what led to the situation, what happened) and had to complete a 78-
item mood scale. Researchers using target scoring must ensure that the target person’s 
information is valid and reliable and influenced only minimally by variables such as social 
desirability, self-monitoring ability, and self-awareness. 
 
Social Auditory Intelligence Measures 
Auditory tests of social intelligence are not only rare but, with regard to SI research tradition, 
also limited to social understanding (see TIM, Sundberg, 1966; subtests of the 4/6 Factor 
Test). The other existing measures present video and auditory material together and mainly 
stem from practical application based needs in the field of I/O psychology. There seems to 
be a lack of measures testing social auditory abilities more broadly (e.g. perception, 
understanding, memory, flexibility). In chapter 2.6, additional measures that are derived from 
emotion research tradition will be presented. At this point, I concentrate on some interesting 
details about the subtests of the 4/6 Factor Test and the TIM.  
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In O’Sullivan’s and Guilford’s tests (1965), auditory abilities are measured with three subtests 
(For further details beyond the information provided here, see O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1965.). 
In the subtest “inflections” (behavioral units), one of four drawn facial expressions has to be 
chosen that expresses the same feeling as a tape-recorded vocal inflection. For test 
construction, six neutral phrases were selected (yes, mother, I did it, well, really, that’s good). 
Three actors produced a variety of inflections for each of the six phrases. Five inflections of 
each phrase were selected (5 x 6 = 30 items). Half of the inflections and pictures are male, 
half female. Concerning the subtest “sound meaning” (behavioral classes), three classes of 
emotive sounds were formed, produced by a man and a woman (non–actors). For each 
emotive sound the appropriate class has to be chosen. For example, three sounds: heavy 
breathing, startled laugh, whimper, were produced; the appropriate class to select would be 
“fear”. Within the subtest “reflections” (behavioral implications), subjects have to choose one 
out of four alternative interpretations that correctly reflects the feeling of a tape-recorded 
statement. The material (statements) for the test stems from published reports of therapy 
cases. An example: Which alternative statement expresses the attitude or feeling underlying 
the given statement? - “I’m just wondering how I’ll act – I mean how things will turn out.” 
Alternatives: a) She’s looking forward to it., b) She’s worried about it., c) She’s interested in 
how things will work out. With respect to psychometrics, the auditory tests “inflections” and 
“sound meaning” have the lowest reliabilities within the battery (see also Table 2-2). 
O’Sullivan and Guilford expected reasons in little agreement among subjects with a single 
auditory stimulus (e.g. Kramer, 1963), but there was good agreement. Test intercorrelations 
were between .14 and .25 (“reflections” with “inflections”: r=.18; “reflections” with “sound 
meaning”: r=.25; “sound meaning” with “inflections”: r=.14). Despite reliability problems, all 
three tests loaded most highly on the expected factor (units, classes, implications): .22-.38. 
“reflections” also showed a high loading (.35) on “semantic relations”. Common variance is 
assumed to be due to the verbal part of the factor and subtest. According to O’Sullivan and 
Guilford (1965, p. 24), “inflections” assesses mainly the ability to understand facial 
expressions. The difficulty of the test lies in the drawings (match appropriate drawings to 
sound sequences). The test sound meaning did not show any significant loading on any 
factor. Partially, this result can be explained with the low reliability of the subtest. In addition, 
verbal variance was not sufficiently controlled. Also, note that O’Sullivan and Guilford (1965) 
did not use any auditory reference test in the validation of their test battery. They only 
included standard academic intelligence measures like verbal comprehension vocabulary, 
verbal and word classification, verbal analogies, Differential Aptitude Test (DAT), mutilated 
words, hidden figures, picture arrangement, etc.). 
 
The TIM suffers from technical limitations, as a tape is used. During test taking, the test 
takers had to be very quiet, and there should have been differences in understanding 
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dependent on where subjects sat (close to the tape recorder or far away). The TIM has the 
advantage of target scoring. The content of the 40 statements was taken from patient’s 
interviews. Stricker and Rock (1990) made some minor changes in the questionnaire of the 
TIM but everything else remained untouched (email correspondence with Larry Stricker, 
January 9th, 2007). 
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Table 2-4: Behavior-oriented Social Intelligence Measures
Test name Definition/ 
Model 
Scales 
(mentioned in test) 
Approach Results/Studies 
Interview 
(Ford & Tisak, 
1983) 
Keating’s 
(1978) model 
SI= behavioral  
effectiveness of 
social per-
formance 
Criteria: 
(1) react appropriately to questions 
of  the interviewer 
(2) show appropriate nonverbal 
behavior  
      (3) … 
Interview Reliability: Interrater Reliability: 65% agreement 
Cronbach’s Alpha: Hogan’s Empathy Scale (.46 & .47), social goal 
attainment (.48 & .43), self-report (.76), other report (>=.90) 
Convergent validity: 
Intercorrelation SI measures: .33 - .36 
Discriminant validity: 
- cross-domain correlation: .21 - .26 
- no relation neither to self- and peer report social ability   
  inventories nor to academic intelligence measures                         
? indicators of SI and AcI loaded on different factors 
Criterion validity: SI tests were of higher validity in predicting a 
behavioral criterion than AcI tests (N=620, 9th and 12th grades) 
Frederiksen, 
Carlson & 
Ward, 1984 
--- Task: 
- take on the role of a doctor who 
  interviewed his patient 
- ratings on warmth, control and 
  organization 
Interview / 
Role - play 
Discriminant validity: 
- no positive significant correlations between interview scores (SI) 
and reasoning ( -.08 - .14), verbal abilities  (-.24 -.01), science 
achievement (-.41 -.03), cognitive flexibility (-.12 -.16), ideational 
fluency (-.01 -.15), and medical knowledge (-.09 -.16); 91 students 
Behavioral Role 
play Test (Mc 
Fall & Marston, 
1970) 
--- Social situations are briefly described. 
Afterwards the role-play starts wherein 
the subject answers like he or she 
would in real-life. Everything is 
recorded by tape and then evaluated. 
Subjects are interviewed about the 
feelings accompanying their behavior. 
Interview / 
Role - play 
Reliability:  
-interrater-reliability: .73 - .93 
 
Validity coefficients not available 
 
Interpersonal 
Competence 
Inventory (ICI, 
Stricker & 
Rock, 1990) 
Interpersonal 
Competence= 
effectiveness in 
dealing with 
other people 
- videoscenes display an interview 
  between superior and employee  
- reply section: Subjects have to answer
  within the scenes instead of the boss;   
- criteria: originality and effectiveness 
- test also included a judgment section: 
  Description of the situation as  
  indicator of academic intelligence. 
Interview / 
Role - play  
Reliability: 
- internal consistency of  ICI-scores: .81 (effectiveness of answers); 
.92 (originality of answers); .74 (accuracy of judgment) 
Convergent validity: 
- no convergent validity with nonverbal social skills (e.g. CARAT, 
TIM) and SI self-report instruments  
Discriminant validity: 
- significant correlations with verbal AcI, no separability 
- correlations with vocabulary test: .41 - .50 (Stricker & Rock, 1990) 
Role-taking test 
(Feffer, 1959; 
Feffer & 
Suchotliff,1966)
ability to 
change 
perspective 
- measure of balanced decentering 
- subject has to invent stories about  
  certain pictures and tell the stories  
  from the view of every person that is  
  shown in the pictures. 
Role - play - role-taking ability increases with age 
- no relations to verbal fluency and verbal intelligence 
2  Theoretical Background 
 
44 
Conclusions With Regard to Behavior-oriented Measures 
Within studies that included behavior-oriented measures, SI could often be separated from 
AcI (e.g. Feffer, 1959; Ford & Tisak, 1983; Frederiksen et al., 1984). On the one hand, more 
realistic measures that implement the actual social behavior seem to be more useful tools for 
the measurement of SI. On the other hand, the differences in the method applied (paper-
pencil tests for the measurement of AcI vs. role-plays and interview settings for SI 
measurement) could be responsible for separate factors. Verbal skills of a person may also 
have an influence on rating the answers. However, the results were not uniform (e.g. Stricker 
& Rock, 1990). It can be concluded that behavior-based measures of SI tend towards being 
separable from AcI. Interestingly, researchers relying on behavioral measures of SI and 
considering SI as behavioral -rather than cognitive- attribute the problems of separating SI 
from AcI to the cognitive operationalization of SI (see Ford, 1982, 1994; Keating, 1978; 
O’Sullivan et al., 1965; Walker & Foley, 1973). 
 
Since the acquisition of social cognitive skills (e.g. role-taking behavior, person perception 
and moral reasoning) does not ensure socially intelligent behavior (Ford & Tisak, 1983), 
ideally, social behavior should be measured in real-world settings that require behavioral 
responses to real people (O'Sullivan et al., 1965). If this is not possible and testing relies on 
nonverbal behaviors (e.g. drawings, gestures, vocalizations), individual differences in 
drawing, acting, or public-speaking ability interfering with the measurement of actual social 
intelligence per se have to be controlled (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1966, 1976). 
 
I take the perspective that success in separating SI operationalized as behavior, from AcI is 
not surprising as different levels (cognitive preconditions vs. behavioral implementation) are 
contrasted. The use of behavior-orientated measures in comparison to AcI would make more 
sense if academically intelligent behavior was contrasted to socially intelligent behavior. We 
encounter similar problems when dealing with self-report measures (see the following 
section). 
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Table 2-5: Social Intelligence Self-/Peer-report Measures 
Test name 
 
Definition/ 
Model 
Scales 
(mentioned in the test) 
Results/Studies 
Social Skills 
Inventory (SSI, 
Riggio, 1989) 
Measurement of 
basic social skill 
components that 
underlie social 
competence 
Contents (social and 
emotional) cross skills 
(sensitivity, expressivity and 
control)  
? 6 dimensions (90 Items): 
Social Sensitivity (SS) 
Social Expressivity (SE) 
Social Control (SC) 
Emotional Sensitivity (ES) 
Emotional Expressivity (EE) 
Emotional Control (EC) 
Reliability:  
Alpha: .62 - .87 (different samples) 
Retest: .81 - .96 (N=40, two weeks) 
Convergent validity: 
- no coherent correlations with SI performance measures 
- substantial correlations with self-reports of social behavior as well as social 
  contacts  
- total SSI–ACT: .64; Total SSI - PONS: .12 (EE & ES: .18; .19) 
Discriminant validity: 
- no coherent correlations with AcI  
- substantial correlations with personality variables 
Group differences: women perform better 
Marlowe (1986) 
Used several self-
report instruments 
(e.g. PDA, 
Zuckerman & 
Larrance, 1979) 
SI=ability to under-
stand feelings, 
thoughts and 
behaviors of per-
sons, including one-
self, in interpersonal 
situations and to act 
appropriately upon 
that understanding 
Model (Marlowe, 1985) 
-Social interest 
-Social self-efficacy 
-Empathy 
-Social behavioral skills 
(performance) 
 
 
Convergent validity: 
- Postulated dimensions could not be justified (N=188, mean age: 43.4 years;  
  83.5 female) 
- five separate factors emerged (prosocial attitude, social skills, empathic skills, 
  emotionality, social anxiety) ? multidimensionality of SI 
Discriminant validity: 
- no significant correlations with AcI (that can be attributed to the fact that AcI 
was measured via objective tests whereas SI was assessed via self-reports) 
Brown & Anthony 
(1990) 
 Social skills (evaluation via  
Social acceptance and 
effectivity)  & Personality 
for both self- and other rating 
 
Reliability: 
- average intercorrelation among social variables: r=.34 
Discriminant validity 
- in a factor analytic study (1) AcI could be separated from (2) Peer-ratings of  
  social behavior and personality and (3) self ratings- of social behavior and  
  personality (method effects) 
- average correlation AcI-SI: .15 
Prototypical Acts on 
SI (Amelang, 
Schwarz & Wege-
mund, 1989) 
 
Self- and peer rating 
of social intelligent 
behavior 
-Social intelligence (SI)- 
perception, behavior, 
knowledge, memory 
Reliability: 
- Cronbachs Alpha = .91  
- middle act intercorrelation: .13 
Convergent validity: .40 (peer- and self-ratings)  
Divergent validity: only minor correlations with academic intelligence (CBI 1 
/CBI 3) (N=119) (-.01 - .03) 
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Table 2-5: Social Intelligence Self-/Peer-report Measures, continued (part 2) 
Test name 
Definition/ 
Model 
Scales  
(mentioned in the test) 
Results/Studies 
Perceived Decoding 
/Encoding Ability 
Scale 
(PDA, PEA, 
Zuckerman & 
Larrance, 1979) 
 
Measurement of the 
extent to which a 
person believes to 
have decoding  
ability  
(interpretation of  
nonverbal cues) 
32 items Reliability: 
- internal consistency: .85  
 
Convergent validity: 
- correlation with PONS (N=88): .13 (full version, see Riggio & Riggio, 2001); 
.26-.28 (brief version) 
- no correlations with vocal cues of affect 
 
Social Competence 
Nomination Form 
(SCNF, Ford, 1982),
To be used for 
multiple source 
feedback  
 
Social competence 
is the attainment of 
relevant social goals 
in specified social 
contexts, using ap-
propriate means 
and resulting in 
positive develop-
mental outcomes. 
 
 
Social competence has to be 
judged according to perfor-
mance in six hypothetical 
social situations (e.g. peer 
counselor situation, double-
date situation, etc.). For each 
situation subjects are asked to 
nominate six people (three 
female and male each) in their 
grade/group whom they 
thought would be particularly 
good at handling that situation. 
Then, subjects were asked the 
question, "How do you think 
you would do in the role of the 
…?" (self-judgment on a 5-
point scale; very well-poor). 
Reliability: 
- internal consistency: about .70 - .95 (self-ratings are internally more consis-
tent than peer nominations and teacher ratings) 
-interrater reliability: .85 - .95 
 
Validity: 
- core social competence factor unique to the social domain, 11–15% of 
variance explained (but may also represent a self-report method factor) 
- empathy was consistently and highly related to social competence in differ-
ent schools, both sexes, and age groups 
 
Hogan‘s Empathy 
Scale (Hogan, 1969)
Empathy: the 
intellectual or 
imaginative 
apprehension of 
another’s condition 
without actually 
experiencing that 
person’s feelings (p. 
308) 
Non-affective 
Comprehensions of others 
and role-taking as social 
understanding components 
Reliability: 
Kuder-Richardson (KR): .71; Retest: .84 (2 months) 
64 item questionnaire 
Convergent validity: 
- 4 factor structure: Social self-confidence, even temperedness, sensitivity, 
non-conformity (Johnson, Cheek, & Smither, 1983) 
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Table 2-5: Social Intelligence Self-/Peer-report Measures, continued (part 3) 
Test name 
 
Definition/ 
Model 
Scales 
(mentioned in the test) 
Results/Studies 
Social competence 
questionnaire 
(Schneider, 
Ackerman, & 
Kanfer, 1996) 
Developed out of 
laypersons’ 
descriptions of 
typical socially 
competent behavior 
Extraversion, warmth, social 
influence, forming an 
interpersonal circumplex: 
social insight, -openness, -
appropriateness, -
maladjustment 
72 items 
Reliability: 
- Alpha of scales: .50 (maladjustment) - .87 (extraversion) 
Discriminant validity: 
- many significant correlations with personality composites 
- no correlations with measures of numerical and verbal reasoning (GPA,  
  ACT) 
- social insight showed the greatest discriminant validity with respect to 
  personality and academic intelligence 
 
Rating Test of 
Empathy 
(Dymonds, 1949, 
1950) 
Empathy is defined 
as the imaginative 
transposing of one-
self into the think-
ing, feeling, and act-
ing of another. (Dy-
monds, 1950, p. 
343) 
 
Cross-questionnaire,  
Self-rating. Peer-rating and 
rating in the perspective of the 
peer (how would peer rate 
own person, and himself) on 
the traits: 
1. superior-inferior 
2. friendly-unfriendly 
3. leader-follower 
4-. shy-self-assured 
5. sympathetic-unsympathetic 
6. secure-insecure 
 
Reliability: 
- Split half: .82  
- Retest reliability: .60 
- Lindgren & Robinson, 1953: .69 - .73 
 
Validity: 
- no relationship with academic intelligence (Wechsler) 
- no relationship with personality (MMPI) 
- The test seem to measure rather cultural norms than empathy 
(Lindgren & Robinson, 1953) 
- Orlik (1978): results not promising 
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Conclusions With Regard to Self-/Peer-report Measures 
SI measured via self-report was separable from AcI (Amelang et al., 1989; Brown & Anthony, 
1990; Marlowe, 1986; Riggio, 1989). However, when presented with personality variables, 
correlations were significant (e.g. Riggio, 1989). That leads to the assumption that SI self-
report instruments are rather indicators of personality than of social intelligence. When 
presented together with peer reports and performance measures, clear method factors 
emerge (Brown & Anthony, 1990). On the one hand, SI self-report measures seem to have 
nothing in common with either academic intelligence or social intelligence performance 
measures (e.g. Barnes & Sternberg, 1989; Riggio, 1989). On the other hand, Furnham and 
Chamorro-Premuzic (2004) reported a moderate correlation (r = .30) between self-rated and 
measured IQ. A recent meta-analysis shows that information on intellectual performance 
(grades, class ranks, and test scores like the SAT) collected via self-reports should be 
interpreted with caution (Kuncel, Credé, & Thomas, 2005). Beyond the inability of examinees 
to self-report or self-estimate their (emotional) intelligence, the ease with which responses on 
such measures can be distorted may be one of the reasons for a dissociation between the 
responses and actual ability. Visweswaran and Ones (1999) state that respondents can fake 
self-report measures when they are instructed to. In addition, participants fake without 
explicit instruction (McFarland, 2003). It appears that the method, self-report or performance-
based, is not the problem, but rather what is asked about. People know whether they are 
good liars, but not how accurate they are in detecting deception. Commenting on theoretical 
considerations and empirical findings that have been obtained again and again, Kihlstrom 
and Cantor (2000) state “the measurement of individual differences in social intelligence by 
means of self-report scales is a major departure from the tradition of intelligence testing […]” 
(p. 364). Similarly, Bronfenbrenner, Harding, and Gallwey (1958) consider the conventional 
paper-pencil technique to be inappropriate in appraising the judge’s ability to recognize 
whether other people actually behave in a certain manner (e.g., influential or submissive). 
Instead, we appraise the judge’s sensitivity of whether or not other people regard him as 
behaving in a particular fashion. However, it is not that self-report measures do not include 
variance from the variable of interest; rather, they include so much in addition (Sechrest, 
2005). 
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Table 2-6: Social Intelligence Knowledge Tests  
 
 
Test name Definition/ 
Model 
Dimensions/ 
Material 
Scales 
(mentioned in test) 
Results/Studies 
Tacit Knowledge 
Inventory for Managers 
(TKIM, Wagner & 
Sternberg, 1991) 
Implicit 
knowledge in 
specific 
situations 
Dimension: 
knowledge 
 
Material: verbal 
Behavior patterns to deal with 
work situations, afflicted with 
problems have to be rated 
according to their 
effectiveness. 
 
Example for subscale: 
knowledge about the 
management of others 
Reliability: 
- Cronbachs Alpha: .74 (84 students); .80 (631 Military); - 
- Retest (3 weeks, N=84): .78 
 
Divergent validity 
N=45 participants on a leadership development program 
(age M=44; 41 males) 
- correlation with computer simulations (Earth II, Energy 
International): -.61 
- correlation with IQ: -.14 
 
Criterion validity:  
-… with salary: r= .46 (N=54 manager) 
-… with management experience (nr. years: r .-30, N=64) 
Social Etiquette Test 
(Wong, Day, Maxwell, & 
Meara, 1995) 
Social 
knowledge= 
knowing rules 
of etiquette; 
Developed on 
the basis of 
several books 
of etiquette 
Dimension: 
knowledge 
 
Material:  
verbal, pictorial 
 
Pictorial: Participants have to 
identify etiquette mistakes 
pictured in drawings that show 
interacting people according to 
the standards of good 
etiquette. 
 
Verbal: Subjects get a short 
situation description. Then 
they have to answer a 
question by selecting the most 
appropriate option out of 4 
alternatives. 
 
Both are 12 item MC tests. 
Reliability: (N=240 undergraduates) 
- verbal subtest: .30 
- pictorial subtest: .57 
 
Convergent Validity: 
- intercorrelation of the two subtests: .24 
- The verbal subtest correlated with the Judgments in 
social situations subtest of the GWSIT (soc. Insight) (.18) 
- The pictorial subtest correlated with, social perception 
nonverbal (Expression Grouping Test of the Four 
Factor Test of SI) (.20) and social insight nonverbal 
(Cartoon Prediction of the Four Factor Test of SI) (.16) 
 
Divergent Validity:  
- The pictorial subtest correlated with verbal AcI (.17). 
-  Zero correlations between the verbal knowledge test 
   and AcI. 
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Conclusions With Regard to Knowledge Tests 
The available knowledge tests are rather specific (manager knowledge, etiquette 
knowledge). However, we regard social knowledge as having an important relationship to SI 
that influences how we perceive other people (our experiences form our view and 
expectations of others), whom we remember (e.g. voices and faces that are similar to 
someone in our family), and how we understand other people (e.g., extracting roles and 
normative behavior from the interpretation and assessment of the person’s social behavior). 
There seems to be a lack of knowledge tests that investigate “everyday“ knowledge (e.g. the 
typical behavior of a doctor, the role of a father/mother, teacher, etc.). 
 
General Conclusions 
The inability to discriminate between SI and AcI, as well as difficulties in selecting external 
criteria against which the SI tests could be validated, resulted in declining interest in the SI 
construct as a distinct intellectual entity (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000). However, interest in the 
construct revived when researchers tried to get a better comprehension of the construct 
applying MTMM designs. By means of MTMM approaches, method-related variance can be 
controlled (see also chapter 2.1.4). This seems to be especially important with regard to the 
high correlation between verbal SI measures and AcI. New techniques in data analysis 
yielded new possibilities. Instead of measuring only narrow and specific aspects of social 
intelligence, researchers tried to cover the SI construct more broadly. In the following section, 
well–known MTMM studies are presented. 
 
2.2.4 MTMM Studies of Social Intelligence 
The MTMM approaches presented included different kinds of measures –verbal and 
nonverbal performance measures, self- and other report data, and knowledge tests. New 
techniques of analysis (e.g., structural equation modelling) were used to separate trait- and 
method-related variance. 
 
Study 1& 2: Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995 
Wong et al. (1995) included academic intelligence, social cognitive perception and a social 
behavioral measure as traits in their MTMM study, they carried out with 134 female 
undergraduate psychology students (mean age: 19.8 years). Socially intelligent behavior was 
measured through a video-recorded encounter of a male and a female. The behavior was 
rated according to the effectiveness of the heterosexual interaction. Wong et al. 
operationalized social cognitive perception through “Recognition of the mental state behind 
words”, a verbal subtest of the GWSIT (Moss et al., 1955, see chapter 2.2.3), and through 
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the nonverbal expression grouping subtest of the Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence 
(O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976). A model with four uncorrelated method factors (verbal, 
nonverbal, self-report, other-report) and three correlated trait factors (AcI, social perception, 
effective social behavior) emerged. Social perception showed a substantial overlap with 
academic intelligence (.67) that exceeded the correlation between the social cognitive and 
behavioral intelligence measures (.54).  
 
In their second study, Wong et al. (1995) intended to measure social knowledge, social 
perception, and social insight with both verbal and nonverbal measures. Twohundred and 
twenty-seven psychology undergraduate students (59% female, mean age: 19.9 years) 
participated. Social knowledge was operationalized through a verbal test (task: identification 
of the best solution for a social problem) and through a nonverbal measure that required 
identification of etiquette mistakes in drawings. The Social Translation Test of the Four 
Factor Test of Social Intelligence served as a verbal measure of social perception. The 
Expression Grouping Test of the Four Factor test was used as a nonverbal measure of this 
facet. Social insight (verbal measure) was assessed with the Judgment of Social Situations 
subtest of the GWSIT (Moss et al., 1955) and the Cartoon Prediction subtest (nonverbal 
measure) of O’Sullivan and Guilford (1976). Social knowledge and social insight could be 
identified as separate factors, which are positively related to AcI. Social perception was not 
separable from social insight. Wong et al. (1995) conclude that, despite much criticism (e.g. 
O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976; Walker & Foley, 1973), verbal measures of SI are not 
necessarily problematic (because verbal method factors did not form coherent factors with 
large loadings). One criticism is that Wong et al. (1995) used a selected sample of high-
achieving college students in their study. Whether the results are generalizable to subjects 
with lower education and lower IQ is not yet clear. Further criticism concerns the lack of a 
theoretical model as a basis for the study. Consequently, their choice of SI subconstructs, 
social insight, flexibility and knowledge seems rather arbitrary. 
 
Study 3: Jones & Day, 1997  
Jones and Day applied the construct of Gf and Gc to social intelligence. Gf was 
operationalized as verbal and nonverbal social cognitive flexibility and Gc as verbal and 
nonverbal social knowledge. In the social cognitive flexibility tasks, participants had to list all 
possible interpretations of social ambiguous situations presented video-based (nonverbal) or 
written (verbal). Social knowledge was operationalized with the Expression Grouping Subtest 
(O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976) as a nonverbal measure. The Social Translation Test 
(O’Sullivan and Guilford, 1976) served as a verbal measure. A study with 169 high school 
participants (mean age 17.5 years, about 60% female) yielded a separable social cognitive 
2  Theoretical Background 
 
52 
flexibility factor that was positively related to AcI. Social knowledge could not be 
distinguished from AcI. 
 
Study 4: Lee, Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Thorpe, 2000 
Lee et al. (2000) used measures for both social and academic crystallized and fluid 
intelligence, and could identify all four trait factors. Social inference was sought to represent 
social fluid intelligence. Social knowledge served as a representative for social crystallized 
intelligence. Social inference and social knowledge correlated with .63; the two AcI factors 
correlated with .85. SI and AcI factors correlated between .24 and .40. The verbal and 
pictorial factor were not clearly separable (r= .92) but were uncorrelated with the self-/other-
report measures. The study was implemented with 169 undergraduate psychology student 
participants (50% female and male) with a mean age of 19.76 years (18 – 22). 
 
Study 5: Lee, Day, Meara, & Maxwell, 2002  
Lee et al. (2002) used open-ended questions in social knowledge and social flexibility tasks 
and applied them in a sample of 246 psychology students (mean age: 19.65; 52% females). 
The authors took the view of Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987) who proclaimed open-ended 
questions as being more indicative of real-life social problems than tasks with only one 
correct answer. They used the Role Category Questionnaire (Lee et al., 2002) as a verbal 
measure. The questionnaire presents certain kinds of social roles that participants should 
use to describe persons fitting into a specified role in detail. Within the nonverbal measure, 
photographs from well-known persons are presented. The presented persons have to be 
described in depth. The number of different characteristics was taken as a performance 
score. Social cognitive flexibility was measured with the tasks Jones and Day (1997) applied 
(list all possible interpretations of social ambiguous situations, video-based and written). The 
postulated social intelligence trait factors emerged and were separable but correlated with 
creativity. 
 
Study 6: Weis, 2002; Weis & Süß, 2007 
Weis (2002) examined three cognitive SI domains, namely social knowledge, memory and 
understanding, relying on written, pictorial and video-based material. The Chapin Social 
Insight Test (Chapin, 1967; Gough, 1968), the Social Translation Test of the Four Factor 
Test of Social Intelligence (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976), and the Emotions in Relationships 
Subtest of the MSCEIT V.2 (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitenarios, 2003) were used to 
measure written (verbal) social understanding. Pictorial understanding was measured with 
the Faces Test (MSCEIT V.2; Mayer et al., 2003) and with the Couples task (Barnes & 
Sternberg, 1989). The Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (IPT-15, Costanzo & Archer, 1993) 
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was applied to assess video-based social understanding. The TKIM was used as a verbal 
indicator for social knowledge. Weis (2002) developed new social memory tasks, 
“Remembering couples” (pictorial), “Staff files” (written/verbal) and “Video scenes” (video-
based). The Berlin Intelligence Structure Test served as a measure of AcI (BIS; Jäger, 1982, 
1984). In addition, the 118 high school students (12th and 13th grade) and psychology 
students with a mean age of 19.7 years (SD = 3.22; range: 17 - 33 years) and a proportion of 
67.2% women worked on several SI self-report measures (PDA/PDE, Zuckerman & 
Larrance, 1979; SSI, Riggio, 1989; Prototypical Acts on SI, Amelang et al., 1989, see chapter 
2.2.3) and the extraversion, openness and agreeableness scales of the NEO-FFI (Borkenau 
& Ostendorf, 1993), which served as an indicator of personality. The findings revealed the 
three postulated SI domains separable from AcI. Although academic intelligence memory 
correlated with all SI domains, multiple regression analysis and confirmatory factor analysis 
indicated structural independence of SI factors. Compared to verbal tasks, nonverbal tasks 
showed less overlap with AcI. SI performance measures demonstrated only minor correlation 
with SI self-report measures; SI self-report measures were correlated with the personality 
scales.  
 
Conclusions Concerning MTMM Studies 
The studies just described confirm the hypothesis of SI being a multidimensional construct. 
Which subconstructs SI actually contains is still unclear. In addition, social intelligence 
measured via self-and other-report and performance measures did not load on the same trait 
factor. As mentioned by Cronbach (1960, see also Sackett, Zedeck, & Fogli, 1988) self-and 
other-report measures seem to measure the typical performance, whereas performance 
measures seem to be indicators of maximal performance. In Lee et al.’s study (2000, see 
above), SI and AcI were not correlated. In a SEM model allowing intercorrelation between 
the two factors, the AcI–SI relation was estimated to be .37 (< .05). However, a model that 
did without this path was not significantly worse and for parsimonious reasons would have 
been preferred. According to Carroll (1993) and Lee et al. (2000), the findings query whether 
SI can be considered to be an intelligence. However, what do we expect? As soon as we get 
correlations between SI and AcI, the constructs seem to be not separable. If AcI and SI are 
not correlated, SI is not considered to be an intelligence. Should the positive correlation with 
another intelligence be a criterion to be handled as an intelligence? If so, how high should it 
be to treat it as an intelligence? In my opinion it is very important to specify the expectations 
and criteria that are required to handle a construct as an intelligence (see chapter 1.2). 
 
It is interesting, that most of the studies in the domain of SI have been carried out with young 
people. Of 44 studies published before 1983, 40 used students as subjects (primary school 
students, high school students, undergraduate students, graduate students) (Landy, 2006). 
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The graduate and undergraduate students were psychology majors. Only five studies (four of 
them applied the Guilford and O’Sullivan tests, 1965) were conducted with high school 
students. These studies revealed an AcI-independent SI factor. Landy (2006) criticizes rightly 
that these selections of participants are not representative. Moreover, most of the studies 
were implemented in rather individualistic cultures like the USA and Europe. Research of 
social and emotional intelligence would profit from including studies of Eastern and Arabic 
cultures (Landy, 2006). 
 
Literature research showed that until 2004 no further studies in the domain of “social 
intelligence“ were published. Possible reasons may be the already mentioned problems and 
the emergence of emotional intelligence as a (more) popular construct. Thus, scientific 
discussion and research these days concentrates rather on emotional intelligence and the 
broad and diffusely specified construct of social competences (see chapter 2.3). 
 
 
2.3 Social Intelligence in the Context of Social Competences  
Social intelligence can be seen as part of the larger construct of social competences. 
Besides social intelligence emotional intelligence, parts of practical intelligence and social 
competence can be subsumed under “social competences.“ Related constructs are social 
cognition, wisdom, self-regulative and control abilities. In this chapter, the SI construct will be 
classified within the nomological network of those constructs. Similar terms and constructs 
are differentiated, related and classified into a broader model of social competences (Süß et 
al., 2005). 
 
2.3.1 Emotional Intelligence 
Whereas social intelligence has a relatively long research tradition, emotional intelligence 
(EI) is a rather new ability construct suggested by Salovey and Mayer in the 1990s. 
Regarding it thoroughly, it was very similar to the old SI construct but ran under a new name 
and became popular as one of the most relevant factors of life success in theory, work 
environment and daily life (Goleman, 1995). Although Goleman’s assumptions about the 
relevance of emotional intelligence for life success were not founded empirically, his book 
inspired other researchers to concentrate their research on the exploration of the “new” 
construct EI, which today is widely seen as an interaction between emotion and cognition. 
 
In the last few years, research in the EI domain has expanded. Several volumes were 
published or are in press (e.g. Geher, 2004; Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, in press; 
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Schulze, Freund & Roberts, 2006; Schulze & Roberts, 2005), a vast number of studies have 
been carried out and several instruments (mainly self-reports) have been developed. Several 
of the published studies and instruments do not differ considerably from the older SI 
construct (Weber & Westmeyer, 1997). According to Weber and Westmeyer (1999), the 
popularity of the EI construct compared to AcI has three reasons: First, EI described by 
Goleman (1995) can be practiced and is not genetically predetermined. Thus, everyone can 
have it, if they want. Second, in contrast to academic intelligence, emotional intelligence is 
associated with “goodness” and “virtue” and thus combines the good with the 
correspondence to the intelligent. Finally, in EI there is no discrepancy between 
heart/feeling/passion and reason/intelligence. Both are reconcilable. Surprisingly, there have 
been almost no empirical considerations that relate EI to the older SI (e.g. Kang et al., 2005). 
When EI first emerged, it was defined as a subset of SI (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). In 1993, 
Mayer and Salovey regarded EI skills as grouped together with SI. In the subsequent 
literature, EI extended beyond the scope of SI (Mayer & Salovey, 1997), then SI disappeared 
from theoretical (and empirical) accounts of EI and was almost completely neglected in EI 
literature until 2004. EI constructs often were defined in such a broad manner that in some 
cases SI was even regarded as a part of EI (Barchard, 2003). Up to this point it appeared to 
be necessary to prove its scope. Those considerations took place almost without any 
empirical investigations. Our attempts to render the overlap and distinctiveness between 
social and emotional intelligence more precisely (Süß et al., 2005; Weis & Süß, 2005), have 
been taken up (e.g. Austin & Sakolofske, 2006) so that now, rare empirical results exist 
(Amelang & Steinmayr; 2006). 
 
Models of Emotional Intelligence 
Whereas a common model of SI has not existed before now, in EI research tradition different 
models came up. The models can be classified into two distinct groups – trait (or mixed) and 
ability models of emotional intelligence (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000b) that vary 
considerably depending on the scope of conceptualizations and the instruments used. Table 
2-7 summarizes important differences between mixed models and ability models of EI.  
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Table 2-7: Ability Models and Mixed Models of Emotional Intelligence 
 
Ability models Mixed models 
Definition Mayer et al. (1999, 2000a) define 
emotional intelligence as a collection 
of emotional abilities that can be 
divided into four branches that are 
arranged from more basic to higher-
level skills (see Figure 2-6). 
collection of (partially already 
well-known) abilities and non-
ability traits (Neubauer & 
Freudenthaler, 2005, p. 31). 
Construct 
(Petrides & 
Furnham, 2000, 
2001) 
Ability EI Trait EI is often regarded as a 
diverse group of personality 
variables and others that should 
predict success in professional 
and everyday life. 
Example of a 
model 
Four-Branch Ability-Model (Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997, see Figure 2-6) 
BarOn Model (BarOn, 1997) 
(see below) 
Type of 
performance 
(Cronbach, 
1960; Sackett et 
al., 1988) 
maximal typical 
Type of 
measurement 
performance test self-report 
Examples of 
instruments 
• Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT, Mayer 
et al., 2000b) 
• Test of Emotional Intelligence 
(TEMINT, Schmidt-Atzert & 
Bühner, 2002) 
• Situational Test of Emotion 
Management (STEM) and the 
Situational Test of Emotion 
Understanding (STEU) 
(MacCann, 2006) 
• BarOn Emotional Quotient 
Inventory (Bar-On, 1997, 1999) 
• Schutte Emotional Intelligence 
Test (SEIS, Schutte, Malouff, 
Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, 
Golden, & Dornheim, 1998) 
• Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS; 
Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, 
Turvey & Palfai, 1995) 
 
 
Among existing conceptualizations of trait EI, the BarOn model (BarOn, 1997) is the 
broadest, and the only one, empirical findings exist for. BarOn defines emotional intelligence 
as an array of noncognitive abilities, competencies, and skills that influence one’s ability to 
succeed in coping with environmental demands and pressures (p. 14) and regards it as “the 
key” to individual differences in life success. BarOn (1997, 2000) conceptualized four broad 
dimensions –intra- and interpersonal skills, adaptability and stress management– containing 
13 subscales. Another five subscales form a facilitator scale of EI, known as general mood. 
In 2003, Pérez already identified more than 50 EI self-report measures (Pérez, Petrides, & 
Furnham, 2005) that were developed in order to assess “trait EI.” Empirical results have 
shown again and again that ability and trait EI differ considerably (e.g. Warwick & Nettelbeck, 
2004): self-report instruments of EI correlate strongly with personality variables, whereas 
performance measures of EI are related to cognitive variables. EI self-report measures are 
2  Theoretical Background 
 57 
very similar to measures of self-reported social intelligence (see chapter 2.2.3). I compared 
the BarOn EQ-I and the Schutte Emotional Inteligence Scale (SEIS) with the social 
intelligence self-report measures Social Skills Inventory (SSI) and Perceived Decoding Ability 
Scale (PDA) (see chapter 2.2.3). A comparison of the items of the BarOn EQ-I and the SSI 
revealed a correspondence of about 50%. Often item wordings are almost identical, such as 
the BarOn EQ-I item “People think I am sociable,” which corresponds to the SSI item “I love 
to socialize.” The similarities between the SEIS and the PDA are even more apparent: 78% 
of the PDA items are covered through similar items of the SEIS, with item wordings being 
nearly identical in both tests (e.g. item 32 of the SEIS: “I can tell how people are feeling by 
listening to the tone of their voice” corresponds to PDA item 25: “I usually cannot tell how 
people feel from their tone of voice”). In a first preliminary study, the SEIS and the PDA 
correlated with r=.63 (p<.001; N=30; Seidel, Weis, & Süß, 2004). For a more detailed 
description of the comparison, see Weis et al. (2006). Strong overlap concerning definitions, 
scales and items can be found, particularly in the domains of emotion perception and 
expression, in understanding oneself and others, in emotional control or adaptation to social 
situations, and interpersonal interaction. There is uniqueness of social intelligence self-
reports regarding sensitivity to interpersonal interactions and the application to social 
behavior (Weis et al., 2006). 
 
In summary, EI models and the corresponding classification can be regarded as a major 
advantage for the new EI construct since the distinction has not been made in social 
intelligence research. Thereby, a general problem emerges more clearly: Does it make 
sense to talk about an emotional intelligence since it has been proven repeatedly that (self-
report) indicators of “trait EI” can be treated as indicators of personality (see below and also 
Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, in press)? Scherer (in press) does not suggest the conceptual 
differentiation between trait and ability EI but instead lumps both together and calls it 
emotional competence. With regard to the specifications that have been made in chapter 1 
and 2.2, I will concentrate my description on ability EI and provide more detailed information 
concerning definitions, models, instruments and results of research. Since the label 
“intelligence” does not appear appropriate for “a personality trait (EI)” I will only refer to “trait 
EI” as far as it is directly important to understand the studies we carried out. For further 
information about mixed models of EI, see the listed references. 
 
Ability Models of Emotional Intelligence (Ability EI) 
Currently, the most accepted EI ability model is the “Four-Branch Ability-Model“ (Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997, see Figure 2-6). It seeks to incorporate a number of well-established 
constructs from emotion research and tries to synthesize the two psychological constructs of 
intelligence and emotions in the EI construct. The model focuses on emotions and their 
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interactions with thoughts (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). The modified “Four Branch Ability 
Model” (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) is based on the original ability model developed in 1990 
(Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and strictly restricts EI to mental abilities and delimits it from 
personality traits. Each branch of the model consists of four abilities. The ability domains are 
here briefly described, mentioning their overlap with social intelligence.  
 
 
Figure 2-6: Four-Branch Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) 
 
Perception, Appraisal and Expression of Emotion (Branch 1) describe the ability to 
recognize/perceive one’s own and other people’s emotions, to discriminate among them and 
to express them accurately. These basic input processes are necessary for the further 
processing of emotional information in order to solve problems (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitenarios, 2001). This ability can be assigned to parts of social perception as a domain of 
social intelligence. 
 
Emotional Facilitation of Thinking (Branch 2) is the ability to use emotions in order to 
enhance reasoning, for example, the use of happiness that facilitates creativity and inductive 
reasoning. This ability does not refer to social intelligence.  
 
Understanding and Analyzing Emotions (Branch 3) involves cognitive processing of emotions 
and includes the abilities to name emotions, to get insight into their emergence and to 
understand the changes of emotions. This ability is quite similar to social understanding.  
 
Reflective Regulation of Emotions (Branch 4) is the ability to manage emotions in oneself 
and in others. This ability consists of the most advanced skills (staying open to different kinds 
of pleasant and unpleasant feelings, monitoring of emotions as well as coping with them by 
Emotional Intelligence
Emotion management
Emotion understanding
Self-regulative abilities
(e.g. emotion control)
Emotion perception Branch 1
Branch 2
Branch 3
Branch 4
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moderating unpleasant emotions and enhancing pleasant ones). This EI component shows a 
partial overlap with SI constructs in the domain of social understanding. Mayer, Salovey, and 
Caruso (2000a) regard emotional intelligence as broader than social intelligence, because EI 
includes personal (private) emotions that are important for personal growth. In their view, EI 
is more focused than SI, because it concentrates on the emotional part of problems rather 
than on (more complex?) social aspects.  
 
Although currently the best available, Mayer et al.’s (2000b) four branch model raises several 
difficulties. There exist no explicit criteria for deciding which qualities belong to EI (e.g. 
emotional expressiveness, empathy, perspective-taking, etc. are excluded). The model 
ignores contextual information. The model excludes unconscious processes, assuming EI to 
be a crystallized ability, which is seen as declarative rather than procedural. Implicitly, it is 
assumed that the abilities of the corresponding Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) covered by the four branches are equal for all different emotions. 
However, each emotion is supported by its own distinct neuropsychological system (e.g. 
Panksepp, 1998). We also know that the preferred channel of emotion perception varies 
according to the type of emotion (e.g. negative emotions are better recognized auditorily).  
 
Measurement of Ability Emotional Intelligence  
In 1999, Mayer at al. (1999) developed the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) 
consisting of 12 performance tasks intended to measure the abilities covered by the four 
branches (Salovey & Mayer, 1997). In order to score the test corresponding to a 
psychometric intelligence test, they used consensus and expert scoring (see chapter 2.2.3). 
Studies by Mayer et al. (1999); Roberts, Zeidner, and Matthews (2001); and Ciarrochi, Chan, 
and Caputi (2000) support the assumption of a general EI factor and validity of Branch I and 
IV (perception and management of emotion). Validity of the remaining branches is unclear. 
Moreover, some of the ability measures are problematic because of low reliabilities (Ciarrochi 
et al., 2000). Correlations between expert and consensus scoring are low and not satisfying. 
The correlations with criteria differ according to the scoring modus that was applied. That 
points to the question of whether the same ability is measured using different scoring modi. 
As a reaction to these problems, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 
(MSCEIT, Mayer et al., 2000b) was developed. The authors used consensus scoring (based 
on a sample of more than 2000 people) and expert scoring (based on 21 members of the 
International Society of Research in Emotion, Mayer et al., 2003). Mayer et al. (2003) report 
higher reliabilities and a correlation of r=.91 between expert and consensus scoring (see also 
Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002; r=.93 - .99). Despite this high correspondence between two 
scoring modi, the MSCEIT is criticized since, according to their definition, objective 
perception tasks should need neither expert nor consensus scoring. Rather, they should use 
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theoretical systems to score emotions that already have a long tradition in emotion research 
(see e.g. Ekman, 2004; Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001). Scherer (in press) adds that, 
through the scoring procedure measures, response agreement with population means is 
collected, since in the absence of clear criteria, even expert scoring is likely to reflect social 
agreement. Some further problems emerge with the MSCEIT: The test contains only static 
(verbal and pictorial) material rather than dynamic (video and audio) material. According to 
Brody (2004, p. 234), MSCEIT items reflect knowledge of how to regulate emotions rather 
than, corresponding to AcI tasks, also dealing with problem-solving (fluid) items. An 
additional personal criticism concerns the items presenting pictures of landscapes. Subjects 
are instructed to name the corresponding feelings that are expressed. I query whether a 
certain landscape picture evokes the same feeling in everyone. 
 
Other performance-based EI instruments are, for example, the Test of Emotional Intelligence 
(TEMINT, Schmidt-Atzert & Bühner, 2002), the Situational Test of Emotion Management 
(STEM, MacCann, 2006) and the Situational Test of Emotion Understanding (STEU, 
MacCann, 2006). With regard to the TEMINT, short descriptions of real social/emotional 
situations of a target person are presented. Test takers have to judge the feelings of a target 
person. The answers are scored according to the deviation from the target person’s answer. 
However, for me it seems almost impossible to interpret the emotions, because no context 
information is provided. According to Schmidt-Atzert and Bühner (2002), the TEMINT is 
useful to predict school grades. Compared to the MSCEIT, it covers the domains of 
perception and understanding of emotions. However, whether school grades are the 
appropriate criterion for an EI test is questionable. The STEU intends to assess the 
understanding of emotions occurring in different situations and is target-scored, allowing 
verification of the correct answer. The STEM measures emotion management in work-life 
and personal-life contexts for the emotions sadness, fear, and anger. Situations represent 
one of eight general content areas (e.g., health concerns, isolation and unfairness). 
 
In the emotion research tradition, the Ekman-60 faces test (see also Facial Expressions of 
Emotion–Stimuli and Tests; FEEST; Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 
2002) was developed, which is a power measure of EI. Sixty facial expressions are 
presented in a random order on a computer screen, and participants have to indicate via 
mouse click whether the emotion expressed is happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust or 
surprise. Each image remains on the screen for a maximum of five seconds. The test is a 
good example of performance-based EI measures; however, it is limited to the pictorial 
perception domain. 
 
 
2  Theoretical Background 
 61 
Overlap of Ability Emotional Intelligence with Social Intelligence 
In spite of its shortcomings the MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002) at present is the only commonly 
accepted broad performance measure of emotional intelligence. Concerning the overlap 
between SI tests and the MSCEIT subtests (as an EI measure) we can conclude that, for the 
subtests “Pictures“ (Branch 1) and “Sensations” (Branch 2), no equivalent tests in the domain 
of SI are available. In the “Pictures” test, participants have to indicate the extent to which 
certain images or landscapes express various emotions. In the “Sensations” subtest, 
subjects have to compare different emotions to different sensations, such as color or 
temperature. All other subtests of the MSCEIT vary in their degree of overlap with SI tests. 
Most similarities can be found with the subtests “Emotion Management” and “Emotions in 
Relationships,” which show overlap with the Chapin Social Insight Test (Chapin, 1967, 
Gough, 1968, see chapter 2.2.3) and with the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers 
(TKIM, Wagner & Sternberg, 1991, see chapter 2.2.3). The tests already mentioned are 
similar in that a social situation or problem has to be evaluated according to different possible 
reactions. The aim is to find the best solution for the situation or problem. The “Faces” 
subtest measures the ability to perceive emotions in faces. This ability is also very important 
to be successful in the IPT-15 (Costanzo & Archer, 1993) and in the ”Couples Task” (Barnes 
& Sternberg, 1989). The IPT-15 is a video-based test of social understanding (see chapter 
2.2.3), which requires, for example, judgment of the relationship between people, recognition 
of deception, etc. In the Couples task, the kind of relationship between a man and a woman 
presented in a picture has to be evaluated (are they a couple or two strangers?). Most of the 
SI tasks requiring the same abilities as the newer EI tasks stem from the test battery of 
Guilford and O’Sullivan (1966; 1976). The “Pictures” and “Sensations” tests that do not have 
a correspondence in SI tests, do not refer to social interactions in social situations. Rather, 
they focus on emotions that evolve from nature or images. Conclusively, all MSCEIT tests 
have a correspondence in older SI tests except those that do not deal with people and thus 
are not important for socially intelligent behavior. 
 
Kang et al. (2006) postulate SI and EI to overlap and to be multidimensional, depending on 
one another. In their opinion, SI and ability EI differ from AcI. They suggest transferring 
Gf/Gc Theory of academic intelligence to SI/EI. Both SI and EI contain acquired declarative 
and procedural knowledge as well as fluid parts (p. 110). Crystallized social and emotional 
intelligence, according to Kang et al. (2006), can be specified as follows. Social knowledge is 
regarded as etiquette knowledge depending on culture. Emotional knowledge is seen as 
established perception ability. They distinguish social/emotional knowledge about oneself 
and others and they consider the flexible use of knowledge in order to find solutions to new 
problems as a fluid social and emotional ability. An additional attempt that examined the 
overlap and distinctiveness between SI and ability EI is described in Davies, Stankov, and 
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Roberts (1998). Davies et al. (1998) used the IPT-15 (Costanzo & Archer, 1993, see chapter 
2.2.3), a social perception performance test relying on videos (indicators of SI), and the 
Emotion Perception in Faces (indicator of EI; Mayer, DiPaolo & Salovey, 1990). SI and EI 
correlated with r=-.09 (N=131) and showed bipolar loadings on one factor. Barchard (2003) 
applied the Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976) in order to 
indicate SI and the MSCEIT 1.1 (cited by Barchard, 2003) as an EI measure. However, she 
does not report any correlations between both instruments. 
 
Relationship Between Ability Emotional Intelligence and Academic Intelligence 
This dissertation does not aim to investigate whether EI is a useful construct. However, 
because of the similarities of EI and SI and the replacement of SI by EI, studies that were 
conducted in EI research can provide important results concerning the SI–AcI relation. 
Therefore, some notes about ability EI and AcI follow.  
 
Austin and Saklofske (2006) report a study that relates EI measures to information 
processing speed (see also Austin, 2004, 2005). Amongst other measures, 97 participants 
worked on three information processing speed tasks (IT-tasks). The first dealt with 
discrimination between happy and neutral faces. In the second task, test takers had to 
differentiate between sad and neutral faces and in the third two stimuli without emotions were 
used (neutral condition). Another ability EI task involved recognition of faces without time 
limitation. As a main finding, the emotional IT tasks correlated significantly with the faces 
tasks (time unlimited), whereas the neutral IT tasks did not correlate with the time unlimited 
faces test. The faces test (EI ability) did not show correlations with crystallized intelligence 
tests, nor with a personality scale. Factor analysis revealed an overall processing speed 
factor that explained variance in all IT tasks. Additional variance of the emotional IT tasks 
can be explained through an emotion processing factor. The results indicate that there is 
indeed an emotional perception ability that is different from AcI, though emotion perception 
tasks also share systematic variance with the neutral perception task. This finding is 
especially important related to results obtained regarding social perception ability. The few 
studies in social intelligence dealing with perceptual abilities, had difficulties justifying social 
perception as a separate factor (see Wong et al., 1995). 
 
MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts (2004a) investigated whether EI can be seen as 
a standard intelligence and used the Situational Test of Emotion Management (STEM) and 
the Situational Test of Emotion Understanding (STEU). Three marker variables of fluid and 
crystallized intelligence served as measures of AcI. Personality was represented through a 
personality questionnaire based on the NEO-PI-R (advanced version of the NEO-FFI, 
Ostendorf & Angleitner, 2004). Some other criterion values were collected. The results with 
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178 students (76.4% female) indicate that EI is separable from fluid and crystallized AcI. The 
correlations between ability EI and AcI are higher than the EI-personality correlations. 
MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts (2004a) draw the conclusion that performance-
based EI can be regarded as a standard intelligence that constitutes new content areas 
within existing intelligences such as Gf and Gc. However, results are contradictory. Schulte, 
Ree, and Carretta (2004) investigated the construct validity of EI (measured with the 
MSCEIT) considering the relations to the Big Five (measured with the NEO-FFI) and to “g” 
(measured with the Wonderlic personnel test of intelligence). The “g” measure and EI 
correlated with r= 0.45. A regression analysis with the three predictors g, agreeableness, and 
gender could explain about 65% of the EI variance (corrected R= 0.81). Conclusively, the 
authors call EI as a separate construct into question.  
 
Until now, there is no agreement among researchers whether EI can be regarded as a 
separate construct. Several authors support the view of Mayer and Salovey (1997), who 
proclaim that (ability) EI meets the conceptual, correlational, and developmental criteria of an 
intelligence. These authors regard the EI construct to be clearly distinguishable from 
personality traits but positively correlated with measures of AcI (Austin et al., 2004; Austin & 
Saklofske, 2006; Derksen, Kramer & Katzko, 2002; Mayer et al., 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; 
Roberts et al., 2001). Austin and Saklofske (2006) expect EI to rise with age and experience 
with social interaction and overlap more with culture-dependent and acquired (crystallized) 
than with fluid abilities. Surprisingly, Austin et al. (2004), without providing reasons, regard EI 
as more likely to be an intelligence than SI since there are biological hints (e.g. with brain 
lesions) in EI research that point in the direction of an intelligence (z.B. Bar-On, Tranel, 
Denburg, & Bechara, 2003). However, according to our knowledge, there have never been 
studies that examined SI in a similar way. Moreover, as already indicated, I wonder whether 
moderate correlations with AcI are really the right criteria to show that EI comprises an 
intelligence domain distinct from AcI. Obviously, EI research deals with the same problems 
SI research did. The result obtained for SI in this dissertation should also yield interesting 
implications for EI research, taking into account the similarities between ability EI and SI 
discussed above. 
 
Combined Studies of Trait and Ability Emotional Intelligence Related to Academic 
Intelligence 
Engelberg and Sjöberg (2005) focused on emotion perception as a part of emotional 
intelligence. Their analysis was based on 282 respondents. EI was operationalized by both 
performance and self-report measures. Findings revealed that emotion perception (i.e., 
accuracy in the judgment of others’ acute and habitual feeling states) was related to a 
comparably higher accuracy in the assessment of mood experienced by others. Results 
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further suggest that successful social adjustment is related to a more accurate perception of 
variations in others’ mood, which strengthens the hypothesis that emotion perception is 
essential for adaptation on a social level. 
 
Some authors found relationships of EI self-report and EI ability measures. Austin (2004) 
found a significant correlation between the EI self-report subscale “Appraisal“ (modified 
version of the SEIS) and EI ability measures (recognition of emotions on faces in IT tasks, 
see above) in a study with 92 students and volunteers (71.2% female; mean age: 32 years). 
Another study with 95 students (Austin, 2005) included the Raven Progressive Matrices 
along with the IT-tasks and the Ekman Faces Test. Structural Equation modeling revealed 
two correlated factors: (1) a speed factor with high loadings of the nonemotional IT task and 
the Raven Test, and (2) an emotion factor with high loadings of the emotional IT tasks and 
the Ekman Faces Test. Self-reported EI was again significantly and positively correlated with 
the EI performance score. In addition, Brackett and Mayer (2003) report correlations between 
EI self-reports and ability measures between .12 (EQ-I and MSCEIT) and .18 (SEIS and 
MSCEIT) when controlled for personality variables. 
 
Critical Conclusion on the Emotional Intelligence Construct 
The hope arose that EI could explain even more than the 20–25% of variance on criteria 
such as training and proficiency success (see Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) predicted by IQ tests. 
However, in a meta-analytic study of VanRooy and Viswesvaran (2004) based on 59 
independent empirical studies with aggregated sample sizes up to N=9522, EI has a value of 
only .23 in the prediction of job performance. EI correlated with all personality dimensions 
(Big Five) significantly (.23 - .34) and exceeded those between EI and job performance. 
When AcI and personality were accounted for, GMA provided substantial incremental validity 
above EI (.31) whereas EI provided no validity above GMA (.01) in predicting job 
performance (VanRooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). Bachard (2003) found that multiple measures 
of EI (trait and ability) did not show incremental validity over AcI and personality in the 
prediction of academic success. These results have been confirmed by several other authors 
(Amelang & Steinmayr, 2006; Austin et al., 2004; Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004; Dawda & 
Hart, 2000; Derksen, Kramer, & Katzko, 2002; Newsome, Day & Catano, 2000; Petrides & 
Furnham, 2001; Parker, Summerfeldt, Hogan, & Majeski, 2004). On the one hand, this 
seems to confirm results obtained by Schmidt and Hunter (1998, see also chapter 1.3). On 
the other hand, it may stem from the inappropriate use and integration of criteria (i.e., 
aggregating results for different jobs) and their collection (e.g., sympathy-biased supervisory 
ratings) or inappropriate measures (indicators) of EI. No matter what is the actual reason for 
this result, EI has yet to prove its scope against AcI, as well as against the older construct of 
SI. Empirical results argue in favor of dealing with personality when talking about trait EI 
2  Theoretical Background 
 65 
rather than approaching the status of an intelligence (see Weber & Westmeyer, 1999). 
Summarizing the current status of EI, Murphy (2006) remarks that EI is often poorly defined 
and measured, that the relationship of EI to other constructs (e.g. AcI, SI, personality) is not 
adequately understood, and that claims about the predictive power of EI for success in 
school etc. are not supported. Prospective research with regard to EI and its relationship of 
AcI and SI should begin with the development of a new appropriate EI test that extends the 
scope of the MSCEIT and may attain the status of a standard reference instrument. 
Expenses can be saved by doing without subtests that deal with emotions regarding stones 
and landscapes. With an appropriate ability EI instrument that concentrates on EI-specific 
components, it should also be possible to examine the relationship to SI with more reliability 
and validity. More detailed studies are needed to examine exactly, which EI components are 
predictive when controlled for other variables (see also Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001). 
 
2.3.2 Practical Intelligence 
Definition and Construct 
One can differentiate between two approaches to measure practical intelligence (PI). The 
first assesses practical abilities and skills (see Fleishman, 1967), while the second focuses 
on tacit knowledge (see Sternberg & Wagner, 1986; Wagner, 1994). Fleishman (1967) 
included practical-technical and technical-constructive abilities and skills as well as 
psychomotor coordination in the scope of the construct. Sternberg and Wagner (1986) 
modified the traditional construct, and define PI as the ability to successfully handle ill-
defined problems and daily life tasks without clear answers. Neisser (1976) also talks about 
“intelligent performance in natural settings” and distinguishes this form of intelligence from 
AcI. Whereas the traditional construct did not have anything in common with SI or even 
explicitly excluded it (Mariacher & Neubauer, 2005; Sperber, 1995), PI according to 
Sternberg and Wagner (1986) seems to be related to SI. Dealing with the environment in 
general includes contact with a social environment to an important degree (Kaiser, 1998). PI 
in the view of Sternberg and Wagner is similar to the construct of problem solving (Dörner, 
1987) treating practical, ill-defined and unformulated problems that are embedded in daily life 
and thus different from AcI (formulated by others, well-defined, disembedded from ordinary 
experience, see Hedlund, Forsythe, Horvath, Williams, Snook, & Sternberg, 2003). Their 
(often multiple possible) solutions mainly require additional information and are achieved with 
multiple methods. According to Wagner and Sternberg, PI is operationalized as practical 
know-how, or the ability to acquire “tacit knowledge” (TK). People with TK often are not able 
to explain their way of working on a certain task or problem. TK is acquired through personal 
experience and imitation of others and has a practical value for the individual (Hedlund et al., 
2003). By means of the degree of TK, experts can be differentiated from laypersons. 
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Sternberg and Wagner (1986) suggested three parts of TK abilities: (1) knowledge about 
oneself (abilities, shortcomings, self-motivation strategies), (2) knowledge of how to solve 
tasks (how to work effectively), (3) knowledge of how to deal with others (managing different 
people, superiors, co-workers and subordinates). 
 
Relationship to Social Competence 
Sternberg and Wagner (1986) carried out studies on conceptions of laypersons concerning 
PI and social competence as well as their relationship. The prototypical everyday intelligent 
person is characterized by practical problem solving ability, social competence, character 
and interest in learning and culture (Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981). The 
prototypical socially competent individual is described by prosocial skills (responding to the 
need of others), social-instrumental skills (knowing how to get things done), social ease 
(enjoying social activities and involvement) and self-efficacy (having a good self-concept). 
Sternberg and Wagner (1986) regard social competence as a part of PI. Ford (1986) has a 
quite similar view and suggests that PI involves the pursuit of transactional goals that entail 
things outside the body (e.g. establishing a friendship with a playmate). In Ford’s view, many 
of the transactional goals valued by individuals and their societies are social in nature 
(treating people fairly, having good relations with friends and family). Wagner (1994) sees the 
major difference between (academic) work in school and (practical) work performed outside 
the classroom in that the former is done independently whereas the majority of practical work 
is done in cooperation with others. 
 
Measurement of Practical Intelligence 
Instruments that measure PI in the sense of Sternberg and Wagner (1986) are rare. Some 
German-language tests and tasks concentrate on the ability to find practical solutions to 
problems that are not at all social (e.g. tasks described in Sperber, 1995; PAI30 test of daily 
intelligence, Mariacher & Neubauer, 2005). PI tests that focus on tacit knowledge can be 
classified according to their degree of realism. The ETS Basic Skills Test (1977, cited by 
Wagner, 1994) is a test with a rather low degree of realism and is mainly oriented on 
instruments measuring AcI. The tasks for example require reading a paragraph and 
describing the main theme afterwards, interpreting maps, and interpreting written guarantees 
for products. One of the most famous instruments is the “Tacit Knowledge Inventory for 
Managers“ (TKIM; Wagner & Sternberg, 1991), which can be regarded as moderately 
realistic according to our classification since it makes use of realistic situations one might 
encounter in a job situation. Wagner and Sternberg (1991) postulate three dimensions that 
describe different tasks: (1) Managing self, (2) Managing tasks, and (3) Managing others. 
Whereas the first two dimensions include knowledge about the motivational and 
organisational aspects of the own behavior as well as knowledge about the performance of 
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tasks at work, the third dimension overlaps clearly with social intelligence. “Managing others” 
deals with knowledge about other people (e. g., successful contact with superiors, colleagues 
and co-workers). Knowledge about other people influences how someone interprets the 
behavior of a certain person (see chapter 2.2.1). The TKIM consists of 7–19 problem-solving 
scenarios that list 6–16 potential actions that have to be rated on a seven- or nine-point scale 
for either quality or importance. The test is mainly scored using expert ratings. Similar to the 
TKIM, the Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders Inventory (TKML) was developed to assess 
the knowledge leaders possess (Hedlund et al., 2003). The In-basket Test (Frederiksen, 
Saunders & Wand, 1957, cited by Wagner, 1994) is a highly realistic measurement that 
places examinees at an executive’s desk and asks them to handle items contained in an in-
basket. Performance is evaluated against criteria (e.g. taking responsibility). 
 
Empirical Results 
The less realistic the test, the higher was the correlation with “classical IQ” in empirical 
studies (Wagner, 1986). However, differences in IQ correlations could also be due to 
differences in the methods applied (AcI paper-pencil test – PI paper-pencil test vs. AcI paper-
pencil test – PI behavioral measure). Performance on practical tasks does not decline with 
age, as with crystallized ability (whereas fluid intelligence declines). Wagner and Sternberg 
(1985; Wagner, 1987) assessed TK in business managers, undergraduates, and graduates 
with the TKIM. TK differentiated the samples that were tested: undergraduates received the 
lowest scores, graduates’ scores were significantly higher, and professionals performed the 
best. Professionals’ scores were also predictive for indices of career performance (e.g. 
additional 32% of variance in performance in the problem solving scenarios Earth II and 
Energy International). Scores on TK measures rarely correlate with IQ measures (e.g. with 
verbal reasoning of the Differential Aptitude Test, r= .16, N=22 and r=.12, N=60). TK predicts 
real-world performance independently of IQ and personality (Wagner, 2000, obtained a 
correlation between citation count and tacit knowledge of .44 (p<.001) with psychologists). 
However, as Gottfredson (2003) mentions, a problem with criterion-related correlations 
arises for TK because of the limitation to the significant coefficients. For 22 reported 
correlations the n-weighted average is .26, the average for the 35 unreported correlations is 
only .08. For the entire 57 studies with well-known sample sizes, the weighted average is 
only .15 (Gottfredson, 2003). Dilchert and Ones (2004) estimated the incremental validity of 
PI beyond AcI to be .02 and .03 for the prediction of job performance and academic success, 
respectively. 
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Critical Discussion 
Sternberg’s conception of PI is rather broad and similar to the unspecific and all-inclusive 
conceptions of trait EI (e.g. BarOn, 1999). Because of the scope of the construct, there are 
some differentiation problems from his success intelligence (Sternberg, 2005), as well as 
from SI emerge, reminding us of the problem of intelligence inflation (Weber & Westmeyer, 
2001, see also chapter 1.1). Another difficulty consists in the view of SI as a part of PI. Even 
though it is obvious that PI, according to Wagner and Sternberg as well as Ford, is quite 
similar to SI (with the combining part being TK), it seems to be presumptuous to include SI 
research occurring since 1920 in the “own conception” without a closer reflection. It is not yet 
settled how the purportedly multidimensional SI construct is actually related and integrated 
into PI. In my opinion, it is doubtful whether PI defined as TK is a separate construct beyond 
SI. It seems reasonable to include TK into SI. The specific PI that differs obviously from both 
AcI and SI is consequently better defined according to Mariacher and Neubauer (2005) or 
Sperber (1995). TK can be regarded as a superordinate mechanism that plays an important 
role in PI, SI, and EI. In Gottfredson’s (2003) view, the TK construct points to a form of 
experience and knowledge that lends itself to the development of wisdom (see chapter 
2.4.3). These theoretical considerations are supported by a closer examination of empirical 
results: Gottfredson (2003) states that Sternberg et al. have made an implausible claim that 
TK would reflect a general factor of intelligence that equals or exeeds g in generality and 
everyday utility. Their research presenting only meager data in a small number of small 
samples of higher-educated people (highly restricted samples), and working with many 
examples and anecdotes of mostly ill-educated people, does not justify a separate construct 
of tacit knowledge PI. Schmidt and Hunter (1993) also criticize the idea of tacit knowledge as 
something new and argue that the construct can be considered as an already existent and 
well-developed form of job knowledge rather than intelligence. Moreover, TKIM scales do not 
show sufficient reliability (average reliability of scales is alpha=.48). Austin et al. (2004) 
suggest to hold off on the question of whether PI can be treated as an intelligence because 
empirical studies are rare and show inconsistent results. Jensen (1993) remarks that “tacit 
knowledge seems to be an exceedingly mysterious variable, theoretically and empirically. 
We are told that it behaves like a personality factor (predicting “adjustment” in college), and 
that it also predicts scholastic performance. But then we are told that it is virtually 
uncorrelated with personality or with IQ or g, with almost anything else we know something 
about […].“ (p. 9) 
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2.3.3 Social Competence 
Social competence is poorly defined and scientifically not well integrated into models and 
theories. Nevertheless, it is a widely used construct, in both our daily life and the work 
environment. Often, it is even regarded as more important than intellectual abilities. 
Consequently, many different opinions about the construct and its components exist.  
 
Definitions and Models of Social Competence 
The prevailing conceptions of social competence depend on the corresponding psychological 
discipline. Clinical psychologists emphasize assertion of one’s own interests as socially 
competent behavior (e.g. Hintsch & Pfingsten, 2007). Within the field of developmental 
psychology, a socially competent person is able to adapt well to the norms and values of a 
society and the environment (Waters & Sroufe, 1983). According to Runde (2001, see also 
Kanning, 2002), these conflicting goals have to be balanced within an interaction situation. 
This compromise between adaptation and assertion reflects the view within 
Industrial/Organizational Psychology (see Kanning, 2003; Prechtl, 2005). Runde, Bastians, 
Kluge and Wübbelmann (2001) define social competences as “the knowledge and 
implementation of behavior in social interaction” (p. 3). Euler (2004) considers social 
competence as necessary in communication with other people. Social communication, in his 
opinion, is always specific for a certain situation. A successful social communication requires 
the person to behave appropriately. Euler (2004) regards this competence as a disposition 
for continuous behavior in specific types of situations. He postulates three dimensions of 
behavior: (1) recognition, (2) evaluation, and (3) skills/abilities. The communication with other 
people serves as a basis to apply social competences. Communication takes place on four 
levels: (1) object/domain, (2) relationship, (3) self-expression, and (4) purpose. By means of 
verbal and nonverbal expressions in a conversation all four types of information are given. 
The communication process is therefore dynamic. The possibility of misconceptions arises 
within the communicative behavior. The only way to measure socially competent behavior is 
by means of behavioral measures (situation exercises, observation of social behavior, etc.). 
According to Bechtoldt (2003), socially competent people are able to analyze human 
interactions and act purposefully. They have to have both perceptive and behavioral abilities, 
in order to be able to consider the interests of their interaction partners at the same time. 
That reflects once more the difficulty of measuring social competence properly, because 
several dimensions or variables have to be included into this concept. 
 
Definitions and models of social competence can be classified as being potential-based, 
behavior-oriented, or mixed. Models that are known as behavior-oriented can be described 
as being dependent upon the context, while models that focus on the potential /preconditions 
of a person are independent from the context. The latter models assume that the 
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characteristics that enable competent behavior exist independently from the given situation. 
In Table 2-8, three representative models are presented including their basic assumptions 
and differences.  
 
Table 2-8:  Models of Social Competence  
 Greif  
(1987) 
Kanning  
(2002) 
Schneider et al. 
(1996) 
Definitions of 
social 
competence 
Successful realization 
of aims and plans in 
social interaction 
situations. Social 
competence 
corresponds to socially 
competent behavior. 
Total knowledge, skills 
and abilities of a 
person, which support 
socially competent 
behavior (≈ context 
specific behavior that 
serves an aim that is 
socially accepted). 
Socially effective, 
instrumental 
behavior (directed 
towards social aims) 
and its cognitive, 
affective and 
behavioral 
antecedents. 
Characterstic 
dimensions 
• Social perception 
• Interpretation of 
social indicators 
• Social perception 
• Behavior control 
• Assertion ability 
• Social orientation 
• Communication ability
• Social intelligence 
• Social skills 
• Personality variabl. 
• Social self-
regulation 
Focusing 
potential 
vs. result 
result-oriented mixed model potential-oriented 
Dependence 
upon the social 
context 
yes yes no 
Evaluation 
standard 
efficiency efficiency and social 
acceptance 
efficiency 
Note. Table according to Süß et al., 2005, p. 356 
 
In the view of Greif (1987), the acting person evaluates and perceives the relevant situation 
parameters starting with a specified aim. The evaluation results in a certain behavior that 
leads to a modification of the environment. The result is compared with the original aim. The 
process described in a behavior-oriented closed-loop system continues as long as the result 
corresponds to the aim. Kanning (2002) starts from a different perspective: He describes 
social competence as a mixed model and postulates a structure model containing four 
dimensions (see Table 2-8). In addition, two process models are assumed: (1) the model of 
elaborated genesis and (2) the model of automatic genesis of socially competent behavior. 
Both models are similar to the considerations suggested by Greif and can be differentiated 
according to the mode of information processing of the relevant situation parameters. 
Whereas in the model of eleborated genesis the relevant situation parameters are analyzed 
consciously, they are processed heuristically in the model of automatic genesis, Schneider et 
al. (1996) regard social competence as the person’s potential, which does depend on the 
context. In this thesis, social competence is expected to subsume parts of Social, Emotional 
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and practical intelligence as well as moderator variables. The construct includes 
performance-based constructs such as SI as well as personality, interest, attitude and 
behavior variables such as self-monitoring, agreeableness, social commitment and altruism. 
 
Measurement of Social Competence 
The broadness of the social competence construct makes its measurement difficult, 
especially when the study is limited to only one indicator of social competence. Moreover, the 
lack of an explicit theory has a negative impact on systematic research (Kanning, 2002). 
Therefore, instruments are clearly orientated on practical needs (context of work 
environment) or are designed rather arbitrarily. Since social competence can be regarded as 
a conglomeration of SI, EI, PI, and additional personality and other variables, it is not 
possible to measure “one” social competence. Rather it should be specified which social 
competence aspect is measured (e.g. social intelligence). Alternatively, more than one or two 
instruments should be used. One could also state that the construct “social competence” is 
not specific enough to be able to operationalize it sensibly. 
 
Studies in the Domain of Social Competence 
Bechtold (2003) discovered that social competence is positively related to the suppression of 
negative emotions instead of coping with them. Integrative conflict management which can 
be regarded as the prototype of socially competent behavior, was positively related to 
positive affectivity and self-efficacy. In her study, 124 working people of different domains 
worked on the ISIS 2.0 (Interactive System for the Identification of Social competences, 
Runde et al., 1999, see chapter 2.2.3). Self-report instruments were used to assess the self-
concept and affectivity variables. Interpersonal conflict situations with colleagues, employees 
and superiors were recorded as well as the solutions used to cope with the problems. At the 
end of each of the four weeks, examination occurred. Bechtold (2003) concluded that 
performance-based social competence includes the ability to regulate one’s own behavior 
but not the ability to regulate one’s own emotions. She describes social competence as a 
performance characteristic, which should not be measured with self-report questionnaires (p. 
263). 
 
Several authors found a positive relationship of social skills and academic achievement: 
Feshbach and Feshbach (1987) reported strong relationships for girls between empathic 
skills at the age of 8-9 and reading and spelling at age 10-11. According to a study of Green, 
Forehand, Beck, and Vosk (1980), children with high academic achievement were more 
accepted, less rejected, and less disliked by peers. Their teachers saw them as less deviant, 
and they more frequently engaged in positive interactions with peers than children with low 
academic achievement. 
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2.3.4 Social Competences: An Integration Attempt 
Figure 2-7 illustrates our view of the overlap between SI, EI, and PI and their relationship to 
social competence. Obviously, we see these constructs as sharing common variance but 
also as having their unique parts. SI is completely included in the concept of social 
competence.  
 
Figure 2-7: Relationship Between Social Competence and Social, Emotional and Practical 
Intelligence 
 
We developed an integrative model of socially competent behavior that serves as a 
classification schema for social competences and as a tool to demonstrate their relationship 
(see Figure 2-8). Our model distinguishes between person characteristics, target-oriented 
actions (goal directed behavior) and evaluation standards. Each person has certain 
preconditions with respect to SI, EI, and PI (see Sternberg & Wagner, 1986) as well as 
specific values on moderating variables like altruism, self-monitoring or agreeableness. 
Potential and moderating variables together form the social competence of a person. The 
potential variables are action-independent and can be described as underlying variables that 
are expected to influence socially intelligent and competent behavior. However, having the 
cognitive preconditions to behave socially intelligently does not automatically imply a transfer 
of this ability into action. “A person might understand a social situation […] and be incapable 
of doing anything about it. To know is not to do.” (p. 5; O’Sullivan et al., 1965). In our view, 
moderator variables influence the pursuance of socially intelligent and socially competent 
behavior. We assume these abilities to be independent of the given context, thus emerging in 
a variety of contexts. Abilities are expected to have a direct influence on behavior. Whether a 
certain behavior is considered as socially intelligent or competent is determined by the social 
context (social situation the person is in, see also Kaiser, 1998, p. 229). In one situation it 
may be competent to help another person, while in another situation it may be more 
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adequate to be assertive. Wearing an evening dress is appropriate at a ball but not in a job 
application situation. Whether a certain behavior is competent or not is determined by the 
evaluation standard. Social behavior always pursues a certain aim, which does not have to 
be explicit or conscious. The effectiveness of a certain behavior depends on the degree to 
which the aim (e.g. promoting equity, caring and helping behavior, establishment of 
relationships, social responsibility, individuality, resource acquisition, safety, for more 
examples see Ford, 1994) is achieved. A behavior can be regarded as socially effective if the 
particular evaluation standard is attained. In addition, the social acceptance of the behavior 
has to be considered. Social acceptance depends on the culture (see example of Germany 
versus Japan in soup sipping, chapter 2.2.1). Behavior can be rated as socially competent if 
the means of goal attainment and the goal itself correspond to the group-specific (moral) 
norms and values (Süß et al., 2005). Knowledge that refers to social circumstances also 
depends on culture. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-8: Integrative Model of Social Competences (Süß, Weis, & Seidel, 2005)  
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2.4 Related Constructs and Research Domains of Social Competences 
In the view of laypersons, concepts such as empathy and wisdom are parts of the everyday 
life comprehension of SI (see e.g. Kaiser, 1998) beyond cognitive abilities (understanding 
others), behavior-related aspects (dealing with other people), and knowledge. Moreover, 
there are conceptions coming from different fields of science, namely, social cognition in 
social psychology and Theory of Mind (ToM) in neuropsychology. This chapter deals with the 
overlap and distinctiveness between these concepts and the SI construct. It would extend the 
scope of this thesis to relate the broad scope of associated constructs to SI (e.g. personality 
variables such as agreeableness and extraversion). Therefore, I selected those which are 
most often confused with SI and of which the position in the nomological network is least 
clear. 
 
2.4.1 Social Cognition and the Theory of Mind 
When talking about social intelligence, often the question of how SI can be differentiated 
from social cognition comes up. Social cognition deals with how people select, interpret and 
remember social information in order to make decisions and judgments (Aronson, Wilson, & 
Akert, 2004) and is also defined as the ability to interpret and predict others’ behavior in 
terms of their beliefs and intentions and to interact in complex social environments and 
relationships (Baron-Cohen, Ring, Bullmore, Wheelwright, Ashwin, & Williams, 2000). Both 
definitions are similar to the subconstructs we conceptualized as being parts of SI, namely 
perception, memory and understanding. Further support for the similarity of both constructs 
is provided by Adolphs (2003) as well as Grady and Keightley (2002), who subsume the 
ability to understand and respond to the emotional content and environmental cues as well 
as the ability to remember emotional information under the construct of social cognition. 
Correspondent with our definition of social intelligence, social cognition seems to include 
perception, memory and understanding of relevant social information that is used in order to 
make decisions and judgments (see Aronson et al., 2004) and to interact in complex social 
environments and relationships (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Since social cognition seems to 
include social behavior, it is similar to SI definitions that contain a behavioral as well as a 
cognitive component (see definitions of SI, chapter 2.2.1). Almost no empirical studies 
relating social cognition to social intelligence exist. An exception is a study of Ford (1982) 
who examined the relation between social cognition and social competence applying nine 
social cognition measures and four social competence measures. Social competence was 
measured by means of the Social Competence Nomination Form (SCNF, Levenson & 
Gottman, 1978) including self, peer, teacher, and interviewer ratings. Social cognition 
measures contain tests such as means-end thinking (i.e., subjects have to find possible 
solutions in unfinished stories dealing with a protagonist in critical social situations) and 
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awareness of consequences (i.e., subjects face a temptation conflict in which they have to 
describe the thoughts of the protagonist and the outcome of the situation). Both unpublished 
tasks are described in Platt and Spivack (cited by Ford, 1982). In addition, Hogan’s empathy 
scale was applied (see also chapter 2.2.3). Findings of Ford’s (1982) study show that social 
cognition is related to socially competent behavior (measured by the SNCF rating scale). 
Ford (1982) interpreted the result to indicate that socially competent adults are more 
cognitively resourceful in having more ways to address interpersonal problems and to 
construct plans and strategies for their solution. Empathy was strongly related to social 
competence measures, and higher social competence was associated with a larger and 
more elaborate social network. In addition, social competence tasks could be clearly 
separated from AcI. Although I appreciate this rare work of Ford (1982), there are some 
critical aspects which have to be considered in the interpretation of the results. First, Ford 
(1982) defines social competence as “the attainment of relevant social goals in specified 
social contexts, using appropriate means and resulting in positive developmental outcomes.” 
(p. 323). However, whether an outcome is positive depends on the social context and of the 
evaluation processes of each individual involved in the social situation. The outcome may be 
positive for one person but negative for the other. Second, whereas in other studies Hogan’s 
empathy scale was used to assess SI and social competence (see chapter 2.2.3), Ford 
(1982) uses it to measure social cognition. Third, some of the social cognition measures 
applied in Ford’s study could also serve as social cognitive flexibility measures.  
 
One particular aspect of “social cognition” is the Theory of Mind (ToM, see e.g., Adolphs, 
2001). ToM should explain the ability to attribute mental states to oneself or another person 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978) or infer other persons’ mental states and emotions (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). We use this ability to make sense of or to 
predict another person's behavior (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). ToM is also known as 
“mentalising'' (Morton, Frith & Leslie, 1991), “mind reading'' (Whiten, 1991), and “social 
intelligence'' (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), and overlaps with the 
term “empathy''. ToM represents an evolved psychological capacity most highly developed in 
humans. It probably emerged as an adaptive response to increasingly complex primate 
social interaction (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). Understanding a speaker’s intention is a 
precondition for learning new words. A child begins to distinguish between own and others’ 
mental states (e.g., “I think”) at the age of four (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). The authors 
conclude that the development of ToM is paralleled by language acquisition. Their view is 
confirmed by Sperber and Wilson (2002), who regard the ToM as a prerequisite for the 
pragmatic use of human language. Greig et al. (2004) and Brüne and Bodenstein (2005) 
provide empirical findings showing that a violation of the rules of pragmatic use of language 
is linked to patients’ impaired ToM in schizophrenia.  
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ToM is mainly applied in the clinical context for the diagnosis of cognitive dysfunction and the 
comparison between clinical and normal groups with regard to understanding and 
interpreting other people’s behavior (see e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). ToM tests can be 
classified into (1) standard tests (e.g., (dis)prove that others can hold false beliefs different 
from one’s own (correct) knowledge), (2) tests including the understanding of higher order 
false belief tasks, metaphor, irony, and faux pas (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006) and (3) tests 
for adults with psychopathological conditions, containing short stories with double bluff, 
mistakes, persuasions, cartoons, or other visually presented material (see Brüne & Brüne-
Cohrs, 2006). ToM tests are rarely available for the diagnosis of mild deficits in adults. The 
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes'' test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) is an exception and can be 
considered as an “advanced ToM test.” It taps one’s ability to put himself/herself into the 
mind of another person and “tune in'' to their mental state by using 25 photographs of the 
eye-region of the face in different actors. The test taker is asked to choose which of two 
words (in the revised version four words) best describes the feelings and thoughts of the 
person. Another popular ToM test is the “Faux-Pas recognition test” (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & 
Knight, 1998; Gregory, Lough, Stone, Erzinclioglu, Martin, Baron-Cohen, & Hodges, 2002), 
which presents written scenarios to test takers. The subjects have to answer questions 
concerning awkward behaviors as well as thoughts and feelings of the person in question. 
The following example gives an impression of the task.  
 
Text: 
Vicky was at a party at her friend Oliver’s house. She was talking to Oliver when another 
woman came up to them. She was one of Oliver’s neighbors. The woman said, "Hello," then 
turned to Vicky and said, "I don't think we've met. I’m Maria, what's your name?" "I’m Vicky." 
"Would anyone like something to drink?" Oliver asked. 
 
Test takers have to answer questions like “Did anyone say something they shouldn't have 
said or something awkward?” If yes, ask: “Who said something they shouldn't have said or 
something awkward?”, “Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?”, “Why do 
you think he/she said it?”, “Did Oliver know that Vicky and Maria did not know each other?”, 
“How do you think Vicky felt?” The task also contains control questions to ensure proper 
understanding (e.g., “In the story, where was Vicky?”, “Did Vicky and Maria know each 
other?”) (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002). 
 
To summarize and conclude, the instruments that are used to assess social cognition and 
ToM are quite similar to social and emotional understanding tasks involving additional 
knowledge and flexibility components (see also emotional expression of faces and word 
described in Keightley, Winocur, Burianova, Hongwanishkul, & Grady, 2006). In all research 
traditions, differential and diagnostic psychology (social intelligence), social psychology 
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(social cognition), and (clinical) neuropsychology (ToM), the same construct seems to be 
subject of investigation. However, the term social cognition consisting of cognitions, emotions 
(see Adolphs, 2003; Grady & Keightley, 2002), and behaviors is in my opinion rather 
inappropriate. It is not specified what social cognition actually is and how it is related to other 
constructs. I agree with Adolphs (2001), who claimed that the components and boundaries of 
social cognition are for the most part ill-defined. Reasons for this lack are probably a different 
research approach in social- and neuropsychology, which lacks the profound methodology 
common in differential psychology, combined with interests in processes rather than in 
structures. In spite of the fact that parts of social cognition appear to be equal to what we 
define as SI (i.e., underlying components that determine the degree to which socially 
competent behavior can be shown), the research traditions differ considering the starting 
point. The social cognition research tradition focuses on general laws/general phenomena 
(e.g., the actor-observer difference, schemata and heuristics to facilitate judgments), 
whereas SI in differential psychology concentrates on individual structures and traits. Tests 
of social cognition and ToM tests also lack systematic development and an underlying 
theoretical model, and are subject to methodological shortcomings. Although some major 
methodological deficits were corrected in earlier versions of the ToM tests (see e.g. two 
options to choose, Baron-Cohen) the concentration on static stimuli does not do justice to the 
dynamic nature of the real world (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
 
2.4.2 Empathy 
It is not surprising that SI and EI often get confused with empathy, because both constructs 
claim to contain parts of the empathy construct. Moreover, within both EI and SI research 
traditions, empathy instruments were used to measure either EI or SI. In many trait 
conceptions of EI, empathy is an integral part (e.g. Goleman, 1995, 1998; Bar-On, 1997; 
Petrides & Furnham, 2003). Some empathy measures were applied as SI measures (e.g. 
Hogan Empathy Scale, 1969, see chapter 2.2.3), and some SI measures were used for 
research about empathy (e.g. the Chapin Social Insight Test, reported in Davis, 1996). In 
spite of these conception problems, people intuitively seem to assume that there is a specific 
empathy construct that differs from already defined SI and EI conceptions. Maybe therefore, 
in the literature, the question about the difference between empathy and various other 
constructs (e.g. emotional and social intelligence) is rarely addressed and far from reaching a 
consensus among researchers. 
 
Definitions and Constituents of the Empathy Construct 
There has been considerable confusion regarding the definition and measurement of 
empathy (Riggio, Tucker, & Coffaro, 1989). Knowledge concerning the essential constituents 
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in experiences of empathy is scarce (Håkansson & Montgomery, 2003). In the following, I 
only summarize some of the existing definitions and include my comments about their 
relationship to SI and other related constructs in parentheses. Dymond (1950, S. 343) 
defines empathy as the imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and 
acting of another. In his view, insight is the relationship between self-perception and 
perception of the self by other (similar to social perception and understanding). In the 
perspective of Davis (1983), empathy refers to the reactions of one individual to the observed 
experiences of another (social perception and correspondent social behavior). According to 
Marlowe (1986), the ability to cognitively and affectively understand others can be regarded 
as an empathic ability (social understanding and its transposition into social behavior). 
According to Feshbach and Feshbach (1982), empathy includes three essential components: 
(1) the ability to use relevant information in order to perceive, recognize and label emotions; 
(2) perspective and role-taking as the ability to assume and experience another person’s 
viewpoint; and (3) emotional responsiveness as the ability to share another person’s feelings. 
These components overlap with regard to EI (see 1) and SI (see 2), which are cognitive. 
Specific to empathy seems to be the actual empathic behaviour (see 3). Bohart and 
Greenberg (1997) summarize that most definitions of empathy include the idea of “trying to 
sense, perceive, share or conceptualize how another person is experiencing the world” (p. 
419). 
 
One can distinguish between two research traditions, cognitive empathy (includes 
perspective-taking) and emotional empathy (i.e. vicarious experience of another person’s 
emotional state). Cognitive empathy is measured mainly through the Hogan Empathy Scale 
(HES, Hogan, 1969), whereas emotional empathy is measured by means of the Mehrabian 
and Epstein Questionnaire measure of emotional empathy (QMEE, Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972), both being self-report measures. Davis (1980), however, includes both traditions in his 
conception of empathy and even adds two additional components. Davis describes empathy 
as a multidimensional construct and views it as the phenomenon that connects two otherwise 
isolated individuals to each other: the empathizer, who empathizes with another person, the 
target (Davis, 1996). He discriminates between perspective-taking as the ability to adopt the 
point of view of others (cognitive empathy) and empathic concern as other-oriented feelings 
of sympathy and concern for unfortunate others (affective empathy), fantasy (i.e., tendencies 
to transpose oneself to fictitious characters), and personal distress (i.e., self-oriented feelings 
of personal anxiety and unease in tense interpersonal settings). Those four dimensions 
should be measured through the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), a 28-item self-report 
measure. Understanding as a result of perspective-taking should be considered an aspect of 
empathy (Davis, 1996). In Davis’ studies, perspective-taking was related to interpersonal 
functioning (i.e., implies higher extraversion and self esteem, lower social dysfunction). There 
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was no relationship with AcI (SAT, WAIS). Concerning the scales “fantasy” and “empathic 
concern,” there was no relationship with interpersonal functioning.  
 
Perceived similarity facilitates empathic response (Hoffman, 2000; Krebs, 1975), and 
empathy seems to increase with age (Björkvist, Österman, & Kaukiainen, 2000). A lack of 
empathy is also associated with the so-called Machiavellianism. A machiavellian person 
makes use of social competence to manipulate people to reach his or her own aims. The 
ability to perceive feelings of other people has only strategic aims and does not serve the 
establishment of relationships. Machiavellian persons establish relationships without social 
closeness since such relationships could obstruct the assertion of their own aims. These 
people are not tied to social norms and values (Christie & Geis, 1970). Empathy exerts an 
influence on social relationships and outcomes through its impact on the frequency of 
specific relationship behaviors and the perception those behaviors create in social partners 
(Davis, 1996). Empathy is the affective response that stems from the accurate apprehension 
or comprehension of another person’s emotional states. It often turns into sympathy or 
personal distress. 
 
Uniqueness of Empathy? - Its Relationship to Social Intelligence and Emotional Intelligence 
in the Nomological Network 
Regarding the suggested constituent parts of empathy, we have to query, what constitutes 
the specific empathic part that is not yet included in other constructs? In a study of Riggio et 
al. (1989), 171 undergraduates worked on the Social Skills Inventory (SSI), various empathy 
scales, an essay empathy task (i.e. they had to write about social failure and success), and 
on an emotional perception performance measure (Pictures of Facial Affect; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1975). Correlations between SSI and the empathy scales were positive and 
significant. Riggio et al. (1989) conclude that there is a tremendous overlap between social 
skills and empathy. Björkvist et al. (2000) believe that the socially intelligent individual is 
capable of producing socially intelligent behavior according to the goal he or she desires. 
This goal may be hostile or peaceful. 
 
Empathy, according to most of the above mentioned definitions, is seen as putting oneself 
into someone’s feelings, thoughts and actions (similar to SU), but more than that, to feel for 
that person. Concerning the relationship to SI, a person high in SU should have better 
preconditions for empathy than a person low in SU. This hypothesis is supported by 
Kaukiainen, Björkqvist, Lagerspetz, Österman, Salmivalli, Rothberg, and Ahlbom (1999), who 
regard the cognitive part of the empathy definition as nearly equivalent to the SI component 
social understanding. SI constitutes cognitive preconditions, whereas empathy can be 
regarded as a behavior. SI could be either positive (e.g., show empathic behavior, peaceful 
conflict resolution) or negative (ignoring the other person, asserting one’s own goals) 
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concerning the relevant aims in the situation. Empathy, however, can be considered as 
completely positive (on condition that it is not exaggerated).  
 
The relationship between empathy and EI is quite similar when emotions are directed 
towards other people: an emotionally intelligent person (perceiving and understanding the 
emotions of others) should be more likely to show empathy than a person who does not have 
this ability. However, an emotionally intelligent person does not necessarily show empathy. 
That person can also use the ability for his or her own sake. I think that the specific part of 
the empathy conception is a feeling for other people that is rather behavioral than a cognitive 
precondition. All cognitive aspects mentioned in the context of empathy can be described 
through SI and EI. In my view, empathizing can be regarded as one component of socially 
intelligent behavior (provided that it is used for a certain aim). 
 
2.4.3 Wisdom 
“For wisdom, which is the worker of all things, taught me: for in her is an understanding spirit 
holy, one only, manifold, subtil, lively, clear, undefiled, plain, not subject to hurt, loving the 
thing that is good quick, which cannot be letted, ready to do good. Kind to man, steadfast, 
sure, free from care, having all power, overseeing all things, and going through all 
understanding, pure, and most subtil, spirits. For wisdom is more moving than any motion: 
she passed and went through all things by reason of her pureness.“ (Wisdom 7, 22-23, 
Douay-Rheims, American Ed., 1899). Refering to this citation, it appears that wisdom has to 
do with (1) a sense of understanding, (2) that it has good consequences (happiness, 
pleasantness, peace, honor, glory) (3) and that it results in socially positive behavior. Similar 
components are listed in the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. In theory and research, 
implicit and explicit theoretical approaches to explore the construct of wisdom have to be 
distinguished. Implicit approaches try to find out how laypersons describe wise people, 
whereas explicit approaches focus on experts’ views of wisdom. According to results of 
implicit approaches, Holliday and Chandler (1986) characterize a wise person as having 
extraordinary understanding of life problems, communicative abilities, interpersonal 
competences and social “unobtrusiveness.“ In Sternberg’s view (1990), a wise person tries to 
avoid schemata of thinking and behavior but is able to understand automatic (schematic) 
thinking and behavior in others. A wise person tries to get an understanding of automatic 
assumptions of other people and their behavior (use of assumptions). With regard to results 
that stem from explicit-theoretical approaches, Baltes and Smith (1990) describe wise people 
as experts for life questions, including questions about living together (pragmatics of 
intelligence, Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987, p. 2f). Baltes and Staudinger (1993, see also Baltes, 
Smith & Staudinger, 1992) propose five components of wisdom: (1) rich factual knowledge, 
(general and specific about life conditions), (2) rich procedural knowledge (general and 
2  Theoretical Background 
 81 
specific about strategies of judgment and advice concerning matters of life), (3) life-span 
contextualism (knowledge about the contexts of life and their temporal relationships), (4) 
relativism (knowledge about differences in values, goals and priorities) and (5) uncertainty 
(knowledge about relative indeterminacy and unpredictability of life and ways to manage). An 
expert’s answer should reflect more of these components whereas a novice’s answer should 
reflect fewer of these components. Data support this assumption. 
 
Wisdom in the Context of the Related Constructs Social, Emotional and Practical Intelligence 
In Sternberg’s view, wisdom has its core in tacit knowledge (TK), which is associated with 
practical intelligence (PI, see chapter 2.3.2). Sternberg (2000) defines wisdom as the 
application of TK as mediated by values toward the goal of achieving a common good 
through a balance among multiple, often competing, interests (inter-, intra-, and 
extrapersonal) and responses to environmental contexts (adaptation and shaping to existing 
environmental contexts, selection of new environmental contexts). In contrast to wisdom, in 
PI any sets of interests (individual or collective) should be maximized (Sternberg, 2000). 
According to Sternberg (2000), wisdom is at least partially domain specific, because TK is 
acquired within a given (set of) context(s). The ability to be wise may transfer, but the actual 
content of wise advice may vary. A wise person will know the limitations of his or her TK. 
Intelligence seems to be a precondition, necessary but not sufficient to be wise, and wisdom 
seems to be more related to crystallized than to fluid intelligence. Similar to empathy, all 
cognitive preconditions, PI, SI and EI can lead to good or bad aims, whereas wisdom always 
seeks the common good and fair judgment and balance interests. Sowarka (1989, p. 95) 
expresses the similarity of wisdom and SI through the notion that in his opinion, SI tests can 
measure common aspects of wisdom. Wisdom requires major EI components 
(understanding, judging and regulating emotions) but goes far beyond EI.  
 
Conclusion 
Conclusively, wisdom is based on preconditions such as PI (tacit knowledge), SI 
(understanding of other people), and EI (judgment and regulation of emotions) but goes 
beyond these constructs. Whereas PI, SI and EI can be regarded as preconditions of socially 
intelligent behavior, wisdom is part of that behavior; it can only become obvious in expressed 
behavior (consultations, judgments). This uncovers another difference: whereas the cognitive 
constructs (i.e., SI, PI, and EI) should be assessed with performance measures and have 
one completely correct solution, in wisdom there is no correct solution but different ways that 
will have different consequences.  
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2.5 Auditory Abilities as a Domain of Intelligence 
Besides SI and its relationship to familiar conceptions, the construct of auditory intelligence 
(AuI) should be explored within this dissertation and be related to AcI. Despite their 
importance (see chapter 1.1) and although many studies dealt with auditory abilities, they 
were almost never integrated in models or tests of intelligence (i. e., facet and hierarchical 
theories that exist in the domain of musical abilities). That does not do justice to the 
significance auditory abilities have. According to Atkin, Bray, Davison, Herzberger, 
Humphreys, and Selzer (1977), the expression of abilities in auditory tasks may be an even 
better indicator of “human intelligence” than expression through visual tasks. The next 
chapter provides theoretical knowledge about auditory abilities with regard to definitions, 
concepts, models and theories of auditory and the closely related musical abilities. Auditory 
and musical abilities will be classified in the nomological network with a focus on their 
relationship to AcI. Approaches will be described dealing with the past work that was 
conducted in order to measure auditory abilities. This chapter finishes with my own 
conception of auditory intellectual abilities and my suggestion for an approach to measure 
them. 
 
2.5.1 Auditory Abilities: Definitions and Conceptions 
Stankov (1994, p. 157) defines auditory abilities in the broadest sense as cognitive abilities 
that depend on sound as input and on the functioning of our hearing apparatus, 
encompassing simple sensory processes and abilities required for the solution of complex 
problems (verbally or musically). Carroll (1993) provides a very similar view in regarding 
auditory ability more specifically as depending mainly on the characteristics of the auditory 
stimulus itself and the individual’s capacity to apprehend, recognize, discriminate, or even 
ignore those characteristics, independent of the individual’s knowledge of structures (e.g. in 
language or in music) that determine the overall pattern of an extended auditory signal. He 
discriminates these abilities from those that are not strictly auditory abilities, e.g. speech 
comprehension or musical apprehension. Speech comprehension, according to Carroll, can 
only be regarded as an auditory ability when the signal is distorted or attenuated so that 
interference with normal speech comprehension occurs. Speech comprehension usually 
depends on knowledge of a language, only secondarily on auditory ability. Similarly, music 
appreciation ability can be regarded as an auditory receptive ability only as long as it 
depends on the individual’s capacity to perceive and discriminate those features that make 
an appreciation possible. Buttsworth, Fogarty and Rorke (1993) subsume listening skills, 
including intonation, pitch discrimination etc., under the concept of aural abilities. Results 
indicate that musical aptitude is a “general ability to make discriminations and judgments with 
respect to all attributes of musical sounds” (Carroll, 1993, p. 373), at the same time 
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comprised of different abilities in this domain depending on particular attributes of musical 
sounds or types of musical material. However, the differentiation between music and sound 
is, especially in the context of modern music, difficult. Bruhn, Oerter and Rösing (1993) 
suggest including sounds in music if the person who listens directs the attention to the 
sound. Stoffer and Oerter (2005) supplement this necessary but not sufficient condition by 
proclaiming that the sound also has to follow familiar conventions (e.g. a periodic structure 
that is similar to rhythm). An early distinction between musical and tonal psychology (Kurth, 
1931) describes tonal psychology as referring to single impressions (tone, interval, chord, 
rhythmic pattern etc.) whereas music psychology regards the whole.  
 
2.5.2 Auditory Abilities Within Established Models of Intelligence 
Within well-known structure models of intelligence, only Guilford (1967, content domain: 
auditory), Gardner (1983, musical intelligence), Horn-Cattell-Noll (see e.g. Horn & Noll, 
1997), and Carroll (1993, broad auditory perception ability) include auditory abilities, as well 
as the integrative CHC theory (see chapter 2.1.3; McGrew & Evans, 2004). 
 
Within Guilford’s facet model (1967, for a figure and description see chapter 2.2.2), auditory 
abilities can be classified in the symbolic input. Symbolic (S) input according to Guilford 
means that information is provided in single symbols that do not make sense in a single unit 
(e.g., letters, numbers, tones, and single words). Comparable to social abilities (see chapter 
2.2), AuI is composed of 5 (operations) x 6 (products) = 30 different abilities using tonal 
symbols as a content domain. According to Gardner (1983) (see also chapter 2.2.2), musical 
intelligence involves skill in the performance, composition, and appreciation of musical 
patterns. It encompasses the capacity to recognize and compose musical pitches, tones, and 
rhythms, with pitch and rhythm being central aspects of musical intelligence. He regards 
musical intelligence running in a pattern almost structurally parallel to linguistic intelligence. 
Both authors, Guilford and Gardner, with their inclusion of musical/auditory abilities but also 
social/interpersonal abilities (see chapter 2.2.2), significantly contributed to a broader view of 
intelligence research. 
 
Horn and Noll (1997) included a broad auditory function on a second level. The auditory 
factor together with the visual factor is seen as a perceptual ability. The authors of the 
Woodcock-Johnson test III (Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) assume a clear 
association between reading achievement and the ability to analyze and interpret sounds in 
words. Auditory processing in their view is also closely related to short-term memory (STM). 
According to Schrank (2006), poor performance in STM is often associated with problems in 
auditory processing, since STM relies on the process of acoustic-articulatory coding. 
McGrew (1994) defines Ga as “a combination of Incomplete Words and Sound Blending 
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tests that measures the ability to analyze and synthesize auditory-linguistic stimuli” (p. 1156) 
(see below for a description). 
 
One of the broadest categorization models of intelligence is Carroll’s (1993) Three-Stratum 
model, which was already mentioned in chapter 2.1.3. Based on the reanalysis of 38 
available datasets, Carroll (1993) proclaimed a broad auditory perception factor indicated by 
discrimination or perception of auditory sounds or speech. The broad auditory perception 
factor is classified with fluid and crystallized intelligence, general memory, learning and visual 
perception on the second stratum of his model (see also Figure 2-9). Carroll found the 
auditory factor to consist of twelve primary level abilities on the first stratum: (1) hearing and 
speech threshold; (2) speech sound discrimination; general sound discrimination, namely; (3) 
sound frequency and sound (4) intensity discrimination; (5) duration discrimination and (6) 
musical discrimination and judgment; (7) resistance to auditory stimulus distortion (SPUD); 
(8) temporal tracking; (9) maintaining and judging rhythm; (10) memory for sound patterns; 
(11) absolute pitch; and (12) sound localization. Within hearing and speech threshold (factor 
1), Carroll found that auditory tests including speech exceed pure auditory threshold tasks. 
This finding corresponds to the results of Surprenant and Watson (2001), whose speech 
tasks explained variance in performance that was different from variance explained by pure 
tone tasks. Although Carroll clearly separated musical abilities from auditory abilities (see 
definition), he included musical discrimination and judgment (factor 6) as an auditory factor. 
However, the relevant tonal tests provide nearly any musical context and depend to a great 
deal on tests of elementary discriminations among tonal materials. Rhythm ability (factor 9) 
surely has to do with the ability to discriminate time relationships. Carroll (1993) therefore 
raises the question whether maintaining a beat is truly an auditory ability or should rather be 
considered as a temporal ability. SPUD seems to be different from processes that are 
required in the visual domain (visual closure). Temporal tracking found in a dataset of 
Stankov and Horn (1980) has potential as a separate individual differences factor, as it is not 
restricted to auditory content. Carroll also includes the factors of absolute pitch (11) and of 
sound localization (12). Since absolute pitch is relatively rare, a separate factor could not be 
identified in the studies Carroll reanalysed. Sound localization ability was identified in the 
study of Aftanas and Royce (1969) and until now was replicated in only one study (Dun, 
2000). As is mentioned in the name of the factor (broad auditory perception), most of the 
factors seem to deal with discrimination and perception of auditory stimuli (factors 1-5, 7, as 
well as parts of 6, 8 and 11). The remaining factors can be classified as requiring memory 
abilities (10, parts of 9); reasoning (judgment) abilities (parts of 6 and 9); or special abilities, 
like temporal abilities (parts of 8 and 9), localization abilities (12) and expert abilities (11). A 
closer look at Carroll’s Three-Stratum model (1993), finds that all abilities except the auditory 
are covered by the abilities described in the Berlin Model of Intelligence Structure (BIS, 
Jäger, 1984, see chapter 2.1.5). 
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Figure 2-9: Abilities of the Three-Stratum Theory (Carroll, 1993) Covered by the BIS 
Note: Auditory abilities are highlighted with a frame; BIS-R=reasoning; BIS-M=memory; BIS-F=figural; BIS-
C=creativity; BIS-S=processing speed; BIS-AcI=Academic intelligence 
 
In chapter 2.1.3, I mentioned that an auditory processing factor is included in CHC theory 
(see McGrew & Evans, 2004). This factor includes some of the primary abilities Carroll 
suggested in his reanalysis (1993), which stem from the studies carried out by Stankov and 
Horn (1980). The Ga factor in the corresponding Woodcock-Johnson Test battery (WJ III) is 
measured by the subtests Incomplete Words and Sound Blending representing the factors 
“Maintaining and judging rhythm” (in spoken language), “SPUD”, and “Listening verbal 
comprehension”. 
 
According to my review, an established intelligence test measuring auditory abilities 
extensively and appropriately does not exist. However, there were two comparatively broad 
attempts to measure auditory abilities or parts of auditory abilities: the Test of Basic Auditory 
Capabilities (TBAC, Watson, Johnson, Lehman, Kelly, & Jensen, 1982, revised by 
Surprenant & Watson, 2001), and the auditory test battery described in Stankov and Horn 
(1980, Horn & Stankov, 1982). Moreover, auditory intellectual abilities are covered in the WJ 
III (see Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001). Their assessment will be described in the next 
chapter 2.5.3. 
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2.5.3 Auditory Ability Tests 
Approach of Watson et al. (1982, Surprenant & Watson, 2001) 
Watson et al. (1982) developed an extensive Test of Basic Auditory Capabilities (TBAC). The 
test concentrates on auditory discrimination abilities and comprises seven discrimination 
subtests (pitch discrimination, single-tone intensity discrimination, single-tone duration 
discrimination, pulse/train discrimination, embedded test-tone loudness, temporal order for 
tones, temporal order for syllables) and one nonsense syllable identification test. There are 
eight levels of difficulty for the seven discrimination tests. In the eighth test, subjects hear 
nonsense syllables in cafeteria noise and are asked to identify the sound by choosing one of 
three written alternatives. Christopherson and Humes (1992) report a general reliability value 
of .76 for the TBAC. The revised version (Surprenant & Watson, 2001) contains additional 
subtests of speech processing abilities. Surprenant and Watson (2001) report an overall 
alpha of .78 (including TBAC and supplemental speech tests), .75 for the TBAC alone and 
.64 for the supplemental speech tests alone. For the revised version, a factor analysis with 
93 subjects (principal components analysis, Varimax, extraction criterion: eigenvalue > 1) 
revealed a three factor structure that was able to explain 54% of the total variance. The 
factors were interpreted as (1) nonspeech discrimination (including most of the TBAC 
measures), (2) speech identification (including supplementary speech tests and the syllable 
identification test), and (3) temporal order discrimination (including the two temporal order 
tests, Surprenant & Watson, 2001). The temporal order tests resemble the temporal tracking 
ability identified by Stankov and Horn (1980) and reported in Carroll’s reanalysis (see this 
section). The results indicate that speech and nonspeech tests administered in this study 
share very little common variance. Surprenant and Watson (2001) performed a factor 
analysis on the data with 45 participants and included measures of AcI (Scholastic Aptitude 
Test, SAT, Educational Testing Service, and grade point average, GPA) in addition to the 
TBAC and the three supplemental speech tests. A four-factor solution resulted out of this 
study: AcI indicators (SAT, GPA) as well as temporal-order variables of the TBAC (Tones 
and Syllables) loaded on the first factor. The second factor subsumed tests of hearing 
threshold. The third factor consisted of nonspeech TBAC tests and the fourth factor was 
made of speech tests. This study is a further hint of the partial independence of speech and 
nonspeech auditory abilities. Speech processing measures correlated only weakly with 
measures of spectral and temporal auditory resolving power. However, the expressiveness 
of the results is doubtful, as the sample size was rather small (45 students). The first six 
TBAC subtests based on tones were strongly interrelated (mean .48, range: .35 - .65) 
(Watson & Miller, 1993). Principal components factor analysis revealed one factor, 
accounting for 57.2% of the variance (N=94 undergraduates). Watson (1991) reports 
correlations with the SAT ranging between .30 and .42 applying six of the TBAC tests. Later 
on, the tests “modulation detection for sinusoidally amplitude modulated tones (SAM) and for 
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ripple-noise bursts, gap detection and gap discrimination, identification of noise-masked 
familiar environmental sounds (such as doors closing, electric saws, cars starting, doors 
barking, etc.) were added (Kidd, Watson, & Gygi, 2000; total of 19 tasks administered to 340 
subjects). Results show a relative independence of speech processing tasks with words, 
nonsense CVCs (consonant-vowel-consonants) and sentences concerning other auditory 
abilities (Watson & Kidd, 2005). Results of their study indicate again that speech (and 
familiar non-speech sounds) is special and different from tones and other auditory stimuli.  
 
Approach of Stankov and Horn (1980; Horn & Stankov, 1982; Stankov, 1980) 
Since the end of the 1970s, there was not much interest in auditory abilities. Horn (1968) first 
had the idea of a broad auditory ability factor. He realized that an auditory factor 
corresponding to the primary visual abilities second order factor was missing. Since then, 
Stankov and Horn (Stankov, 1983; Stankov & Horn, 1980; Stankov & Spilsbury, 1978) 
searched for hints of a primary mental ability concerning auditory measures. They based 
their test construction on marker tests in the visual domain. Corresponding to tasks within the 
visual domain, auditory tasks should make use of basic stimuli as pure tones, chords and 
voices. Intensity and pitch were used as the main fundaments for the construction of auditory 
tests analogous to the fundaments of line and shape in visual tests. Stankov (1971) 
describes those fundaments as contents that should be distinguished from the cognitive 
operation that is required (discrimination, memory and reasoning). The auditory tasks they 
developed should demand the same cognitive operations as visual tasks but apply auditory 
material. For their tonal tasks, Stankov and Horn used piano tones and pure tones. 
Moreover, Stankov and Horn (1980) included tasks of music and language (speech) 
perception ability. They selected and developed tasks according to findings in the domain of 
music abilities (Drake, 1939; Karlin, 1941; McLeish, 1950; Seashore, Lewis, & Saetveit, 
1960; Shuter, 1968; Wing, 1948) as well as results in the domain of speech perception and 
listening comprehension (Fleishman, Roberts, & Freidman, 1958; Hanley, 1956; Karlin, 1941; 
Solomon, Webster, & Cirtis, 1960; Spearritt, 1962; Sticht, 1972; White, 1954). In one of their 
main studies, 241 adult males participated and worked on more than 50 different auditory 
tests consisting of speech and musical material. Including 44 tests, factor analysis revealed a 
second order general auditory factor (Ga) which can be located next to a broad visual ability 
factor and seven primary auditory ability factors. The factors were interpreted as (1) tonal 
memory, (2) speech perception under distraction (SPUD), (3) verbal comprehension, (4) 
immediate memory, (5) cognition of relationships, (6) discrimination among sound patterns, 
and (7) maintaining/judging rhythm as primary auditory abilities (Stankov, 1983; Stankov & 
Horn, 1980; Stankov & Spilsbury, 1978). In addition, they discovered an ability called 
“temporal tracking,” which is regarded as important for the understanding of language with 
extreme high or low tempo. Temporal tracking is expected to be related to working memory 
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(Stankov, 1983). The label “temporal tracking” emphasizes the sequential nature of many 
working memory aspects (temporal) and the specific mental manipulation (mental tracking). 
Temporal tracking was also found in the already reported study conducted by Surprenant 
and Watson (2001, temporal order factors). Four of five tests of loudness discrimination were 
excluded because of low reliability. That is probably the reason the expected loudness 
discrimination factor did not emerge. The primary abilities are quite different but can be 
sorted in categories of being more likely related to discrimination/perceptual abilities (factors 
2, 6), to memory (factors 1, 4, parts of 7) or reasoning abilities (factors 3, 5, parts of 7).  
 
Correlations between the seven primary factors are generally positive, whereby listening 
verbal comprehension, temporal tracking, auditory cognition of relationships, and 
discrimination of auditory sound patterns form an intercorrelation cluster that is assumed to 
represent crystallized intelligence (gc, Stankov & Horn, 1980). The relationship between 
listening verbal comprehension and maintaining and judging rhythm (which is expected to 
have a moderate relationship to gc) seems to support this hypothesis. However, temporal 
tracking was identified as an indicator of fluid intelligence in other studies (see e.g., Stankov, 
1983; Carroll, 1993). Memory for sound patterns and discrimination of auditory sound 
patterns seem to represent fluid intelligence (gf). Speed under distraction as well as 
maintaining and judging rhythm could indicate a broad auditory function similar to a broad 
visual function that has already been identified.  
 
The primary level factors making up Ga require holistic comprehension of sounds and 
patterns among sounds in many different ways. They have to be differentiated from auditory 
acuity tests (e.g. pitch and loudness discrimination). Within auditory acuity tests, subjects 
have to deal with mutilated and incomplete sounds. This kind of ability dimension is 
characterized by variables pointing to very elementary processes of simple discrimination 
and seeming to represent organization among sensory detector functions of hearing (low in 
hierarchy). In additional analyses of Horn and Stankov (1982), listening verbal 
comprehension is not part of Ga. A major proportion of variance in this factor seems to be 
involved in the verbal intellectual comprehension represented by gc and in sound 
discrimination. It does not seem surprising that several auditory tasks load on gf and are 
expected to be related to working memory. Auditory ability tasks require a capacity for 
maintaining awareness, and good reasoning requires maintaining the elements of a 
reasoning problem within the span of immediate apprehension. In 1994, Stankov classifies 
the auditory primary factors into three layers. On the first layer, sensory detection tasks (e.g., 
pitch discrimination) can be classified. The second layer consists of tasks expected to tap 
perceptual processes (e.g., SPUD). The third layer contains tasks such as tonal reordering 
and cloze, which affect higher order intellective processes (see Stankov, 1994).  
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Earlier researchers expected verbal tasks to be better performed by the left hemisphere and 
tonal tasks by the right hemisphere. Stankov (1980) investigated whether one ear (and the 
opposite hemisphere) is superior in performing a certain auditory task. He worked with four 
primaries of the auditory ability, namely temporal tracking, SPUD, maintaining and judging 
rhythm and tonal memory. He assumed Ga and Gv to be broad perceptual factor and located 
Gv processing mainly to the right hemisphere based on former research. His findings reveal 
that tonal memory was better performed by the right hemisphere and corresponding left ear. 
Temporal tracking and verbal comprehension, however, were better performed by the right 
ear and corresponding left hemisphere. SPUD and “maintaining and judging rhythm,” as well 
as other auditory factors did not show any ear and hemisphere preference. Therefore, former 
assumptions could be confirmed only partially. Stankov (1980) also claims that Gv is different 
from Ga. He assumes that lateralization is not typical for Ga. Rather, competition taking 
place on a perceptual level seems to be important. Confirming findings are shown with 
regard to differences between AIT (auditory inspection time) and VIT (visual inspection time) 
tasks (see below).  
 
Some of the tests show correlations with musical experience, but it is not necessary to be 
musically trained to be able to complete the auditory tasks. However, it seems plausible that 
the degree of musical experience of the subjects alters the results as well as the factor 
structure. Whereas musically inexperienced subjects are expected to listen to musical stimuli 
melodically and rhythmically, musically experienced people are assumed to include 
harmonies in their judgments as well (Shuter, 1968). In pitch memory tasks, musicians 
showed greater right posterior temporal and supramarginal activation (namely short-term 
auditory storing), whereas non-musicians had greater activation on the left secondary 
auditory cortex (namely early perceptual brain regions) (Gaab & Schlaug, 2003). 
Performance between the two groups was quite similar. Conclusively, cognitive and 
perceptual processing seem to differ between non-musicians and musicians. 
 
The findings of Stankov and Horn (1980) could be consolidated in several studies (Horn & 
Stankov, 1982; Dun, 2000). Their approach, conceptualization, and task ideas were taken up 
and integrated into the WJ III (see McGrew & Evans, 2004; Schrank, 2006; McGrew, 1994). 
The auditory processing factor (Ga) is measured with two marker variables, namely “sound 
blending” (i.e., ability to integrate and speak whole words that are presented auditorily in 
parts; phonetic coding) and “incomplete words” (i.e., ability to name a complete word after 
hearing a recording of the word with at least one missing phoneme; phonetic coding). Both 
tests were taken from the Stankov and Horn (1980) battery. The subtests “auditory attention” 
(i.e., speech-sound discrimination, resistance to auditory stimulus distortion), “sound 
patterns-voice” (i.e., sound discrimination), and “sound patterns-music” (i.e., sound 
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discrimination, music discrimination and judgment) are mentioned to be Ga indicators, as 
well (Schrank, 2006). However, in most of the analysis, only the phonetic coding factors 
(sound blending and incomplete words) were included (see also McGrew, 1994). With fewer 
than three indicators, identification problems emerge since the factor will probably be 
underidentified (e.g. Kenny, 1979; Bühner, 2006; for an overview see Loehlin, 2004). The WJ 
III uses auditory material in the other hypothesized factors, as well (i.e., gc, gf, STM, LTM), 
without being associated with Ga. In addition, some of the tests are indicators of several 
factors. Thus, the tasks applied in the WJ III suggest a facet design, including a modality 
facet (auditory, visual) and an operation facet (i.e., gf, gc, STM, LTM). This, however, is not 
used for the WJ III test. Rather, the proposed factors are regarded as being at the same 
level. Ga was even identified as a subcomponent of Gc.  
 
Although I appreciate the integration of auditory abilities within the WJ III, the test structure 
and its empirical evidence does not seem convincing. In addition, the two Ga marker tests 
stem from the Stankov and Horn approach (1980). In contrast to Watson et al. (1982, 
Surprenant & Watson, 2001), who focused mainly on perception abilities, Stankov and Horn 
also included auditory tasks intended to measure memory and reasoning. Thus, until now, 
Stankov and Horn were the only researchers who tried to measure auditory abilities 
extensively. Therefore, the auditory part of this dissertation will be based on the original work 
of Stankov and Horn (1980). The systematic nature and methodological foundation of the 
Stankov and Horn approach are further reasons for this choice. Nevertheless, it is valuable to 
draw attention to the much better explored and more progressive domain of musical 
psychology compared to the psychometric intelligence domain. It is important to take the 
results within musical psychology into account for further development of an appropriate 
instrument for the assessment of auditory intellectual abilities as well as for a validation tool 
of auditory SI. 
 
2.5.4 An Insight into Models and Tests of Music Psychology 
Theories and Models of Musical Abilities 
In the research tradition of musical abilities, hierarchical and non-hierarchical theories have 
to be distinguished. Seashore et al. (1960) as well as Mainwaring and Bentley (1955, cited in 
Shuter, 1968) supposed musical abilities to depend on specific basic capacities of time, 
intensity discrimination, and memory of pitch. Drake (1939) and Wing (1948) took a different 
view and proclaimed a general musical ability factor. Others act on the assumption that there 
are group factors. Holmstrom (1969) reanalyzed some older datasets using factor analysis 
(Varimax rotation) and found three factors. The first factor, “Alpha,” was interpreted as a 
primary perception factor and expected to have a physiological basis that is only slightly 
influenced by musical experience. Tasks of tonal memory had their highest loadings on the 
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second factor “Beta.” The third factor, “Gamma,” with loadings of the tasks of rhythm, pitch 
and memory, was interpreted as a broad music factor. “Gamma” was highly correlated with 
intelligence.  
 
Franklin (1956) argued that musical talent includes two parts: “mechanical-acoustic” talent 
(i.e., ability to discriminate with regard to pitch, timbre, time and intensity; see pitch 
differences in the Seashore test) and “judicious-musical” talent (ability to discriminate at the 
service of music, see also Wing test). Apparently, the mechanical-acoustic talent is more 
basic compared to the judicious-musical talent. In my view, the former can also be described 
as basic auditory ability whereas the latter is undoubtedly musical. Whereas the more basic 
auditory tests operate with single units, the musical tests prove their need for musicality 
working with musical sequences and musical context. An enhancement of musical talent is 
made by tonal-musical talent (experiences music as a whole), which Franklin (1956) locates 
on a higher level. Creative musical talent (i.e., musical talent as a tool subordinated to 
imagination and thinking) is at the top of the hierarchy, being even more complex musically 
and less basic auditorily. In each case, the more basic level is a prerequisite for the higher 
level. Davison and Torff (1994) support the view that intelligent activity in music is context 
dependent. They classify musically intelligent activity within three levels: (1) perception (i.e., 
discrimination while listening to music), (2) production (i.e., musical thought expressed in 
composition and performance), and (3) reflection (i.e., critical thinking behind re-envisioning, 
reconceptualizing, and re-working, leading to coherent musical composition or interpretative 
performance). 
 
Musical Ability Tests 
Tests of musical ability were mainly developed to select students of music. The most notable 
tests have been the Seashore Test of Musical Talent (Seashore, 1919; Seashore, Lewis, & 
Saetveit, 1960) the Standardized Test of Musical Intelligence (Wing, 1939), the Gordon Test 
(Gordon, 1965, 1989), the Bentley Test (Bentley, 1966), and the Drake Musical Aptitude Test 
(Drake, 1933a, b). All these tests and, correspondingly, several factor analytic studies on 
these tests, were developed for use in music sciences (Horn & Stankov, 1982) rather than for 
measurement of intelligence operations with auditory content. However, orientating on 
Franklins taxonomy, some of the subtests contain auditory tasks rather than musical ones. A 
selection of the well-known musical ability tests is presented in the following.  
 
a) Seashore Measues of Musical Talent(s) 
Seashore (1919) published a first standardized version of a musical screening instrument. 
Seashore focused on the acoustical aspects of musical aptitude (atomistic, Gordon, 1998); 
only one of his suggested subtests (i.e., tonal memory), requires more than a comparison 
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between two tones. Subtests of the Seashore test classified in two series (A and B), differing 
in degree of difficulty, examine the discrimination abilities concerning frequencies, intensity, 
duration, rhythm, timbre, and musical memory. For the total test, a reliability coefficient of rtt= 
.89 is reported (see Franklin, 1956). The internal consistency of the subtests depends on the 
age of the participants and is sometimes very low (Franklin, 1956). In some of the subtests, 
clear ceiling effects emerged among participants with musical experience. In nearly all 
subtests, participants with musical experience (N=131, Kormann, 1985) score higher than 
the normative sample (N=1550, Butsch & Fischer, 1966). Karlin’s (1942) results seem to 
support Seashore’s assumption of a hierarchy of talents that are independent from one 
another. In a factor analysis that included different auditory measures, eight separable 
factors of musical ability could be extracted: discrimination ability concerning (1) frequencies, 
(2) intensity, (3) duration, (4) rhythm, (5) timbre, (6) musical memory, (7) auditory analysis, 
and (8) synthesis. According to French (1951, cited in Stankov, 1971), four factors are well 
established: pitch quality (see 1), loudness (see 2), auditory integral (see 8), and auditory 
resistance (see 3). Shuter-Dyson (1982) reports correlations between the test and expert 
ratings ranging between r=.34 and r=.47. The quality of the stimulus material of the Seashore 
Test is rather bad and only available on phonograph. Instructions are spare and studies of 
the test were only administered in the context of musical education. The Seashore subtests 
were criticized as being too basic for a musical test, as they require only discrimination 
abilities (Rothe, 1991, cited in Kormann, 2005).  
 
b) Standardized Test of Musical Intelligence (Wing, 1948) 
Wing’s purpose was to cover the scope of musical abilities with a short series of tests 
(Shuter-Dyson, 1982). In 1939, he published an instrument with seven subtests that were 
available on tape until 1961. In contrast to Seashore, he conceptualized musical stimuli as 
containing a source and a content of sound. Whereas Seashore used an electronic 
instrument for his stimulus material, Wing chose the piano. With respect to the content, Wing 
used musically related pitches, whereas Seashore’s pitches were unrelated. For about 80 
minutes, subjects have to work on the following subtests: chord analysis, changes of pitch, 
memory for melodies, and tests of rhythm, harmony, dynamics and phrasing (judging the 
more appropriate grouping of notes by pauses, legato, staccato, etc.). Chord analysis and 
pitch change can be regarded as atomistic; the remaining subtests are rather musical. In 
Wing’s opinion, musical memory consisted of the interplay between tonal and rhythmic 
elements. He regarded rhythm as natural and subordinate to melody (melody requires 
rhythm). Split-half reliability for four of the subtests (rhythm, harmony, dynamics and 
phrasing) was only between .28 and .50. The total score of the test correlates with teacher 
ratings in the range between .64 and .90. According to Shuter-Dyson (1981), the subtests 
chord analysis, changing pitch and memory are the most useful measures (see also 
Kormann, 2005).  
2  Theoretical Background 
 93 
c) Drake Musical Aptitude Tests (Drake, 1933a, 1939b, 1939; see also Siegel, 1958)  
Drake’s conception of musical talent is similar to that of Wing in expecting a general musical 
ability factor. In a first stage of development, the Drake tests consisted of four subtests, 
namely melodic memory (i.e., two-bar melodies have to be compared to four alternative 
melodies), retention (i.e., memory for elemental factors, test of absolute pitch or memory for 
isolated tones), intuition (i.e., presentation of ideas/feelings by means of music), and interval 
discrimination. Thus, both, auditory acuity and musical expressiveness are included. When 
the test was published in 1954, only melodic memory (then known as musical memory) was 
carried over. The additional test was called rhythm, which could be applied in two forms, A 
and B. In form A, a pre-determined tempo had to be maintained by the subjects for varying 
periods of time. Form B required the maintenance of a tempo against a second distracting 
rhythm. Reliability for the two tests is mainly reported around .85 to .95 (Md=.84). There 
seems to be no training improvement (Gordon, 1961). The subtests show only low 
correlations, which disproves Drake’s assumption of a general factor. Drake’s rhythm test 
and Seashore’s rhythm test correlate only between r= .02 and r= .11. Musical memory and 
rhythm demonstrate a low correlation with age and intelligence (r= -.07 to.10). They show 
moderate correlations (r~.35) with musical experience and a wide range of correlations (.31 - 
.91) with teachers’ ratings of musical talent (Shuter-Dyson, 1982).  
 
d) Bentley Test (1966; German version of the test Jacoby, 1986) 
Bentley (1966) published the “Measures of Musical Abilities.“ The measures intend to 
measure some aspects of musical giftedness, namely pitch discrimination (k=20 tasks; 
increasing level of difficulty, differences in double oscillations per second between 26 to 3), 
tonal memory (k=10; Which tone of a five-tone melody was changed in the second 
presentation of that melody?), chord analysis (k=20; Does the chord consist of three, four or 
five tones?) and memory for rhythm (k=10; Which of five rhythm times was changed in the 
second presentation of that rhythm?). The test was developed for children between 7 and 14 
years old and is based on norms of 2000 school children. The subtests show low 
intercorrelations. Retest reliability after four months was r=.84 and .83 after one year 
(McLeish, 1971, cited by Shuter-Dyson, 1982), and validity (criterion: examination marks) 
r=.94 in a sample with 70 boys of 11 years.  
 
e) Gordon Tests (1965, 1989) 
Gordon (1965, 1989) regards music aptitude as the potential to achieve in music. In order to 
measure this aptitude, he developed tests of musical giftedness in a developmental (e.g. 
Primary Measures of Musical Audiation, PMMA) and an established (Musical Aptitude 
Profile, MAP) “stadium.” The MAP (1965) for testing children aged 9-17 years, examines 
tonal imagination (harmony and melody), rhythmic imagination (tempo and metrum), and 
musical judgment (phrasing, balance, style). The PMMA (1979) for 5-8 year-old children 
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measure tonal imagination and rhythm abilities. Gordon could show that students who have a 
high level of pitch discrimination and students who perform well in time discrimination do not 
necessarily perform well on the MAP. But students performing well on the MAP have high 
levels of pitch and time discrimination (Gordon, 1998). Thus, basic discrimination processes 
seem to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for musical performance. This is another 
indication that we should separate musical and auditory abilities. Gordon also regards rhythm 
aptitude as a profoundation of musical aptitude. Rhythm aptitude is a necessary condition to 
show high overall musical achievement. Deriving from theoretical considerations and 
empirical findings, Gordon subsumes tonal, rhythm and aesthetic-interpretive components 
under stabilized musical aptitude. The first two components are rather basic, whereas the 
third requires both tonal audiation and rhythm ability. The subtests’ reliability values range 
from .66 to .85; the total test score has a reliability score between .90 and .96 (Shuter-Dyson, 
1982). Predictive validity of the MAP for judges’ ratings of the rhythmic, melodic and 
expressive aspects of previously prepared etudes with and without teachers’ guidance and of 
sight-reading of students as well as scores on a music literacy test is .75. Shuter-Dyson 
reports a median validity of .79 for the total scores predicting teacher ratings. 
 
f) Test of Buttsworth, Fogarty, and Rorke (1993) 
Buttsworth et al. (1993) present a test of musical ability intended to be used for the 
development of musical ability through formal training programs. Specifically, it deals with 
one vital aspect of aural abilities, intonation (playing in tune). Buttsworth et al. highlight that 
intonation is one of the most frustrating problems in, but also one of the most important 
aspects of, successful musical performance. They developed 14 tests containing 30 test 
items each. Four of the tests were expected to assess unlearned aural skills, mostly pitch 
discrimination. The remaining ten tests were assumed to depend on prior experience, mostly 
dealing with intonation skills. The test battery should capture variance associated with two 
broad factors: pitch discrimination and intonation. However, some of the tests either had 
reliability problems or were of an inadequate difficulty level, so that they had to be excluded. 
Only three of the tests were able to explain 36% of the variance produced by aural training 
scores. Two of the tests dealt with identification of out-of-tune tones in dyads and triads; the 
third required subjects to decide whether the melodic or harmonic form of the minor scale 
was used in a tonal sequence. The authors conclude that intonation ability represents a basic 
ability for later learning and a variety of aural skills (Buttsworth et al., 1993). 
 
What Can We Conclude Regarding Theories, Models and Tests in Musical Psychology?  
First of all the tests differ with regard to their scope. The Wing test seems to be the broadest 
measure, including not only discrimination and memory abilities but also more complex, 
music-specific tests such as harmony. Bentleys’ tests appear to be similar but cover a 
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narrower spectrum of discrimination, memory and analysis tests. The other tests, although 
including many subtests (e.g. Seashore and Buttsworth et al.) are rather specific. Gordon’s 
test concentrates on the more complex musical abilities and includes imagination and 
judgment measures, Buttsworth et al. focus on intonation ability as a very specific aspect of 
musical ability, and Seashore includes mainly discrimination tests. Apart from the scope of 
the tests, it is surprising that many subtests do not seem to be much different from tests 
described in Stankov and Horn (1980) as well as in Watson et al. (1982). The Seashore test 
is most difficult to separate from auditory ability measures (see chapter 2.5.3). This 
assumption is supported by analysis revealing ceiling effects for musicians and also 
providing confirmation for the separation into mechanical-acoustical tests and judicious-
musical tasks. With regard to Bentley’s test, only his chord measure seems to be music 
specific and can easily be discriminated from basic auditory abilities.  
 
These considerations complicate the discrimination between auditory and musical abilities. 
There are difficulties in defining the differences and developing appropriate tests. Moreover, 
the question emerges whether differences between the two constructs indeed exist. With 
respect to the factorial structure resulting of analysis of the tests in musical psychology, 
Stankov (1971) noticed that specific factors (such as pitch, loudness, timbre and rhythm) 
seem to appear if a test requires pure discrimination on a psychophysical basis. A general 
factor of broad group factors seems to emerge when the tasks involve complex processes to 
a higher degree. Factor analytic studies including musical ability tests also confirm the 
separation between mechanical-acoustical tests and judicious-musical tests. Franklin (1956) 
carried out two factor analytic studies with 79 (1st study) and 157 (2nd study) elementary 
teachers applying the methods of successive approximation (1st study) and simple structure 
rotation technique (2nd study). In the second study, the Seashore and Wing pitch tests 
representing basic auditory and advanced musical abilities loaded on separate factors. 
Besides this finding within the pitch discrimination ability, he could identify a tone memory 
factor, a melody and harmonic factor, a rhythm and intelligence factor, and a factor including 
tests which are judged as being particularly judicious-musical (Wing tests). Franklin (1956) 
regards the ability of pitch discrimination as a precondition for other musical tasks (e.g. tonal 
memory). This may account for the relationship emerging between tasks that measure 
different aspects. According to Bruhn (1993), classical music tests (e.g., Gordon, Seashore 
or Bentley) are developed to measure musical talent. However, with tasks dealing with 
simple differences between tones and tonal sequences, the tasks concern rather musical 
memory (comment added: auditory memory) and thus cover only one aspect of musical 
talent. 
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2.5.5 The Relationship of Auditory and Musical Abilities to Academic Intelligence 
This section complements the findings with respect to auditory and musical ability but 
focuses mainly on the relationship of these constructs to AcI. Results concerning auditory 
abilities are reported first, then combined with those concerning musical abilities. 
 
Auditory Abilities and Academic Intelligence 
Relationships between auditory abilities and AcI mainly refer to the tasks of Stankov and 
Horn (1980) and to the TBAC (Watson et al., 1982; Surprenant & Watson, 2001). Horn and 
Stankov (1982) report correlations of Ga with a general visual factor (.44), hearing (auditory) 
acuity (.28), fluid intelligence (gf; r=.39) and crystallized intelligence (gc; r=.54). Ga seems to 
be more closely related to gc than to gf (Horn & Stankov, 1982). However, according to 
Stankov (1986), Ga due to loss in auditory acuity decreases with advancing age and 
therefore differs from gc, which remains rather stable until old age (Stankov, 1986). Dun 
(2000) carried out a study with 92 first year psychology students applying the auditory tasks 
described in Stankov and Horn (1980). She included a total of eighteen tasks in her test 
battery. Four of the tasks can be recognized as markers of gf and gc; four were chosen from 
the Referenced Tests of Cognitive Factors (Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976) in order to 
measure visual ability; and the remaining nine tasks were established markers of broad 
auditory ability. Dun reports evidence of a broad auditory factor that correlated with gf (.55), 
with gc (.36), and with visual abilities (.43). She did not find a relationship between speed 
and Ga. The particularly high correlations with gf support the results obtained in Horn and 
Stankov (1982) and are expected to be due to the requirements on working memory that are 
demanded by the auditory tasks. However, the moderate correlations between broad visual 
and broad auditory ability, in her view, may also stem from similar construction principles: 
auditory task development was orientated on the development of visual tasks and on 
established musical tests. 
 
Deary, Bell, Bell, Campbell, and Fazal (2004) report correlations between .28 and .40 of the 
TBAC loudness discrimination test and psychometric intelligence tests (Mill Hill Vocabulary 
Test, Raven, Raven, & Court, 1982; Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence Test, Cattell & Cattell, 
1973; Digit Symbol Test, Wechsler, 1981). In another experiment implemented by the same 
authors, the Seashore test was used as an auditory sensory discrimination measure. Again, 
the correlation between the sensory auditory factor and a general intelligence factor was 
about .68 and highly significant. Deary et al. (2004) conclude that something in sensory 
discrimination tests appears to be substantially shared with psychometric intelligence tests. 
Deary (2000) summarizes the correlations found between auditory sensory pitch 
discrimination and psychometric intelligence. With the exception of one study (Deary, Head, 
& Egan, 1989) they ranged from .14 to .57 (Watson, 1991). Subjects who scored higher on 
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psychometric intelligence required shorter stimulus duration to make accurate pitch 
discriminations (Deary, 2000). Conclusively, Spearman (1904) seemed to be right in his 
assumption that general sensory discrimination and general intelligence have a common, 
more fundamental source (Spearman, 1904). 
 
Musical Abilities and Academic Intelligence 
Since standardized tests of musical abilities exist, a large number of studies about the 
relationship between musical abilities and AcI have been carried out. Inspecting the results, 
Stankov (1971) draws the conclusion that the correlations between musical abilities and 
intelligence are mostly positive and around .30. However, he remarks that correlations may 
depend on the level of tasks and that correlations between auditory abilities and AcI may be 
due to common speed variance. In existing tests of musical abilities (see section 2.5.4), tasks 
are mostly on a low-level of sensory discrimination. When related to low level intelligence test 
tasks (e.g. processing speed tests), correlations increase. Comparable with the 
differentiation problems between auditory and musical abilities, major tests of musical ability 
do not depart much from sensory psychology tests (Franklin, 1956). McLeish (1950) found 
out that speediness in higher levels of cognition has an influence on the Seashore memory 
and discrimination tests. Music is extremely dependent on time: irregularities in tempo 
destroy the character of music. Therefore, speed seems to be more important for musical 
abilities than other components of intellectual abilities. However, not only the task level and 
time dependence seem to have an impact on the relationship between musical abilities and 
AcI. Lynn, Wilson, and Gault (1989) discovered that performance in tasks of Wing’s 
Standardised Test of Musical Intelligence correlated with the results in Raven’s Standard 
Progressive Matrices (chords analysis r=0.27; pitch change r=0.40; pitch memory r=0.37; 
N=97). For his analysis, he used the accuracy rather than the speed as a performance 
measure. Subjects did not have a time limit to complete the tasks. 
 
Wing (1948) found that lower values in tests of intelligence were associated with lower 
values in musical tests. However, higher IQ is not sufficiently accompanied by high musical 
ability. Intelligence therefore seems to be a necessary but insufficient condition for musical 
ability; given a minimum intelligence level, IQ does not have an additional positive 
impact/influence on the degree of musical ability. According to Kormann, above-average 
musical giftedness requires a least a slightly above-average academic intelligence IQ. Wing 
(1948) assumes musical intuition (fast comprehension of music or musical tasks) is one form 
of intelligence even if it is not measured in standard tests of intelligence dealing with 
reasoning. Edmund’s (1960, cited by Stankov, 1971) findings confirm these results. The 
findings of these underlying assumptions provide evidence that the important auditory 
domain of intelligence is not measured through well-established intelligence tests. 
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Several authors (Fleishman et al., 1958; Franklin, 1956; French, 1951; Hanley, 1956; Harris, 
1969; Karlin, 1942; Kelley, 1964; Shuter, 1968; Solomon et al., 1960; Stankov, 1971; White, 
1954; Woodrow, 1939) carried out research studies about auditory abilities within their 
nomological network of other intellectual abilities (vocabulary, spatial, speed, speech and 
perception, visual abilities). Stankov (1971) concluded from those findings that apparently, 
intuitive notions about the similarities between auditory and visual tests do not correspond to 
similarities in the functions involved. He further assumed that abilities high in hierarchy (e.g. 
verbal comprehension) can be measured equally well through either of the modalities, visual 
or auditory. On a lower level, however, variables of the two modalities will have less in 
common. This corresponds to the assumptions the radex model proposes (see chapter 
2.1.4). As soon as complexity rises, abilities move to the center of the radex, they correlate 
higher, and they consequently share more common variance. Peripheral, and more specific, 
abilities move out of the center and therefore should share less common variance. A study 
by Kormann (1971) showed that 37 of 48 correlation coefficients between musical tasks and 
measures of AcI were significant; rhythm memory and AcI correlated with r=.54. AcI 
reasoning seems to be related especially to musical abilities that require comparison and 
counting. However, musical productivity (creativity) did not correlate with tests of AcI at all 
(Kormann, 1971).  
 
With respect to the relationship between musicality and intelligence, it may be that an 
underlying AuI serves as a precondition for musicality (musical ability/skills) and additional 
abilities requiring hearing. Maybe the relationship between traditional intelligence tests and 
musical ability tests is not as high as findings let us assume, because traditional intelligence 
tests lack of an AuI dimension. 
 
On Auditory Inspection Time and Intelligence 
Representatives of the mental speech tradition focused on simple auditory ability measures 
of mental speed, so-called auditory inspection time (AIT) tasks. Mental speed researchers 
share the view that “general intelligence” is mainly determined by the speed of information 
processing in the brain (for references, see e.g., Deary, 2000; Eysenck, 1987; Jensen, 
1982b; Neubauer, 1995; Vernon, 1983). Inspection time refers to the length of exposure time 
needed to correctly discriminate between two stimuli. Most of the AIT measures require 
sensory discrimination concerning loudness, pitch, time, or localization. In auditory pitch 
discrimination (AIT-P), a low- and a high-frequency tone presented at various durations have 
to be differentiated. The task is relatively similar to common pitch discrimination but explains 
unique variance (Olsson, Björkman, Haag, & Juslin, 1998). AIT tasks were found to be 
correlated with general intelligence (Deary, 1994, 1995, 2000; Deary & Stough, 1996; Irwin, 
1984; Raz, Willermann, & Yama, 1987; Spearman, 1904). The strength of the correlations 
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depends on how AIT is measured: Raz et al. (1987) found correlations higher than the 
usually -.30 relationships (see Hunt, 1980) ranging between -.42 and -.54 between pitch 
discrimination and performance on Cattell’s Culture Fair Intelligence Test (Cattell & Cattell, 
1973). They argue that high intelligence is associated with a greater resolution of sensory 
information. Raz et al. (1987) and Deary (1994) agree with the perspective of Spearman 
(1904), who claimed that auditory abilities (in particular the detection of thresholds for sound 
frequencies) constitute the basic processes of intelligence. Within the AIT types, empirical 
findings support stronger and more consistent relationships of AcI with loudness 
discrimination compared to pitch discrimination. On the contrary, AIT-P tasks correlate more 
highly with general musical ability (i.e., more complex musical tasks regarding the results 
mentioned above). Problems with pitch discrimination arise with participants having absolute 
pitch ability. Helmbold and Rammsayer (2006, see also Rammsayer & Brandler, 2002) 
examined the relationship of psychophysical temporal tasks and AcI. They applied auditory 
performance measures of interval timing, rhythm perception, and bimodal temporal-order 
judgment, e.g., in rhythm perception subjects had to indicate whether the presented rhythm 
was perceived as “regular” (beat-to-beat interval appeared to be of the same duration) or 
“irregular” (deviant beat-to-beat interval). They found the auditory timing tasks to be positively 
related to psychometric intelligence (figural reasoning: r=.47, Wiener Matrizen-Test, WMT; 
Formann & Piswanger, 1979; numerical speed test [Zahlen-Verbindungs-Test, ZVT; Oswald 
& Roth, 1987]: r=.36). An additional study (Rammsayer & Brandler, 2002) revealed that high 
IQ individuals are better in duration discrimination of auditory intervals, in temporal order 
judgments and temporal resolving power for central sensory information. A study of Deary et 
al. (1989) revealed a higher AIT-IQ correlation in verbal than in nonverbal IQ tests. That 
points into the direction of a common underlying mechanism between verbal and auditory 
processing. According to Deary et al. (1989), this result mirrors verbal ability operating as a 
cumulative average of past levels of processing efficiency and explaining less idiosyncratic 
variance than a more fluid task. Verbal ability scores allow more resources to be freed for 
consolidation of verbal information when information intake is faster and discrimination more 
accurate. 
 
In summary, the mental speed approach has to be considered rather critically since empirical 
results do not confirm the view of a basic speed factor that determines intellectual 
performance and reduce the complex interplay of intelligence subconstructs unrealistically. 
However, findings obtained with AIT tasks may be important with respect to the relationship 
of different types of AIT tasks to AcI and musical abilities as well as with regard to the 
relationship between auditory and verbal latent variables. 
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2.5.6 Integrative Considerations on Auditory Ablities and their Relationship to 
Academic Intelligence 
The construct “auditory abilities” seems to include everything that makes use of acoustic 
cues (see also Carroll, 1993; Stankov, 1994). These cues might be spoken language, as well 
as pure tones or complex music compositions. However, the abilities (or skills) can be 
differentiated according to the knowledge and skills they presuppose. A musician should not 
have any problems in identifying a presented chord. For a layperson who never played an 
instrument or sung in a choir it may be an unsolvable task. Correspondent to AcI, auditory 
tasks independent from prior knowledge should be adequate indicators of auditory 
intellectual abilities (auditory intelligence). That does not imply that people who are trained in 
music should not have advantages in the solution of not only complex musical but also basic 
auditory tasks.  
 
Basic abilities can be further differentiated according to the stimulus material they rely on. 
Stimuli might be pure tones, familiar environmental sounds, and basic language (speech). 
Dealing with basic tones should be more closely related to musical abilities, whereas 
language-based (speech) tasks should have a closer relationship to tasks dealing with 
written verbal material. In terms of facet theory, besides the content dimension, an operation 
facet can be built. Within the cognitive operation, comparable to AcI facet models, 
discrimination, memory, reasoning and creativity abilities may be distinguished. Following 
these considerations, a preliminary model of auditory abilities can be developed (see Figure 
2-10). 
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Figure 2-10: Preliminary Model of Auditory Abilities 
 
According to this preliminary and definitional model, auditory abilities include music, pure 
tones, sounds, speech and spoken language as content domains (stimulus material). Spoken 
language might occur within academic as well as social abilities. These content domains can 
be combined with operational domains, namely discrimination (corresponding to academic 
perception), memory, reasoning and creativity. The auditory intelligence domains tones, 
noises, and speech remain as auditory content expected to be rather independent from 
(musical) experience and different from already well-established verbal AcI. Consequently, in 
this thesis, auditory intelligence is defined as the ability to discriminate, remember, reason 
and work creatively (on) auditory stimuli, which can be tones, environmental sounds and 
speech. Auditory intelligence is separated from musical abilities, but nevertheless partly 
overlaps because musical material mainly consists of single tones. Correspondingly, speech 
tasks are distinguished from auditory language tasks, but are expected to overlap because 
language contains several speech units. However, this model should only serve as a 
preliminary basis of orientation. Transitions between auditory intelligence and musical 
abilities as well as verbal academic ability are smooth. Therefore, the operationalization (see 
chapter 4.2) of auditory intelligence should be rather broad, including partly musical abilities 
and spoken language abilities. Auditory intellectual abilities seem to be positively correlated 
to but separable from classical AcI. Taking up Stankov’s (1971) and Horn’s (1967) 
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suggestions, auditory tasks should be equivalent to tasks of AcI in level in order to minimize 
undesired variance. In my opinion it is not yet clear whether auditory tasks not only differ in 
content but also require completely new operations. If so, they need completely new task 
ideas to measure them properly. However, in this thesis, past results have to be taken up to 
continue research systematically. 
 
 
2.6 Social Intelligence Meets Auditory Intelligence 
2.6.1 On the Relevance of Social Auditory Abilities 
In our daily life, we can often hear how a person feels by listening to the tone of voice (e.g. 
on the phone: “You sound good today.“). This chapter focuses on social and emotional 
stimuli expressed and received through voices and combines two not yet well-established 
constructs, social and auditory intelligence. Effective interpersonal relationships and social 
performance require individuals to accurately decode nonverbal expressions of emotions in 
other people and remember what they said and how they expressed it. It is almost 
impossible to discuss emotions without considering the social context in which they occur 
(White, 2000). Social relations produce emotions in different ways (Kemper, 2000) (e.g. 
reading a letter from a loved one, making compliments on a neighbor’s new dress) and also 
are described as “social emotions” (Brandstätter, 1990). In an intercultural study, Scherer, 
Wallbott, Matsumoto, and Kuhdo (1988) found that in Japan, Europe, and the USA more 
than 50% of the emotional episodes were elicited by others (especially true for joy, anger and 
sadness). A representative inquiry with American students revealed that guilt, shame, and 
embarrassment in more than 80% of cases were elicited by others (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, 
& Barlow, 1996). The quality of a relationship is determined through the affective intensity of 
the interaction. According to Banse (2000), social emotions have the function of adapting the 
behavior of people to the necessities of living together. As within psychometric intelligence 
research, empirical investigations within this field are rare, I will mainly follow results obtained 
in emotion research with a special focus on emotions expressed through speech. Speech 
can be described auditorily (i.e., aspects of sound as they are perceived by people such as 
pitch and loudness), acoustically (i.e., properties of sound independent of perception such as 
fundamental frequency and intensity) and articulately (i.e., production of speech such as 
subglottal pressure, vocal effort). In my descriptions, I focus on auditory and acoustic aspects 
of speech. Vocalisation and voice quality together are labeled “paralanguage” (Trager, 1958, 
p. 4, cited by Kramer, 1963). Prosodic features of speech are any nonverbal features 
including loudness, pitch and rate (Frick, 1985).  
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We associate social processes in the auditory domain with communication using language. 
For example, the ways of speaking (i.e., use of dialect, pauses, intonation, intensity) of two 
interaction partners increasingly resemble each other when they feel sympathy for each 
other but diverge when feeling antipathy for one another (Giles, Mulac, Bradac, & Johnson, 
1987). Dropping or rising the voice helps the interaction partner to gather the meaning of 
what is said. Likewise, a speeded manner of speaking emphasizes the urgency of a situation 
(see Shintel, Nusbaum, & Okrent, 2006). Summarizing past studies, a person’s changing 
emotional state and stable personal characteristics, as well as a speaker’s age, height and 
weight can be judged with better than chance accuracy from nonverbal properties of the 
voice (see Kramer, 1963; Krauss, Freyberg, & Morsella, 2002; Lass & Davis, 1976). Males 
rated the social attractiveness of a woman more highly when her speech rate was higher 
than their own. Apparently, there are perceptual cues in the voice (e.g., pitch, loudness, 
breathiness, rate, intonation, resonance, fundamental frequency) that reflect the speaker’s 
characteristics. All in all, the perceived social attractiveness and competence of a speaker 
were evaluated as higher when speech parameters were similar to the evaluator’s own 
(Feldstein, Dohm, & Crown, 2001; Kallinen & Ravaja, 2004; Nass & Lee, 2001). Lower voice 
levels in adolescents were associated with lower self-worth in a study implemented by 
Harter, Waters, Whitesell, and Kastelic (1998). Speakers can identify smiling from the voice 
alone. Listeners seem to have precise and consistent criteria for what contrasts happy and 
sad tones of voice (Tartter, 1980). The voice helps to reveal whether someone is lying or 
telling the truth, whether a sentence is meant like it was said or is rather ironically spoken 
(e.g. Ekman, O’Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991). When emotionally aroused, people seem 
either to be silent or to talk a lot, which is evident in 27 cultures on five continents (Wallbott & 
Scherer, 1988). Sad sentences are longer than neutral, and angry sentences are significantly 
shorter (Reilly, McIntire, & Seago, 1992). One indicator for deceit is a rising voice (e.g. 
Ekman, Friesen & Scherer, 1976). Thus, it becomes evident that the voice reveals a great 
deal of information about a person, their feelings, thoughts, actions and relationships, and 
that it is important to a person’s auditory SI. 
 
2.6.2 Visual vs. Auditory Channel – Difference in Importance? 
In spite of its obvious importance, the voice has received far less interest than the face 
(Baum & Nowicki, 1998; Scherer, 1986). There may be several reasons (e.g., lack of 
adequate methodology, difficulties in defining relevant parameters, in graphic representation, 
and in the distinction between the linguistic and paralinguistic domain). The examination of 
the fleeting auditory perceivable voice signal is methodologically much more costly than the 
observation of facial expressions (Scherer & Wallbott, 1990). Besides the methodological 
reasons, for a long time visual abilities were regarded as more relevant. Why? 
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Mehrabian (1972) and others claim that observers rely more on visual than on vocal behavior 
in making judgments. Mehrabian (1972) used regression analysis and found out that of a 
message’s impact, only 7% can be attributed to verbal content. The vocal channel accounts 
for 38% and the visual channel for 55% of the variance. Nonverbal channels (how something 
is expressed) consequently seem to have a much higher impact than the actual verbal 
expression (what is actually expressed) (see also Video-Primacy hypothesis, Krauss, 1981, 
cited in Wallbott, 1995). Findings of DePaulo, Rosenthal, Eisenstat, Rogers, and Finkelstein 
(1978) show evidence that, when there is inconsistency between auditory and visual 
nonverbal information, subjects were more influenced by visual cues than by auditory cues 
except for very discrepant messages favoring auditory cues. However, the actual importance 
of a channel depends on the social context (Ekman, Friesen, O’Sullivan, & Scherer, 1980; 
O’Sullivan, Ekman, Friesen & Scherer, 1985), the degree of consistency across channels, 
and on the intimacy of the communication (see Hess, Kappas, & Scherer, 1988). For 
example, O’Sullivan et al. (1985) found that voice is more highly correlated with honest 
speech, whereas content is more correlated with deceptive speech. In social exchanges 
among nonintimates, the verbal response directs the course of the interaction, whereas in 
more intense relationships, verbal communications about internal events are ignored. In 
judging other people, both verbal and nonverbal cues are important. Complementary to the 
context dependence of a channel’s relevance, there are even findings indicating a higher 
importance for verbal rather than visual information (Domangue, 1978). Maier and Thurber 
(1966) found that accuracy was highest when an interview was read (77% accuracy) and 
listened to (77%) compared to an accuracy of only 58% when participating in the interview. 
The authors conclude that visual information distracts attention from the important 
information, consequently reducing accuracy. Children three and four years old have a 
strong preference for prosody over facial expression when revealing emotions in their story 
telling (Reilly & Seibert, 2003).  
 
Voice recognition may be particularly important in the clinical context. People with an 
acquired inability to recognize faces (prosopagnosia) and all other visually impaired people 
have to rely strongly on voices for identification (Bodamer, 1947, cited by Schweinberger & 
Sommer, 1997). Furthermore, for several proficiencies depending on the auditory channel 
(e.g. telephone counsellors), social and emotional auditory abilities are of major importance. 
Recognizing the emotional state and drawing conclusions about the dialog partner’s 
personality are important conditions for telephone counsellors and salesmen in order to deal 
most effectively with their customers. Forty female telephone counsellors performed 
significantly better concerning portrayed emotions in vocal stimuli when compared to 40 
female face-to-face counsellors (t=2.55; p=.013). They were not better in recognizing 
emotions from visual cues (Wallbott, 2003). Besides emotion recognition, there are also hints 
that problem solving can be more effective in telephone communication compared to direct 
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interaction. Limited to vocal communication, there is less distracting information that keeps 
people from focusing on relevant problems (Wallbott, 1995).  
 
Generally, positive emotions and attitudes (e.g. joy and positivity) are better recognized 
visually, whereas negative emotions (especially anger, but also sadness, indifference and 
dominance) are better recognized in the vocal channel (e.g. Wallbott & Scherer, 1986; 
Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979). That is probably due to adaptive 
advantages such as the ability to warn (fear) or threaten (anger) over large distances using 
auditory rather than visual methods (see e.g. Johnstone & Scherer, 2000; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992). The verbal channel was identified as being the most controllable, followed 
by the face and the body and finally the voice as the channel with the least possibility of 
control. The less controllable a channel is, the more accurate it should be in revealing the 
true message (see Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). In summary, focusing on only visual stimuli 
when dealing with social intellectual abilities cannot be justified, considering the extensive 
proof of the significance of the auditory channel. 
 
2.6.3 Emotion Theories – Basic Concepts 
Dealing with emotions, for example expressed through the voice, it is crucial to define how 
many emotions exist and how they can be classified. There are two major hypotheses in 
emotion research. Some theorists reduce emotion theories to “basic emotions,” namely 
anger, sadness, fear, disgust, surprise and joy, that are expected to be psychologically and 
biologically fundamental (not further reducible, relying on psychic mechanisms that emerged 
from natural selection, see Reisenzein, 2000). In the reductionist’s opinion, all other emotions 
are based on these fundamental emotions; consequently, only the basic emotions need to be 
described and analyzed (Izard, 1977; McDougall, 1908, 1960; Plutchik, 1994; Tomkins, 
1962). Other theorists argue that in addition to basic emotions there are secondary emotions 
consisting of basic emotions and additional elements (e.g. cognitions and behavior 
tendencies). Repentence, for example, is regarded as sadness caused through the 
evaluation of a past action as morally wrong (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). Data confirm 
the second approach rather than the assumption of discrete basic emotion theorists (Meyer, 
Schützwohl, & Reisenzein, 1997). There is growing consensus among emotion psychologists 
that emotion needs to be viewed as a multicomponent entity (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 
1991; Johnstone & Scherer, 2000). 
 
According to Plutchik (1994), emotions vary in intensity (e.g. fear vs. panic), in similarity (e.g. 
shame and guilt are more similar than love and disgust) and in polarity (joy vs. sadness). 
Emotions have to be distinguished from the affective states, moods, attitudes, and 
personality traits of the speaker. At present, there is no consensus about the number and 
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degree of differentiation between emotions (Schmidt-Atzert, 2000). Shaver, Schwartz, 
Kirson, and O’Connor (1987) used the prototype approach to specify scripts of five basic 
emotions, namely love, joy, anger, sadness, fear and maybe surprise. They found these 
emotions to overlap substantially with emotion examples mentioned spontaneously by 
laypersons and with the emotions children first learn to name (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). 
The emotions listed by more than 40% of 200 subjects were happiness, anger, sadness, 
love, fear, hate, and joy. Ekman (1984) differentiated between fear, anger, surprise, disgust, 
sadness, and happiness, also known as the six basic emotions. Epstein (1984) does without 
surprise and disgust and suggests love and affection instead. In a study carried out by 
Bretherton and Beeghly (1982), 28-month-old children were able to distinguish between love, 
like, mad, scared, happy and sad (see also Harris, 2000). Schmidt-Atzert (2000), using the 
differential emotions scale (see Izard, 1977), could establish nine (i.e., fear, anxiety, 
restlessness, sadness, shame, joy, affiliation, sexual agitation, surprise) of ten emotions 
empirically. There were some problems, however, with the disgust items. Russell (1980) 
classifies emotions within a circumplex model that consists of the dimensions agitation-
quietness and pleasure-displeasure. Reisenzein and Hofmann (1993) selected 23 emotions 
(e.g., interest, joy, surprise, distress, anger, fear, shame, disgust, contempt, and guilt among 
others) orientating on cognitive models (e.g. Izard, 1977; Weiner, 1986) and empirical criteria 
(e.g., emotional states that are typical examples of emotions in the layperson’s view). 
According to Reisenzein and Hofmann (1993), a good model should approximate the 
subjects’ natural ability to distinguish emotions based on appraisal of relevant situational 
information. It is obvious, that the suggested models are quite similar in including basic 
emotions (see e.g. Ekman, 1984) and complement these through a number of additional 
ones. Newer emotion theories describe emotions as processes including different reaction 
components or modalities (Scherer, 1990). Scherer (1996, 2003) suggests a component-
process-model based on the Brunswik lens model. It contains five emotion components (i.e., 
cognitive, neurophysiological, motivational, expressive, emotional), which are based on five 
subsystems (i.e., information processing system, supply/provision system, guiding system, 
action- and monitor system) and have specific functions (i.e., stimulus appraisal, system 
regulation, performance preparation, communication of reaction and intention, reflexion and 
control). Emotion is regarded as a series of interrelated adaptive changes in several 
organismic subsystems following antecedent events evaluated to be of major importance to 
an organism’s goals. Emotion process is seen as a sequence of highly variable, quickly 
changing emotional states (Scherer, 1986). Banse and Scherer (1996) used empirically 
generated scenarios including 14 emotions. Ten out of the 14 contained pairs of the same 
emotion family, with five differentiations altogether. Their model makes concrete predictions 
that refer to changes in the most important acoustic parameters for the 14 emotions (see 
section 2.6.4). A detailed overview about a plethora of different emotion theories and their 
assumptions is provided by Scherer (2000). In my considerations and test development, I 
2  Theoretical Background 
 107 
rely on the model of Scherer, since his research seems to be thorough and sound, and since 
principles of Brunswik symmetry are considered. Moreover, Scherer and colleagues were the 
only ones who provided an emotion in voice recognition test with German intonation 
(pronunciation). 
 
The lack of consensus makes it difficult to compare existing studies. Scherer (1986), for 
example, proposed a distinction between quiet happiness and elated joy, between cold and 
hot anger, dejected sadness and desperate grief, and so on. When, in a study, the emotion 
of joy is reported, it remains unclear whether it refers to quiet happiness or elated joy. 
Additional problems encountered when comparing or summarizing studies concern their 
degree of reality (reality vs. portrayed), their measurement and statistical procedures. Often, 
interindividual differences concerning the meanings of emotion labels lead to differences in 
judgment. Reisenzein and Hofmann (1993) used comparative model testing in order to 
control for these possible confounding factors. They found out that subjects can discriminate 
between emotions rather well. Laypersons were not significantly worse in emotion 
discrimination compared to trained observers. Ambiguous and complex situations, however, 
are harder to discriminate, as it is especially difficult to decide which of the simultaneously 
occurring emotions dominates.  
 
2.6.4 The Objective Measurement of Social Cues/Emotions in Voices 
In the past, researchers have tried to identify objective components for emotion recognition in 
voices. Johnstone and Scherer (2000) differentiate between four groups of measuring the 
encoding of voice. (1) Time-related measures expect rate and duration of vocal sounds and 
pauses to vary for different emotions (e.g. extraverted American speakers produce fewer 
hesitation pauses than introverted speakers). (2) Intensity-related measures reflect the 
amount of energy in a speech signal, the effort required to produce speech and the 
perceived loudness (e.g. lower intensity is related to submission). (3) Measures related to 
fundamental frequency (F0) examine the number of cycles per second in a periodic sound 
that strongly determines pitch of voice (e.g. higher fundamental frequency seems to be 
associated with a competent and dominant personality in male Americans and with discipline 
and dependability in male German and female American speakers, Scherer, 1979). (4) The 
combined time-frequency-energy measures use formants to identify emotional states. 
Forming the individual sounds (phonemes) of a language, each phoneme can be 
characterized by the amplified frequencies corresponding to that phoneme (formants). The 
amount of resonance (formant amplitude) and the range in the given formant (formant 
bandwidth) may change considerably with different emotional states. As a suprasegmental 
feature of speech, prosody includes intonation, loudness, pitch, and rate of speech (tempo) 
(e.g. Michell, Elliot, Barry, Cruttenden, & Woodruff, 2003). It co-occurs with the lexically 
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conveyed message and therefore reveals whether a sentence corresponds to its content or 
whether it is meant ironically (Reilly & Seibert, 2003). Banse and Scherer (1996, 2003) relied 
on such objective parameters and used empirically generated scenarios to test the 
predictions of changes in the most important acoustic parameters for the 14 emotions. High-
stress conditions or mental workload were associated with higher F0, higher intensity values 
and faster speech rate than low-stress conditions. Sadness and boredom have been found to 
show low F0, F0 variability, intensity and speaking rate. Compared to a neutral condition, the 
“fundamental frequency, F0” rose when the emotions joy, anger and fear were expressed. 
The intensity of the voice was reduced when sadness was expressed compared to the other 
emotions. The portion of high frequency energy (> 635 Hz) was higher when anger was 
expressed compared to other emotions. Banse and Scherer (1996) could distinguish 
between different emotions with comparable arousal levels such as rage, panic, and elation, 
via their acoustic profiles. Confusion patterns could show that confusion within the same 
emotion family is more probable than between emotions from different emotion families. For 
example, disgust is confused with nearly all other negative emotions (Banse & Scherer, 
1996). The end of a prosodic contour has a special significance in the discrimination of 
emotions. Rising pitch at the end of a phrase may either indicate a question or express 
uncertainty, politeness, or submission (Frick, 1985). Falling contours are in turn associated 
with pleasantness (Scherer, 1974). 
 
Considering the review of findings, vocal parameters seem to be promising indicators of 
physiological arousal (e.g. Scherer, 1979, 1986; Frick, 1985). On average, acted emotions in 
voices could be classified with an accuracy of 60% (chance level: 12%) by the hypotheses 
the model makes. This value is based upon 30 studies that were implemented in the early 
80s (Scherer, 1989) and was supported by later studies (e.g., 65%, van Bezooijen, 1984; 
56%, Scherer, Banse, Wallbott, & Goldbeck, 1991). The best recognition rates could be 
obtained for sadness (72%) and anger (68%), followed by joy (59%) and fear (52%). 
However, people who are good at emotion recognition also show rates of about 56% correct 
assignments. Thus, they are even better than objective emotion diagnostic tools. It can be 
assumed that judges intuitively choose more complex judgment and information integration 
strategies than is possible in objective emotion assessment. Even when controlled for 
emotion differentiation (see above, global joy vs. differentiation between elation and 
happiness) recognition rates do not rise higher than 55-56%. The recognition rates are about 
15% lower compared to recognition rates that were found for the recognition of facial 
expressions (Scherer, 1999). Besides the degree of emotion differentiation, one major 
problem in studies was their focus on emotion discrimination rather than on actual emotion 
recognition. Being able to discriminate between alternative emotions does not automatically 
mean that the person is also able to identify a single emotion. Other errors occur with 
emotions similar in valence (e.g. pride and interest). Although standardized spectral 
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parameters can be regarded as very important in the measurement of qualitative differences 
between emotions, there is no common agreement about the appropriate parameters that 
should be measured, nor about the appropriate length of a prosodic contour. 
 
Moderating Variables 
Studies on objective emotion measurement suggest several variables and parameters that 
influence the auditory recognition rate. 
 
a) Familiarity and length of stimulus presentation (duration) 
Recognizing unfamiliar voices from a previous presentation may engage perceptual or 
cognitive mechanisms quite different from those involved in the recognition of familiar voices 
(Schweinberger & Sommer, 1997). Performance for famous voices improves with increasing 
stimulus duration. The most rapid improvements were observed during the first seconds of 
stimulus presentation (Schweinberger & Sommer, 1997). Ambady and Rosenthal (1992, 
1993) showed that samples of nonverbal behavior with a duration of only half a minute allow 
observers to form an impression of a person’s affective state and interpersonal attitudes 
correlating highly with objective criteria or long-term observation judgments. Moreover, the 
longer people know each other, the better they get at communicating emotions prosodically 
(Hornstein, 1967). However, there are also studies that did not find an influence of 
acquaintance on the recognition of emotions (Scherer, London, & Wolf, 1973). 
 
b) Context 
Emotion psychology suffers from the serious difficulty of studying emotions in a (real-life) 
social context (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Wallbott & Scherer, 1989). In most of the studies 
on vocal emotion recognition, subjects are presented with isolated stimuli of nonverbal 
expressive behavior, rather than dynamic and static context stimuli such as the situation, 
related persons’ behavior and changes in the course of time (Wallbott, 1986). However, in 
daily interaction situations, we experience nonverbal behavior within the social context. The 
knowledge of the context in which the communication occurs determines the translation of 
the received message (Kappas, Hess, & Scherer, 1991). 
 
c) Culture 
Auditory emotion expressions by people of a certain culture are recognized above chance 
level by people of different cultures. Scherer et al. (2001) documented an accuracy value of 
about 66% across all emotions and countries using German actors and evaluators from nine 
countries in Europe, Asia and the USA. Their findings were interpreted as a proof for the 
existence of universal, culture-independent rules for vocal characteristics concerning specific 
emotions. Nevertheless, language-specific paralinguistic patterns of the vocal emotion 
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expression do exist. The more different languages are, the lower the emotion recognition 
accuracy was. In German voice samples, the recognition rate among Germans was 74% 
whereas only 52% of the emotions were identified correctly by Indonesians. Joy was much 
harder to recognize (42%) than the other emotions (around 70%). In summary, the results 
indicate that there are universal inference rules from vocal characteristics of specific 
emotions across cultures. However, it is possible that understanding the verbal content is a 
crucial precondition for the correct interpretation of prosodic features. 
 
d) Speech material generation technique 
In the past, there have been different approaches in the generation of speech material: 
natural vocal expression, induced emotional expression, simulated emotional expression and 
masking techniques (Scherer, 2003; Campbell, 2000). Table 2-9 gives a short description of 
each of the four methods and provides a summary of their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Several techniques were applied to mask speech. In voice content masking the speaker 
recites standard meaningless material (e.g. alphabet or numbers) or some standard 
meaningful but affectively ambiguous or neutral material (a word, phrase, or one to two 
sentences) with different moods or tones of voice. Filtering (Rogers, Scherer, & Rosenthal, 
1971) removes selected bands of frequencies. Low-pass filtering, for example, removes the 
higher frequencies of speech upon which word recognition depends. Intonation, rhythm, 
tempo, and loudness of the voice remain the same, while speech intelligibility is lost. 
Compared to ordinary speech, the voice sounds calm and steady, muffled and slightly 
distorted. However, the upper and lower overtones of speech contribute to the personal tone 
or timbre of a person’s voice (Ochai & Fukamura, 1957, cited by Kramer, 1963). Applying 
randomized splicing (Scherer, 1971), spoken language is cut in pieces so that words are 
scrambled. The voice sounds natural, but more pleasant, more peaceful and nicer than 
ordinary speech. The content cannot be understood. Additional possibilities are playing 
backwards, pitch inversion and tone silence coding. Scherer, Ladd, and Silverman (1984) 
found that politeness was still recognizable in the most severely masked speech samples. 
Natural emotions were used in the clinical context with depressed people and during 
psychotherapy (see e.g. Hargreaves, Starkweather, & Blacker, 1965; Roessler & Lester, 
1976), and rarely with unimpaired people (Huttar, 1968). On the one hand, speech samples 
obtained in naturally occurring emotions may not have been sufficiently emotional to yield 
discrete vocal cues pronounced sufficiently to show up in acoustic analysis. On the other 
hand, simulated emotions with instructed encoders may not be natural enough, especially 
when actors are asked to produce the stimulus material. Emotions may only be identified 
because posers overemphasize powerful cues, particularly arousal, but miss more subtle 
cues, that differentiate discrete emotions in natural settings (Scherer, 1986). Kappas et al. 
(1991) criticize the focus on portrayed emotions in past studies. Thus, it remains relatively 
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unclear how far results obtained with acted utterances can be transferred to natural 
occurrence (Kappas et al., 1991). Until now, systematic studies on the relationship between 
acted and natural emotions are scarce (see Halberstadt, 1986). 
 
Table 2-9: Description of Speech Material Generation Techniques 
Technique Short 
description 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Natural vocal 
expression 
 
  
Material is 
recorded during 
naturally 
occurring 
emotional states 
(e.g. in dangerous 
flight situations or 
affectively loaded 
therapies) 
-  high ecological 
validity 
-  especially useful in   
clinical context 
- brief voice samples, small 
number of speakers and bad 
quality 
- emotions are not always 
obvious 
- appraisal of an event is 
individually different 
- several emotions may be 
reflected simultaneously 
- lack of control in speech 
material (see Williams & 
Stevens, 1972) 
Induced 
emotions 
Emotions are 
induced (e.g. via 
stress induction, 
presentation of 
emotion-eliciting 
slides or films) 
- comparable voice 
samples for all 
participants 
- often only weak affect 
- appraisal of an event is 
individually different 
 
Simulated vocal 
expressions 
Voice samples 
produced by 
actors 
- yields intense, clear, 
prototypical, and 
unambiguous 
expressions 
- danger of over-emphasis 
- lack of more subtle (natural) 
cues 
Masked speech  
 
(Techniques are 
described in 
further detail 
below.) 
Removes speech  
intelligibility  
 
- allows the use of 
natural speech 
rather than 
artificially posed 
emotions 
- unclear how far it is 
comparable to reality 
- unclear whether additional 
processes (general 
discrimination ability, hearing 
ability, etc.) play a role, too. 
 
e) Group differences 
Several studies have shown that persons differ with respect to their ability to decode 
emotions from facial expressions and other nonverbal channels (Hall, 1978, 1984; Rosenthal 
et al., 1979; Russell & Fernández-Dols, 1997; Wallbott, 1998). Among laypersons the 
hypothesis often emerges that people who have lost their sense of hearing or their vision are 
forced to compensate for that loss by increased investations in other channels (deficit 
hypothesis). However, several studies revealed no differences between blind people and 
normal hearing subjects in identifying emotions and familiar environmental sounds. 
Sometimes, visually impaired people even performed worse (see Blau, 1964 cited by 
Wallbott, 2003; Minter, Hobson, & Pring, 1991; Rosenthal et al., 1979; Wallbott, 2003). 
Research about gender differences with regard to vocal expressiveness and emotion 
recognition reveals inconsistent results. There are findings, showing that men may convey 
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emotions more clearly through specific vocal characteristics (e.g. harshness, laxness, 
intensity) than women. Other studies, however, did not show any differences (Brody & Hall, 
2000). Females reporting to experience positive emotions intensely and receiving rewarding 
feedback, produced speech that showed higher vocal-emotion-related parameter values 
(e.g., F0) than comparison subjects. In male subjects, expression of emotion was more 
clearly related to negative emotional intensity (e.g., failure) (Bachorowski & Owren, 1995). 
 
2.6.5 Measurement Approaches in Emotion Research  
In EI and SI research, instruments developed and results obtained in the emotion research 
tradition were almost completely neglected in studies. However, a plethora of tests within this 
field, often labeled as interpersonal sensitivity, do exist (e.g., Communication of Affect 
Receiving Ability Test, CARAT, Buck, 1976; Japanese and Caucasian Brief Affect 
Recognition Test, JACBART, Matsumoto, LeRoux, Wilson-Cohn, Raroque, Kooken, & 
Ekman, 2000; Facial Action Coding System, FACS, Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002; 
Standardized database of facial expressions, Ekman, 1973; Emotional Stroop-Test; 
McKenna & Sharma, 1995, 2004). Interpersonal sensitivity used as a construct in emotion 
research is defined as the correct identification and comprehension of social stimuli 
(perception, inference, decoding, deception) (see Bernieri, 2001) and thus apparently 
overlaps with the SI subconstructs we are interested in. Table 2-10 summarizes the most 
famous tests relying on auditory material that were developed within the tradition of emotion 
research.
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Table 2-10: Auditory Tests in Emotion Research 
Test name 
Definition/ 
Model 
Dimensions/ 
Material 
Scales Results/Studies 
Profile of Nonverbal 
Sensitivity (PONS; 
Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, 
Rogers, & Archer, 1979) 
Nonverbal 
sensitivity 
 
Content of 
scenes can be 
classified 
according to 
positivity 
(positive vs. 
negative) and 
dominance 
(dominant vs. 
submissive) 
Dimensions: 
understanding (perception) 
 
Material: 
auditory, video, pictorial 
 
 
Short audio and 
video extracts 
have to be judged 
according to the 
emotion, 
cognition and 
content that is 
displayed in the 
section. 
 
Auditory: 20 
items, each 
randomized 
spliced and 
content filtered 
 
Psychometry: 
- Alpha: full PONS: .86 (220 Items); audio: .17-.30 (Hall, 2001) 
- Retest-reliability: Md=.69 (6 studies) 
Convergent validity: 
- measures of person perception (programmed cases task, 
nonverbal decoding tasks): r= .28 
- no correlations with dispositional empathy measures 
Discriminant validity: 
- cognitive complexity: Md r =.28 (two studies) 
- no correlations with AcI (IQ, SAT, Vocabulary, school 
achievement) Md r= .14 (15 samples) 
- personality variables (adjustment, extraversion, encouraging 
etc.): r=.22 (24 studies) 
Criterion validity: 
Greater professional advancement was associated with lower 
PONS scores, for clinicians (-.62) and teachers (-.66). 
Additional remarks: 
- Women perform better than men (in 80% of the samples). 
- Voices of women are easier to judge. 
- Training improves performance. 
Diagnostic Analysis of 
Nonverbal Accuracy 
(DANVA, Nowicki & Duke, 
2001, 2007) 
 
and DANVA2 
DANVA-AP (auditory and 
pictorial) 
Measurement of 
emotional 
sensitivity based 
on affect in voice 
and face 
 
 
Dimensions: 
perception, understanding 
 
Material: 
auditory and pictorial 
 
 
Systematically 
samples two 
levels of intensity 
(high and low) of 
four emotions 
(happy, sad, 
angry and fearful)
Psychometry: 
- Alpha between .64 and .83  
- Retest: two months r = .84, (n = 45); (Nowicki & Carton, 1993); 
six weeks: .83 (N=68) 
- Mean accuracy increased with age between 4 and 19 years. In 
eldery people it increases gradually following a cubic function 
(Baum & Nowicki, 1998) 
Convergent validity: 
- only minor correlations between the subtests 
- relation to similar tests: r= .48 und .58 
- no correlations with social perception auditory 
Discriminant validity: 
- no correlations with AcI, but correlations with academic 
achievement (Nowicki & Duke, 1989) 
- no correlations with general auditory processing (tone 
discrimination, Baum & Nowicki, 1998; r=.03) 
- correlations with social competence criteria, such as conflict 
involvement .25 - .52 (more errors in DANVA, more conflict 
involvement, less effective strategies)  
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Table 2-10: Auditory Tests in Emotion Research, continued 
Test name 
Definition/ 
Model 
Dimensions/ 
Material 
Scales  
(mentioned in test) 
Results/Studies 
Index of Vocal Emotion 
Recognition Test (Vocal-
I; Scherer, Banse, & 
Wallbott, 2001; Scherer, 
in press); 
 
Item material of the 
GVEESS. 
Subjects have 
to identify 
emotions in 
meaningless 
sentences that 
are spoken by 
male and 
female German 
radio actors. 
 
Dimensions: 
perception 
 
Material: auditory 
 
Two senseless 
sentences were 
spoken. 
 
Use of the scenario 
approach to get 
sentences as 
naturally acted as 
possible. 
 
joy, sadness, fear, 
anger, neutral 
Validity: 
- no correlation with EI ability measures (MSCEIT, emotion 
perception) 
- same confusion matrices and recognition patterns in nine different 
countries (Germany, Switzerland, France, Great Britain, USA, Italy, 
Spain, Indonesia, the Netherlands) 
- Anger was recognized most easily (recog. rate: 76%), followed by 
neutral, sadness, fear, and joy (42%). Joy was most often confused 
with neutrality. 
- Women performed significantly better (Scherer, in press). 
- overlap with facial recognition (Facial-I): r = .24 (N = 1,264; p < 
.001) (Scherer, in press). 
- correlation: Gf - vocal, r = .18 (N = 1,311; p < .001), recognition 
Criterion validity: 3% advantage (t significant at p < .01) for 
employees in non-management positions for the recognition of vocal 
anger expression 
 
Multimodal Emotion 
Recognition Test (MERT; 
Bänziger, 2005; 
Bänziger, Grandjean, & 
Scherer, 2005) 
Evaluation of 
the perception 
of dynamic face 
and voice 
expression 
Dimensions 
perception 
 
Material: video, 
audio, audio-video 
picture 
10 acted emotions, 
each represented in 
four modalities 
facet design with 120 
items (3 clips x 10 
emotions x 4 
modalities) 
Psychometry: 
- retest of the MERT after 6 weeks 
- confusions among emotions emerged mainly with emotions of the 
same family (subjects: N=73 (63 female) had to choose one of 10 
emotions) 
Validity: 
- no significant correlations of the MERT with the NEO-FFI and the 
STAI 
- MERT correlates with BIS / BAS between .26 (audio; audio-video) 
and .31 (video). 
- correlation between PONS and JACBART with MERT (N= 70): r= 
.50 
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Conclusions With Regard to the Instruments 
The available instruments can be criticized in different ways. The PONS uses only one 
person for stimulus generation, the content-filtered and random-spliced masking techniques 
lack ecological validity, and it does not include the measurement of specific emotions. The 
rating of affects is combined with a forced choice. This implies that if one recognizes the 
affect displayed correctly it is possible to make a mistake in choosing the wrong MC option. 
The PONS does not show evidence of sufficient reliability. Neither the PONS nor the DANVA 
include the social context (see Nowicki & Duke, 2001).  
 
As evidenced by the information provided in Table 2-10, the instruments dealing with 
recognition of emotions and socially relevant stimuli in voices clearly concentrate on the 
perception domain including some aspects of social understanding. With the exception of the 
findings reported in Bänziger et al. (2005, r=.50), the intercorrelations between the 
instruments are rather low, ranging between -.09 and .20 (see Ambady, LaPlante, & 
Johnson, 2001; Hall, 2001; Scherer, 2003) indicating a lack of convergent validity. This lack 
may be due to variable theory and method application (i.e., concerning construct definition), 
the duration and method of stimulus presentation, (i.e., spontaneous vs. acted emotions), the 
channel (face, eyes, gesture, voice), the definition of the criterion, and the consideration of 
guessing probability. An additional reason may be the amount of (different) subconstructs 
that are subsumed under interpersonal sensitivity, such as attentional accuracy, ecological 
sensitivity, sensitivity to deceit and to the identification of emotions, interpretation of cues 
(see e.g. IPT-15 vs. PONS), and empathic inference (=everyday mind-reading, Ickes, 2001) 
(see Hall, 2001). Not only are the intercorrelations among the instruments of this research 
tradition low, but the relationship to AcI and personality are low as well. It would thus be quite 
interesting to examine what these kinds of instruments actually measure. 
 
How are Social and Emotional Intelligence Related to Research from Emotion Theory? 
There are almost no empirical studies that relate measures commonly used in emotion 
research to measures of SI and EI. Nor did I find theoretical conceptions about how they may 
be related in the literature. However, there are some rare exceptions published recently. In 
the view of Scherer (in press), highly emotionally competent individuals are characterized by 
optimal functioning of the emotion mechanism with respect to both emotion perception and 
emotion production. According to Scherer, “emotion production refers to the total pattern of 
bodily and behavioral changes that characterizes the adaptive function of emotion, allowing 
the organism to cope with events of major relevance for well-being” (p. 175). The visible 
bodily and behavioral changes provide important information about the individual's reaction 
and potential behavioral intention to social interaction partners. A precondition of this emotion 
signaling in social intercourse is the accurate perception and interpretation of other peoples’ 
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emotional states. Scherer (in press) postulates three components that are expected to have 
an effect on these two functions: appraisal (i.e., evaluating events in an accurate fashion with 
respect to the personal implications of the events and one's ability to cope with the 
consequences), regulation competence (i.e., the capacity to react in an appropriate fashion 
with respect to promising action tendencies and situational contingencies), and 
communication competence (i.e., the ability to produce emotion signals in accordance with 
strategic aims and cultural norms and to correctly infer the emotions of others on the basis of 
outward expression and to empathize with others under appropriate circumstances). It is 
apparent that these components overlap with both emotional and social intelligence. The 
perceptual function is what we assume to be a part of an underlying intelligence (cognitive). 
The production function can be seen as the potential (intelligence) that is transformed into 
action (e.g. social behavior). Scherer’s appraisal component should also play a major role in 
social and emotional understanding (cognitive) whereas regulation and communication are 
expected to be more important in the actual behavior. According to this perspective, I would 
expect a relationship between auditory emotion perception tasks (e.g. items of the VOCAL-I, 
see Table 2-10) and our SI perception domain as well as between appraisal tasks (e.g. 
PONS test, see Table 2-10) and our social understanding dimension. Recent empirical 
results (Roberts, Schulze, O’Brien, MacCann, Reid, & Maul, 2006), however, indicate that 
instruments of the psychometric tradition (the MSCEIT) and measures that were developed 
in the emotion research tradition (VOCAL-I) load on different latent variables.  
 
 
2.7 Objectives for Test Development 
2.7.1 General Ideas 
Two questions are subsumed under construct validity: (1) To what extent does the test 
measure a trait that exists? (validity of the test) (2) How well does the proposed interpretation 
correspond to what is measured by the test? (validity of the construct). The evidence fo the 
two kinds is usually not separable (see Loevinger, 1957; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
Therefore, conceptualizations and models of both SI and AuI were formulated recommending 
how to measure these constructs. The results obtained with these measures may suggest 
revisions of the models, which in turn, may provoke thought about whether we measured 
what was intended. Test and theory development underlie the following specifications: 
• The SI and AuI test should tap a wide range of the abilities that we regard as 
manifestations of those constructs. They should be content valid. 
• The constructs are regarded as latent, with indicators that we will attempt to identify and 
measure. The specific abilities were chosen to represent the construct according to the 
discussion of the constructs (see chapters 2.3 – 2.6) as exhaustively as possible, but often 
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we had to sample and postpone the development of tasks representing the universe to a 
later time. 
• Available and recommendable tasks that fit into the model were taken from existing tests. 
The remaining gaps were filled with new developments orientated on the selected 
instruments, the corresponding literature, and tasks that we thought would be appropriate 
to measure the construct.  
• At this point, the immediate use of these tests is likely to be for research; applications 
(e.g., in school testing, personnel selection and training) should follow at a progressive 
stage of test development. 
• Both tests will be developed and structured so as to be useful primarily for adults aged 20 
to 40 years. 
• All abilities tested will be assessed by multiple items that will be subjected to analyses of 
their psychometric properties by conventional methods of the Classical Test Theory (CTT). 
Specifically, we will be attempting to develop measures that have a high degree of internal 
consistency. 
 
2.7.2 Development of a Social Intelligence Test 
Since existing instruments of social intelligence did not meet our requirements of being 
realistic, including representative material, relying on clear definitions and a theoretical 
model, and being methodologically thorough, we decided to develop a new SI test. The 
construction of a new measure was already suggested by Wong et al. (1995), who 
suggested developing more appropriate measures in order to examine SI. With the exception 
of some tasks that could be adapted relying on previous work (Weis, 2002), the test had to 
be completely newly developed. With this test, we aimed at overcoming past problems and in 
turn allowing the profound investigation of the still unsatisfactory and unanswered questions 
(e.g., concerning subconstructs and validity against AcI). The following objectives should be 
a guideline for the development of a new SI test and the implementation of a corresponding 
study. 
 
1) The test should concentrate on cognitive aspects of SI. It clearly excludes social 
behavior from its scope. 
Whereas tests of AcI measure cognitive preconditions of academically intelligent behavior, 
according to many authors SI tests should measure socially intelligent behavior. 
Consequently, the goal of SI tests is much higher than for tests of AcI. However, it makes 
sense, correspondingly to AcI, to develop tests of the purportedly measurable cognitive 
preconditions for a person’s socially intelligent behavior first, and in a second step, validate 
these instruments within social situations with persons who are willing to show socially 
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intelligent behavior. Therefore, we focus only on the cognitive requirements necessary to 
show socially intelligent behavior. 
 
2) The test should be a performance measure. 
Focusing on multiple cognitive aspects of social intelligence, we can choose between self- 
and other-report measures and performance measures, since behavior measures are out of 
the question as explained above. Knowledge tests cannot be applied, since the cognitive 
operation should be measured rather than the crystallized knowledge (see framework of 
Süß, 1996, 2001; third criterion). Ability measures represent the individual’s performance 
level on a task, whereas self-report measures are filtered through a person’s self-concept 
and impression management motives. Because of former results concerning self-report and 
other-report measures (high correlations with personality, no emerging social intelligence 
factor) and the problems that appeared when relating them to AcI, we intend to assess SI 
with a performance test (see framework of Süß, 1996, 2001; second criterion). 
Corresponding to Carroll (1993), an intelligence test should assess actual ability to perform 
well at mental tasks rather than one’s self-reported beliefs about these abilities (Carroll, 
1993; Neisser et al., 1996). We are interested in maximum performance, correspondent to 
AcI tests. 
 
3) Underlying theoretical model 
For a successful study of SI and further insights into the construct, one has to start with 
definitions of the construct and develop a model that may serve as a basis for test 
development and empirical studies. Therefore, this dissertation is based on the model of Süß 
et al. (2005, see also Weis & Süß, 2007), including the corresponding definitions and 
subconstructs of social understanding, social memory and social perception. As may be 
expected, scoring divergent productions proved considerably harder than scoring cognitions, 
as in the former case a best answer hardly exists, and the subjects’ responses must be 
evaluated by independent judges for quality and quantity (similar to AcI creativity tests). 
Thus, in our studies, social flexibility is excluded because of economical reasons and minimal 
empirical results. Social knowledge is also excluded because of its special role in that it 
explicitly depends on prior knowledge and therefore is not a “pure” cognitive operation. 
 
4) Application of a MTMM design including written, auditory, pictorial, and video-based 
material 
By means of the application of a multimethodal design relying on written and spoken 
language as well as on pictures and videos the theoretical model of Süß et al. (2005, see 
also Weis & Süß, 2007) is extended to a hierarchical facet model. The advantages of facet 
models have been specified in chapter 2.1.4. Archer and Akert (1980) could show empirically 
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that every channel contains meaningful information and that there is an information 
redundancy (the same information is imparted by different channels and cues). They assume 
that even small pieces of information imparted through different channels are interpretable 
and sufficient to come to the correct conclusion of the situation and of peoples’ behavior. In 
the view of Ambady and Rosenthal (1992) information of too many channels at the same 
time may be rather distracting. On the contrary, Ekman, O’Sullivan, Friesen, and Scherer 
(1991) report the highest accuracy for the detection of deceit when all channels are involved. 
Obviously, there is no common opinion and empirical results are contradictory. Therefore, in 
our SI test, different channels should be involved separately but referring to the same 
situations. Future studies may combine the channels systematically. One could argue that 
written material from former studies of SI (e.g. Chapin, 1967; Gough, 1968; Orlik, 1978; 
Riggio et al., 1991; Shanley et al., 1971; Wong et al., 1995) is not worth further investigation. 
However, although many problems arose with written material in the past, there are practical 
as well as theoretical reasons to include it (see also Wong et al., 1995). One of our main 
methods of communication is via email. That makes it especially important to understand and 
react adequately to social cues and to avoid misconceptions. Semantic content was 
important to the identification of sadness (Apple & Hecht, 1981), and the verbal channel was 
most accurate to communicate the distinction expressive-inexpressive (Ekman et al., 1980). 
With regard to theoretical reasons, the question of whether SI measured with written material 
is separable from AcI could not be assessed exhaustively because of theoretical (lack of 
theoretical model) and methodological (lack of a test including realistic material, inclusion of 
social context) shortcomings. Empirical studies provided evidence, that verbal information is 
particularly important in longer exposures to social cues leading to a greater accuracy 
(Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). Research based on newly developed realistic written SI tasks 
that include the social context and are developed thoroughly should be worthwhile to further 
address the question of the relationship between social verbal intelligence and AcI. Another 
reason for the use of written language concerns the operational domains. Is there a 
relationship to AcI in all operational domains (understanding, memory and perception) of SI, 
including written material? 
 
5) Inclusion of the social context 
Statements about the SI of a person require consideration of historic and cultural elements, 
and even different conditions of life, as well as a notice of personal aims someone brings into 
the context of a situation. Intelligence is not intrinsic to a person but must be contextually 
defined (Ford, 1982) and is to a large part determined by social or personal values rather 
than by objective, scientific criteria. Consequently, a person’s behavior can never be judged 
as socially intelligent or unintelligent. Statements can only be made regarding the specific 
situation. This makes it once again important to search for underlying characteristics of SI, 
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because all other behaviors are context dependent and thus cannot be empirically 
investigated in a way that is generalizable and valid across situations, aims and people. For 
the measurement of underlying characteristics, possible social situations have to be covered 
as completely as possible. A person who is able to understand someone’s feelings, thoughts, 
and relationships to other people correctly in different social situations and with different 
kinds of people is, in our view, expected to be socially intelligent. Therefore, stimulus material 
for our test should be chosen according to its representativeness of possible social 
situations. A kind of a taxonomy on social situations should be provided (or alternatively, if 
not available, newly developed) that can be covered as completely as possible by the 
stimulus material.  
 
6) Realistic (non-acted) material 
For most of the existing tests, actors generated the stimulus material. With actors, typical 
conflict and cooperation situations can be displayed (see e.g. VISION, Runde & Etzel, 2005, 
chapter 2.2.3) clearly and unambiguously. However, it has to be queried whether acted 
social situations correspond to reality. In daily life, we often encounter social situations that 
are not as extreme and exaggerated as shown in acted situations. On the contrary, daily 
social situations and emotions are often much more subtle. Besides bypassing the problem 
of overemphasis that arises with actors, another advantage of the use of realistic stimulus 
material is the lack of transfer problems between the test and the social behavior that is 
shown in real life (important for criterion validation, training etc.). In our study, we decided to 
use realistic situations instead of actors. The collection of realistic material is much more 
costly and requires much more effort. How that was done is described in chapter 4.1. 
 
7) Objective scoring  
In chapter 2.2.3, I mentioned that the scoring of SI tasks should be as objective as possible. 
This seems to be easier with regard to social perception and social memory tasks than for 
social understanding tasks. Perception tasks should include reactions to objectively present 
stimuli in the material. Social information that is tested in social memory tasks should be 
obvious in the stimulus material, which has to be remembered. For social understanding 
there are no equivalent systems to determine the correct answers on the tests. The items of 
such tasks are much more complex, requiring alternative scoring procedures, namely (1) 
target scoring, (2) consensus scoring, and (3) expert scoring (see chapter 2.2.3).  
 
For our social understanding test we decided to focus on target scoring to avoid the negative 
implications of consensus scoring (see chapter 2.2.3) and expert scoring (dependence on a 
usually small group of experts’ opinions and is an opinion rather than being objective). The 
approach mentioned by Legree et al. (2005), who take the perspective that consensus 
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scoring may be an adequate procedure for some domains (i.e., with neither experts nor 
object knowledge; for controversial subjects) is not recommendable for several reasons. 
First, including only novices in the sample may result in strong intra- and interindividual 
disagreement among subjects and with an experts’ view. Second, the procedure may not 
apply when the target has extra information that is not available to the outside observer (see 
chapter 2.2.3), which is true for the approach we used, which will be presented in chapter 
4.1.3. According to Kang et al. (2005), “consensual definitions of SI have not been 
forthcoming in the literature” (p. 112). However, since consensus-based scoring does not 
imply much effort it may be an easily gained additional source of information we can use with 
respect to the correspondence between target and consensus scoring (see chapter 2.2.3). 
 
8) Representative sample  
a) Age range between 25 and 40 years 
It is interesting that most of the studies in the domain of SI have been conducted with young 
people. Out of 44 studies published before 1983, forty studies used students (primary school 
students, high school students, undergraduate students, graduate students) as subjects 
(Landy, 2006). Only five studies, four of them using the Guilford and O’Sullivan tests (1965), 
were conducted with high school students and revealed an independent SI factor compared 
to AcI. All of the graduate and undergraduate students were psychology majors. Landy 
(2006) criticizes correctly that this selection of participants is not representative. Even after 
1983, most studies have been implemented using (psychology) students (see references 
chapter 2.2), often for economical reasons (availability of psychology students, lower costs). 
At least one of our studies should involve adults, who have to prove their SI in a variety of 
privat (e.g., family) and public/working situations. 
 
b) Different levels of education and proficiency  
Focusing on psychology majors, proficiency and level of education did not vary considerably 
in past studies. However, results of some investigations show that there are differences 
concerning education and proficiency. For example, profiles of sophisticated samples 
showed good performance on video and poorer performance on audio while profiles of the 
unsophisticated showed the reverse pattern. Rosenthal et al. (1979) assume that reading the 
tone of voice is a rather unsocialized skill compared to reading visual cues (in western 
standards). However, regarding the results from an evolutionary standpoint they seem to be 
counterintuitive: Nonverbal language starting from this viewpoint should emerge as being 
more basic. Our aim is to examine social intelligence at least in one study with a group of 
adults covering different proficiencies. 
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2.7.3 Composition and Construction of an Auditory Intelligence Test (AuIT) 
I assume auditory intellectual abilities to be classified according to the cognitive operation 
they require (discrimination, memory, reasoning and creativity) and according to the material 
that was used (e.g., tones, familiar environmental sounds and speech) (see chapter 2.5). The 
Stankov and Horn (1980) test battery is still the broadest that exists and covers several of the 
operational and content domains mentioned. Therefore, my purpose is to take the Stankov 
and Horn tasks as a basis and develop additional tasks for cells that are not covered by their 
subtests. Several objectives arise starting from this point that will be explained briefly below, 
since most objectives that are also valid for the AuIT have already been described in the 
context of SI. 
 
1) Performance-based measurement 
Auditory intelligence should be measured based on performance instead of using self- and 
other-report measures or knowledge tests (see Süß, 1996, 2001; second criterion). 
 
2) Operational domains 
Tasks should tap the three operational domains discrimination, memory and reasoning. 
Similar to SI, an additional auditory creativity dimension is expected, which would be 
measured, for example, with composition tasks. However, the creativity domain exceeds my 
and our limits because of economical reasons including scoring difficulties, test time, and 
effort. Therefore, the creativity domain is reserved for future research.  
 
3) Content domains 
At least two content domains, speech and tones, should be included forming according to 
Figure 2-10 the poles of what I defined as “auditory intelligence.“ It would make sense to 
examine the familiar environmental sounds in addition if enough resources are available.  
 
4) Level of tasks 
As suggested by Stankov (1971) and Horn (1967), the level of auditory tasks should be 
equivalent to tasks of AcI in order to minimize undesired variance. That means developing 
tasks with a mean difficulty of .50 covering different degrees of difficulty.  
 
5) Musical experience 
The tasks should be soluble without musical knowledge (see Süß, 1996; 2001; third 
criterion). However, we cannot make sure that people with musical experience do not have 
advantages in solving tonal tasks.  
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3 Hypotheses  
I already indicated that task development and selection of both constructs, SI and AuI, is 
intended to take place on a level comparable to AcI. With respect to the hypotheses 
described below that will be examined with the test of SI and AuI, the constructs should be 
compared at the same level, such as expected primary factors with primary factors and 
secondary factors with secondary factors (e.g. AcI memory with SI memory and AuI 
memory). Thus, factors should be Brunswik symmetrical (see Wittmann, 1988). 
 
 
3.1 Social Intelligence 
3.1.1 Convergent Construct Validation of Social Intelligence 
Social Operation Domains 
We expect a coherent SI structure with a general positive manifold including all operations 
(postulated SI model, Süß et. al; Weis & Süß, 2005) and contents (see MTMM design, 
chapter 2.1.4). Since we know that SI is a multidimensional construct, we expect the 
dimensions of social perception, social memory and social understanding to be moderately 
correlated. Perception is a precondition to memorize socially relevant cues; both perception 
and memory are preconditions for social understanding. Therefore, social perception as the 
most basic dimension and social understanding as the dimension with the highest degree of 
complexity should demonstrate the lowest correlations; whereas social memory should show 
higher correlations with perception as well as understanding.  
 
Social Content Domains 
Correlations within nonverbal content domains, namely video-based and pictorial material, 
should be higher than with written and spoken language. It could be that video-based and 
pictorial material do not form separate factors as expected, but rather build a combined 
nonverbal dimension entity in addition to the written and auditory factors (see Figure 3-1, 
circle). Auditory abilities (spoken language) are expected to correlate more highly with video-
based material than with written language and pictorial material because of the dynamic 
nature of the material. Verbal material should correlate more highly with auditory material 
than with pictorial and video-based material because of the common application of language. 
According to the MTMM approach (see Campbell & Fiske, 1959), as a further development 
of facet models, the correlations between the ability dimensions should be higher across 
methods than the correlations within the same method but across dimensions. 
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Figure 3-1: Expected Structure of Social Intelligence  
Note: Strength of correlations is indicated by thickness of arrows. SP=Social perception; SM=Social memory; 
SU=Social understanding 
 
 
3.1.2 Divergent Construct Validation of Social Intelligence  
Wechsler (1958, p. 75) queried whether "social intelligence is just general intelligence 
applied to social situations.“ In our view, however, SI should form a separate ability domain. 
Since our test includes the social context, we can test Wechsler’s assertions. 
 
Academic Intelligence (Operations) 
According to Carroll (1993), SI measures should correlate at least moderately with AcI to be 
regarded as an aspect of intelligence. However, in Lee et al.’s study (2000, see above), SI 
and AcI were not at all correlated. In a Structural Equation Model (SEM model), which 
allowed an intercorrelation between the two factors, the AcI – SI relationship was estimated 
to be .37 (< .05). However, a model that fit without that path was not significantly worse and 
thus would have been preferred for reasons of parsimony. According to Carroll (1993) and 
Lee et al. (2000), these findings question whether or not SI can be regarded to be an 
intelligence. However, as already mentioned (see chapter 1.2 and 1.3), criteria have to be 
specified in a way that clearly defines the manner in which a construct will (and if so, how 
strongly) or will not be related to AcI. However, there is no clear criterion that stresses the 
strength of correlations between constructs necessary for defining it as intelligence. 
Intelligence according to the definition as being underlying and stable, relatively general and 
to a comparatively higher degree genetically predetermined does not prescribe guidelines for 
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the strength of correlations with AcI. In my opinion, to be treated as an intelligence, 
correlations with AcI are not needed if the criteria described in Süß (1996) are fulfilled. To 
find an ability construct meeting the criteria and being not at all correlated with AcI, in my 
view seems even to be preferable, as a greater portion of variance can be explained. High 
correlations with AcI, on the contrary, seem to prove that nothing novel is measured. In order 
to be handled as an ability construct different from AcI and others, I suggest moderate 
correlations at the most. Of course, the correlation-related proportion of variance explained 
by other variables should also be taken into account and serve as even better proof. With 
regard to our study, we expect SI to form a completely different construct, and consequently 
to be clearly separable from AcI. However, we also expect low to moderate correlations, 
because we expect cognitive operations of AcI and SI (e.g. memory) to share some parts of 
variance. In more detail, we assume social understanding as the core facet of Social 
Intelligence to show, compared to other social intelligence domains (i.e., social memory, 
social perception), the lowest correlations with AcI (see also Figure 3-2). 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Expected Relationship Between Social Intelligence and Operations of Academic 
Intelligence 
Note: Strength of correlations is indicated by thickness of arrows. SP=Social perception; SM=Social memory; 
SU=Social understanding; S=AcI Speed; M=AcI Memory; R=AcI reasoning 
 
 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence (Contents) 
Concerning the content domains, I expect the highest correlations between social written 
abilities and verbal AcI. Since I expect SI perception and SI memory as well as SI written to 
share more common variance compared to SI understanding and the other SI content 
domains, I wonder whether SI perception and memory applying written material can be 
separated from AcI. Nonverbal as well as social auditory abilities should demonstrate lower 
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correlation with the BIS contents. However, all social content domains should be weakly 
correlated with verbal AcI, because in SI tasks, written task instructions, answer sheets etc. 
are used. We assume minor correlations between academic figural-spatial and SI pictorial, 
and even lower correlations with video-based material. Academic numerical and academic 
figural-spatial ability are expected to be less correlated with social written abilities, because 
of variance that emerges out of written material (paper-pencil) that all those tasks have in 
common. The same is assumed with respect to the relationship between verbal academic 
and all SI contents (see Figure 3-3).  
 
Figure 3-3: Expected Relationship Between Social Intelligence and Contents of Academic 
Intelligence 
Note: Arrows indicate the height of the expected correlations. Higher correlations are indicated by thicker arrows.  
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3.1.3 Summary of Hypotheses With Regard to Social Intelligence 
Internal SI structure 
H1S 
A coherent SI structure is expected to be indicated by showing a general 
positive manifold including all operations and contents. 
H2S 
The dimensions social perception, social memory, and social understanding 
are moderately correlated (.20 - .40).  
H3S 
Social perception and social understanding demonstrate the lowest correlation, 
whereas social memory shows higher correlations with both perception and 
understanding.  
H4S 
SI language domains (written and spoken) are more lowly correlated than the 
nonverbal content domains (video-based and pictorial material). 
H5S 
Auditory abilities (spoken language) are expected to correlate more highly with 
video-based material than with pictorial material. 
H6S 
Verbal material should correlate more highly with auditory material than with 
pictorial and video-based material.  
Relatioship between SI and AcI (operations) 
H7SAo SI and AcI are expected to demonstrate low to moderate correlation.  
H8SAo 
SI factors are assumed to be intercorrelated more highly than with the 
corresponding AcI factors. 
H9SAo 
Social understanding shows the lowest correlations with AcI (particularly 
reasoning) compared to SI perception and SI memory.  
H10SAo SI perception is expected to be correlated most highly with AcI speed.  
H11SAo SI memory is expected to be correlated most highly with AcI memory.  
Relationship between SI and AcI (contents) 
H12SAc 
All social content domains are assumed to be weakly correlated with verbal 
AcI. 
H13SAc 
The highest correlations are expected between social written abilities and 
verbal AcI (nonverbal and auditory abilities should demonstrate lower 
correlations with the BIS contents). 
H14SAc Social written abilities are assumed to be weakly correlated with academic numerical and academic figural-spatial ability. 
Note. H=hypothesis; S=Social intelligence; A=Academic intelligence; o=operation; c=content 
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3.2 Auditory Intelligence 
3.2.1 Inner Structure of Auditory Intelligence 
I expect that auditory abilities can be described applying two facets analogous to the BIS 
model: A content facet including speech and non-speech material and an operation facet that 
splits up into auditory discrimination, memory and reasoning. All domains are expected to be 
correlated but nevertheless separable. Comparable to SI, the content and the operation 
model should be tested separately because of restrictions concerning degrees of freedom. 
Figure 3-4 illustrates the expected internal structure of auditory abilities. 
 
Figure 3-4: Expected Structure of Auditory Abilities 
Note. AD=Auditory discrimination; AM=Auditory memory; AR=Auditory reasoning 
 
3.2.2 Extension of the BIS Model through an Auditory Intelligence Dimension 
The auditory ability dimensions are expected to be separable from AcI (represented through 
the BIS model). There are several possibilities for how auditory abilities could be classified 
into the BIS model: 
1) They form an additional content domain in addition to verbal, numerical and figural-spatial. 
2) They form a completely new operation. 
3) They form a new facet (together with the precedent visual abilities). 
Of course, not all of the possibilities can be tested in the present study. For now, I expect 
auditory abilities to make up an additional content domain within the BIS model (see Figure 
3-5) including speech and tonal material. Speech-related auditory abilities are assumed to 
show higher correlations with verbal AcI and with the corresponding operations they are 
expected to measure. Tonal auditory ability is expected to correlate with figural and 
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numerical AcI contents, since tonal material is assumed to require internal representation 
(cognitive strategy), which might be imaginative (visual, figural-spatial) or numerical (counting 
tones) and is applied to the scale and distances between tones. 
 
Figure 3-5: Expected Relationship Between Auditory Intelligence and Content Domains of 
Academic Intelligence 
 
With regard to operation domains, firstly, I expect auditory discrimination to be related to AcI 
speed, auditory memory to be related to AcI memory, and auditory reasoning to be related to 
AcI reasoning. However, I assume the correlations between the two suggested intelligence 
constructs to be low to moderate as they do not share the same content material (see Figure 
3-6). 
Figure 3-6: Expected Relationships Between Auditory Intelligence and Operation Domains of 
Academic Intelligence 
Note: AD=Auditory discrimination; AM=Auditory memory; AR=Auditory reasoning S=AcI Speed; M=AcI Memory; 
R=AcI reasoning 
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It is also possible that auditory intelligence tasks form a completely new operation on top of 
the auditory content or make up a new facet together with visual abilities. If auditory abilities 
form a new operation, the auditory operation domains (discrimination, memory and 
reasoning) are expected not to be correlated with the AcI operations processing speed, 
memory and reasoning (or to demonstrate only minor correlations). 
 
3.2.3 Summary of Hypotheses With Regard to Auditory Intelligence 
Internal Auditory Intelligence structure 
H15Au Three at least moderately correlated (.40 - .60) auditory operation factors 
emerge: auditory reasoning, memory, and discrimination. 
H16Au 
 
Two content factors, speech and tonal auditory, are expected to be moderately 
correlated (.30 - .50).  
Relationship between Auditory Intelligence and AcI 
H17AuA Auditory discrimination is expected to show the highest correlation with AcI 
speed. 
H18AuA Auditory memory is assumed to be most highly related to AcI memory. 
H19AuA Auditory reasoning is supposed to be most highly related to AcI reasoning. 
H20AuA 
 
Auditory abilities make up an additional content domain within the BIS model 
(are clearly separable from AcI contents). 
H21AuA 
 
Speech-related auditory ability is expected to show higher correlations with 
verbal AcI than the auditory tonal ability. 
H22AuA Tonal auditory ability is expected to correlate with figural and numerical AcI 
contents.  
Note. Au=Auditory intelligence, A=Academic intelligence 
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3.3 Social Auditory and General Auditory Abilities 
3.3.1 Relationship to Academic Intelligence 
All in all, I expect social auditory abilities to be separable from but positively intercorrelated 
with general auditory abilities. The relationship between social auditory abilities and general 
auditory abilities reflects the relationships of the superordinate model that includes all 
academic and social intelligence factors. Correspondent to the whole model, I assume the 
correlations between social auditory memory, perception and understanding to be higher 
than between social auditory perception and understanding because of the complexity 
differences (see also chapter 3.1.1). Analogous results are expected within general auditory 
abilities. That should result in the strongest overlap between the two auditory memory factors 
(general auditory memory and social auditory memory). With regard to contents, both 
auditory speech and auditory tonal tasks are assumed to correlate with social auditory tasks. 
However, because of the use of language in both general auditory speech tasks and social 
auditory tasks, factors including speech should correlate more strongly than the tonal factor 
with the social auditory abilities.  
 
Figure 3-7: Social and General Auditory Abilities in the Context of Academic Intelligence 
written
auditory
pictorial
verbal
numerical
figural-
spatial
Academic Intelligence
with auditory speech and non-
speech abilities
Social
Intelligence
video
auditory
speech
auditory
non-speech
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3.3.2 Summary of Hypotheses With Regard to Social Auditory vs. General Auditory 
Abilities 
 
H23SAu 
Social auditory abilities are expected to be moderately intercorrelated with 
general auditory abilities.  
H24SAu 
The strongest overlap of social auditory and general auditory intelligence is 
expected between the two memory factors.  
H25SAu 
Both auditory speech and auditory tonal tasks are assumed to correlate 
positively with social auditory tasks. 
H26SAu 
The auditory speech factor should correlate more highly with social auditory 
abilities than the auditory tonal factor. 
Note. S=Social intelligence; Au=Auditory intelligence
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4 Test Development 
This chapter describes the development of the Social Intelligence Test – Magdeburg (in the 
following abbreviated with “SIM”) and of the Auditory Intelligence Test (in the following 
abbreviated with “AuIT”). The main focus is on the development of social written and social 
auditory tasks. Examples of the tasks are provided on the enclosed CD (test demonstration). 
 
 
4.1 Development of the Social Intelligence Test-Magdeburg (SIM) 
For the development of the SIM, an extensive research plan was worked out. The test ideas 
for the written social intelligence tasks was my responsibility. The auditory social intelligence 
tasks were partly developed together with Jenny Papenbrock who left our research project 
after the first main study (see Papenbrock, 2005). The social understanding tasks were 
developed together with Susanne Weis who was also responsible for the pictorial and video-
based tasks. See her work (Weis, in preparation) for the test development, modifications and 
results of these content domains. In the following chapter, the main steps of test 
development and the modifications that were made for the first main study are described with 
respect to the social understanding tasks as well as for the auditory and written memory and 
perception tasks. 
 
4.1.1 Test Design 
In order to meet the objectives described in chapter 2.7, a test design was developed that 
included the three operational domains of (1) social understanding, (2) memory, and (3) 
perception and that relied on written and spoken language and pictorial and video-based 
material. In the following, the term “different types of material” is used in order to refer to the 
separation of auditory, video-based, written, and pictorial content domains. Each cell 
resulting from cross-classification of operations and contents should be represented through 
two tasks. In the first study, however, we restricted our development on at least one task for 
each cell. In a next step, the cells should be completed by additional tasks using the results 
of the first validation study. In this chapter the test development is illustrated by some 
examples; the complete test will be presented in the context of the main study (see chapters 
6.2.2, 7, and 8.2.2). Table 4-1 represents our test design with the abbreviations that will be 
used in the text that follows. 
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Table 4-1: Overview of the Social Intelligence Test Design and the Corresponding 
Abbreviations 
Material/Method 
Operational domain 
written 
language (w) 
spoken 
language (a) pictorial (p) 
video-based 
(f) 
Social understanding 
(SU) Scenario approach 
Social memory (SM) SMw1+2 SMa1 SMa2 
SMp1 
SMp2 
SMf1+2 
 
Social perception (SP) SPw1 SPw1 
SPa1 
SPa2 
SPp1 
SPp2 
SPf1 
SPf2 
Note: SMw=Social memory written; SPw=Social perception written; SMa=Social memory auditory; SPa= Social 
perception auditory; SMp=Social memory pictorial; SPp=Social perception pictorial; SMf= Social memory video-
based; SPf=Social perception video-based 
 
We chose a scenario approach for the design of the social understanding (SU) tasks. Our 
reasons for selecting this approach were the following: Social understanding deals with the 
interpretation and judgment of other peoples’ feelings, thoughts, and relationships (see 
chapter 2.2.2). On the one hand, it is important to judge a person’s behavior, and 
accompanying thoughts and feelings, correctly in an arena of knowledge at a relatively early 
point. On the other hand, it is also important to refine one‘s interpretation of the person’s 
feelings, thoughts, and actions when more background information is available. A person 
may behave differently in private and public settings. The behavior may also depend on the 
people the person deals with (e.g., husband/wife, children, relatives, friends, acquaintances, 
colleagues and superiors) as well as on the number of people interacting in a certain 
situation (e.g., dyads, small groups and larger groups). It is difficult to cover all these aspects 
with a variety of people in one or two tasks separating the different types of material. 
Therefore, we chose a scenario approach that presents one person in further detail in 
different settings involving all kinds of material we selected. We decided to investigate the 
different channels separately (e.g., presenting video without sound, pictures without text, 
etc.) in order to get as much information as possible about each type of material and about 
the effects of a certain sensory channel (see chapter 2.7.2 for further reasons). 
 
4.1.2 Taxonomy of Social Situations  
In order to represent the context adequately and systematically (see chapter 2.7.2; Dewey, 
1909, cited by Landy, 2006) by select appropriate and representative material, we searched 
for a taxonomy of possible social situations. Such taxonomies are rare; for an example see 
Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) who distinguished object and referent dimensions and included 
variations of the content and the time. Despite of extensive literature review, we found only 
one classification we could rely on. Runde and Etzel tried to cover as many social situations 
as possible with their taxonomy that also serves as a basis for their instrument VISION 
(Runde & Etzel, 2005). They differentiate between three dimensions: (1) The content 
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dimension is described by parameter values (or: specifications, characteristics) job, family, 
friends and public life. (2) The structure dimension differentiates between a group and a dyad 
and (3) the quality dimension involves two conditions, competitive and cooperative behavior. 
Our own taxonomy is based on the Runde and Etzel (2005) system but is enlarged and 
modified on the basis of literature studies in the domain of social cognition (e.g., Abrams, & 
Hogg, 1999; Aronson et al., 2004; Forgas, 2000). Figure 4-1 presents our classification 
system for possible social situations. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Taxonomy of Possible Social Situations 
 
The “objects” dimension describes the number of interacting persons. We include single 
others as a characteristic of this dimension, accounting for monologues, emails, pictures with 
emotional expressions emerging in situations in which single persons are not seen or heard 
by other people. However, in contrast to tests of emotional intelligence, the expressions, 
behavior etc. of single others are always elicited by human beings rather than being free 
from social interaction (see e.g., emotions in the MSCEIT elicited through landscapes). Small 
groups are, according to the literature in social psychology, groups including between two 
and nine persons (Witte, 2005). According to Witte (2005), larger groups (e.g. sport clubs or 
school classes) can also be considered as small groups dependent on the duration of 
acquaintance and the time spent together. The more intense the contact is, the larger the 
number of people that can be encompassed by the idea of a “small group.“ Small groups are 
chosen as object dimension since they have their special laws of behavior different from the 
individual and a larger social context and because the interaction in such groups is expected 
to influence decision-making (see Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958). In our taxonomy, however, 
we do not classify dyads as small groups, but regard them as a separate entity. We 
differentiate between private and public “settings” as social systems and include family and 
relatives, friends and private acquaintances within the private category. The public domain 
subsumes job situations, as well as daily public life (e.g. shopping, going by train or bus, 
interactions in administration offices or departments). The “content” of a situation is classified 
according to the interpersonal circumplex, which is made up of two main dimensions, status 
(assured-dominance vs. passive-submissiveness) and love (warm-agreeableness, see 
Wiggins, 1979). Status is also described as control (Kiesler, 1983), power (Wiggins, 1979) 
Parameter values
Single others
Dyads
Small groups
Private
Public
Circumplex
dimensions
Objects Setting ContentContext variables
X X
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and agency (Wiggins, 1991); love is known in terms of affiliation (Kiesler, 1983) and 
communion (Wiggins, 1991). The dimensions are characterized as follows. (1) Power: 
Dominance is expressed through steady and raised voice, speech interruptions, presentation 
of information, expression of opinion, leading and delegating behavior, and getting quickly to 
the relevant point of an interaction. Submissive behavior is shown through the application of 
soft language and patient behavior that lets others precede (speak and act). It tends to 
conform with the opinion and meaning of others, does not directly express the wishes of the 
actor, and avoids responsibility. (2) Love: An agreeable behavior is characterized by attentive 
listening, smiling, a positive attitude, talking to other people, making compromises, showing 
correspondence (of opinions; agreement) and expressing affiliation and sympathy. 
Quarreling is expresed through demanding and sarcastic behavior, not answering to 
questions, witholding information or providing wrong or inaccurate information. The 
interpersonal circumplex is supported by 40 years of psychological research and has been 
successfully applied in a variety of studies with widely different settings (e.g. Carson, 1969; 
Foa, 1961; Kelley, Holmes, Kerr, Reiss, Rusbult, & Van Lange, 2002; Kiesler, 1983; Leary, 
1957; Wiggins, 1996; Wiggins & Trobst, 1997). The circumplex goes back to the 
Interpersonal Adjective Scales (Wiggins, 1979), classifying and categorizing words 
describing the way, people interact. The axses can serve either for the description of an 
individual/group or for the classification of a situation (see Wiggins, 1991). An example 
description for a status situation in public life can be “strivings for mastery and power that 
would enhance and protect the differentiation of the individual, accompanied mostly by 
dominant, seldom by submissive, behavior. An example of a description for love in private 
settings might be “strivings for intimacy, union and solidarity with a social or spiritual entity, 
and communality would be partly reflected in frequent agreeable behaviors and infrequent 
quarrelsome behaviors”. A certain interpersonal behavior can be classified in the two-
dimensional space through marking the co-ordinates. Often, the interpersonal circumplex 
dimensions were examined through self-report measures (e.g. Inventory of Interpersonal 
Problems-Circumplex; IIP-C, Alden, Wiggins & Pincus, 1990), which was also used in this 
dissertation. The Circumplex dimensions are expected to cover parts of the broader structure 
of the Big Five in further detail, namely agreeableness and extraversion. The dimensions 
extraversion and agreeableness depend directly on the presence of other persons: Both 
dimensions seem to determine the extent of social stimulation and the preferred way of 
social interaction. The circumplex dimensions interact with the setting. Moskowitz (1994) 
found that in public situations, the status of the interaction partner was of prime importance, 
whereas in private situations, the degree of intimacy (closeness) was decisive. Social norms 
play a greater role in public situations than in private situations. In the private domain the 
person has a larger margin of freedom to behave according to personal tendencies. The 
source of information, applying our taxonomy, always stems from a person-situation 
interaction. According to Wiggins (1979), interpersonal events may be defined as dyadic 
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interactions that have relatively clear-cut social (status) and emotional (love) consequences 
for the self and other people. 
 
With respect to our task material, we do not expect, that in each task all possible 
combinations of object, setting, content and question mentioned in the taxonomy (see Figure 
4-1) are covered. However, systematic variation can also be managed by covering the cells 
across tasks (instead of presenting each combination within one task). 
 
4.1.3 Social Understanding Tasks (SU) 
Each scenario deals with one target person shown in both private and public life interacting 
with different people. Various situations and background information about the person 
provide context information. Judging a person across different situations should lead to a 
higher degree of reality (more extensive impression of the person) and consequently to 
better conditions for high verisimilitude. For the material collection, two persons accompanied 
the target person for two or more days and collected video, audio, pictorial, and written 
material of that person in different private and public situations with different people. One 
person concentrated on filming, the other on generating questions related to interesting parts 
of the situation. In order to collect as much information as possible in limited time, target 
persons were asked to make a schedule of situations that might reasonably be expected to 
be encountered during the period reserved for recordings. Before recordings were made, all 
persons present were asked to sign a letter of agreement for later use of the material. In 
order to minimize effects of recordings on natural behavior, we did not use the first 10 or 15 
minutes for item generation and questions. However, all our target persons told us, that after 
a short time and a few recording sessions, they tended to forget the camera and behaved 
naturally. As soon as possible after finishing the recordings of one situation, the target 
person was asked about her feelings, thoughts, and relationships to other persons present in 
selected parts of video, audio, pictures, or written notes. Some questions that emerged later 
on during test development were answered in a second meeting and/or via email/phone. We 
generated standard questions for each modality involved for a particular person and 
situation. The questions served as an orientation but were adapted according to the specific 
situation and people. Beyond standard material, there was always a possibility of completely 
different questions arising in the special situation. The content of the questions concerned 
cognition, affect, and behavior. The questions differed slightly according to the kind of 
material (written and spoken language, pictures, videos). Consequently, a 3 (question 
contents) x 4 (material) matrix with 12 cells was applicable. In addition, we developed 
evaluation questions dealing with metacognitive issues. In Table 4-2 an excerpt concerning 
language-based items from our question catalogue is presented. For comparable questions 
concerning video-based and pictorial material, see Weis (in preparation). 
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Table 4-2: Questions for Target Persons (Verbal and Auditory Material) 
 
Cognition Affect Relationship to other people Evaluation/Metacognition 
 
What do you want to attain 
with the text you wrote/with 
what you said? (purpose)  
 
How do you explain your 
remark (comment/ 
expression) in the situation? 
(explanation) 
 
How would you describe your 
attitude concerning this 
person/this topic? (attitude) 
 
 
 
Which feelings did the 
expression of person x elicit? 
 
How do you feel with regard to 
the person you correspond/talk 
with? 
 
How comfortable do you feel 
with regard to your own 
expressions/the situation/the 
expressions of the other(s)? 
Why? 
 
Describe the mood you were in 
when writing the text 
(email/letter)/talking to the other 
person …? 
 
  
 
How important is the 
topic/correspondent person for 
you? Why? 
 
How much sympathy do you feel 
for the correspondent person? 
Why? 
 
How typical is this way of writing 
(e.g., email, letter)/way of 
conversation/talking for you?  
 
How familiar are you with the topic 
of writing (e.g., complaint, 
loveletter)/of the conversation? 
 
Would you have expressed 
anything different in another 
situation (other person of 
correspondence, different topic)? 
What? 
 
How did you think, during writing, how 
the text/what you said would appear to 
the person who reads/hears it? 
(metacognition) 
 
How probable do you think it is that you 
attained your aim (with what you said 
or wrote)? (metacognition) 
 
Did you think any thoughts different 
from what you wrote/said? What? 
(Difference between expressed 
behavior and thoughts/feelings) 
 
At any point in the conversation do you 
now wish you had said something 
different? What? Why? 
 
Do you believe that you were able to 
say what you wanted to say? Why 
(not)? 
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Once the questions were generated, the target person had the opportunity to view the 
scenes and pictures again and to hear the audiofiles in order to be reminded of the exact 
situation. The target person and the accompanying persons were permitted to exclude 
material and information they did not want to be exposed but none of them seized that 
opportunity. Target persons were asked to name the cues in the material indicating their 
feelings and thoughts in the situation and their relationship to others. In addition, a short self-
presentation including some basic information about the person’s age, proficiency, family 
status and favorite hobbies was recorded. That information was intended to provide some 
background information for the test and help the subjects get an impression of the voice and 
the physical appearance of the target person. At the end of the recordings, the target 
persons were asked to complete some additional questionnaires: the NEO-Five Factor 
Inventory (NEO-FFI, Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993), the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-
Circumplex (IIP-C, Horowitz, Strauß, & Kordy, 2000), the Prototypical acts on SI (Amelang et 
al., 1989), a social desirability questionnaire of the FPI-R (Fahrenberg, Hampel, & Selg, 
2001) and a biographical questionnaire. The answers of the target persons to our questions 
after each scene, as well as the answers they gave in the questionnaires, served for 
generating items later on. Answeres to the questions concerning the scenes should be given 
on a visual scale in order to be able to transfom them to different kinds of scales (e.g., 6-
point or 7-point scale). We took care to use high quality equipment in order to maximize the 
quality of the stimulus materials. Video recordings were made with a videorecorder 
(Panasonic NV-GS50) and pictures were taken with a Minolta Dimage A1. Audiofiles were 
finish-worked with the program CoolEdit 2.0 and saved as wav-files (quantization 16Bit, 
sampling rate 44KHz, mono).  
 
Selection of Appropriate Target Persons  
Our main criterion for selection of the appropriate persons was that they be typical in gender, 
age, proficiency and education of the sorts of persons our student subjects might encounter 
as they go around their daily lives. We did not want unusual, exotic persons for our targets, 
especially at this beginning point in our efforts. The descriptions show in Table 4-3 represent, 
of course, only our first scenarios, eventually they should be complemented by an expanding 
array of target persons if our general approach proves to be successful. We chose as targets 
persons that are well known to at least one of our team and on whose information we could 
rely. Of course, that does not guarantee that the person’s self-assessment and those of 
others’ do not diverge. To assess the likely veridicality of the target persons’ answers, we 
also asked them to complete a social desirability scale. In addition, we collected extra 
information on the scenes. Table 4-3 presents an overview of characteristics of the first four 
persons we recorded in their daily private and public lives. None of the recordings was done 
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in Magdeburg since we wanted to minimize the possibility that one of the target persons is 
known to the test takers. 
 
Table 4-3: Overview of Scenario Target Persons (First Study) 
Name of person Gender Age Proficiency 
Christoph male 23 student of law 
Renate female 24 medical-technician 
Katharina female 26 student of psychology 
Matthias male 33 independent dancing teacher 
 
Selection of Material 
The material obtained from target persons was edited to enhance quality (e.g., noise 
reduction in audio files) and to ensure anonymity (e.g., removing of names and places) and 
was then separated into segments constituting what we judged to be adequate and coherent 
stimuli. The questions we had formulated were assigned to the correspondent material. In a 
team of at least six psychologists and psychological assistants we evaluated and discussed 
each scene and the corresponding questions. A scene was selected for use only when there 
was a consensus on its appropriateness and that relevant cues to the answer of the target 
person could be identified in the task material. The selected scenes were revised again and 
then combined into an approximately 20 minute sequence. Finally, all materials were 
integrated into a software package that was adapted especially for the use in our study 
(WMC program, see also chapter 4.3). With the exception of the self-presentations of the 
target persons in the beginning of each scenario that combined videos, and sound, all 
materials (written, auditory, video and pictorial) were presented separately. The answer 
sheet was prepared with an initial short scene description followed by different kinds of 
questions (open, 6-point rating scale, multiple choice). At the end of the session, the subjects 
were asked to judge the presented target person according to the Big 5 and the Interpersonal 
Circumplex. Once the scenarios are established, the content of the social understanding 
scenario scenes could serve as a subtest of long-term memory. 
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Example of the Task 
Box 4-1: Example of a Social Understanding Task (SU) 
 
 
 
Scoring of Answers 
Persons being tested later were asked to respond to questions and fill out questionnaires as 
they thought the relevant target person might have done. Scores on the tasks were then 
generated by comparing the answers of our subjects to those of our target persons. The 
deviation between the target person’s answer and the subject’s answer produces the 
itemscore. The smaller the deviation the better the score. Since we got the answers of our 
target persons to our questions about emotions, cognitions, and relationships to other people 
we had a rather objective criterion by means of which to evaluate the answers of our test 
takers instead of taking the “common sense” as the best answer. As already mentioned, to 
ensure the best conditions for the veridicality of the target person’s answers, we chose 
persons who were familiar to us. These persons completed a social desirability scale, we 
have started to collect peer-ratings on them, and we will get some expert ratings in the 
future. 
 
4.1.4 Social Memory Tasks (SM) 
Social memory is the ability to store and recall social information. In order to discriminate 
social memory clearly from social perception and from social knowledge (see also chapter 
2.2.2) items (questions) and task material have to be explicit and unambiguous without 
requiring any kind of interpretation or judgment that is part of social understanding. 
Perception without interference has to be taken for granted. In the social memory tasks, the 
material contains exactly the information (word, sentence, picture, movement, etc.) that is 
asked for later on. The social context is taken into account, and items cover the cells of our 
taxonomy as well as possible. Table 4-4 presents the conceptual scheme for written and 
auditory social memory tasks. 
 
 
First, a short introduction (written, video, and sound) of the target person “Renate” serves 
the familarization with the appearance and voice of Renate.  
 
In a short conversation with a colleague and friend of hers she talks about her 
experiences with her former job.  
 
After listening to the conversation, subjects have to answer questions that concern 
Renates feelings and degree of sympathy for her former boss, and her opinion about the 
job in general. The questions have to be rated on a 6-point rating scale. 
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Table 4-4: Test Ideas of Written and Auditory Social Memory Tasks 
 Written Auditory 
Material 
Task 1: one-sided correspondence 
including emails, letters, involving 
socially relevant content  
 
Task 2: two-sided correspondence 
including emails, letters, involving 
socially relevant content  
Task 1: one-sided expressions, 
monologues 
 
 
Task 2: telephone dialogues, 
conversations with two and more 
people 
Question type open open 
Scoring percent of right answers based on a key of analysis for evaluation 
percent of right answers based on 
a key of analysis for evaluation 
 
For both modalities, task 1 and task 2 can be differentiated with respect to the manner of 
communication. Whereas the first task deals with only one person, in the second task two or 
more people communicate. In the following a more detailed rational of each of the memory 
tasks is presented. 
 
 
Social Memory-Auditory: Test Description 
Subjects listen to sound sequences including a different number of people. Subjects are 
encouraged to listen carefully and try to remember as much socially relevant information as 
possible. After listening, subjects have a certain amount of time to answer questions to each 
presented sound file (conversation). Questions are answered in open format. We tried to 
cover our taxonomy with questions that involve all modalities (cognition, affect and 
relationship to other people). See Box 4-2 for an example. Table 4-5 presents an overview of 
the sound files included in the task. 
 
Box 4-2: Example of an Auditory Social Memory Task (SMa) 
 
 
Example: 
 
The first conversation deals with a conflict between a boy who carries out his alternative 
service and his colleagues who evaluate his working behavior. In the colleagues’ opinion 
he does not work autonomously enough and extends his breaks beyond time allowed. 
The narrator talks about a meeting, in which he, his superior, and his colleagues are 
present. The narrator rejects the accusations. 
 
Possible questions that are asked:  Who complains about the narrator?  
How did the superior behave during the discussion? 
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Table 4-5: Test Construction Rational of the Task Auditory Social Memory (SMa) 
Task Gender Private  Public  
male Conversation 2  
(1:48 / 5 / 6)  
about holiday with girlfriend 
 
Conversation 1 
(1:36 / 5 / 8) 
about conflict with 
colleagues and superior 
1) monologues:  
one person 
female Conversation 3  
(1:48 / 5 / 7) 
about a friend who has 
personal and financial 
problems 
 
Conversation 10  
(1:57 / 5 / 5) 
telephone conversation 
about parents 
 
Conversation 7  
(1:50 / 5 / 7) 
report about feedback for  a 
trainee’s performance 
homogeneous Conversation 4 
(1:54 / 5 / 7) 
small group discussion 
about a TV program 
 
Conversation 9  
(2:11 / 5 / 8) 
about a female sales 
assistant a man met in a 
shop 
Conversation 5 
(1:50 / 5 / 8) 
future profession: industry 
vs. university 
 
Conversation 8 
(2:12 / 5 / 5) 
girl looks for a gift for her 
mother 
 
Conversation 11  
(2:14 / 5 / 5) 
changes in life 
 
2) conversations: 
dyads and small 
groups  
heterogeneous Conversation 12  
(1:42 / 6 / 7)  
about a wedding 
Conversation 6  
(1:46 / 5 / 5) 
about a gift a member of the 
work group received 
Note: In parentheses: (duration / number of questions/number of possible points); A summarizing note on the 
content of each sound file is provided within the cells. homogeneous: either women or men; heterogeneous: 
women and men mixed. 
 
Social Memory-Written: Test Description 
In the social written memory task, four text modules are presented. Each text has to be read 
carefully in a limited amount of time. Subjects are instructed to concentrate to remember the 
socially relevant details as accurately as possible. After each text, subjects have a limited 
amount of time to write down their answers to several open-ended questions. An example is 
presented in Box 4-3. Table 4-6 shows the test construction rationale. 
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Box 4-3: Example of a Written Social Memory Task (SMw) 
 
 
Table 4-6: Test Construction Rational of the Task Written Social Memory (SMw) 
 Private Public 
One-sided 
correspondence
Text 1: skiing holidays 
(231 words) 
 
Text 2: objection against a school 
reference (342 words) 
More-sided 
correspondence
Text 4: letter correspondence 
between friends (355 words) 
Text 3: consultation offer/order  
(333 words) 
 
 
4.1.5 Social Perception Tasks (SP) 
Social perception is the ability to perceive social information about persons and context as 
fast and accurately as possible (similar to perceptual speed in academic intelligence) (see 
chapter 2.2.2). In order to separate social perception clearly from social memory, all relevant 
information must be available, obvious, unambiguous, and objective. Possible cues to react 
to are, for example, a laughter in a conversation, a change of speakers, an emotional word 
etc. This quick responsiveness is particulary important with regard to the distinction of social 
perception from social understanding. In the same way as for social understanding tasks, the 
social context should be taken into account, and items should cover the cells of our 
taxonomy as well as possible. Within all social perception tasks, targets are presented in 
advance of the item material. People have to react as soon as previously presented targets 
emerge.  
 
 
 
 
 
[…] Surprisingly, vacation was also good for me. I never thought that I would like skiing. I 
participated in a beginner‘s course with an actually kind skiing instructor. He explained 
skiing well. Unfortunately, he always felt the need to touch women. That is something, I 
can absolutely not tolerate. One of my colleagues also participated, but she gave up on 
the third day. The major reason was probably her weight. I felt so sorry for her because I 
talked her into coming with us. Tomorrow, I am going to see her again at work, I hope she 
will not be mad at me.  […] 
 
Possible questions are: 
 
Which positive information does the narrator write about the skiing teacher? 
Why did the narrator feel sorry that one of her colleagues gave up? 
What does the narrator hope when she meets her colleague again? 
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Test Idea Auditory and Written Social Perception Tasks 
Table 4-7: Description of the Preliminary Auditory and Written Social Perception Tasks 
 Written Auditory 
Material Task 1: On the right hand side of the 
screen a short text with social content 
emerges (extracts of emails, letters, 
diaries,etc.). On the left hand side, a 
question that has to be answered on the 
basis of the text on the right hand side is 
presented (e.g. Is the future of Liz topic 
of the text passage? – answer with “yes” 
vs. “no”) 
 
Task 2: Sentences, phrases, chats, etc. 
are presented. Reactions have to be 
made according to the content (social 
content vs. non-social content; positive 
vs. negative emotion) 
 
Task 1: Reaction to target cues in 
conversations; possible target cues: 
names of people, interruptions, laughter, 
talking at the same time, etc. 
 
Task 2: Presentation of voices. Reaction 
to changes of pitch, tempo, emotions 
Scoring Reaction time and accuracy Reaction time and accuracy 
 
For the written social perception tasks, it is important to show the target questions before 
presenting the item content. Target questions are available until the item is answered in 
order to avoid memory effects. Moreover, reading speed has to be controlled. Perception 
tasks are quite short in duration. Once started, it is difficult to explain the task again to 
someone who did not understand it properly. Therefore, the task has to be practiced to 
ensure proper understanding before starting the test.  
 
Auditory Social Perception Tasks 
In the social auditory perception task, subjects have to perceive specified facts and react to 
the stimulus as fast and accurately as possible as soon as it has been perceived. Facts can 
be names of persons, the voice of a child, rejection or agreement, laughter, etc. The number 
of people talking within the sound files differs. A more vivid impression of the test can be 
obtained by listening to the CD examples (see appendix D). 
 
The conversations and corresponding stimuli that have to be perceived differ in complexity. 
In six of the conversations only one stimulus has to be monitored; the same number of 
conversations requires reaction to two stimuli. In one additional conversation, three stimuli 
have to be monitored. Four examples serve for practicing the task. In three of them one 
stimulus has to be monitored (agreement, laughter, change of speaker), in the fourth, 
subjects have to practice the reaction to two stimuli (laughter, voice of a woman). In the 
following an overview of the conversations (see Table 4-8) and the corresponding stimuli 
(see Table 4-9) is presented. 
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Table 4-8: Rational for Auditory Social Perception (SPa) 
 
Sex One cue Two cues Three cues 
male  1) Telefone conversation: 
Niklas/Steven; dyad (8) 
 
2) Politics conversation; 
small group (6) 
3) Conversation at a 
summer evening party; 
small group (7) 
 
4) Conversation with a 
colleague about a new 
bike; dyad (12) 
 
--- 
Homo-
geneous 
fe-
male 
 5) Conversation about a 
wedding dress; small 
group (7) 
 
 6) Telephone conversation 
about a job/application; 
dyad (10) 
 7)  Tea time conversation; 
small group (8) 
 
8) Conversation while 
regarding 
photographs; small 
group (11) 
 
13) 
Conversation 
during 
breakfast; 
small group 
(10) 
Heterogeneous  9) Explanation of a game 
on holidays; small group 
(9) 
 
10) Reaction of a father to 
his baby daughter; dyad 
(9) 
 
11) Conversation at a 
party about a flat and 
furniture; dyad (8) 
 
12) Conversation at a 
birthday party about 
hairdressers; small 
group (10) 
--- 
Note: The situations recordings took place involved dyads and small groups. In parentheses, the number of cues 
in a conversation is shown. 
 
Table 4-9: Overview of the Different Types of Cues in Auditory Social Perception (SPa) 
Type of cue Number of items Conversations 
laughter 15 3, 7, 8, 
names  18 3, 8, 9, 13 
agreement 18 1, 11, 13 
interruptions 10 2, 13 
reaction to voices 23 7, 10, 12 
rejection 6 4 
admiration 7 5 
filling words (like ehm) 10 6 
SUM 107  
Note: Modified according to Papenbrock (2005) 
 
 
Written Social Perception Tasks 
We also worked to develop stimuli to elicit target-oriented reactions for the social written 
perception task. I decided not to present single social/emotional words to be judged but 
instead elected to select sentences so that items could include at least some social content. 
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Using sentences, however, implies that reading comprehension and reading speed are 
expected to influence the performance on the social perception tasks. I tried to minimize both 
influences and also included measures of reading speed as a reference (e.g., a possible 
covariate). The task will be described in Box 4-4. 
 
Box 4-4: Example of a Written Social Perception Task (SPw) 
 
 
At first, a target statement arises on the left hand side of the computer screen. The question 
deals with social/emotional issues. Then, extracts of emails and letters are presented on the 
right hand side of the computer screen. The task is to scan the short text extracts and judge 
the statement according to its correctness (wrong or right). The judgment can be made 
without interpretation only on the basis of the short text. Memory effects should be excluded 
because the question and the extract are visible until the item is completed. Subjects are 
instructed to press a key for each answer (wrong or right) as fast and accurately as possible. 
The second level of increased complexity contains two statements that have to be judged. 
Only if both statements are right should the overall answer be “right.“ If one of the statements 
is wrong, the overall answer is “wrong.“ Table 4-10 shows the different parts of the written SP 
tasks. 
 
Example 1 (statements, complexity part 1, private setting): 
On the left hand side a statement appears: 
Running in twos does not seem to be as effortful as alone. 
 
On the right hand side a short statement appears: 
On Wednesday, I was running with a friend. It is really fun to run in twos and is not as 
much effort as running alone. After running I felt quite fit. 
 
Answer: “right” 
 
 
The second part of the task is similar but uses questions instead of statements. One 
(level 1) or  two (level 2) questions arise, that have to be answered with “yes” or “no”. In 
the case of two questions, the overall answer is only “yes”, if both questions can be 
answered with “yes.“ If one of the two questions has to be answered with “no”, the overall 
answer is “no”. Answering occurs by key pressing. 
 
Example 2 (questions, complexity part 2, public setting): 
On the left hand side two questions appear: 
- Did the author agree to be the only representative at the conference?  
- Is Mr. Moss mentioned in the text? 
 
On the right hand side a short statement appears: 
I don’t venture to hope that Mr. Moos has time the 28.11. I already agree to attend the 
conference alone. 
Answer: “wrong” 
4  Test development 
 148 
Table 4-10: Overview of the Written Social Perception Task (SPw) 
Task 1: Statements Setting 
  private public 
one statement 9 items 8 items Complexity level 
 two statements 7 items 7 items 
Task 2: Questions Setting 
  private public 
one question 8 items 8 items 
Complexity level 
 
two questions 7 items 7 items 
 
 
4.2 Development of the Auditory Intelligence Test (AuIT) 
The idea for the development of the test of general auditory abilities arose in the discussion 
about validation of the social auditory intelligence tasks. 
 
4.2.1 Selection of Tasks 
First, tasks from the Stankov and Horn battery (1980) were selected that fit in well in our 
taxonomy and represented the factors identified by Stankov and Horn (1980, see chapter 
2.5). Representativeness of the tasks for a factor was evaluated in terms of their loadings 
and communalities. Moreover, the loading on a common, more general auditory factor was 
considered. Among the suitable tasks, we again selected according to the reliability value 
(Cronbach’s Alpha and Retest, see Carroll, 1993; Stankov & Horn, 1980; Horn & Stankov, 
1982), length, and heterogeneity (to cover as many aspects as possible of our definition of 
auditory ability; see recommendation by Loevinger, 1957). Moreover, the correspondence to 
tasks of academic intelligence was attempted. For the auditory tasks, parts of the scale and 
written notes were available and provided by Lazar Stankov. Auditory recordings did not exist 
any more. As not all original items were still available, we tried to complete the tasks and 
introduced some modifications that seemed to be reasonable to us. Alexander Trinko1, 
musician at the University of Magdeburg, helped us to complete the score including the 
development of new items and the implementation of modifications.  
 
                                            
1 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Alexander Trinko, Institute of Music Psychology, University of 
Magdeburg, in the implementation of auditory tonal tasks. 
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4.2.2 Completion of Tasks  
Within auditory intelligence (see chapter 2.5), the focus was on tonal (nonverbal) tasks, 
because language-based tasks seem difficult do differentiate very sharply from verbal AcI 
tasks as well as SI tasks. The aim was to cover each nonverbal cell with at least two tasks 
and each cell requiring language with at least one task. Not all cells could be covered as we 
required by relying solely on the tasks of Stankov and Horn. Thus, we decided to supplement 
the memory cell of the classification system through a newly developed task, “audiobook”. 
The task “recognition of familiar environmental sounds” was also added to get an idea of the 
corresponding content domain (see chapter 2.5.6). We focused on tonal and speech content 
as being the boundaries to explore the ins and outs of auditory intelligence especially with 
regard to verbal AcI. In addition, we chose an auditory inspection time task (pitch and 
loudness discrimination, AIT-P/AIT-L, Deary et al., 1989; Olsson et al., 1998) to complement 
the battery, because extensive research has been done with auditory sensory discrimination. 
Speech perception includes an additional task, “recognition of repeated voices”, that 
corresponds to the task “detection of repeated tones” in the nonverbal perception domain. 
Since it includes voices, it is expected to mark the transition to social auditory abilities. The 
reasoning nonverbal cell also includes a third task, chord decomposition. This task, though 
including auditory nonverbal material, is assumed to represent the transition to musical 
abilities. According to Stankov (1994), within psychological research, auditory abilities can be 
measured on three levels, namely sensory, perceptual, and higher-order processes. We split 
between memory and reasoning as higher order processes and subsumed the sensory 
perceptual abilities under the concept of “discriminative abilities”. The following matrix (see 
Table 4-11) represents all auditory tasks, that are described thereafter. In order to simplify 
matters, the task recognition of familiar environmental sounds was subsumed under the 
nonverbal category, since it does not involve speech material. Actually, it makes up an own 
category (see chapter 2.5.6).  
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Table 4-11: Classification Matrix of Auditory Intelligence Tasks 
 Perception Memory Reasoning 
 
Tonal/ 
Nonverbal 
 
 
 
• Detection of re-
peated tones  
 
• AIT-P/AIT-L 
(discrimination 
of pitch, Olsson) 
 
 
• Recognition of fa-
miliar environ-
mental sounds 
 
• Rhythm reproduc-
tion 
 
• Tonal figures 
 
• Tonal series  
 
• Tonal analogies 
 
• Chord decomposition 
 
 
Speech 
 
• Masked words 
 
• Recognition of 
repeated voices 
 
 
• Audiobook 
 
 
• Disarranged sen- 
tences 
 
Note. The newly developed tasks are highlighted in italics. 
 
In order to get an impression of the tasks, a short description of each task appears below. 
Directly after the name of the task, in parentheses, are the operation and content domains 
according to the classification system, as well as the corresponding factor according to 
Stankov and Horn (1980, see chapter 2.5.2 and 2.5.3). 
 
a) Detection of repeated tones (discrimination, nonverbal; factor: temporal tracking) 
An eight-tone melody with four different tones is played. Except for one, all tones are 
presented at least twice. Subjects have to indicate which of the eight tones is presented only 
once (Stankov & Horn, 1980). The task includes 17 items. Some items were newly 
developed as not enough items were already available. The task was classified within the 
discriminative abilities because of its task requirements (detection of a stimulus within a 
sequence of tones), although empirical analyses (see chapter 2.5.3) revealed relationships 
with gf/gc and working memory. 
 
b) AIT-L /AIT-P (discrimination, nonverbal; factor: discrimination among sound patterns) 
There are different possibilities for measuring auditory inspection time. Mainly, auditory 
discrimination of pitch (AIT-P) or loudness (AIT-L) have been used. In an AIT-L task, a tone 
indicates the beginning of the item (832 Hz, 500 ms), followed by a short break (1000 ms). 
Two tones of different intensity (loudness) (60 dB and 57 dB) are presented immediately, one 
after the other, and then masked through rustle. Participants have to decide whether the 
louder or the softer tone was presented first. Pairs of tones are presented within 11 blocks, 
including 120 items altogether, with decreasing duration of presentation (200 ms, 150 ms, 
125 ms, 100 ms, 85 ms, 70 ms, 55 ms, 40 ms, 30 ms, 20 ms, 15 ms). The succession of 
tones (high intensity ? low intensity or low intensity ? high intensity) occurs by chance. The 
pitch of the tones remains constant at 832 Hz (Deary et al., 1989; Olsson et al., 1998). In a 
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similar way, in an AIT-P task, a tone indicates the beginning of the item (832 Hz, 500 ms) 
followed by a short break (1000 ms). Two tones of different pitch (880 Hz and 784 Hz) are 
presented immediately, one after the other. Participants have to decide whether the tone 
higher or lower in pitch is presented first. Pairs of tones are presented within 11 blocks, 
including 120 items altogether, with decreasing duration of presentation. The succession of 
tones (high pitch ? low pitch or low pitch ? high pitch) occurs by chance. The intensity of 
the tones remains constant at 60 dB (Deary et al., 1989; Olsson et al., 1998). 
 
c) Recognition of familiar environmental sounds (memory; familiar environmental 
sounds / nonverbal; new) 
Subjects are instructed to remember as well and as accurately as possible, twenty target 
sounds presented in succession and interrupted only by a short silence. Thereafter, 45 
sounds (after pilot studies of 55) sounds are presented. Each sound has to be judged as to 
whether it belongs to the previously presented set of sounds or not. 
 
d) Rhythm reproduction (memory, nonverbal; factor: maintaining and judging rhythm) 
Twenty rhythms, varying in length and complexity, are presented. Participants have to 
reproduce each rhythm using the keys of the computer (Drake, 1954, see Shuter-Dyson, 
1982; Stankov & Horn, 1980). In contrast to Drake’s (1954) and Stankov’s and Horn’s (1980) 
task, which required subjects to reproduce the rhythm as long as the original stimulus was 
beaten out, in our task the rhythm has to be beaten only once. 
 
e) Tonal figures (memory, nonverbal; factor: immediate auditory memory) 
Participants hear a sequence of four tones in descending or ascending order. Thereafter, 
four alternative sequences, each including four tones, are presented. The one that includes 
the same notes as the target sequence is to be chosen (Stankov & Horn, 1980). The task 
includes 17 items. 
 
f) Tonal series (reasoning, nonverbal; factor: auditory cognition of relationships) 
Four tones are played one after another in a particular order (ascending, descending or 
other). Four answer alternatives follow, each including one tone. The tone that completes the 
series logically (not musically) has to be selected (Stankov & Horn, 1980). In contrast to the 
original task, our 21 item task includes four instead of three options. 
 
g) Tonal analogies (reasoning, nonverbal; factor: auditory cognition of relationships) 
The pitch difference of two tones played in succession has to be remembered. Four 
alternatives are then presented, including two tones with the critical pitch difference. The 
alternative containing the two tones equivalent to that of the first two tones has to be selected 
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(Stankov & Horn, 1980). The modified version involves four answer alternatives instead of 
three. The task consists of 17 items, some of which were newly developed. 
 
h) Chord decomposition (reasoning, nonverbal; factor: auditory cognition of 
relationships) 
A three-tone-chord is followed by four answer alternatives including three tones each. 
Participants have to choose the alternative that contains the three notes presented in the 
three-tone-chord (Stankov & Horn, 1980). To supplement the original task, some new items 
were developed. The whole task contains 14 items. 
 
i) Masked words (discrimination, verbal; factor: speech under distraction, SPUD) 
Isolated words differing in frequency (frequent two syllable words – infrequent two syllable 
words – one syllable words) and spoken with different intensity, have to be recognized 
against a background noise also varying in intensity (quiet – middle – loud). The words that 
were identified against the noise must be written down (Stankov & Horn, 1980). The kind of 
background noise at a party (instead of a cafeteria noise as in the original task) goes along 
with a variation in word frequency. The task includes 35 items. A similar task is also used in 
Gygi, Kidd, and Watson (2004). Unlike our task, in their study, they used high and lowpass 
filtering techniques and short sentences (431 to 3945 ms) instead of single words. 
 
j) Detection of repeated voices (discrimination, verbal; factor: temporal tracking) 
A separate word (like “april” or “chair”) is spoken eight times in succession by four speakers. 
One of the four voices is only presented once. That voice has to be identified (Stankov & 
Horn, 1980). The task contains 25 items. This task was classified within the dicrimination 
domain for the same reasons as described for the task “detection of repeated tones” (see 
above). 
 
k) Audiobook (memory, verbal; new) 
A 312 word text, excluding social content, is read. Participants are allowed to hear it twice 
and thereafter have to answer 14 questions concerning the content of the text (in the first 
study an open-ended answer format was used). 
 
l) Disarranged sentences (reasoning, verbal; factor: auditory verbal comprehension) 
A sentence with disarranged words is presented. Participants have to write down the 
sentence with the correct order of the words (Stankov & Horn, 1980). We translated most of 
the original sentences into German language but also generated some new items. The task 
contains 19 items. 
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In collaboration with the musician Alexander Trinko, we arranged for the completion and 
order of the tonal auditory task items to be presented according to the following principles: 
Items were classified into three levels of difficulty (easy – middle – difficult). Within these 
levels, several parameters were manipulated. Easy items involve a clear harmonical 
structure (e.g. C-Dur), work with a clear leading tone, and distractors can be identified by 
focusing on the last tone. Time is easy with regard to rhythm (2/4); it contains only trioles. 
Fast syncopes are introduced only in the last items of that difficulty level. Items in the mid-
range of difficulty also include foreign tones that do not belong to the harmony. The order is 
changed: tonal sequences are no longer melodies but are still tonal, sometimes phrygian. 
Moreover, dissonances are introduced and leading tones are not dissolved. With respect to 
rhythm, time gets more complex by using an additional beat (3/4). Additional breaks, 
neighborhoods with trioles as well as the use of eighth and sixteenth notes makes the 
sequences more difficult. In the items with the highest degree of difficulty, there is neither a 
harmony nor a melody. The items make use of abstract tones, great jumps as well as 
similarities between target and distractors, non-chords and inversions. Also to test rhythm 
more fully, syncopes, breaks between basic beats, and quintoles are employed.  
 
Difficulty levels were fixed based on findings in the literature. Tonal sequences (songs etc.) 
are remembered better when they have a clear orienting structure with a predominant tonic 
chord. If tonal structure is lacking or obscured by rhythm the recognition and recall, 
performance is considerably worse (Boltz, 1991). We also took into account that primacy and 
recency effects are larger for auditory than for visual stimuli (Bruhn, 1993), the first and last 
tones thus are more prominent. 
 
4.2.3 Integration of Items into the Presentation Program  
Tonal tasks were realized with the program Cakewalk Pro Audio 7.00. For all tonal tasks 
except the rhythm task, we used a piano tone as most people may be expected to be familiar 
with piano tones, and compared to other instruments (e.g. the flute), the tone does not fade 
out. The rhythm task was realized with the “wood drums” sound chosen from the Cakewalk 
program. For the language-based tasks (recognition of repeated voices, masked words) 
students read selected words and were recorded on a dictating machine (Sony ICDSX20). 
The text of the task audiobook was read by several students, and we selected the one with 
the clearest language. Voices were recorded by the already mentioned dictating machine. 
Datafiles were cut and arranged with Cooledit 2.0 and saved in wav-format (16Bit, Sampling 
Rate 44KHz, mono). The general auditory tasks and the social auditory tasks were integrated 
in the WMC program, a special software (see next chapter 4.3). 
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4.3 Pilot Studies 
The auditory tasks of both test batteries (see chapter 4.1 and 4.2) along with a preliminary 
version of the scenario task were pre-tested in two pilot studies, since we had no prior 
experience with auditory material. For item and test presentation we used the WMC (Version 
0.15) program taken from a former research project at Mannheim University, Germany and 
adapted to the needs of the SI project (i.e., adaptation of a DOS Version into Windows)2. The 
WMC software allows saving data from all tasks that are based on reaction times (AIT, 
rhythm, and social perception). The preliminary scenario task was presented with 
PowerPoint. The main focus of the pilot studies was to guarantee the technical 
implementation, to gain experience with auditory material, and to test practicability and 
feasability of the tasks in order to optimize the first test version. In addition every computer 
was tested with a diagnostic program (WMCDiag) whether it is reliable enough to measure 
reaction times (RT). 
 
In the first pilot study in August 2004, 29 students participated. The study took place in the 
computer pool of the Institute of Psychology, University of Magdeburg. Participants were 
tested for about four hours. Students’ mean age was 24.76 (SD: 3.27); 69% (N=20) were 
female. In addition to the AuI and SI tasks, a feedback questionnaire was administered, 
which served for collecting students’ feedback and suggestions for improvement. Each task 
was evaluated according to questions such as “What was good? What could be improved?”, 
etc.. The instrument also contained questions about the comprehensibility of the scale. At the 
end, an overall rating/evaluation was requested. Items that reduced the internal consistency 
of the scales substantially, items that were too easy or too difficult (restriction of variance) 
and items of minor theoretical importance were excluded or modified. Additional items were 
developed according to the theoretical knowledge gained from first analysis. Some of the 
tasks including modified and newly developed items according to the findings of the first pilot 
study were again tested in a second pre-study in October 2004. One-third of the subjects had 
already participated in the first pilot study. Altogether, 17 participants with a mean age of 
23.67 (SD= 2.97 years) were tested, of whom 82.4% (N=14) were female. We chose this 
sample for the following reasons: First, we were able to compare the results of the first pilot-
study test version to the modified second pilot-study test version for the same subjects. 
Second, the two-thirds of participants who did not take the test before could provide 
information not influenced by retest effects (i.e., memory and practice effects). In the 
following subchapters a summary of the pilot study results is provided. Of course, sample 
size is not large enough to draw generalizable conclusions but we judged the sample 
sufficient for testing practicability and using it for test improvement. The final selection of test 
                                            
2 I appreciate the work of Thomas Becker in adapting the software to our needs as far as it was possi-
ble. 
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items was done according to the results (item analysis) of both pilot studies and the feedback 
questionnaire. 
 
4.3.1 Pilot Testing of Social Intelligence Tasks 
Both pilot studies indicated, that the test ideas worked out well. Beyond item reliability, item 
difficulty, and comprehensibility of the instructions, in general, the following changes were 
made:  
1) Items with bad quality (person not visible or understandable) were excluded. 
2) Mono files were converted into stereo files for better understanding, which was only 
possible with a newer version of the WMC program. 
3) Items were adapted in intensity. 
With respect to auditory social perception, since the task was too difficult, tasks with items 
containing three reaction possibilities were excluded in favor of only simple or choice reaction 
time. Voices were introduced before presenting the items (conversations), in case that voice 
identification was difficult. In auditory social memory tasks, time to answer the questions had 
to be lengthened in order to avoid speed effects. In addition, the conversations were reduced 
in length to 100 – 135 seconds. In the pilot studies, the scenario tasks were carried out as a 
group test so that faster students sometimes had to wait for a long time for students who 
worked more slowly. In order to be able to self-administer the scenario task we changed the 
instructions.  
 
4.3.2 Pilot Testing of Auditory Intelligence Tasks 
Some Remarks about Task Administration 
Every tonal task was practiced with two examples. The second presentation was 
accompanied by the score shown on the screen, and the correct option was marked with a 
circle line. Every nonverbal task (except for the rhythm task) was presented twice. The 
answers of the participants were marked on an answer sheet. Test takers were allowed to 
revise their choice after the second presentation; the second choice (if needed) was taken as 
the final one. Participants were instructed not to guess but instead to make some remarks 
about the tasks that they could not answer or with which they had problems. The rhythm task 
was practiced with three examples, each presented twice. The time to complete the tasks 
was not limited. Each item could be started by self-administration. The answers (reactions) to 
the rhythm task were recorded by the computer program. The rhythm produced by the 
participant was compared to the rhythm presented with a tolerance of 200 ms (lower bound 
70%, higher bound 130%) and absolute degrees of freedom in interval deviation of 50 ms. 
Absolute values have priority above relative values meaning that when absolute values are 
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violated, the item is regarded as wrong even when relative values are within the permissable 
range. The reason for this procedure is that with very short intervals, relative deviations can 
lie within the domain of motoric skilfullness. Motoric ability is, however, not what we want to 
measure. The main results and revisions are summarized in the next few paragraphs, 
starting with the nonverbal tasks, and continuing with the rest of the general auditory 
intelligence tasks.  
 
Nonverbal Auditory Tasks 
Findings of the first pilot study showed that most of the tasks were too difficult and not 
sufficiently reliable. Reliability ranged from .06 (tonal series) to .77 (rhythm reproduction). We 
selected the items that worked out well, classified them into three difficulty levels (easy – 
middle – difficult), and searched for reasons for failures for items that did not function well. 
New items were developed according to the number of items missing in each difficulty level. 
Item characteristics (internal consistency, item difficulty and item-total correlation) could be 
improved considerably after the first pilot study. The distributions of the modified tasks were 
all acceptable. With the exception of chord decomposition (Alpha=.55), internal consistency 
improved (detection of repeated tones from .36 to .80; tonal figures from .39 to .53, rhythm 
reproduction from .77 to .90). However, some of the tasks still did not meet our demands with 
respect to reliability (tonal analogies, tonal figures and chord decomposition). Apparently, 
after the second pilot study, there were still items with negative item-total correlations that 
had to be eliminated or modified. Possible reasons for the inadequate item characteristics 
may well have been our lack of knowledge in the development of auditory tasks. We had to 
construct many items on our own, albeit with a musician’s help, based on our own 
construction rationale for classifications and order of difficulty. For the task “tonal series”, at 
first, we did not have any notes at all. Therefore, we developed this task together with 
Alexander Trinko, who tried to develop sequences of tones that should be completed 
musically. However, that did not work out with students having no musical expert knowledge. 
Fortunately, we then got the tonal score from Lazar Stankov and replaced the whole task in 
the second pilot study. Reliablility increased from .06 to .63. In the revised tonal series task 
of Stankov and Horn (1980), tonal series have to be completed logically, rather than in the 
first version, musically. Changes that were made beyond modifications and item selections 
according to results of the feedback questionnaire concern the mode of presentation (speed 
of presentation; breaks between tones), instructions, and the feedback (summary feedback 
at the end of the task instead of reporting back after each item. A summary of modifications 
is provided in the appendix A.2.1. 
 
Findings of the feedback questionnaire also gave us some information about the strategies 
that were used to find the right task solution. Several students indicated that they tried to 
remember the tone with the lowest and the highest pitch or clear-cut tones. Others classified 
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tones in groups (low-middle–high of pitch). Some students imagined the tones visually on a 
scale (see also results reported in Danthiir, Roberts, Pallier, & Stankov, 2001) or counted the 
tones numerically. That indicates that we can expect some correlation with numerical and 
figural abilities. Moreover, some of the students told us that they mentally sang the tones in 
order to find the right alternative. 
 
Speech, Environmental Sounds and Inspection Time Tasks  
The tasks audiobook, detection of repeated voices and recognition of familiar environmental 
sounds were only tested once since time was limited in the second pilot study, and we had 
less experience with tonal tasks. Mean item difficulty was sufficient for masked words (.48; 
range: .03 - .97), recognition of voices (.43; range: .07 - .97) and AIT-L (.50; range: .28 - .83), 
and for recognition of familiar environmental sounds (.76; range: .35 - .97) as the random 
probability is .50 and the mean difficulty should be higher. Both audiobooks were rather easy 
(mean item difficulty of .77 and .74, respectively). Internal consistency was not sufficient for 
any of the tasks (range: .40: audiobook 1 to .67: masked words) but was a good point to start 
to improve the test, with the exception of recognition of familiar environmental sounds (.05: 
recognition of fam. environm. sounds). We excluded or modified ambiguous items and items 
with negative item-total correlations. Further modifications resulted from the feedback 
questionnaire (see chapter 4.3). The task masked words was criticized because the words 
could not be identified against the background noise; some of them were not spoken clearly 
enough. Therefore, the loudness of the background noise and the speaker’s voice were 
adapted in order to attain better recognition rates. The degrees of difficulty were made more 
obvious resulting in a 3 x 3 matrix with factors: loudness of background noise, loudness of 
speaker, and frequency of words. The topic of the task audiobook 1, dealing with pollen 
allergy, was not appropriate. The text was not only too easy but also influenced by the 
different degree of knowledge subjects had about the topic. The test score should therefore 
reflect knowledge of the topic in addition to memory of the auditorily presented text. For the 
second audio-book, which was a report about a journey to Macao, the difficult foreign names 
and words were replaced and the text was shortened. For both audiobooks, time to answer 
the questions was too short so that the score reflected not only memory but also speed (of 
thinking and writing as we used open-ended questions). The sound sequences of the familiar 
environmental sounds test were adapted in length. In addition, grouping of distractors and 
targets should make the task more difficult. (e.g., one of four ringtones served as a target, 
the others as distractors (other examples: mist/rain/heavy rain/thunderstorm; car sounds like 
driveaway/ brake sharply/slow down. The AIT-loudness (AIT-L) was replaced through AIT-
pitch (AIT-P) since the subjects had severe problems in solving the tasks and AIT-L tasks, 
after a first enthusiasm, were not well received in research (see chapter 2.5.5). In order to 
have a representative selection of tasks for the verbal reasoning domain (for a description 
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see above) an additional auditory speech task, disarranged sentences (see chapter 6.2.2) 
served for test supplementation. With respect to the task recognition of repeated voices, 
some new recordings (clearer voices) served to replace items that did not work well. A 
summary of task changes is provided in the appendix A.2.2. 
 
For the auditory speech tasks, subjects used strategies like focusing on the spoken words 
while trying to ignore the background noise (masked words), rote memorizing of words 
through repetition, collecting facts, imagining stimuli visually, combining concepts with 
knowledge (audiobook), representing the sounds visually, combining sounds with a story, 
and memorizing the name of the sounds (familiar environmental sounds).  
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5 Methodological Issues Concerning Data Analysis 
5.1 Preparatory Data Analysis 
5.1.1 Outliers and Influential Cases 
The detection of outliers was done with graphical analysis, box plots, frequency distributions, 
and scatter plots applying Systat and SPSS. After systematic exclusion of reasons such as 
data entry errors, improper functioning of instruments, administration and instruction I used 
the following strategy that is orientated on Roth and Switzer (2002). Outliers and influential 
cases were eliminated as soon as they deviated considerably from the rest of the distribution 
leading to distortions resulting in altering of the covariance matrix and/or if there were cogent 
theoretical reasons. As soon as distributions were shaped it is reported in the corresponding 
presentation of results. In baseline data (such as readspeed) there were outliers with people 
reacting extremely slowly. Such cases were not excluded since baseline reaction times were 
intended for the use of correction in the social intelligence tasks and should provide a 
realistic measure of the individual reaction times on certain tasks. 
 
5.1.2 Missing Data 
It occurred that some single values are missing unsystematically (not the same persons in 
every task, not only one task or one item), mainly because of omissions, slips, careless 
mistakes, and sometimes because of a lack of task comprehension. Since we had only minor 
experience with the tasks, in this occurrence, I neither excluded the whole case nor 
performed mean substitution. In analysis of single tasks, all available cases were included 
(pairwise deletion). However, the listwise deletion procedure was applied in intercorrelation 
and multivariate analysis. Imputation was used for social perception tasks. Since these tasks 
are based on reaction time values, omissions are likely and require substitution in order to 
obtain a positive definite covariance matrix. Mean substitution is expected to produce 
comparatively accurate estimations and biases estimated variances and covariances 
towards zero. See Schumacker and Lomax (1996) for a short overview of possibilities of 
dealing with missing data. 
 
5.2 Scale Construction 
5.2.1 General Scale Construction  
The score of a task was built by summarizing the correspondent items. Item seclection 
included three steps: First, items that did not reach chance level (exceed random probability) 
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were excluded. Second, the remaining items were selected according to their item-total 
correlation (abbreviated with rit). The lowest value for rit was .10. However, if possible, only 
items with rit >= .20 were included in a scale. Items with lower values were also involved, if 
they were theoretically particularly representative for the scale. Third, a distractor analysis 
was performed to locate possible difficulties and concentrate on the items that proved 
reliablity after distractor analysis. In addition, items were selected in order to represent a 
wide range of difficulties. Internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha) was primarily taken as an 
indicator of reliability and is considered as an appropriate way in developing new tests (see 
Bühner, 2006). A high degree of internal consistency was a criterion of usefulness of the 
subtests. Since high internal consistency is normally associated with high homogeneity and 
may lead to unrepresentative item selection, items that were sought to reflect different 
important aspects of the construct were maintained. Open-ended answers were scored by at 
least two independent raters. 
 
5.2.2 Scenario Scales 
A different procedure was applied with respect to the target scores of the scenario tasks. In 
these scores, the deviation of the participant’s answer from the exact answer of the target 
person is evaluated. Zero is the best possible score; The larger the deviance, the worse the 
participant’s performance is scored. The tasks involve items that can deviate only in one 
direction since the target person chose an extreme category (one or six in the 1st study and 
one or seven in the 2nd study). This deviance can cause a higher difference score than target 
person’s answers located in the middle of the scale (e.g. “3” which can deviate only with 3 or 
4 points, respectively). Therefore, in both studies, the differences were weighted according to 
the maximal possible deviation in one item to avoid an unequal weighting as in some of the 
items, for example, a deviation of 5 is possible whereas in other items the deviation is only 3. 
In addition, we paid attention to select items representative with regard to the distribution of 
deviation points, so that items with an extreme answer and items representing middle 
categories are well-balanced. Despite our theoretical preference for target scores, (see 
chapter 2.7) different scoring procedures were used in the first study to get an impression of 
their effect on the intercorrelations and the reliability. These are the alternative scoring 
procedures we examined: 
1) Right-wrong scores: Only the exact answer was scored with one point. Remaining values 
were scored with zero. 
2) Deviation points: The exact answer was scored with two points, a one-point difference 
from the exact answer was scored with one point. All other values were scored with zero. 
3) Proportion-based consensus scoring: The answer most of the subjects chose gets the 
highest score. Each alternative gets the value of percent of participants who chose the 
correspondent option (for issues of scoring see also chapter 2.7). 
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5.2.3 Perception Scales 
Open answers were compared to the targets answers and judged by two independent raters. 
After the application of the selected scoring procedure, the items were summarized to a total 
written, auditory, pictorial and video-based social understanding scale across all scenarios. 
With respect to social perception scores, reaction time (RT) scores as well as accuracy 
scores were computed. Since RT scores are in line with the definition of the social perception 
dimension (see chapter 2.2), I will focus on RT scores. However, accuracy is considered by 
using only the correct reactions for scale construction. Results concerning accuracy scores 
will be mentioned in addition as far as it makes sense in the context of this thesis. The 
following procedure was taken before building the social perception RT scores (see Box 5-1). 
The described steps were not obligatory but applied as soon as they were needed, 
particularly, when scores were not normally distributed. 
 
Box 5-1: Procedure of Trimming Reaction Time Variables and Smoothing of Distributions 
 
 
5.3 Testing of Preconditions and Software 
In the context of the present work, the preconditions such as normality, linearity, variance 
homogeneity, etc. that have to be fulfilled in order to apply a certain statistical procedure 
were generally tested. Results of these tests are only reported in cases of significant 
deviations from these conditions. In general, SPSS was used to perform standard data 
analysis such as descriptive statistics, reliability analysis, graphs, and for exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA). EQS 6.1 was applied in confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). 
 
 
1) False trials were set to missing. 
 
2) Remaining trials with a RT value less than 150 ms were set to missing. 
 
3) Subjects and variables with too many missings (more than 40%) were excluded. 
 
4) RTs deviating strongly from the group mean (outliers) were set to a heuristic value. 
 
5) Computation of the individual mean and SD and trimming by setting values that exceed 
“mean + 3 SD” to exactly “mean + 3 SD.“  
 
6) Calculation of group specific mean and SD, analogous trimming of the distribution ana-
logue to 5). 
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5.4 Factor Analysis 
In data analysis, both types of factor analysis EFA and CFA will be used. EFA is often 
regarded as old-fashioned. However, as Burns, Bastian, and Nettelbeck (in press) criticize 
rightly, much work in the SEM framework is “exploratory in nature, with liberal use of 
modification indices for model refinement and generation” (p. 297). In line with Carroll (1995), 
I feel that EFA and CFA should complement each other. EFA “lets the data speak for 
themselves” (Carroll, 1995, p. 436) and thus provides important information about the 
relationship between variables that may serve for a comprehensive view of the data and a 
basis for modifications in the case that the theoretical model does not fit as it was expected. 
The advantages of CFA should not be discarded either: CFA’s are less subject to problems 
in factor interpretation; they provide objective statistical tests of latent traits being superior to 
zero-order correlation examination among manifest variables; they partition variance into 
parts that are due to trait, method and error factors, thus the expected values of the 
correlations among latent variables are not affected by unreliabilites in manifest variables; 
they allow comparisons between nested models, that can lead to clear estimates of the 
degree of convergent validity, discriminant validity, and method variance in MTMM design 
(see Widaman, 1985).  
 
Factor analysis is discussed controversially and often leaves behind an impression of 
subjectivity and arbitrariness (Holz-Ebeling, 1995). Consequently, results and conclusive 
interpretations are rather noncommittal (Beauducel, 2001a). I will use a strategy with respect 
to both EFA and CFA that is going to be described straightaway and will only be mentioned 
again in the presentation of findings if it diverges from the following procedure. 
 
5.4.1 Strategy: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
In dimension reduction performed with EFA, principal axis method is chosen for factor 
extraction. According to Beauducel (2001a, see also Widaman, 1993) this method compared 
to principal components analysis is more robust concerning changes in the composition of 
variables (e.g., smaller sample sizes and communalities). I decided to apply direct oblimin 
(delta=0) as one of the most common and empirically proven rotation techniques (Beauducel, 
2001a). A major advantage of oblique rotation methods is that they include orthogonal 
rotation as a special case and examine, whether orthogonality exists or not (Beauducel, 
2001a). Thus, they provide more information than orthogonal solutions (Fabrigar, Wegener, 
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). In most of the variable sets, it is rather unlikely that variables 
are completely independent (e.g. within the domain of general auditory abilities). Parallel 
analysis will be performed as the major factor extraction criterion, since it probably leads to 
more reliable results than comparable extraction criteria (Scree-test, Kaiser Guttman rule) 
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(Beauducel, 2001a; Zwick & Velicer, 1986). Often, too many components are extracted 
relying on the Kaiser-Guttman rule. In the application of the Scree-test there is no common 
opinion about where the line that discriminates “significant” from “random” components has 
to be located (Enzmann, 1997). Despite its advantages, the parallel analysis technique is 
conservative (Beauducel, 2001b); the number of factors is rather underestimated than 
overestimated. The probability of underestimation is especially evident when rotations to 
oblique-angled simple structure are performed and when empirical data show a strong first 
eigenvalue (Beauducel, 2001b). Parallel analysis (PA, Lautenschlager, 1989) was applied as 
factor extraction criterion and performed with the program RanEigen (Enzmann, 1997). In the 
case of high probability of underestimation or as soon as it is theoretically sensible, I will also 
report factor solutions according to the Kaiser-Guttman rule.  
 
5.4.2 Strategy: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
CFA analyses, in this thesis, are based on covariance matrices since they are generally 
preferred compared to correlation matrices (see Cudeck, 1989). Maximum-likelihood (ML) 
will be applied as an estimation algorithm since they are more stable and precise (Olsson, 
Foss, Troye, & Howell, 2000). In order to obtain reliable results, a sample of 200 subjects is 
necessary; however, if error variance is low, samples with 50 to 100 subjects may be 
sufficient if indicators are normally distributed (Urban & Mayerl, 2003). Balancing resources 
and statistical requirements we strive for a sample size of close to 200 in at least one 
investigation. Sample sizes should always be larger than N=100. Multivariate normal 
distribution as a precondition for the application will be tested using Mardia’s Kappa 
(normalised multivariate kurtosis coefficient, 1970). Results will only be reported if conditions 
are violated. In addition, the original Chi² statistic will be computed and complemented 
through a selection of fit indexes which is going to be explained in the following. Tanaka 
(1993) classified the fit indexes in three groups: (1) absolute (e.g. the RMSEA and the 
SRMR) vs. incremental fit indexes (e.g., the NNFI, IFI, and CFI); (2) indices adjusting for 
complexity (e.g. IFI and the RMSEA) or not; (3) population-based (e.g., the RMSEA and the 
CFI) vs. non population-based indexes. However, PCA results (Beauducel & Wittmann, 
2005) showed that the components did not correspond to the classification aspects proposed 
by Tanaka (1993) and that the fit indices are heterogeneous (Beauducel & Wittmann, 2005). 
When Chi² and RMSEA indicated fit, the incremental fit indices (e.g. the CFI) suggested 
misfit and vice versa. The heterogeneity of the indices suggests to report several fit indices. 
Therefore, the authors recommend a model evaluation strategy that focuses on RMSEA, 
SRMR, and the Chi²/df values for psychometric research on areas of psychology where main 
loadings are typically low. SRMR and RMSEA were most robust against small distortions in 
data simple structure (Beauducel & Wittmann, 2005) which can be found in most of the data 
sets dealing with comparatively low loadings, for example in personality research. On the 
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contrary, incremental fit indexes were much more susceptible to misfit. Following these 
recommendations, I chose to report the Chi²/df value, the SRMR, the RMSEA, and for 
reasons of popularity and common use in many studies the CFI, too. If no concrete 
hypotheses are specified, all paths will be allowed in a structural equation model. If both EFA 
and CFA are performed, factor correlations will be reported on a latent level. 
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6 First study  
6.1 General Aims of the First Study 
The first study had two major aims: First, the evaluation of the SIM and the AuIT with respect 
to basic statistics, reliability, and structure. At this stage of test development, we aimed at 
getting as much data as possible for each single task in order to use it as a basis for further 
test development. In addition, the evaluation of the tests aims at providing information for 
task supplementation of the SI test since in the first study cells are mainly covered by only 
one instead of two tasks per cell (see chapter 4.1.1). Second, analysis should be performed 
to investigate the hypotheses that are listed in detail in chapter 3, concerning the internal 
structure of SI and AuI (content and operation domains), their relationship to AcI. and the 
relationship among each other. The study should be carried out with students since in this 
stage of test development this group is assumed to deal the best with not yet completely 
matured task instructions and unexpected technical or other problems. Moreover, students 
cover a part of the target group (adults older than 22) for whom the tests will be developed. 
 
 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 127 students of different faculties (psychology, economical sciences, and 
process engineering) all having a higher education degree (“Allgemeine Hochschulreife 
(Abitur)”, corresponds to A–level). Their mean age was 21 years (SD=3.06, Md=20) in the 
range between 19 and 35 years; 53.5% were female. Table 6-1 presents the number of 
students of the different faculties across gender. On a two-point rating scale, 36.2% of the 
participants indicated having musical experience.  
 
Table 6-1: Cross-classification of Students According to Faculty and Gender 
 Faculty (%)  
Gender (%) 
Psychology Economics and process 
engineering 
Sum 
Male 3.15 (4) 43.31 (55) 46.5 (59) 
Female 24.41 (31) 29.13 (37) 53.5 (68) 
Sum 27.56 (35) 72.44 (92) 100 (127) 
Note: All numbers are reported in percent; the corresponding number of students is shown in parentheses. 
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6.2.2 Materials 
The participants worked on the SIM and on the AuIT. The Berlin Intelligence Structure Test 
(BIS, Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 1997) served as a measure of AcI and was used as a 
reference instrument for both SI tasks and AuI tasks. For economical reasons we excluded 
the creativity dimension. Three baseline measures were applied to control for the influence of 
speed of moving the mouse, reading speed, and simple reaction time with regard to the 
social perception speed tasks. Information about biographical data, computer experience, 
and hearing abilities was collected with reference questionnaires. In addition to these 
complementary questionnaires, we collected data on self-report instruments such as the 
questionnaire of gender interests (MF subscale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory 2; Hathaway, McKinley, & Engel, 2000), the Prototypical Acts on Social Intelligence 
(Amelang, Schwarz, & Wegemund, 1989; see chapter 2.2.3), and the NEO-Five Factor 
Inventory (NEO-FFI) according to Costa und McCrae (see Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993). As 
self-report instruments are not subject to this dissertation, I will not deal with this question in 
further detail in this thesis. We plan to publish analyses regarding these questionnaires and 
their relationship to the performance measures in a separate paper. The following table 
provides an overview of the tests we applied. Each of the tests is shortly described in the 
following, with a focus on language-based (auditory and written) tasks. 
 
Table 6-2: Overview of the Materials Used in the First Study 
Test name (Sub-) construct Method 
  written auditory pictorial video-based 
SI understanding Scenarios 
SI memory SMw1 SMa1 SMp1 SMf1 SIM 
SI perception SPw1 SPa1 SPp1 SPf1 
  verbal  numerical figural-symb. 
Reasoning 
(processing 
capacity) 
Word analogies 
(WA) 
Facts and 
opinions (TM) 
Word 
knowledge 
(WS) 
Senseless 
inferences (SL) 
Syllogisms (SV)
 Number 
sequences (ZN) 
Letter sequences 
(BR) 
Estimation (SC) 
Reading tables 
(TL) 
Computational 
reasoning (RD) 
Figural 
analogies (AN) 
Bongard (BG) 
Surface 
development 
(AW) 
Figure 
assembly (FA) 
Memory Memorizing 
words (WM) 
Phantasy 
language (PS) 
 Two-digit 
numbers  (ZZ) 
Paired associates 
(ZP) 
City map (OG) 
Figure 
memorizing 
(FM) 
Memorizing 
routes (WE) 
BIS  
 
(see manual 
for task 
descriptions)  
Processing speed Part-whole (TG)
Classification of 
words (KW) 
 X-larger (XG) 
Seven divisible 
(SI) 
Arithmetic 
operations(RZ) 
Marking letters 
(BD) 
Old English 
(OE) 
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Table 6-2 Overview of the Materials Used in the First Study (S1), continued 
Test name (Sub-) construct Method 
 AuI speech AuI tonal   
Reasoning Disarranged 
sentences (DS) 
Tonal series 
(MA4) 
Tonal analogies 
(MA2) 
Chord 
decomposition 
(MA5) 
  
Memory Audiobook (AU) Rhythm (RH) 
Recognition of 
environmental 
sounds (FES) 
  AuIT 
Discrimination   Masked words 
(MW) 
Detection of re-
peated voices 
(RV) 
Repeated tones 
(MA1) 
Tonal figures 
(MA3) 
 
  
Baseline measures 
 Mouse speed (Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003; Sander, 
2005) 
 Simple reaction time  (Oberauer et al., 2003; Sander, 2005) 
 Readspeed (Rüsseler & Münte, 2001) 
Basic (reference)questionnaires / self report measures 
 Bio-data 
 Hearing Screening Inventory                 (Coren & Hakstian, 1992) 
 Computer experience (Süß, 1996; Wittmann & Süß, 1999; Feigenspan, 2005) 
 Gender interests                                    (see Papenbrock, 2005). 
 Prototypical Acts on SI                           (Amelang, Schwarz & Wegemund, 1989); chapter 2.2.3 
 NEO-Five Factor Inventory                    (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993)  
 
Scenario Tasks 
We administered four scenarios: Two female (Renate, 23 years, medical-technician; 
Katharina, 25 years, psychology student) and two male persons (Christoph, 23 years, 
student of law; Matthias, 33 years, dancing teacher) were included as central target persons. 
The scenario started with some background information of the procedure and about the 
target person, followed by a short self-presentation of the target person that aimed at getting 
familiar with the target person’s voice and appearance. Subjects have to judge the target 
person’s cognitions, emotions, and the relationships to other people with the help of written 
correspondence, audio-conversations, pictures and video-scenes. At the end of each 
scenario, subjects are instructed to make a global rating about the target person’s personality 
on the Big Five (NEO-FFI) and his or her general relationship to other people on the 
Circumplex dimensions (see Horowitz et al., 2000). The task material varies systematically 
according to the amount of persons in the situations (single others, dyads and small groups), 
the setting (private vs. public) and the situation content (e.g., comfortable vs. uncomfortable 
situation). The items have to be answered on a 6-point rating scale (e.g., How important is 
the situation for target person xy? 1 = not important at all; 6 = very important), on open-
ended questions, and on multiple choice questions. With respect to rating-scaled items, 
answers were scored with regard to the deviation from the target person’s answer (the minor 
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the deviance the better the performance). In addition, in consensus scores answers were 
evaluated according to the most typical answer of the group. The more the individual answer 
corresponded to the groups judgment of alternatives, the better the test score. Table 6-3 
presents an overview of the items that were developed for each modality. The different 
amount of items of each type and modality is due to the recordings of the scenes. Our aim 
was to find out whether the scenario approach works in general, which type of items works 
best etc. The procedure at this stage was rather exploratory. 
 
Table 6-3: Overview of the Item Number per Modality in Social Understanding Tasks  
Modality   
written auditory pictorial video-based Sum 
Rating 
emotion 
cognition 
behavior (rela.) 
51 
31 
2 
18 
56 
38 
2 
16 
15 
8 
2 
5 
70 
24 
--- 
46 
192 
 Multiple choice 
emotion 
cognition 
behavior (rela.) 
9 
--- 
--- 
9 
1 
--- 
--- 
1 
9 
--- 
--- 
9 
11 
--- 
--- 
11 
30 
Open 
emotion 
cognition 
behavior (rela.) 
4 
--- 
2 
2 
11 
2 
8 
1 
3 
--- 
2 
1 
5 
2 
2 
1 
23 
Sum 64 68 27 86 245 
Note: The numbers represent the number of items. The relative higher number of emotion and relationship items 
is due to the combined questions concerning different emotions (e.g., in one question, sadness, anger, joy, and 
disgust are tested) and behaviors (e.g. in one question dominance, activity, distance, and cooperation are tested) 
whereas cognition questions contain only one item (aspect); rela.=relationship. 
 
 
Social Memory Tasks 
The social memory items for the language-based tasks were all presented as open-ended 
questions because empirical findings showed that they differentiate better among subjects 
than other types of questions such as multiple choice and rating scales (see Funke & 
Schuler, 1998), that they produce a more consistent answer pattern, and result in a clearer 
structure (see Birenbaum & Tatsuoka, 1987). In addition, open-ended questions are 
particularly useful for the collection of possible answers to our questions in order to improve 
the items. The answers to open-ended questions can serve as a basis for the development 
of a MC test for a subsequent and more economical test version we aim at.  
 
a) Memory for socially relevant information in text (SMw1) 
Subjects have a pre-defined time to read a text section and to remember as many of the 
socially relevant details as possible. Thereafter, they have to answer open-ended questions 
aiming at the recall of the socially relevant details of the text. The tasks involves four texts 
differing in content (two are private, two work-related) and length (231 to 355 words). 
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b) Memory for socially relevant information in conversations (SMa1) 
Twelve conversations were displayed; their duration was in the range between 100 and 135 
seconds. After listening to each conversation, subjects had to answer five or six questions 
within 90 seconds.  
 
c) Memory for couples (SMp1) 
Part 1: This test contains pictures of couples that are presented in two blocks each of which 
involves photographs of eight couples. The task is to remember the couples as accurately as 
possible. Thereafter, one partner of a couple is presented followed by four pictures with 
different partners. Subjects have to indicate the correct partner of the person presented 
previously.  
Part 2: Two picture sequences are presented, one contains three, the other nine pictures 
taken in different social settings (teacher’s room, family get-together). After the presentation 
of the pictures, test takers have to answer questions about socially relevant details. 
 
d) Memory for interactions in videos (SMf1) 
Four video scenes are presented on the screen showing a different number of people 
interacting in various situations. Test takers are instructed to remember as many socially 
relevant details as possible. Following the scenes, questions concerning socially relevant 
details of the material have to be answered within 1:15 minutes. Multiple choice and open-
ended format are applied. 
 
Social Perception Tasks 
e) Perception of socially relevant details in text (SPw1) 
Sixty statements (part 1 of the task) and questions (part 2 of the task) have to be judged as 
right or wrong and answered with yes or no, respectively. Subjects have to respond as 
accurately and as quickly as possible by tapping the adequate key. Complexity is varied 
according to the number of questions (one or two) that have to be answered or according to 
the number of statements (one or two) that have to be judged. The task is practiced with 
eight example trials, including two examples for each part and each task level. 
 
f) Perception of socially relevant stimuli in conversations (SPa1) 
The task contains 13 conversations including 107 perception reactions to both verbal 
(names, agreement, rejection, filling words, admiration) and paraverbal cues (reactions to 
laughter, interruptions, and voices). Before starting the test, subjects were familiarized with 
the type of task through working on four conversations involving 30 reactions. Task difficulty 
and reaction time are expected to differ according to the type of stimulus and the number of 
stimuli that subjects have to react on in a single conversation. Each conversation requires 
monitoring between one and three stimuli. 
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g) Person detection in pictures (SPp1) 
A person is presented pictorially and has to be remembered. Thereafter, the same person is 
shown in different pictures in a variety of settings. Subjects have ten seconds to click on the 
person’s head as soon as they identified him or her appearing on the screen. The task 
contains seven sequences including 10 pictures each. 
 
h) Person detection in videos (SPf1) 
A person is presented in a short video and has to be remembered. Thereafter, that person is 
shown in several video sequences. Test takers have to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible as soon as they recognized the person that was shown in the first video. One 
example sequence involving ten reactions served for practicing the task. The test contains 
five scenes with ten reactions each. 
 
Baseline Measures  
i) Mouse speed (Oberauer et al., 2003; Sander, 2005) 
The task mouse speed intends to measure the speed and accuracy of using a computer 
mouse. Subjects have to press as quickly as possible with the left mouse key on a white 
circle point that arbitrarily emerges on the screen. The circle has to be hit as accurately as 
possible by clicking on its center. After ten example trials three blocks including 25 trials each 
follow. It takes about ten minutes to complete the task. 
 
j) Simple reaction time (Oberauer et al., 2003; Sander, 2005) 
The space bar has to be pressed as soon as a white circle appears on the screen. Before the 
circle is shown, a small cross is presented in the middle of the screen. The task is practiced 
with five example trials, followed by 50 test trials. It takes ten minutes to complete the test.  
 
k) Readspeed (Rüsseler & Münte, 2001) 
A text containing 198 words (120 function words, 78 content words and nouns) is presented 
word by word. The respective word is seen only until tapping the space bar. Participants 
were instructed to read the text as quickly and as accurately as possible. The reading time 
was recorded for each word. Following the text, three multiple choice questions involving 
three options each were presented to ensure that subjects did not only click through but also 
understood the content of the text. It takes five minutes to complete the test. For the 
description of the general auditory tasks please see chapter 4.2 and 6.2.2, for the BIS 
description see chapter 2.1.5. 
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Complementary Instruments and Self-report Measures 
l) Questionnaire about personal data 
Personal data was collected in a questionnaire involving information about age, sex, 
education, hearing ability, music experience, and grades of the last report card.  
 
m) Hearing Screening Inventory (Coren & Hakstian, 1992) 
To ensure proper listening to the audio files, a twelve item self-report measure was applied to 
collect information about the individual pure-tone hearing sensitivity. The measure served as 
a substitute for a hearing test that is usually taken by an ear doctor. According to Coren and 
Hakstian (1992), the questionnaire has an internal consistency value of .82. Economical 
constraints and the unavailability of appropriate instruments did not allow us to apply the 
more accurate hearing test. With the questionnaire, those subjects who knew about having 
hearing problems should be identified. 
 
n) Questionnaire of computer experience (5 min.) 
The items of this questionnaire deal with the period of time someone is familiar with a 
computer, the mean time spent by using the computer, the context of using computers (work, 
friends, courses), the knowledge and experiences in using the computer (e.g. programming, 
games, applications, internet, emails, etc.). It ends with a self-assessment of one’s 
experience compared to age-related others. For references of similar versions, see Süß 
(1996); Wittmann and Süß (1999); and Feigenspan (2005). 
 
6.2.3 Implementation  
Equipment 
The study took place in two different computer pools at the University of Magdeburg with 
comparable computers in each room. Each subject had an own PC equiped with earphones. 
For the computer-based tasks, Pentium 4 computers (1.7 GHz) with 256 MB RAM, AT/AT 
compatible, were used. The operating system was Windows NT. The TFT-Monitor ran on 
16bit color because the WMC program requires this setting. For the auditory tasks we used 
earphones (Philips, SBC HP 195). The complete material, with the exception of the written 
language memory tasks and scenarios that were presented with PowerPoint XP, was 
presented with the software program WMC (version 0.15; see chapter 4.3) The answers of 
the auditory tonal tasks and social memory and understanding tasks were recorded with 
paper and pencil answering sheets. Some of the auditory tasks required additional technical 
settings. These are summarized in the appendix A.1. The BIS Test and the questionnaires 
were administered as paper and pencil tests. 
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Procedure 
The study took about 10 hours, and was split up into two test sessions that were carried out 
on different days, each one lasting five hours. The first session was always done before the 
second. The subjects could choose between different possibilities (days and hours) of being 
tested for sessions one and two. The sessions were conducted by trained investigators. After 
having finished the second test session, each participant was rewarded with 50 Euro. 
Psychology students could alternatively record the hours as test participant that German 
psychology students have to accomplish throughout their studies. 
 
Each session was subdivided into four blocks including three ten minute breaks in between 
during which times the test takers were allowed to relax and consume some drinks and 
snacks. In order to ensure motivation and diversion, the tasks of different modalities and 
different abilities/cognitive operations (AcI, SP, SM, SU, general auditory, and 
questionnaires) were varied. The tasks were practiced with example trials in order to ensure 
proper understanding. Each task was started with a different key to guarantee that subjects 
do not start a task accidentally or deliberately without prior instruction. The detailed schedule 
is presented in appendix A.4.  
 
6.2.4 Data Management 
One person did not participate the second day of the study and was excluded from analysis. 
Because of missing values (e.g. lack of task comprehension, careless mistakes), some of the 
psychometrics are based on less than 126 subjects. How I dealt with missing values was 
reported in chapter 5.1. Technical problems occurred while administering the task “masked 
words”. Thus, we could do the analysis with 57 cases only. Some data got lost irreproducibly 
on some of the computers because of technical problems that occurred in the readspeed 
task with the data saving procedure. In some of the first test sessions, a former version of the 
social written perception task was erroneously administered. In this version, the time to 
answer was limited to eight seconds. Many test takers were not able to complete the task 
within this time. The final version allowed 12 seconds answering. One hundred and five 
subjects were tested with the latest version (12 seconds) whereas 21 completed the former 
version. 
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6.3 Results - Social Intelligence  
In the following three sections, the major results of the first study are reported with respect to 
the aims and hypotheses (see chapter 3.1.3). I start dealing with SI, focusing on auditory 
social and written social ability tasks (chapter 6.3). I then turn to AuI (section 6.4), and finally 
relate social and auditory intelligence to one another (chapter 6.5). For each domain, the 
psychometric quality of the scales will be reported before hypotheses testing. Some of the 
hypotheses reported in chapter 3 will only be addressed in the second study.  
 
6.3.1 Psychometric Properties 
Social Understanding 
Table 6-4 addresses the descriptive statistics for each method scale across the four 
scenarios applying target scoring, consensus scoring, and deviation points (see chapter 2.7 
and 5.2). Subjects’ answers to open-ended questions were compared to the targets answers 
and judged by two independent raters. Correspondence of independent raters was more 
than 95%. The target-scores were weighted as described in chapter 5.2.2. In order to make 
the scores comparable to the alternative scoring procedures, the items were z-standardized 
before summarizing them to a score. In addition, with z-transformation, individual answer 
tendencies (e.g. preference for extreme answers) are balanced. The scores presented in the 
following table therefore diverge from their original deviation scale (zero to -5 or -6 
respectively). A comparison score with the original metric to the original score is provided for 
the weighted target scores below the standardized values. Table 3-4 presents the statistics 
of target-scores across all types of items (rating scales, open-ended questions, multiple 
choice) and a selection of only target scored rating scale items. 
 
Target scores proved to be the most reliable compared to all scoring methods that were 
applied. This result shows, that reliable scores are also possible with target scores thus 
contradicting the findings that as a consequence of the method consensus scores are 
generally more reliable (see MacCann et al., 2004b). Theoretically, target scores are the 
most recommendable as well, since they orientate on an external target instead scoring 
according to a group depended common opinion and thus do not depend on the sample. 
Compared to deviation points and right-wrong scores they make use of the whole available 
information. According to Table 6-4, the more differentiated the scale is, the better the 
reliability value; correspondingly, with right-wrong scores we encounter the most extensive 
information loss. We also learn that using only rating scales is not worse compared to the 
application of all kinds of scales (multiple choice and open-ended questions). With the 
exception of the pictorial scale (6 of 15 selected items rating scaled), almost all selected 
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items are rating scaled. Involving only rating scaled items in the scale affects only the 
pictorial score of which the reliability value increases. A detailed comparison between 
multiple-choice (MC) items, open-ended questions, and rating scale items, is not possible, 
since we did not have enough MC items and open-ended questions. Resulting from these 
findings (see Table 6-4), I will concentrate on target rating scores for further analysis (e.g., 
intercorrelations and factor analysis) and include consensus scales for some additional 
analysis. Of these scores, the pictures score (Z=1.49, p<.05 target scoring; Z=1.97, p<.01, 
consensus scoring) was not normally distributed.  
Table 6-4: Psychometrics for Social Understanding Modality Scales Applying Different 
Scoring Modi 
 Item 
number 
Item mean 
(range) 
rit-range Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Weighted difference scores, all types of items 
written 19 .18 [-.26; .72] 1.24 [ -3.11; 0]; SD=0.57 .20 - .61 .80 
auditory 21 .12 [-.22; .71] -1.25 [-2.88; -.29]; SD=.47 .15 - .52 .73 
pictorial 15 .10 [-.19; .83] -.83 [-2.17; -.20]; SD=.40 .05 - .51 .65 
video-based 41 .08 [-.23; .85] -1.47 [-2.46; -.93]; SD=.35 .09 - .43 .77 
Weighted difference scores, only rating scales 
written 18 .19 [-26; .72] -1.35[ -3.31; 0]; SD=0.59 .21 - .61 .80 
auditory 20 .12 [-.22; .71] -1.33 [-3.05; -.33]; SD=.49 .09 - .54 .73 
pictorial 6 . 27 [.03; .74] -.91 [-4.00; 0]; SD=.63 .17 - .74 .69 
video-based 40 .08 [-.23; .85] -1.52 [-2.52; -.96]; SD=.36 .09 - .43 .77 
Deviation points 
written 18 .14 [-.17; .45] .08 - .54 .75 
auditory 14 .14 [-.15 - .49] .03 - .61 .71 
pictorial 7 .14 [-.07; .50] .11 - .54 .52 
video-based 21 .11 [-.19; .50] .06 - .48 .73 
Right–wrong scores 
written 16 .10 [-.14; .40] .06 - .50 .65 
auditory 14 .13 [-.18; .52] .06 - .54 .67 
pictorial 6 .14 [-.12; .44] .06 - .45 .49 
video-based 19 .10 [-.18; .41] .07 - .41 .69 
Proportion-based consensus scoring  
written 16 .15 [-.14; .48] .11 - .58 .72 
auditory 14 .15 [-.15; .47] .03 - .51 .69 
pictorial 6 .16 [-.07; .49] .05 - .55 .58 
video-based 17 .08 [-.15; - .41] .07 - .39 .60 
Note. rit-range= Item-total correlation range; right–wrong scores and deviation scores: item number was kept as 
large as possible to have a valid comparison to deviation scores; target scores: exact deviation from the target’s 
answer, weighted by the deviation that was possible in each item; deviation points: right answer is scored with 2 
points, deviation of 1 with 1 point, all other 0 points; right – wrong scores: only the exact correspondence with the 
targets answer is scored as 1 point, all other zero; Two persons were excluded because of lacking commitment 
(large deviations from mean score), codes: trggi, tnfdr; one value of grrnn was set to -.270 from -.30 as it was an 
outlier. 
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Table 6-5 provides a cross-classification of how many items of each type of material, type of 
scale, and content of question (emotion, cognition, and relationship/behavior) were selected 
from the original number of items that were developed. The numbers represent proportions 
of selected items; the total number of ratings is listed in parentheses. The higher the 
proportion of selected items, the better this type of item construction worked. The rating 
format works for all material scales, but best for pictures and video-based items. However, 
the proportion of selected auditory and written items is highest for open answer questions. 
Multiple-choice format seems to be the least reliable. However, we have to consider that the 
largest available database is on rating format as we used it most often in our scenario 
questions. The lower part of the table reveals that emotion items seem to work best, followed 
by cognition items. With regard to the emotion items, it is not yet clear how the composition 
of emotions that have to be evaluated in one task influence the judgment of the other 
emotions (e.g. does it make a difference whether only two negative emotions have to be 
judged or whether a positive emotion is involved in addition).  
 
Table 6-5: Selected Items in Social Understanding Scenario Tasks 
Percent selected 
(number) Rating Open Multiple choice 
written 35.29 % (18/51) 50 %      (2/4) 0 % (0/9) 
auditory 26.79 % (15/56) 45.45 % (5/11) 0 % (0/1) 
picture 46.67 % (7/15) 0 %        (0/3) 22.22 % (2/9) 
video 32.86 % (23/70) 20 %      (1/5) 9 % (1/11) 
 
Cognition Emotion 
Relationship 
/Behavior 
written 25 % (1/4) 48.39 % (15/31) 13.79 %  (4/29) 
auditory 50 % (5/10) 32.5 %   (13/40) 11.11 %  (2/18) 
picture 0 %   (0/4) 50 %      (4/8) 33.33 %  (5/15) 
video 50 %  (1/2) 46.15 %  (12/26) 20.69 %  (12/58) 
Note: In parentheses you find the total number of selected items compared to the total number of available items. 
 
In the following I use the term “target scores” for weighted target scores measured with rating 
scales. Since target scores were focussed in further analysis and consensus scores will be 
covered in some calculations and comparisons, Table 6-6 shows the intercorrelations within 
consensus (upper part of the table, shaded in lighter grey) and within target scores (lower 
part of the table, shaded in darker grey) separated by the modality scales. All scales 
correlate moderate to high with respect to both scoring procedures, except for the personality 
scale that is correlated significantly negatively only with the video-based scale (target 
scores). The global personality rating of a person seems to be different from a scene 
dependent rating of the target person‘s cognitions, emotions and relationships/behaviors to 
other people. Correlations are highest between the video-based and the auditory scale and 
between the auditory and the written scale. 
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Table 6-6: Intercorrelations within Target (t) and within Consensus (c) Scales 
  Video-based Auditory Pictorial Written Personality
Video-based 1.00 .47** .25** .47** .09 
Auditory .53** 1.00 .31** .60** .06 
Pictorial .31** .18* 1.00 .24** .11 
Written .47** .58** .21* 1.00 .09 
Personality  -.18* -.07 -.06 .08 1.00 
Note: ** Correlations (Spearman) are significant at p < 0.01; *Correlations (Spearman) are significant at p< 0.05; 
N=125, listwise deletion; t=target scores; bottom part: target scores; upper part: consensus scores 
 
Table 6-7 presents the intercorrelations between target scores and consensus scores. The 
scales scored with different procedures are moderately to highly related. Consensus-based 
judgment is most similar to target scores within the auditory and the written modality scales 
(r=.82 for both scales). The findings indicate that the scale construction based on objective 
cues in the task material was successful as both target persons and students judge the 
feelings, thoughts, actions, and relationships similarly. 
 
Table 6-7: Intercorrelations Between Target and Consensus Scales 
Target scores 
Consensus 
scores video-based auditory pictorial written personality 
video-based .68** .45** .22* .47** .12 
auditory .46** .82** .20* .60** .12 
pictorial .18* .21* .63** .27** .03 
written .52** .65** .26** .82** .18* 
personality -.10 .08 -.08 -.04 -.01 
Note: ** Correlations (Spearman) are significant at p < 0.01; *Correlations (Spearman) are significant at p< 0.05; 
N=125, listwise deletion 
 
Again, the target personality scale seems to be neither related to the SI material/content 
scales nor to the consensus-based personality scores (r=-.14). This is another hint of the 
difference between a total personality judgment and the judgment of the target person with 
regard to cognitions, emotions, and relationships in different scenes. In addition, there seems 
to be a difference in how the target person regards his or her own personality and how a 
group of students judges it. Possible reasons for these differences may be that people form a 
picture of the target person very quickly that differs from the objective and more detailed 
judgment in a certain situation. It seems to be worthwhile to address the relationship between 
the personality judgment and the circumplex judgment (IIP-C; part of the behavior dimension) 
within the scenes. I assume them to be stronger related than judgments about feelings and 
cognitions. However, the personality scale (weighted rating score) correlates with .04 (p=.64) 
non significantly with the IIP-C score (score was built by summarizing the personality 
estimations across the materials). The low intercorrelations between the material scales and 
the personality scale may also be due to unclear instructions: The task of the subjects was to 
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put themselves into the target person’s place and to judge the scenes and personality 
according to the target person’s view. However, students often reported that they judged the 
target persons in their own perspective. Thus, instructions should be made clearer in the 
second study. Further analyses could deal with the question of whether the personality 
estimation correlates more strongly with items at the end of a scenario since test takers are 
expected to have a more valid picture of the target person at the end compared to the 
beginning of a scenario task. This may be a subject of further research but is not in the scope 
of this dissertation. Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) distinguish between analytic and non-
analytic judgments, which may also be the reason for the differences between the personality 
judgment dimension and the content specific SU scales. Whereas in analytic judgments the 
judge is required to conceptualize and to quantify specific characteristics of the subjects, in 
non-analytic judgments, the judge responds in a global way. Thus, differences may result as 
a consequence of the different classification: the personality dimension can be classified in 
the non-analytic domain and the other SI scales require specific, analytic judgments. 
 
Social Memory-Auditory 
Descriptive statistics for the total score of the social auditory memory task and for each 
single conversation are presented in Table 6-8. One person was excluded from analyses 
because of a lack of commitment. The answers to the open-ended questions were scored by 
two independent raters according to an assessment profile that was developed by 
investigating the completed questionnaires (answer sheets) of a random sample. Answers 
were only judged as completely correct when they were equal to the presented sound file 
and did not involve any interpretation. Partially correct answers were scored with half of a 
point. Two independent raters judged the answers according to the scoring suggestion. The 
raters agreed in 98% of the items. With respect to the remaining items a consensus 
agreement was attained and conclusions for test optimization with respect to unambiguity 
were inferred.  
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Table 6-8: Psychometrics of the Auditory Social Memory Task (SMa) 
Task 
Number of 
items 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis4) 
Mean 
difficulty (SD)
rit range Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Total score
Revised total 
score 1
Revised total 
score 2
 
61 (62)1) 
 
 
2)33 (rev1) 
 
 
3)27 (rev2) 
-.94/1.49  
 
 
-1.12/1.83  
 
 
-1.07/1.51  
.52 (.09) 
[.06; .97] 
 
.57 (.24) 
[.19; .92] 
 
.58 (.23) 
[.23; .92] 
-.05 - .45 
 
 
.16 - .48 
 
 
.21 - .45 
.78 
 
 
.78 
 
 
.78 
Conversation 1 6 -.33/-.21  .45 (.19) [.19; .69] -.01 - .47 .48 
Conversation 2 5 (4) 1) -.05/-.62  .36 (.18) [.10; .47] -.19 - .03 -.25 
Conversation 3 5 .24/-.14  .34 (.10) [.23; .59] .05 - .17 .26 
Conversation 4 5 .03/.64  .59 (.27) [.29; .96] -.03 - .15 .09 
Conversation 5 5 .45/-.15  .29 (.11) [.18; .42] .18 - .32 .41 
Conversation 6 5 .11/-.26  .51 (.13) [.31; .67] .15 - .30 .43 
Conversation 7 5 .19/-.50  .35 (.30) [.09; .72] .06 - .35 .43 
Conversation 8 5 -2.29/6.21  .88 (.08) [.77; .92] .25 - .58 .63 
Conversation 9 5 .05/-.59  .36 (.14) [.06; .52] -.03 - .21 .21 
Conversation 10 5 -.68/.06  .68 (.29) [.24; .94] .12 - .33 .42 
Conversation 11 5 -.67/.31  .74 (.25) [.33; .93] .06 - .19 .33 
Conversation 12 6 -.82/.89  .62 (.29) [.18; .87] .05 - .44 .40 
Note. Scores are normally distributed except for conversations 2, 4, 5, 6, 8-12. Item numbers in parentheses 
indicate the corrected number after selection; 1)Item 22 has zero variance and is therefore excluded from analysis; 
2)Exclusion of conversations 2, 4, 9 because of severe reliability problems: Conversation 5 was also excluded as it 
did not fit in the scale.; 3)Additional exclusion of items with unsufficient rit; 
4)SE (Skewness): .22; SE (Curtosis): .43 
 
The first revised score (see Table 6-8, in italics) was chosen for further calculations. Variance 
in the first revised score is not restricted compared to the second revised score while 
reliability is maintained. The reliability of the final score can be regarded as sufficient 
whereas the single conversations have some reliability problems. The mean difficulty ranges 
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between .29 and .88. Reasons for unsufficient reliability and item-total correlations may be 
attributed to item formulations, sound quality of conversations, and ambiguity of instructions. 
 
Social Memory-Written 
Table 6-9 presents the correspondent psychometrics of the social written memory task. 
Again, open answers were scored according to an assessment profile (similar to that 
described above) with which two independent raters reached about 99% of agreement. For 
the remaining items, a consensus was attained after discussion. The assessment profile was 
comparable to the one described in the context of social auditory memory tasks in 
differentiation between completely correct answers equal to the text (one point) and partly 
correct answers (half a point). The revised total score has a sufficient reliability (.74), 
however, the single texts are not reliable enough. Possible reasons may be the limited time 
to answer the questions (1 ½ minutes) that may have caused many omissions. (The most 
omissions were obeserved with the last questions of each text.). The mean difficulty is 
between 23% (text 3) and 67% correct (text 1). Text 3 contains many names as well as 
words commonly used in consultancy. That may be a reason for the comparatively low mean 
value.  
Table 6-9: Psychometrics of the Written Social Memory Task (SMw) 
Task 
Number 
of items 
Duration
in min. 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis1) 
Mean 
difficulty 
(SD) 
rit range Cronbach’s Alpha 
Total score
Revised score 
38 
 
 
26 
 -.60/.93  
 
 
-.63/.53  
.46 (.10) 
[.11; .70] 
 
.49 (.13) 
[.17; .93] 
.02 - .41 
 
 
.16 - .46 
.73 
 
 
.74 
Text 1
Revised score
9 
 
 
6 
M: 1:30 
R: 2:00 
-.36/.66  
 
 
-1.32/1.39  
.57 (.17) 
[.37; 93] 
 
.67 (.24) 
[.37; .93] 
.02 - .55 
 
 
.19 - .59 
.53 
 
 
.62 
Text 2
Revised score
10 
 
 
7 
M: 3:00 
R: 2:30 
-.67/1.37  
 
 
-.62/.83  
.46 (.14) 
[.10; .93] 
 
.52 (.28) 
[.22; .93] 
.09 - .37 
 
 
.15 - .38 
.50 
 
 
.51 
Text 3
Revised score
11 
 
 
7 
M: 3:00 
R: 2:00 
.71/.93  
 
 
.05/-.94  
.23 (.12) 
[.05; 43] 
 
.36 (.08) 
[.31; .43] 
.04 - .34 
 
 
.09 - .33 
.47 
 
 
.45 
Text 4
Revised score
8 
 
 
5 
M: 3:20 
R: 2:00 
-.06/-.83  
 
 
.06/-.21  
.53 (.15) 
[.24; .90] 
 
.44 (.13) 
[.24; .65] 
-.04 - .15 
 
 
.12 - .16 
.19 
 
 
.30 
Note: N=126; With the exception of text 4 (revised), all scores are normally distributed. M= memorize; R= recall; 
Correlation between revised and total score: .94. ; 1) Skewness is presented first; the second value represents 
curtosis, SE (Skewness): .22; SE (Curtosis): .43 
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Table 6-10 shows the intercorrelations between the single texts. Considering the low 
reliability for some of the conversations, the moderate correlations are satisfying. Text 4 
showed the lowest correlations with the other texts. This may be due to the low reliability 
value. 
 
Table 6-10: Correlations Between the Texts of the Written Social Memory Task (SMw) 
 SMw text 1 SMw text 2 SMw text 3 
SMw text 2 .35**   
SMw text 3 .30** .38**  
SMw text 4 .17 .15 .32** 
Note: **Correlation is significant at p< 0.01 (2-sided); listwise N=126; SMw=social memory written 
 
 
Social Perception-Auditory 
The social auditory perception task includes items that can be classified into groups of 
different stimuli (e.g., laughter or names). The task also takes complexity into consideration 
(paying attention to one, two, or three stimuli; see chapter 4.1.5). Table 6-11 presents the 
standard descriptives for each type of stimulus and combines these groups into a general 
auditory perception value using z-transformation. Reactions to “rejection” took the longest 
whereas reactions to “filling words” and “agreement” were fastest. The total score is 
sufficiently reliable. With regard to the single scales, reliability would need improvement, in 
particular the scales “admiration” and “filling words.“ The most reliable scales were those 
including reactions to “agreement”, “voices”, and “rejection.“ The values were trimmed 
according to the steps described in the chapter 5.2.3. 
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Table 6-11: Psychometrics for Scales of the Auditory Social Perception Task (SPa) 
Task N 
Number 
of items 
Skewness/
Curtosis 3)
RT range 
(min./max.)
Mean RT (SD) 
1) rit range 
Cronb. 
Alpha 
laughter 125 23 .05/.10  377.00 – 1256.38 
869.07 
(149.46) -.01 - .61 .69 
names 125 18 .22/-.27  519.11 – 1141.46 
830.92 
(131.91) .05 - .62 .68 
agreement 125 27 .06/.57  450.44 – 1064.14 
646.26 
(74.23) .06 - .53 .80 
interruption 122 10 .21/-.64  516.33 – 1444.00 
940.91 
(196.98) .23 - .46 .69 
voices 125 35 .23/-.36  616.37 – 1370.44 
813.51 
(102.10) .00 - .49 .83 
rejection 119 6 1.10/1.93 482.00 – 2808.00 
1154.74 
(366.38) .50 - .93 .88 
admiration 125 7 .39/.59  508.71 – 1220.17 
737.70 
(97.28) .20 - .36 .58 
filling words 124 10 .32/-.53  379.60 – 825.00 
555.44 
(102.80) .18 - .46 .66 
 
Combined 
z-score 
 
 
125 136 (1092)) -.02/-.20  
-2.74 - 2.37
(578.57-  
965.842)) 
--- -.18 - .47 (.10 -.46)2) 
.85 
(.882)) 
Score 
controlled for 
SRT 
125 136 .15/-.22  -2.55- 2.71 0.00 (1.00) --- --- 
Note: N=125; 1) after trimming; 2) after item selection; The combined score was computed by summarizing z-
scores of single scales. The scales “correction” and “answering” were excluded from analyses because of the 
high proportion of missing values (see also chapter 5.3.2, steps of trimming RT values); 3) Skewness is presented 
first; the second value represents curtosis. SE (Skewness): .22; SE (Curtosis): .43 
 
 
Since the simple ability to press a key as quickly as possible is expected to be mixed up with 
the actual social auditory perception ability, I also computed a performance score that is 
controlled for simple reaction time (SRT). The sum of the modified standardized values was 
finally standardized in order to obtain a total score controlled for SRT (see Table 6-12). The 
two values (with SRT and without controlling for SRT) correlate with .84. In the following the 
intercorrelations between the auditory social perception scales with (in italics) and without 
controlling for SRT value are shown (see Table 6-12). 
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Table 6-12: Intercorrelations of Auditory Social Perception Scales (SPa) 
 Scales laughter names 
agree-
ment 
inter- 
ruption voices rejection 
admi-
ration 
 
names 
.29** 
.26** 1.00      
 
agreement 
.12 
.08 
.17 
.10 1.00     
 
interruption 
.00 
.00 
.11 
.10 
.30** 
.30** 1.00    
 
voices 
.05 
.00 
.32** 
.27** 
.39** 
.31** 
.28** 
.27** 1.00   
 
rejection 
-.06 
-.07 
.10 
.08 
.10 
.08 
-.10 
-.10 
.36**. 
.35** 1.00  
 
admiration 
.11 
.09 
.20* 
.16 
.21* 
.16 
.11 
.11 
.18 
.12 
-.07 
-.09 1.00 
filling 
words 
.05 
.01 
.25** 
.19* 
.24** 
.15 
.16 
.15 
.29** 
.22* 
.13 
.12 
.08 
.03 
Notes: **Correlation is significant at p< 0.01 (2-sided); *Correlation is significant at p< 0.05 (2-sided); listwise 
deletion; N=118; Correlations between scales controlled for SRT are presented in italics. The reduced number of 
subjects is due to computer crashes and corresponding loss of data. 
 
With the exception of the scale “rejection“, correlations among scales are positive and point 
into the expected direction. The scales agreement, rejection, admiration, names, and voices 
seem to have more in common than the remaining. The SRT controlled variables still 
intercorrelate only slightly weaker indicating that the auditory social perception task explains 
systematic variance that cannot be described by simple cognitive-motoric reactions. The 
auditory social perception task can also be evaluated regarding the accuracy of task 
performance. The mean value for a combined accuracy score amounts to .70 (SD=.24; 
range: .06 to .98; N=118). The total score has an alpha value of .94 with rit ranging between 
.05 and .70. The reduced score involves 82 items and shows a rit-range between .20 and .63. 
Alpha decreases slightly to .93., the mean value increases to M=.77 (SD=.24; range: .35 - 
.98). 
 
Social Perception-Written  
In chapter 6.2.4, I already mentioned that some of the participants worked on an older 
version of the written social perception task that allowed only 8 seconds to react on the 
questions instead of the intended 12 seconds. Since the program saved only reactions within 
the time limit, subjects with 50% and more missing values were excluded from analysis. That 
is why the number of participants is reduced to 109 persons. In addition, 22 items with more 
than 40% missing values were excluded from analysis. Equal to the auditory social 
perception task, the values were trimmed according to the steps described in the chapter 5.2. 
Mean values and additional statistics were computed separately for each part of the task and 
for a combined score. An attempt to classify the items according to their content did not 
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reveal any differences in reaction times as it was the case for the auditory social perception 
task. One possible reason may be that there were not enough items in one category and that 
for some items it was difficult to assign them into a certain category. Similar to the auditory 
social perception task, in the written social perception task (SPw), I controlled for the 
variance of the baseline measure readspeed (see below). Descriptives of the total SPw 
score, for different levels of difficulty, and for the subscores (part one and two of the task, see 
chapter 4.1.5) are presented in Table 6-13. 
 
Table 6-13: Reaction Time Scores of the Written Social Perception Task (SPw) 
 RT mean (SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis1) 
RT range 
(min.-max.) 
Cronbach’s  
Alpha 
Total mean 
(35 items) 
5488.72 
(631.50) -.20/.16  
3998.43 - 
6995.84 .81 
Revised 
mean  
(32 items) 
5442.19 
(700.57) -.29/.32  
3491.59 - 
7182.97 .83 
Part one 
(statments) 
5445.97 
(752.35) -.43/.31  
3484.15 - 
7219.42 .48 
Part two 
(questions) 
5502.56 
(738.89) -.04/.09  
3665.95 - 
7307.41 .80 
Level 1 5256.98 (710.85) -.48/.33  
3228.52 - 
6716.05 .76 
Level 2 5828.05 (742.69) .22/.27  
4153.29 - 
8055.69 .56 
Note: Level 1 and 2 indicate the degree of difficuly (level 1: one statement or question; level 2: two statements or 
questions; 1) Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis. SE (Skewness): .23; SE 
(Curtosis): .46 
 
The mean reaction time of level 1 (paying attention to one statement/question) is lower than 
the reaction time for level 2 (paying attention to two statements/questions) which is in line 
with the expectations. Moreover, test takers seem to react slightly faster to statements than 
to questions. The reliability for the “question-scale” is sufficiently high whereas the alpha 
value of the “statements scale” of the tasks is rather low. Similarly, the reliability for level 2 is 
considerably lower compared to the level 1 value. More items (18 compared to 8) had to be 
excluded in the “statements scale” because of too many missing values, which may be the 
reason for the low reliability value. The accuracy value of the written social perception task is 
exceptionally high (>= .80). For further information about the accuracy score see appendix 
B.1.1. 
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Written Social Perception Controlled for Reading Speed 
In order to take the individual speed of reading into account, the “readspeed test” (Rüsseler 
& Münte, 2001) was administered. Since the test is still unpublished and up to now was 
applied mainly in the clinical context (case studies), I report some findings we obtained by 
using this test. Table 6-14 addresses the relevant statistics of the raw score and the trimmed 
value of the readspeed test according to the steps described in chapter 5.2. Values were set 
to missing when the RT was lower than 100 ms. The accuracy value was obtained by 
counting the correct answers to the corresponding three text comprehension questions. 
Since the score was not normally distributed after trimming, a logarithmic transformation of 
the score was applied. The correlation between the logarithmic value and the accuracy score 
(r= -.31) was highly significant and indicates a speed–accuracy trade–off thus making a 
combined score necessary in order to cover the readspeed performance appropriately. The 
internal consistency value of the readspeed scale comes to .996 (198 items). In summary, 
the readspeed test seems to be reliable enough to be used for variance control in the written 
social perception task. 
 
Table 6-14: Psychometrics of the Readspeed Test (Rüsseler & Münte, 2001) 
 Mean RT (SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis1) 
RT range  
(min., max.) 
RT-score 
(ms) 422.30 (116.15) .81/.30  239.81 - 787.83 
RT-score 
(trimmed) 418.22 (113.15) .78/.26  237.24 - 781.04 
RT- score 
logarithm 2.59 (.11) .15/-.53  2.37 - 2.87 
Accuracy 
score 1.88 (.68) -.34/.35  0 - 3 
Note: 1) Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis, SE (Skewness): .22; SE (Curtosis): 
.44; Because of technical problems, we have only data sets from 122 persons 
 
In order to obtain a readspeed corrected written social perception performance score, the 
variance of the readspeed accuracy and speed score were partialed out using regression 
analysis. The same procedure was applied for both parts (statements and questions) of the 
task. The correlation between the two parts of written social perception without controlling for 
readspeed reached a value of .78, after controlling for the readspeed variance, it came to an 
index of .76. The value drops only slightly, which indicates that the written social perception 
task explains substancial, reliable variance that is different from readspeed. If it had dropped, 
variance produced by social written perception tasks would have been due to the speed of 
reading. The original written social perception score correlates with .96 with the score 
controlled for the readspeed variance, thus controlling for readspeed variance does not 
change the quality of the original score. 
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Conclusions With Regard to Psychometrics of the Social Intelligence Tasks 
Taking into account the findings obtained through analysis of psychometrics, the following 
scores and procedures will be applied for further analyses: With regard to scenarios, target 
scoring was chosen as being of prime importance. When useful, consensus scoring will be 
applied in addition. Moreover, I will focus on rating scales without the inclusion of MC items 
and open items, as rating-scaled items have proven to differentiate best across all contents. 
With the use of open answer questions, we encounter economical problems (e.g., effort of 
scoring the answers). The ability that should be assessed may also be intermingled with the 
speed of writing and verbal academic intelligence. Concerning social perception tasks, I will 
focus on reaction time measures, corrected by simple reaction time and readspead. 
Nevertheless, for some analyses the original reliability corrected scores are reported. With 
the exception of the pictorial social understanding score, all SI total test scores were normally 
distributed. A closer examination of this task shows that the deviance from normal 
distribution is minor. Therefore, despite of the violation of normality by one task, I will apply 
Pearson intercorrelations while taking attention in interpreting the results related to that task. 
The same occurs with the application of multivariate statistic procedures. 
 
6.3.2 Internal Structure 
The first hypothesis that has been claimed with respect to the internal structure of social 
intelligence deals with the expectation of a coherent SI structure to be indicated by showing a 
general positive manifold including all operations and contents (H1S, chapter 3.1.3). This 
hypothesis will be examined with correlation analysis. Table 6-15 reports the correlations 
between the SI test scores. With respect to the written and auditory social perception tasks, 
the original as well as the baseline corrected values are reported (abbreviated with “corr”). 
Uncorrected and corrected values are strongly related (written social perception: r=.94; 
auditory social perception: r=.92). The correlations with the remaining SI tasks are 
comparable.  
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Table 6-15: Intercorrelations Between the Social Intelligence Tasks (First Study) 
 SPw 
SPw 
(corr.) SPa 
SPa 
(corr) SPp SPf SMw SMa SMp SMf SUw SUa SUp SUf 
SPw corr .94** 1.00             
SPa .00 .02 1.00            
SPa corr -.02 .04 .92** 1.00           
SPp .19 .18 .06 .05 1.00          
SFp -.03 -.05 .18 .08 .41** 1.00         
SMw -.25* -.17 -.07 .06 .01 -.09 1.00        
SMa -.05 -.05 .04 .14 .05 -.01 .51** 1.00       
SMp -.11 -.11 .10 .11 -.05 .05 .19 .09 1.00      
SMf -.18 -.15 .06 .10 -.25* -.16 .34** .33** .22* 1.00     
SUw -.02 -.06 
.04 
-.01 
-.05 
-.06 
-.01 
.00 
-.14 
-.13 
.02 
-.03 
.28** 
.33** 
.23* 
.26** 
.03 
-.02 
-.08 
-.11 1.00    
SUa -.09 -.16 
-.11 
-.17 
-.02 
-.05 
.01 
-.02 
-.12 
-.09 
.03 
.09 
.17 
.23* 
.16 
.27** 
.17 
.10 
-.04 
-.14 .59** 1.00   
SUp .04 .11 
.01 
.07 
.23* 
.02 
.16 
-.02 
.06 
.09 
.01 
-.04 
.05 
.09 
.41** 
.36** 
.02 
.06 
-.04 
-.08 .25* .18 1.00  
SUf -.07 -.10 
-.03 
-.07 
.13 
.05 
.20* 
.16 
-.09 
-.12 
-.08 
-.10 
.23* 
.27** 
.22* 
.23* 
.06 
.10 
-.07 
.10 .53** .60** .32** 1.00 
SUPk -.11 -.05 
-.09 
-.07 
-.11 
-.07 
-.02 
-.05 
.07 
-.18 
-.12 
-.03 
-.03 
.27** 
-.07 
.27** 
-.07 
.08 
-.27** 
.10 .06 -.02 .00 -.08 
Note. In italics: consensus-scored variables; SPw=Social perception- written; SPw corr=Social perception-written, baseline corrected (readspeed); SPa=Social perception-auditory; 
SPa corr=Social perception-auditory, baseline corrected (simple reaction time); SPp= Social perception-pictorial; SPf=Social perception-video-based; SMw=Social memory–written; 
SMa=Social memory-auditory; SMp=Social memory-pictorial; SMf=Social memory-video-based; SUw=Social understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding-auditory; 
SUp=Social understanding-pictorial; SUf=Social understanding-video-based (videos); SUPk=Social understanding-personality 
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The remaining social perception intercorrelations do not conform to the assumptions since 
they are almost zero. Only the correlation between written social perception and written 
social memory is considerably higher and gets significant (.25) using the uncorrected SPw 
score instead of the baseline controlled score (SPw corr.). Maybe the relationship between 
the uncorrected SPw value and the SMw score is due to the common speed variance (time 
for answering social memory tasks was limited). With regard to social understanding tasks, 
consensus-scored variables are reported in addition to originally scored variables. Probably 
because of the shared variance (social, visual and speed), pictorial social and video-based 
social perception tasks correlate significantly with r= .41 and thus meet the expectations (see 
chapter 3). The social memory intercorrelations correspond to our hypotheses. Aside from 
the relationship of pictorial social memory with the language-based social memory tasks all 
correlations are significant and indicate a common social memory factor. A possible reason 
for the low relationship to the social pictorial memory scale may be the low reliability and low 
item number of the task (Alpha=.48, 16 items, N=125) and its distribution problems (see 
above). For comments about the intercorrelations between the social understanding 
subscales, see above (section 6.3.1). The correlations between the social memory and social 
perception variables are rather low. Besides the already mentioned correlation between the 
uncorrected written perception value and the written memory task, the pictorial perception 
tasks shares some common variance with the video-based memory task, probably due to 
their common figural-visual content. Correlations between social perception and social 
understanding are also low, for both consensus-scored and target-scored SI variables. The 
only significant correlation concerns the auditory social perception task and the social 
understanding tasks applying video-based and pictorial material. On the contrary, social 
memory tasks (social written memory and social auditory memory) correlate consistently with 
the social understanding scales. To sum up, the hypothesis H1S can be confirmed with 
respect to SU and SM that are obviously related and share common variance. It has to be 
rejected with respect to the social perception tasks and their relationships to the remaining SI 
variables. These tasks seem to measure something different. These indications will be 
further examined with factor analysis. 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
EFA was performed including baseline corrected social perception scores, social memory 
variables, and target scores for the social understanding tasks. See chapter 5.4 for the 
technique that was applied. Parallel analysis suggests three factors (see appendix B.2.1), 
which are presented in Table 6-16. 
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Table 6-16: Internal Structure of Social Intelligence (First Study) 
  Factor 
 Variables 1 (social understanding) 2 (social memory) 3 (nonverb. perception) 
SU videos .77 -.20  
SU written .74 -.14  
SU audio .73 -.13  
SU pictures .38 -.21 .20 
SM videos -.12 -.69 -.33 
SM audio .35 -.68 .18 
SM written .30 -.59  
SM pictures  -.26  
SU personality  .19  
SP audio .12 -.18 .12 
SP written  .16 .16 
SP pictures  .12 .83 
SP videos   .41 
Course of 
eigenvalues 2.74 - 1.79 - 1.52 - 1.17 - 1.13 - 1.01 - 0.88 - 0.79 - 0.58 -0.45 -0.37 
Note. SU=Social understanding target scores; SM=Social memory; SP=Baseline corrected social perception 
values. Structure matrix. Factor intercorrelations: r (F1, F2)=-.15; r (F1, F3)=.14; r (F2, F3)=.04 
 
The first factor explains 21.11% of the variance and can be interpreted as social 
understanding without including the personality scale. The second factor explains 13.73% of 
the variance and can be regarded as social memory factor. The third factor explains 11.70% 
of the total 46.54% variance. It can be interpreted as figural-visual perception factor that is 
mainly indicated by the social pictorial and social video-based perception scales. In the 
following, the two (SU and SM) factor structure should be proved applying CFA. Since the 
personality scale is not correlated with the remaining SU variables it will be excluded from 
CFA. Nor a third nonverbal perception component will be included, since we have only one 
indicator of each nonverbal perception domain, pictorial and video-based perception. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
CFA (see Figure 6-1) confirmed the the two factor structure and reveals a social memory and 
a social understanding factor that are moderately correlated. Loadings are satisfactory, 
except for the pictorial scales (SMP: .26 and SUP .33) and the video-based social memory 
scale (.45). The model fits the data well, also when applying different scoring methods for 
social understanding variables (see target scored SU: model Siint1 & consensus scored SU: 
model Siint2). The model using consensus scoring fits the data even better than the model 
using target scores as SU variables. Further details about the model fit are shown in Table 
6-17. The social perception factor could not be confirmed as already indicated by correlation 
matrices and EFA. 
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Figure 6-1: Internal Social Intelligence Structure (First Study) 
Note. Normal letters: Target-scored SU variables; Model Siint1; in parentheses: analysis with consensus scored 
social understanding variables (Model Siint2)SM=Social memory; SU=Social understanding; SMw=Social 
memory-written; SMa=Social memory-auditory; SMp=Social memory-pictorial; SMf=Social memory-video-based; 
SUw=Social understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding-auditory; SUp= Social understanding-pictorial; 
SUf= Social understanding video-based 
 
Table 6-17: Model Fit for the Internal Social Intelligence Structure (First Study) 
Model Chi² (df) Prob. CFI RMSEA (CI 90%) SRMR 
Siint1 39.045  (19) .004 .902 .037  (.050, .134) .076 
Siint2 27.518  (19) .093 .952 .061 (.000, .107) .073 
Note. Siint1= model applying target scored SU variables; Siint2= model applying consensus scored SU variables; 
S1: Study 1; Prob.: Probability value; CFI=Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA=Root Mean Square Error of Approxi-
mation; CI= Confidence Interval; SRMR=Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
 
To sum up, concerning the internal factor structure of social intelligence the following 
hypotheses were examined: (1) “H2S: The dimensions social perception, social memory, and 
social understanding are moderately correlated (.20 - .40).” This hypothesis was confirmed 
with respect to social memory and social understanding, but has to be rejected with regard to 
social perception. (2) Since the complete SI structure could not be proved, the hypothesis 
“H3S: Social perception and social understanding demonstrate the lowest correlation, 
whereas social memory shows higher correlations with both perception and understanding.” 
can only be answered in parts. The factor intercorrelation between SP and SU (r=.14) is 
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higher than between SP and SM (r=.04) according to the result of EFA. Thus, hypothesis 
H3S has to be rejected for this study. 
 
It was not possible, to examine the content domains of SI (see H4S–H6S, chapter 3.1.3) with 
CFA as the content structure did not emerge. Since we do not have enough variables, 
parceling technique cannot be applied in order to uncover the maybe hidden content factors 
(correspondent to Jäger, 1982, 1984). With respect to hypothesis “H4S: SI language 
domains (written and spoken) are lower correlated than the nonverbal content domains 
(video-based and pictorial material).”, we can only refer to the intercorrelation matrix which 
indicates that the nonverbal social perception tasks are stronger related (r=.41) than the 
auditory and the written tasks (r=.04; see Table 6-15). The contrary is true for SM (nonverbal: 
r=.22; language-based: r=.51) and SU (nonverbal: r=.32; language-based: r=.59) variables. 
The result for “H5S: Auditory abilities (spoken language) are expected to correlate higher 
with video-based material than with pictorial material.” is true for SM and SU. There is also a 
nominal higher value for SP. “H6S: Verbal material should correlate higher with auditory 
material than with pictorial and videobased material.” is true for SM and SU, but not for SP. 
 
In summary, there are identification problems with the SP factor. The hypotheses that could 
not be confirmed in this study should again be investigated in the second study, after 
improving the SP tasks. In a next step, the two-factor SI model will be related to AcI, 
represented by the BIS model (Jäger, 1982, 1984, see chapter 2.1.5). 
 
6.3.3 Social Intelligence Related to Academic Intelligence 
The aim of this section is to test, whether social and academic intelligence are different, 
though related, constructs. I start analysis by providing the correlations between AcI and SI 
scales in Table 6-18. AcI is represented by the BIS cells (combinations between the cognitive 
operations reasoning, memory, and speed with the contents, namely figural-spatial, 
numerical, and verbal). The correlations between the SI tasks and the BIS cells partly explain 
the missing correlations that were expected between social perception with social memory 
and social understanding. Social perception measured with written material (SPw) correlates 
significantly with verbal and numerical speed of the BIS (please note that the correlations 
have to be negative because the longer reaction time, the worse the score). The variance 
written social perception tasks explain seems to be due to AcI speed. In addition, verbal 
memory and figural reasoning seem to explain parts of the written social perception variance. 
The correlation of SPw with verbal memory may also be due to the common verbal variance. 
This points to the assumption that the written social perception task, is too complex or 
difficult so that higher-order processes such as memory and reasoning partly determine the 
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performance in the task. That has important implications for task modification: This task has 
to be simplified, trying to make the specific social part more obvious. 
 
Similar to written social perception, the perception of videos and pictures correlates with 
figural and verbal speed of the BIS. It is striking that the memory tasks correlate moderately 
with verbal speed indicating that the time limits for answering the questions have been too 
short so that the tasks measure speed beyond memory. With the exception of the SI video-
based memory tasks all SI memory tasks correlate significantly with AcI verbal memory. 
They share common variance because they require the same cognitive operation (memory). 
Answering the open-ended questions requires participants to write down the facts 
remembered and the open-ended questions favor people who possess higher verbal skills 
and are able to express themselves comparatively better. This results in a higher proportion 
of verbal variance explained by the memory tasks. The SI auditory memory tasks also 
correlated with AcI speed verbal. A possible reason may be that the BIS does not involve 
indicators of an auditory performance domain; consequently, the auditory tasks find a 
“partner” in verbal tasks. Surprisingly, the core facet of SI, social understanding, does not 
seem to have anything in common with AcI (BIS cells). Alternatively, we can expect that the 
SI contents are balanced through the scenario approach as former information about the 
target person presented either through pictures, videos, conversations or emails influences 
later judgment of the scenes. In the following the confirmed SI factors, social understanding 
and social memory are contrasted with the BIS factors in EFA and CFA.  
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Table 6-18: Correlations Between the Social Intelligence Variables and the BIS Cells (First Study) 
 
  B_Sf B_Sv B_Sn B_Mf B_Mv B_Mn B_Rf B_Rv B_Rn 
SP written .03 -.35** -.20* -.06 -.30** -.07 -.22* -.19 -.08 
SP audio -.13 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.15 .09 .09 .13 .13 
SP pictures -.14 -.33** -.09 -.04 -.09 .03 .01 -.17 -.03 
SP film -.22* -.11 -.04 -.14 -.04 -.13 -.04 -.17 .03 
SM written -.02 .27** .11 .00 .46** .14 .12 .40** .15 
SM audio -.05 .36** .10 .10 .30** .15 -.05 .31** .08 
SM pictures -.05 .03 .04 .11 .26** .22* -.14 -.03 .08 
SM film .14 .28** -.04 .03 .18 .10 -.08 .12 -.12 
SU written -.04 .13 .00 -.02 .05 -.10 -.05 .18 .02 
SU audio -.14 .10 -.10 .12 .16 -.17 -.10 .02 -.01 
SU pictures -.07 .01 -.06 -.01 .06 .02 -.14 -.05 -.09 
SU film -.07 .07 -.08 .11 .04 .02 .05 .10 .02 
Note. Spearman correlations; ** Correlation is significant at p< 0.01 (2-sided); * Correlation is significant at p< 0.05 (2-sided); listwise deletion; N= 101; SP=Social perception; 
SM=Social memory; SU=Social understanding; B_=Berlin Intelligence Structure Test; Sf=BIS speed-figural; Sv=BIS speed-verbal; Sn=BIS speed-numerical; Mf=BIS memory-
figural; Mv=BIS memory-verbal; Mn=BIS memory-numerical; Rf=BIS reasoning-figural; Rv=BIS reasoning-verbal; Rn=BIS reasoning-numerical 
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Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Parallel analysis suggests four factors for an exploratory factor analysis including SI 
understanding, SI memory, as well as AcI memory, reasoning, and speed (see appendix 
B.2.2). The result of the exploratory factor analysis is presented in Table 6-19. 
 
Table 6-19: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Social Intelligenceand BIS cells (First Study) 
 Factor 
 Variables 1 SI memory 
2 
SI understanding 
3 
AcI reasoning 
4 
AcI memory 
SI-Mw .71 .10 .14  
SI-Ma .69 .14   
SI-Mf .54 -.21 -.19 .16 
B_Rv .54  .50  
B_Sv .54  .21  
SI-Uf  .80   
SI-Ua  .77   
SI-Uw  .72   
SI-Up  .35   
B_Rn   .88  
B_Rf   .70  
B_Sn   .66 .18 
B_Mn    .74 
B_Mf  .11 .22 .52 
B_Mv .28 .10 -.11 .46 
B_Mp .18   .31 
B_Sf    .12 
Explanation of 
variance (%) 22.52 15.29 10.16 8.53 
Course of 
eigenvalues 
3.83 - 2.60 - 1.73 - 1.45 - 1.17 - 1.02 - .84 - .74 - .69 - .59 - .53 - .44 - 
.39 - .28 - .25 - .23 - .20 
Note. N=121, Loadings smaller than .10 are suppressed. Pattern matrix. SI=Social Intelligence; B_=BIS Test 
Cells; Mw=Memory-written; Ma=Memory auditory; Mf=memory figural; Rv=Reasoning verbal; Sv=Speed verbal; 
Up=Understanding pictorial; Ua=Understanding auditory; Uw=Understanding written; Up=Understanding 
film/video; Rn=Reasoning numerical; Rf=Reasoning figural; Sn=Speed numerical; Mn=Memory numerical; 
Mf=Memory figural; Mv= Memory verbal; Mp= Memory pictorial; Sf=Speed figural 
 
The first factor can be interpreted as social memory factor. With the exception of SI pictorial 
memory, all SI memory scales show their highest loading on this factor. The loading of the 
SI-Mp on the AcI memory factor (factor 4) can be explained by either the relatively low 
reliability of memory pictorial or by the relatively low social proportion. Nevertheless, SI-Mp 
shows a subsidary loading on the social memory factor (factor 1). The social understanding 
tasks form the second factor. The third factor describes AcI-reasoning. The AcI-Rv task has 
its second highest loading on that factor which is almost equal to its highest loading on the 
social memory factor. The relationship to the SI-SM factor can be explained through the 
common variance due to verbal comprehension (Rv), which makes up a crucial part of SI-SM 
because of the open-ended questions. Another deviant task loading on the third factor is AcI-
Sn. This loading can be explained by the trend that numerical abilities decreased during the 
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last century (see Schaie, 1994; see Süß, 1999). Possible reasons may be, that because of 
modern technique, students become more used to calculators and have increasing problems 
in mentally solving simple calculation tasks. I already mentioned, that the fourth factor can be 
interpreted as AcI memory. Besides the SI-Mp task, the AcI-Sf has a loading on that factor, 
indicating that it requires partly memory. However, as only the four-factor solution is 
presented, the tasks that were developed to measure the least homogeneous speed factor 
have to be distributed on the remaining factors.  
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis should reveal further information about the relationship between 
SI and AcI. A precondition to attain reliable results is the confirmation of the BIS structure. 
The examination was done using both parcels and scales (see appendix B.3). Parcels were 
obtained (Jäger, 1982, 1984) by means of target-oriented aggregation of operation 
homogeneous and content heterogeneous variables and vice versa. In this way, irrelevant 
variance is suppressed and the relevant variance is maximized. Despite the problems of the 
speed factor revealed by exploratory factor analysis, the postulated BIS structure was proved 
and confirmed. The model fits the data very well (Chi²=42.25, df=32; p=.106; CFI=.971; 
SRMR=.05; RMSEA= .052, CI: .000, .091). You will find the figure in the appendix B.3.1. 
However, a quite high correlation (r=.68) between the reasoning and the speed factor 
confirms the results of the EFA. Compared to the normative sample, in our study, BIS 
standard values are lower in speed tasks concerning words (KW, OE) and numbers (RZ, SI), 
and in reasoning tasks, particularly those applying numerical material (RD, SC, ZN). This 
already anticipates the high correlation between BIS–R and BIS–S. In our study, participants 
performed better in verbal reasoning tasks (SL, SV, TM, WS), figural reasoning tasks (AN, 
AW), and memory tasks (OG). This is particularly evident for the numerical memory (ZP, ZZ) 
and for the speed tasks (BD, TG) (for abbreviations of tasks see chapter 6.2.2). 
 
Proven to be reliable, the BIS model was related to the SIM model. Table 6-20 provides an 
overview of the models. In all analyses, social perception was excluded. In the complete 
model (SI-AcI1), SU (target scores) and SM are contrasted with the BIS factors memory, 
reasoning and speed. Allowing all factor intercorrelations, analysis reveals unnecessary non-
significant correlations between BIS-R and SU (r= -.06) and BIS-M and SU (r=.12). Model SI-
AcI1 allows for intercorrelations between all BIS factors, between the two SI factors as well 
as between SU and BIS-M, SM and BIS-R, BIS-M and BIS-S and reveals zero relationships 
between SU and BIS-R as well as SU and BIS-S. Model SI-AcI2 does without this 
nonsignificant SU BIS-M path. This model is not significantly worse and thus would be 
preferred as it is more parsimonious. The core facet of social intelligence, SU is completely 
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independent from AcI which was already indicated by EFA and correlational analysis. This 
model SI-AcI2 (∆Chi²=1.051, ∆df=1 < Chicrit..95=3.84) is presented in Figure 6-2. 
 
Table 6-20: Models of Social Intelligence and Academic Intelligence (First Study) 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI RMSEA (CI 90%) SRMR
SI-AcI, SU target scores    
SI-AcI1 SM with all BIS 
factors intercorre-
lated, SU corre-
lated with BIS-M 
175.787 (127) .003 .918 .058 
(.035; .077) 
.072 
SI-AcI2  without 
(BIS-M, SU) 
176.838 (128) .003 .918 .057 
(.035, .077) 
.073 
SI-AcI3 without BIS-B; 
includes 
relationships (SU, 
SM); (SU, BIS-M); 
(SU, BIS-R) 
105.097 (85) .069 .955 .045 
(.000; .070) 
.070 
SI-AcI4 see, SI-AcI3; 
excludes (SU, BIS-
M) relationship 
106.373 (86) .067 .955 .045 
(.000; .070) 
.072 
SI-AcI, SU consensus scores      
SI-AcI2C SM related to all 
BIS factors, SU no 
relationship to BIS 
159.361 (128) .031 .95 .046 ( 015, .067) .074 
SI-AcI3C without BIS-B, 
includes all factor 
intercorrelations 
91.559  (84) .268 .982 .027 ( .000; .059) .069 
SI-AcI4C see AcI-AcI3C; 
without (BIS-R, SU) 
correlation 
91.598 (85) .293 .984 .026 (.000; .058) .070 
SI-AcI5C see SI-AcI4C; 
excludes (SU, BIS-
M) relationships 
92.426 (86) .298 .985 .025 (.000; .057) .071 
SI controlled for AcI variance      
SI-AcI8 target scores 43.416 (19) .001 .850 .103 (.063; .144) 092 
SI-AcI9 consensus scores 31.356 (19) .037 .910 .074 (.018; .118) .087 
Note. SI=Social Intelligence; AcI=Academic Intelligence; SM=Social memory; SU=Social understanding; BIS=Ber-
lin Intelligence Structure; M=Memory; R=Reasoning; S=Speed; Prob.=Probability value; CFI=Comparative Fit In-
dex; RMSEA=Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CI=Confidence Interval; SRMR=Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual 
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Figure 6-2: Relationship Between Social and Academic Intelligence (First Study) 
Note. Normal letters: target-based scoring, Model SI-AcI2; In italics consensus based-scoring, Model SI-AcI2C; 
SI=Social Intelligence; AcI=Academic Intelligence; SM=Social memory; SU=Social understanding; BIS=Berlin 
Intelligence Structure; M=Memory; R=Reasoning; S=Speed; SM=Social memory; SU=Social understanding; 
SMw=Social memory-written; SMa=Social memory-auditory; SMp=Social memory-pictorial; SMf=Social memory-
video-based; SUw=Social understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding auditory; SUp=Social understanding 
pictorial; SUf=Social understanding video-based 
 
Intramodel correlations remain stable for both the AcI and the SI model. The SI memory 
factor correlates with .40 with the AcI memory factor, with .43 with the AcI reasoning factor, 
and with .38 with the AcI speed factor. Although the model with a separate social memory 
factor can be confirmed we have to query whether social memory is a specific social ability 
rather than being a compound trait made up by various parts of AcI. This hypothesis seems 
worthwhile to investigate since the SI factors, social memory and social understanding, 
correlate lower than the SI memory factor correlates with the mentioned AcI factors (which 
contradicts H8SAo). Therefore, a regression model was computed with SI-M being the 
dependent variable that is predicted by BIS-S, BIS-M and BIS-R. The model is presented in 
Figure 6-3. 
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Figure 6-3: Regression Model, Predicting Social Memory with the BIS Operations 
Note. Variances of the factors are indicated in bold numbers. BIS=Berlin Intelligence Structure; R=Reasoning; 
M=Memory; S=Speed; SI-M=Social intelligence memory; SMw=Social memory written; SMa=Social memory-
auditory; SMp=Social memory-pictorial; SMf=Social memory-video-based 
 
Obviously, only parts of the social memory factor are explained by the BIS operation factors. 
The largest proportion remains unexplained. Thus, there is still room for specific social 
memory variance. The correlation between SI understanding with AcI memory is lower than 
the correlation with SI memory. These results confirm the homogeneous factor that was built 
by SI-SU scales in exploratory factor analysis. 
 
Excluding the BIS-B factor completely and involving only the purportedly related memory and 
understanding/reasoning factors improves the model fit (see models SI-AcI3 and SI-AcI4). 
Again, doing without the SU-BIS-M relationship does not make the fit worse (∆Chi²=1.274, 
∆df=1 < Chicrit..95=3.84) and would be preferred for reasons of parsimony. The model SI-
AcI2C corresponds to model SI-AcI2 but uses consensus scores. The model SI-AcI2C based 
on SU consensus scores fits the data even better than the target-scored model. Similar 
results were obtained for the models applying consensus scores and exclude BIS-B (see 
model SI-AcI3C to SI-AcI5C). Excluding paths between SU and the BIS factors BIS-R (SI-
AcI3C) and BIS-M (see model SI-AcI5C) does not lead to a worse fit but increases 
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parsimony. The model using consensus scores provides confirming evidence that SU is 
independent from the BIS-factors. 
 
In the models SI-AcI8 and SI-AcI9 the confirmed SI factors SU and SM are related controlling 
for the AcI variance (BIS variance) that was partialed out completely by means of regression 
analysis applying factor scores for both AcI operations and contents. The SI structure 
remained stable when BIS variance is controlled. The fit is only slightly worse compared to 
the model without partialing out the BIS variance. Model SI-AcI9 applied consensus scores 
for SI-SU. Again the consensus-scored model had a better fit compared to the model that 
uses target scores for the SI-SU scales. Both models controlled for the BIS variance (SI-AcI8 
and SI-AcI9), are contrasted with the original SI model (without controlling for BIS variance) 
in Figure 6-1. Numbers for the original model (see model Siint1; see Figure 6-1 and Table 
6-17) are presented in parentheses. Numbers of the consensus-scored model are shown in 
italics (SI-AcI9) and in bold letters (target-scored model SI-AcI8). Particularly the social 
understanding part of the model remains stable. All three models reveal the problems 
concerning the pictorial scales. 
 
 
Figure 6-4: Social Intelligence Model With and Without Controlling for Academic Intelligence 
Note. Normal letters: model without controlling for AcI; bold: target scores; italics: consensus scores; SM=Social 
memory; SU=Social understanding; SMW=Social memory-written; SMA=Social memory-auditory; SMP=Social 
memory-pictorial; SMF=Social memory-video-based; SUW=Social understanding-written; SUA=Social 
understanding-auditory; SUP=Social understanding-pictorial; SUF=Social understanding-video-based 
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To sum up, there is some confirmation for the hypothesis that measures of SI and AcI are 
correlated low to moderately (H7Sao, chapter 3). Social understanding does not show any 
relationship to AcI at all whereas social memory is moderately correlated with BIS-M and 
BIS-R. However, SM has some unique variance, too (see Figure 6-3). With respect to social 
perception we can only refer to the intercorrelation matrix (see Table 6-18) to derive 
indications for or against the confirmation of our hypotheses. As already mentioned, SPw is 
related to both BIS numerical and verbal speed (rSPw-BIS-Sn=.20 and rSPw-BIS-Sv=.35 respectively) 
as well as to verbal memory (rSPw-BIS-Mv=.30) and figural reasoning (rSPw-BIS-Rf=.22). SPp shows 
correlations with BIS-speed verbal (rSPp-BIS-Sv=.33) whereas SPf correlates with speed figural 
of the BIS scores (rSPf-BIS-Sf=.22). Interestingly, there is no correlation between auditory speed 
and AcI speed. Auditory variance is not covered through the BIS tests. Parts of the social 
perception variance thus seem to be due to AcI speed. Hypothesis H8Sao (SI factors are 
intercorrelated more highly than with the corresponding AcI factors) is only true for the SU 
factor which has its strongest relationship with SM. SM on the contrary has more in common 
with AcI than with SU. This confirms H9SAo, according to which “social understanding shows 
the lowest correlations with AcI (particularly reasoning) compared to SI perception and SI 
memory.” H10SAo (“SI perception is expected to be correlated most highly with AcI speed.”) 
cannot be investigated in this study since we did not find a common SP factor. The pattern of 
intercorrelations (see Table 6-18) indicates some higher correlations between social memory 
written (rSMw-BISSv=.27), auditory (rSMa-BISSv.36) and video-based (rSMf-BISSv.28) with AcI verbal 
speed. These correlations are comparable to those found between AcI-speed and SI-
perception (.20 - .40). Hypothesis H11SAo (“SI memory is expected to be correlated most 
highly with AcI memory.”) has to be rejected for this study since the correlation between SM 
and BIS-R (.43) is slightly but not significantly (z=.035 <zcrit=1.96; Olkin & Siotani, 1964, cited 
in Bortz, 1999) higher compared to the relationship with BIS-M (.40, see Figure 6-2). 
 
6.3.4 Language-based Social Abilities vs. Nonverbal Social Abilities 
According to my hypotheses (see chapter 3.1.3), nonverbal abilities (pictorial and video-
based), written, and auditory abilities should form separate factors. Whereas videobased and 
pictorial abilities are expected to mingle, auditory and written abilities are assumed to form 
correlated factors that exist separately from each other. Structure analysis using the tasks of 
one method across different cognitive operations (SP, SM, and SU) does not yield a clear 
and trustworthy structure. Neither two-factor models (nonverbal factor including pictorial and 
video-based material) nor models including three factors (auditory, nonverbal, written) nor 
models containing all four method factors show a sufficient fit to the data. One problem 
seems to be with the social understanding tasks since their contents cannot be completely 
distinguished. This is due to the scenario type of task as even though materials are 
separated, the answers to content specific questions influence each other. With regard to the 
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memory and the perception tasks, content variance may be suppressed by operation 
variance similar to the problem Jäger (1982, 1984) encountered developing the BIS. Whether 
the content structure of the SIM is covered by its operations, could be examined with 
hypotheses-guided aggregation of variables belonging to one method but containing 
heterogeneous operations. For the application of parceling technique at least six variables of 
each method are needed (to form at least three parcels with at least two variables). At this 
point of test development, we have only two variables for the measurement of each content 
factor when doing without the SU variables. I do not take task splitting into account because 
technical dependence on halving the tasks would distort the results. The common task 
specific variance would have an influence on the factor structure. When only including the 
memory and the perception tasks in a CFA, the content model does not fit the data. Using 
modification indexes, a one-factor model is suggested that contains the memory variables 
only. Therefore, here and now, we cannot make clear statements about the relationship 
between nonverbal, auditory, and written social abilities. We either cannot confirm the 
supposed within structure of language based abilities. The hypotheses H12SAc-H14SAc 
(see chapter 3.1.3) can only be approached using intercorrelations between variables: I 
expected all SIM content scales to be weakly intercorrelated with BIS-verbal (H12SAc). 
Regression analysis was used to build factor scores of both the BIS content scales and the 
SI content scales. All SIM content scales correlated significantly with the BIS content scale 
“verbal” (N=101). Correlations between SI-written and AcI-verbal was most highly (rSIw-
BISv=.62, p<.001), followed by SI-auditory (rSIa-BISv= .50, p>.001), SI-pictorial and SI-video-
based (both rSIw-BISp/f=.31, p=.002). Thus, hypothesis H13SAc (“The highest correlations are 
expected between social written abilities and verbal AcI“) is confirmed. With regard to 
hypothesis H12Sac, the correlations were higher than expected. The SI-written scale was 
significantly (rSIw-BISn =.27, p=.006) related to BIS-numerical. This indicates the correctness of 
H14SAc (“Social written abilities are assumed to be weakly correlated with academic 
numerical and academic figural-spatial ability.”) with respect to the numerical domain. All 
other correlations were minor and non-significant (.04 - .14). 
 
6.3.5 Summary of Findings 
In summary, the social intelligence tests worked out well. However, some of the scales have 
to be improved. With regard to the social understanding tasks, rating scales proved to be the 
most successful. Although open-ended questions were useful, too, they imply problems 
reaching beyond economics: Open-ended questions favor people who are fast in writing, 
good at verbal comprehension, and verbal fluency. The same is true for social memory tasks. 
Therefore, open-ended questions should be transformed into a different format. The 
correlation of SM tasks with AcI speed can be reduced allowing more time for answering the 
questions. Social perception tasks seem to measure rather AcI speed than social perception. 
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Additional socially complex items could help to reveal the specifically social part of the 
perception ability. On the contrary, the complexity of written social perception tasks needs to 
be reduced. Working on the social perception tasks seems to be worthwhile in the context of 
structure analytic results, too. Maybe, some task changes allow to answer the question of 
whether a social perception ability does exist more reliably. The first study confirmed the two 
factors, social memory and social understanding, of the multidimensional SI construct. 
Despite its relationship to AcI operations, analyses controlling for AcI variance and a 
regression analysis predicting SI-SM with the BIS operations indicate that SM has specific 
reliable variance that is unexplained by AcI. I now turn to the findings obtained with the 
auditory intelligence tasks. 
 
 
6.4 Results - Auditory Intelligence  
6.4.1 Psychometric Properties 
Table 6-21 summarizes results concerning tasks that were applied in order to measure 
auditory intelligence (AuI). The first column shows the number of items that is included in 
each task. In parentheses, the reduced amount of items after item selection is presented. 
The steps of item selection are described in chapter 5.2). The next two columns deal with 
test duration with and without item selection (selected values are presented in parentheses). 
An “economy quotient” is computed to relate the item number to the item duration. The 
higher the coefficient, the longer the time it takes to complete an item. The next two columns 
show the number of alternatives  subjects have to choose between (scale points) and the 
distribution of the scale. According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnnov test, five of the tasks are not 
normally distributed. Therefore, the following correlation analysis apply Spearman rank 
correlations. The next columns address the mean difficulty, the standard deviation, and the 
range. Consider that some of the tasks are expected to be easy (e.g. familiar environmental 
sounds) in order to be above chance level (items that do not reach .50 were excluded). The 
last columns present some information about the internal consistency. As the tasks differ in 
length and amount of items, I used Spearman-Brown formula to compare their reliability. 
Since for a more elaborated version of the auditory intelligence test, tasks should not contain 
more than 20 items, I chose a 15 and a 20 item version for Spearman-Brown application.  
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Table 6-21: Psychometrics of the Auditory Intelligence Tasks (First Study) 
Task 
Number 
of items
1) 
Duration
(min.) 
2) 
Time 
quotient
4) 
Scale 
/points
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 5) 
Mean 
difficulty 
(SD) 
Difficulty  
range 
Item-total-
corr. 
range 
Cronb. 
Alpha 3) 
Spearman-
Brown scale 
lengthening3) 
Detection of repeated 
tones (MA1), N=125 17 (15) 12 (11) 1.42 8 .10/-.62  .47 (.22) .16 - .75 .24 - .46 .73 (.74) .74 (.79) 
Pitch discrimination 
(AIT-P) N=126 120 (80) 22 (15) 
0.5 
(5.45) 2 .57/-.62  .64 (.16) .56 - .71 .47 - .77 .84 (.88) 
lengthening 
not intended 
Tonal figures (MA3), 
N=126 17 (11) 17 (11) 1 4 .03/-.66  .52 (.23) .33 - .66 .20 - .41 .63 (.66) .73 (.78) 
Rhythm reproduction 
N=126 20 (19) 10 (10) 2 
repro-
duction .35 (.21)/-.29 .41 (.19) .02 - .84 .22 - .62 .82 (.82) .77 (.82) 
Recognition of familiar 
environmental sounds 
N=126 
55 (36) 17 (11) (3.23) 2 -.80 (.21)/.15  .83 (.11) .65 - .98 .10  - .40 .63 (.70) expectation not possible 
Tonal analogies (MA2), 
N=126 17 (7) 12 (5) 1.42 4 .25/-.27  .43 (.23) .28 - .58 .12  - .26 .19 (.43) .62 (.68) 
Tonal series (MA4), N=126 21 (13) 15 (9) 1.4 4 -.31/-.83  .63 (.21) .33 - .84 .15  - .45 .65 (.69) .72 (.77) 
Chord decomposition 
(MA5), N=125 15 (11) 14 (10) 1.07 4 .84/.84  .39 (.20) .25 - .47 .14 - .34 .51 (.54) .62 (.68) 
Masked words N=57 35 (24) 14 (10) 2.5 open .03 (.32)/ .47 (.62) .44 (.16) .07 - .98 .20 - .49 .75 (.79) .70 (.76) 
Detection of repeated 
voices N=126 25 (11) 10 (4) 2.5 8 .29/.07  .44 (.17) .17 - .90 .14 - .30 .36 (.48) .55 (.63) 
Audiobook N=125 14 (11) 12 (12*) 1.17 open -.71/.39  .70 (.15) .30 - .98 .21 - .42 .60 (.60) .67 (.73) 
Disarranged sentences, 
N=124 19 (16) 17 (14) 1.12 open -.65/1.40  .61 (.14) .12 - .95 .18 - .40 .66 (.67) .66 (.72) 
Note: S1= first study; 1) in parentheses: after item selection; 2) in parentheses: after correction; 3) scale was extended to k=15 and k=20 (in parentheses), respectively; 4) the time 
quotient relates the item number to the task duration; 5) Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis, SE (Skewness): .22 if diferent, it is reported in 
parentheses; SE (Curtosis): .43; the tasks pitch discrimination, rhythm reproduction, recognition of familiar environmental sounds, chord decomposition, and detection of repeated 
voices are not normally distributed.  
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Interestingly, internal consistency is rather low. Three of the tasks have severe reliability 
problems (tonal analogies, chord decomposition, recognition of repeated voices). The 
remaining auditory tasks showed reliabilities (Cronbachs Alpha) between .60 (audiobook) 
and .88 (AIT), and are similar to the split-half reliabilities reported in Stankov and Horn 
(1980). It is still unclear why it appears to be more difficult, to obtain high reliability 
coefficients with auditory ability tasks. For further analysis I will use the corrected scores of 
the tasks. In the application of multivariate analyses, the tasks with severe reliability and 
distribution problems were excluded. Reliability and distribution problems have to be taken 
into account when the corresponding tasks are included. Table 6-22 displays the 
intercorrelations between the auditory intelligence tasks. Using listwise deletion, 121 cases 
remain. The task masked words was excluded in the main correlation table because 
technical problems allowed us to analyze only the data of 57 subjects.  
 
The correlations between the auditory intelligence tasks indicate that a general auditory 
intelligence factor exists. However, the operational domains that have been expected do not 
appear. Concerning the nonverbal discrimination tasks (detection of repeated tones and pitch 
discrimination) they show high correlations but correlate highly with tasks of other operational 
domains as well (e.g. with the reasoning tasks tonal series and chord decomposition). In 
addition, there is an unexpected zero correlation with the verbal discrimination task 
“detection of repeated voices”. The three tasks tonal figures, rhythm reproduction and 
recognition of familiar environmental sounds, classified in the nonverbal memory domain, 
correlate moderately. The memory tasks correlate comparably or even more highly with the 
discrimination and reasoning tasks (including the verbal reasoning task) than among each 
other. Similarly, for the nonverbal reasoning tasks, correlations are moderate in strength but 
even stronger with the other operational domains. This is particularly true for the task “chord 
decomposition” which seems to belong to another operational domain. With regard to the 
auditory speech tasks, audiobook and disarranged sentences show correlations in the 
expected direction and strength, revealing their verbal variance (audiobook correlated 
significantly with disarranged sentences only). Detection of repeated voices correlates 
significantly only with tonal figures. It is also noticable, that the task tonal series correlates 
with every task except for audiobook and detection of repeated voices. In summary, these 
results indicate that we did not succeed in developing tasks representing the three 
operational domains reasoning, memory and discrimination or that such operation factors 
simply do not exist. More likely, we can expect a general auditory factor. However, the 
correlation pattern should not be overinterpreted since some relationships may be due to 
distribution and reliability problems. 
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Table 6-22: Intercorrelations Between the Auditory Intelligence Tasks (First Study) 
 
  MA1 AIT-P MA3 RH FES MA2 MA4 MA5 RV AU 
Detection of 
repeated tones 
(MA1) 
1          
Pitch discrimination  
(AIT-P) .51** 1         
Tonal figures 
(MA3) .51** .37** 1        
Rhythm 
reproduction (RH) .36** .39** .34** 1       
Familiar 
environmental 
sounds (FES) 
.15 .22* .17 .20* 1      
Tonal analogies 
(MA2) .18* .07 .19* .14 -.01 1     
Tonal series (MA4) .64** .54** .53** .33** .25** .26** 1    
Chord 
decomposition 
(MA5) 
.44** .28** .36** .33** .03 .07 .38** 1   
Detection of 
repeated voices 
(RV) 
.00 .02 .19* .12 .03 -.11 -.03 .04 1  
Audiobook (AU) .06 .12 .09 .08 .15 .06 .17 .08 .01 1 
Disarranged 
sentences (DS) .20* .22* .28** .29** .08 .10 .30** .16 .08 .23** 
Note. Spearman correlations, listwise deletion, N=121; **Correlation is significant at p< 0.01 (2-sided); *Correlation is significant at p< 0.05 (2-sided) 
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With a selected sample of those persons for whom data was available for the task “masked 
words”, correlations with the remaining auditory tasks were computed. The masked words 
task correlates only with audiobook (.30*) and recognition of familiar environmental sounds 
(.36**). The relationship to audiobook may be explained by the common verbal variance 
corresponding to the expectations. Like the tasks audiobook and detection of repeated 
voices it does not show a significant correlation with tonal series (the purportedly marker task 
of AuI, see also 7.5). Meeting my expectations, tasks including speech seem to be measure 
different abilities compared to tonal tasks and further auditory tasks dealing with non-speech 
material (e.g. rhythm).  
 
6.4.2 Internal Structure 
Such as with social intelligence, in auditory intelligence the internal structure was examined 
applying EFA and CFA. Since the reliability of the tasks detection of repeated voices, tonal 
analogies, and chord decomposition is by far too low, these tasks are excluded from further 
analysis. The three remaining tasks that suffer from distribution problems are included in the 
analysis because they deviate only slightly from normal distribution. Because of its limited 
number of cases, analysis will be run without the task masked words. Dependent on the 
extraction criterion used we find either a one-factor solution (parallel analysis, see appendix 
0) or a two-factor solution (Kaiser-Guttman rule). As parallel analysis is conservative when 
only few variables are included, both one-factor and two-factor solutions will be presented. 
 
Table 6-23: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Auditory Intelligence Tasks (First Study) 
Structure matrix Pattern matrix 
Task 
One-factor 
solution Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Detection of repeated tones .76 .79 .12 .86 -.19 
Tonal series .78 .76 .37 .72 .11 
Pitch discrimination .70 .71 .20 .73  
Tonal figures .63 .63 .21 .63  
Rhythm reproduction .54 .52 .26 .49  
Familiar environmental sounds .36 .32 .24 .27 .15 
Audiobook .20 .17 .64  .66 
Disarranged sentences .42 .37 .45 .24 .36 
Course of eigenvalues 3.19 – 1.15 – .90 – .78 – .66 – .56 – .42  – .34 
Note. Loadings less then .10 are suppressed. N=122 
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Regarding the two-factor solution, there is an obvious difference between speech tasks and 
nonverbal (=tonal and rhythm) tasks. With the two-factor solution, 54.17% of variance can be 
explained. The first factor has an eigenvalue of 3.19 and explains 39.84% of the variance. 
The second factor with an eigenvalue of 1.15 explains 14.33% of the variance. Again, the 
task familiar environmental sounds cannot be classified in either the speech or the nonverbal 
factor. This corresponds to the task classification described in chapter 2.5.6 see Figure 
2-10). The low number of AuI tasks that could be included in the analysis makes it 
particularly difficult to examine whether there are indeed two factors. Maybe even a third 
factor would emerge when including more tasks dealing with environmental sounds.  
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Further examination of the AuI structure was done with CFA. The complete structure (3 
operations x 2 contents) could not be tested because after the exclusion of tasks for reasons 
of reliability, distribution, and technical problems the remaining number of tasks was not 
sufficient. Therefore, operational and content domains were tested separately. For the same 
reasons, some of the postulated factors are only indicated by two predictors. Although for a 
reliable finding we need three or more predictors, I decided to present these analyses since 
they are preliminary and should be used to improve the tasks and select appropriate 
subtests. 
 
Although the expected model (model AuInt1) with three operation domains, discrimination 
(indicated by the tasks detection of repeated tones and AIT-P), memory (indicated by the 
tasks recognition of familiar environmental sounds, rhythm reproduction, tonal figures, and 
audiobook) and reasoning (indicated by the tasks tonal series and disarranged sentences) 
shows a good fit to the data (see Table 6-24), the three operation factors correlated with .93 
and .94. Thus, three separable domains cannot be justified. Conclusively, there seems to be 
only one general auditory intelligence factor. The corresponding model (AuInt2) showed an 
even better fit to the data with the SRMS still slightly exceeding the recommended value of 
.05 (see Table 6-24). Thus, hypothesis H15Au “Three at least moderately correlated auditory 
operation factors emerge: auditory reasoning, memory, and discrimination.” has to be 
rejected. 
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Table 6-24: Models for the Internal Structure of Auditory Intelligence (First Study) 
Model Chi² (df) Prob. CFI RMSEA (CI 90%) SRMR 
AuInt1 24.27 (17) .112 .97 .059  (.000, .109) .054 
AuInt2 25.38 (20) .199 .98 .046  (.000, .095) .054 
AuInt3 19.64 (19) .417 1.00 .017   (.000, .082) .045 
Note: CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA= Root mean square error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; 
SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual 
 
The task audiobook has a very low loading on the auditory factor (.18) indicating that its 
variance is not explained sufficiently by the auditory intelligence factor. Although its rather 
low reliability (.60) has to be taken into account, we expect that its variance can be explained 
through a latent variable different from the auditory intelligence factor. Support for this 
hypothesis is provided regarding the other rather low loadings: The task familiar 
environmental sounds (.35) and the task disarranged sentences (.40) are, such as the task 
audiobook, no tonal tasks. The general auditory intelligence model is presented in Figure 
6-5. 
Figure 6-5: Model of Operations of Auditory Intelligence (First Study) 
Note. S1=first study; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3=Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm 
reproduction; AIT-P=Pitch discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged 
sentences 
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With regard to the content domains, we expected two factors (see EFA), one speech-related 
factor and one nonverbal factor. The corresponding CFA model (model AuInt3) fitted the data 
in an excellent manner (see Table 6-24). However, such as in the operational model one has 
to take into account that the model does not fulfil the criterion of the required three indicators 
that are needed for a reliable measurement (e.g. Bühner, 2006; Kenny, 1979; Urban & 
Mayerl, 2003). The content model AuInt3 is presented in Figure 6-6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Model of Content Domains of Auditory Intelligence (First Study) 
Note. MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3=Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction; AIT-
P=Pitch discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences 
 
The speech and verbal tasks audiobook and disarranged sentences are better described by 
the two-factor model (AuInt3) than by the one-factor model (AuInt2). The two factors are 
moderately correlated, pointing towards two separable domains that can be subsumed under 
a general auditory ability factor. However, some of the correlations between auditory verbal 
tasks and auditory nonverbal tasks are higher than the correlations between the tasks 
belonging to the same factor. For example the correlation between detection of repeated 
tones and disarranged sentences shows a value of .31 (.32 x .79) and exceeds the 
correlation between disarranged sentences and audiobook (.25=.79 x .49 x .79). An 
additional speech task is needed to get further information about the internal structure of 
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auditory intelligence. Masked words seems to be a promising candidate regarding its 
reliability value for a limited sample. Although the content model needs further confirmation, 
the first results confirm the hypothesis H16Au (Two content factors, speech and tonal 
auditory are expected to be moderately correlated.). 
 
6.4.3 Auditory Intelligence Related to Academic Intelligence 
Next, I want to deal with the relationship between AuI and AcI, in particular whether they are 
separable constructs. As mentioned in chapter 6.3.3 the postulated BIS structure, was 
proved and confirmed by means of CFA (see appendix B.3). Since we do not have BIS data 
from three of our test takers and some data is missing with regard to the auditory tasks, 
analysis was performed with 120 cases. Figure 6-7 gives a first impression of the relationship 
between AuI and the BIS dimensions.  
 
 
Figure 6-7. Correlations of Auditory Intelligence with the BIS Scales 
 
It is apparent that correlations with the reasoning dimension are significant in all content 
domains. Therefore, the assumption arises that working memory may be involved in the 
cognitive operations of the auditory tasks. This assumption is in line with findings reported by 
Dun (2000), who applied some of the Stankov and Horn (1980) tasks and found a 
relationship between auditory tasks (particularly tonal tasks) and fluid intelligence (Gf). She 
interpreted this relationship as to be moderated by working memory and concluded that 
particularly tonal series, tonal memory, and detection of repeated tones rely strongly on 
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reasoning abilities. These tasks require maintaining sounds, awareness, and processing of 
information simultaneously which reminds on the simultaneous storage and processing 
dimension of the working memory capacity (WM) model suggested by Oberauer et al. 
(2000). Surprenant and Watson (2001) expect a relationship between auditory discrimination 
and working memory as well. Thus, even detection/discrimination tasks seem to require 
reasoning or capacity processes as specified and reported in advance. In line with findings of 
Dun (2000), Stankov and Horn (1980; see also Horn & Stankov, 1982; Roberts & Stankov, 
1999) assume that auditory abilities are related to fluid intelligence. However, that 
corresponds to results of Kyllonen and Christal (1990; see Süß et al., 2002) according to 
which WM and reasoning are strongly related. In the extended gf-gc theory (see chapter 2.1 
and chapter 2.5) auditory processing is also expected to be closely related to STM (see also 
Danthiir et al., 2001). 
 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence – Intercorrelations 
In order to examine the relationship between AcI and AuI, first, intercorrelations between the 
eight auditory tasks and the BIS cells (to examine the content) are computed (Table 6-25). 
Similar to analyses in the context of SI, the three auditory tasks that differ from normality will 
be included in the following analyses since their deviations from normal distribution are 
minor. I take account of the deviance in the intrpretation of the results.  
 
Table 6-25: Correlations Between the Auditory Intelligence Tasks and the BIS Cells (First 
Study) 
 B_Sf B_Sv B_Sn B_Mf B_Mv B_Mn B_Rf B_Rv B_Rn 
MA1 -.08 .07 .07 .01 -.09 -.19* .17 .19* .09 
AIT-P -.01 -.04 -.02 .10 .02 -.05 .15 .08 .07 
MA3 .04 .11 .18 .11 -.08 -.05 .16 .22* .21* 
MA4 -.12 .06 .22* .16 -.06 .03 .27** .25** .23* 
RH -.12 -.06 .03 .23* -.04 .09 .22* .29** .16 
FES .04 -.01 -.04 .11 .12 -.03 -.02 .09 .04 
AU .10 .32** .32** .33** .37** .27** .23* .33** .25** 
DS .02 .18 .19* .24** .01 .07 .39** .42** .28** 
Note. Spearman correlation; **Correlation is significant at p< 0.01 (2-sided); *Correlation is significant at p< 0.05 
(2-sided); listwise deletion; N= 120; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3=Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; 
RH=Rhythm reproduction; AIT-P=Pitch discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; 
DS=Disarranged sentences; B_=Berlin Intelligence Structure Test, BIS; Sf=Speed figural; Sv=Speed verbal; 
Sn=Speed numerical; Mf=Memory figural; Mn=Memory numerical; Rf=Reasoning figural; Rv=Reasoning verbal; 
Rn=Reasoning numerical; significant correlations are shaded in darker grey, correlations slightly below significant 
level are shaded in light grey. 
 
It is apparent, that most of the stronger relationships (grey shaded cells) between AuI and 
AcI concern the reasoning domain (leading to the hypothesis that working memory is the 
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underlying commonality). The shared variance with reasoning is particularly obvious for the 
auditory tonal marker task tonal series (which corresponds in its structure the number and 
letter series tasks of AcI) for rhythm reproduction and tonal figures. However, the auditory 
speech tasks show the strongest relationships to AcI. Audiobook correlates significantly with 
nearly every BIS cell (highest with memory as expected). Disarranged sentences is related 
strongest to reasoning verbal, also corresponding to the expectations (see test construction 
rationale, Table 4-11 and hypothesis chapter 3.2.3). 
 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence – Exploratory Factor Analysis 
We expect the auditory abilities to form a separate intelligence domain from both BIS 
contents and BIS operations. To test these hypotheses, all eight auditory tasks showing 
sufficient reliability were factor analyzed together with the BIS content parcels (for parceling 
technique see chapter 2.1.5). Parallel analysis suggests two factors (factor 1: 27.84% 
explained variance; factor 2: 16.71%) (see appendix B.2.5). The Kaiser-Guttman rule reveals 
four factors (factor 3: 7.90%; factor 4: 6.36% explained variance). With the two-factor 
solution, 44.54% of the variance are explained, with the four-factor solution we get 58.8% 
explanation of variance. As both factor structures can be justified theoretically, they are 
presented in Table 6-26. Since the BIS was proved in advance and revealed a three-factor 
structure, we can rely on the four-factor structure although parallel analysis suggests only 
two factors.  
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Table 6-26: Exploratory Factor Analysis of BIS Contents and Auditory Intelligence 
Two-factor solution Four-factor solution 
Task 
Factor1
 
AcI 
Factor2 
 
AuI Task 
Factor 1 
 
numeric 
Factor 2 
 
auditory 
Factor 3 
 
verbal 
Factor 4 
 
figural 
P_num2 .74  P_num3 .81  -.34 .32 
P_num1 .71  P_num2 .77  -.47 .45 
P_ver1 .64 .24 P_num1 .71  -.43 .49 
P_num3 .62  MA1  .77   
P_fig1 .58 .15 MA4 .16 .77 -.20 .14 
AU .56 .23 AIT-P  .68  .16 
P_ver2 .56 .19 MA3 .16 .61 -.14  
P_ver3 .51  RH  .53 -.14 .26 
P_fig3 .48 .27 DS .20 .46 -.41 .35 
P_fig2 .47 .13 FES  .38 -.15 .14 
MA1  .77 P_ver2 .29 .17 -.83 .22 
MA4 .24 .76 P_ver1 .44 .22 -.67 .33 
AIT-P  .68 P_ver3 .26  -.62 .31 
MA3 .19 .60 AU .36 .22 -.54 .38 
RH .20 .54 P_fig1 .33 .13 -.40 .82 
DS .42 .47 P_fig3 .41 .28 -.22 .55 
FES .12 .39 P_fig2 .34 .13 -.28 .54 
Explained 
variance (%) 27.84 16.71 
Explained 
variance (%) 27.84 16.71 7.90 6.36 
Course of 
eigenvalues 
4.73  -  2.84  -  1.34  -  1.08  -  .95  - .82  -  .78  -  .73  -  .60  - .56 - .49  - .47  - 
.42  - .38  - .29  - .27  - .24 
Note. N=116; AcI=Academic Intelligence; AuI=Auditory Intelligence; P_num=BIS Parcel numerical; P_ver=BIS 
Parcel verbal; P_fig=BIS Parcel figural; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3=Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; 
RH=Rhythm reproduction; AIT-P=Pitch discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; 
DS=Disarranged sentences; Structure matrix; Intercorrelations within the four-factor solution: F1, F2 (.08); F1, F3 
(-.40); F2, F3 (-.20); F2, F4 (.22); F3, F4 (-.40), F1, F4 (.40). The two factors of the two-factor solution correlate 
with .24. 
 
In both solutions, the auditory tasks clearly form a factor distinct from academic intelligence 
(AcI). In the two-factor structure, only the tasks audiobook and disarranged sentences are 
not clearly part of an auditory factor. Disarranged sentences, representing the auditory 
speech domain, has a high subsidiary loading on the AcI factor in the two-factor solution and 
a high loading on the verbal and figural factor in the four-factor solution.In the four-factor 
structure, the auditory factor is the second strongest. Again, the only task that did not fit in is 
the audiobook. That complements the results obtained against the background of analysis of 
the AuI internal structure and is another hint that the variance of the verbal auditory tasks is 
better covered by traditional AcI. The unique auditory part seems to exist in the tonal 
/nonverbal auditory tasks. We postulated the auditory abilities to be another content facet of 
intelligence. Since we did not succeed in revealing the three auditory operation factors, the 
two-facet structure (content and operation facet) cannot be tested. However, auditory 
intellectual abilities can be related to AcI operations. Auditory intelligence may be different 
not only with regard to the content of the task material but also with the cognitive operation 
that is required. The following EFA relates the auditory tasks to AcI operations. 
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Exploratory Factor Analysis of Auditory Intelligence and BIS Operations 
The Kaiser-Guttman rule indicates a four-factor solution, while parallel analysis again is more 
restrictive and suggests only three factors (see appendix C.2.5). Both the three and the four-
factor analysis are presented in Table 6-27. 
 
Table 6-27: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Auditory Intelligence and BIS Operations 
 Three-factor solution Four-factor solution 
Task 
Factor1 
 
BIS-
R/S 
Factor2 
 
AuI 
Factor3
 
M 
 Task 
Factor 1
 
BIS-R 
 
Factor 2 
 
AuI-
nonverbal
Factor 3 
 
BIS-M 
Factor 4 
 
BIS-S 
P_reas4 .76 .18 .23 P_reas4 .79 .13 .26 .39 
P_reas3 .75 .25 .24 P_reas3 .77 .21 .28 .39 
P_reas2 .64 .31 .21 P_reas2 .69 .27 .24 .29 
P_spee1 .62 -.13 .32 P_reas1 .60 .17 .23 .24 
P_spee3 .62  .36 DS .53 .41 .23 .13 
P_spee2 .60  .28 MA1 .20 .79  -.10 
P_reas1 .56 .21 .20 MA4 .32 .77 .14  
DS .46 .44 .19 AIT-P .17 .68 .12 -.21 
MA1  .77 -.11 MA3 .29 .59   
MA4 .25 .75  RH .33 .52 .21 -.23 
AIT-P  .69  FES  .39 .21  
MA3 .23 .58  P_mem3 .22 .14 .70 .20 
RH .16 .56 .14 P_mem2 .33 -.14 .68 .29 
FES  .39 .19 P_mem1 .22  .65 .11 
P_mem3 .26 .14 .70 AU .40 .19 .51 .36 
P_mem2 .39 -.11 .67 P_spee1 .44  .34 .78 
Parcel 
mem1 .22 .11 .64 P_spee3 .45  .25 .70 
AU .46 .19 .51 P_spee2 .51 -.13 .31 .55 
Expl. 
Var.(%) 27.28 16.39 9.03 
 27.28 16.39 9.03 6.14 
Eigen-
values 
4.91 - 2.95 - 1.63 - 1.11 - .91 - .82 - .77 - .72 - .65 - .60 - .55 - .49 - .42 - .40 - 
.35 - .30 - .23 - .20 
Note. N=116; AuI=Auditory Intelligence; P_reas=BIS Parcel reasoning; P_spee=BIS Parcel speed; P_mem=BIS 
Parcel memory; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3=Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm 
reproduction; AIT-P=Pitch discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged 
sentences; Expl. Var=Explanation of variance; Structure matrix; Intercorrelations for the three factor solution: F1, 
F2 (.18); F1, F3 (.35); F2, F3 (.08); Intercorrelations for the four- factor solution: F1, F2 (.29); F1, F3 (.34); F1, F4 
(.40); F2, F3 (.13); F2, F4 (-.13); F3, F4(.40); Highest loadings are shadowed in grey, subsidiary loadings in light 
grey. 
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It is apparent, that auditory tasks form a separate factor in both the three- and four-factor 
solution. However, correspondent to previous assumptions, the auditory speech tasks 
audiobook and disarranged sentences load higher on the corresponding BIS factors memory 
and reasoning. The variance of the task audiobook seems to be nearly completely explained 
by AcI. The combined factor of reasoning and speed tasks in the three-factor solution is 
probably due to high correlations between speed and reasoning in the BIS structure. In 
summary, general auditory abilities in EFA are clearly separable from AcI content domains 
and from AcI operations. However, the unique variance of general auditory tasks seems to 
be disclosed by tonal/nonverbal tasks. The verbal tasks seem to measure rather AcI, in our 
example verbal memory and verbal reasoning. For further confirmation, CFA will be applied 
in the next section. 
 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence – Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
In our view, auditory ability should be classified in the BIS model besides verbal, figural and 
numerical ability with a double assignment of the verbal auditory tasks on both the auditory 
and the verbal factor (see Figure 6-8). The model AcI-AuI1 (see Figure 6-8 and Table 6-28) 
fits the data in an excellent way. Thus, confirming the findings revealed by EFA: the verbal 
component in the auditory verbal tasks seems to be stronger than their auditory part. 
Introducing some minor changes, the fit of the model improves slightly, except for the SRMR 
(see model AcI-AuI2 and AcI-AuI3, Table 6-28). Model AcI-AuI2 assigns the task audiobook 
only to the verbal component (Table 6-28). Model AcI-AuI3 does without a covariation 
between the auditory and the numerical factor (Table 6-28). The best model fit is achieved, 
when only nonverbal auditory tasks are included in the analysis (see model AcI-AuI4). 
Interestingly, the auditory nonverbal factor does not correlate significantly with any of the BIS 
factors. It correlates highest with the verbal factor: .22. 
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Figure 6-8: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of BIS Contents and Auditory Intelligence Tasks  
Note. Model AcI-AuI1; ML estimation; P_figur=BIS Parcel figural; P_num=BIS Parcel numerical; P_verb=BIS 
Parcel verbal; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3=Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm 
reproduction; AIT-P=Pitch discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged 
sentences 
 
 
CFA is performed relating the auditory tasks to the operation domains of the BIS. Audiobook, 
besides its expected loading on the auditory factor also loads on the memory factor. In the 
same way, disarranged sentences besides its loading on the auditory factor is also assigned 
to the reasoning factor (model AcI-AuI4, see Table 6-28). The fit to the data is satisfactory, 
although worse compared to the classification of the auditory tasks within the BIS content 
dimensions. The auditory-memory and the auditory–speed correlations are zero. That is why 
I did the calculation on a reverse model (model 5, AcI-AuI5, see Table 6-28) including a 
covariation of the auditory factor only with the reasoning factor. The fit improves slightly. 
Once again, it is apparent that the auditory abilities are rather different from AcI. The final 
model AcI-AuI5 is presented in Figure 6-9. 
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Table 6-28: Models of Auditory Intelligence and Academic Intelligence 
Model Chi² (df) Prob. CFI RMSEA (CI 90%) SRMR 
AcI-AuI1 128.112 (111) .127 .970 .037 (.000, .062) .064 
AcI-AuI2 128.946 (112) .131 .971 .036 (.000, .062) .065 
AcI-AuI3 129.363 (113) .139 .972 .035 (.000, .061) .067 
AcI-AuI4 80.649 (71) .203 .981 .034 (.000, .066) .062 
AcI-AuI5 178.407 (127) .002 .921 .059 (.037,.078) .070 
AcI-AuI6 178.488 (129) .003 .924 .058 ( .035,.077) .070 
AcI-AuI7 18.507 (20) .554 1.00 .000 (.000; .072) .043 
AcI-AuI8 17.907 (19) .529 1.00 .000 (.000, .075) .042 
Notes: CFI=comparative fit index; RMSEA=root mean square error of approximation; Prob.=probability value; 
SRMR=standardized root mean square residual; ÁuI=Auditory Intelligence; AcI=Academic Intelligence 
AcI-AuI1: four-factor model (BIS-N, BIS-V, BIS-F, AudI); additional assignment of verbal auditory tasks on BIS-V 
AcI-AuI2: same as model 1 with the exception that the audiobook is only expected to load on the verbal factor 
(verbal instead of auditory task) 
AcI-AuI3: without numerical – auditory correlation 
AcI-AuI4: BIS contents and auditory nonverbal tasks (MA1, MA3, MA4, AIT-P, RH) 
AcI-AuI5: One-factor model of AuI (correspondent to AuInt2; see section 6.4.3), controlled for the BIS variance. 
AcI-AuI6: Two-factor model of AuI with a speech and a nonverbal factor (correspondent to AuInt3; see section 
6.4.3), controlled for the BIS variance. 
 
 
Again, the task audiobook loads higher on the memory factor (.57) than on the auditory factor 
(.21), disarranged sentences shows a higher loading on the reasoning factor (.43) than on 
the auditory factor (.30). The variance of these auditory verbal tasks seems to be explained 
through factors of AcI rather than through a factor of AuI. WM tasks should be included in 
future investigations to make sure that the extra-variance that is explained through the 
auditory tasks is nothing else than pure working memory capacity. A contradiction to this 
assumption seems to be that in empirical investigations, WM correlated much more strongly 
with reasoning (e.g. Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Süß et al., 2002), than the auditory ability 
factor within this investigation does. 
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Figure 6-9: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Auditory Intelligence and BIS Operations 
Note. Model AcI-AuI5; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3=Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm 
reproduction; AIT-P=Pitch discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged 
sentences; P_reas=BIS Parcel reasoning; P_spee=BIS Parcel speed; P_mem=BIS Parcel memory; 
 
 
How does the one-factor auditory intelligence model look like if BIS variance is controlled 
for? Figure 6-10 presents this model wherein all BIS operation and content factors are 
partialed out by means of regression analysis using factor scores. 
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Figure 6-10: One-factor Auditory Intelligence Model With and Without Controlling for 
Academic Intelligence Variance (First Study) 
Note. The loadings of the model without controlling for the BIS variance are presented in parentheses; 
MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3=Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction; AIT-P=Pitch 
discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences 
 
The model controlling for BIS variance fits the data even better (see Table 6-28, model AcI-
AuI6). Figure 6-10 presents model AcI-AuI6 compared to the corresponding model without 
controlling for the BIS variance presented in Figure 6-5 (AuInt2). Its loadings do not change 
much (shown in parentheses in Figure 6-10). The largest differences to the original model 
occur with regard to the speech tasks, because important (mainly verbal) parts of their 
variance are partialed out. However, even in speech tasks unique variance remains. Auditory 
speech tasks share parts with the auditory intelligence factor even if they are considerably 
smaller compared to auditory nonverbal tasks. Partialing out variance of the two factor 
auditory model (including a speech and a tonal factor, see model AuInt3, Figure 6-6) we also 
find an improvement of the model (see Table 6-28, model AcI-AuI7). 
 
With respect to the relationship between AuI and AcI we can conclude the following: The 
three auditory operational domains could not be demonstrated; there are no separate 
discrimination, memory, and reasoning factors. Therefore, H17AuA - H19AuA (see chapter 
3.2.3) cannot be tested. H20AuA (Auditory abilities are clearly separable from the BIS 
contents.) could be confirmed. This is in particular true for the auditory nonverbal tasks since 
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.76
. 34
(.63)
(.71)
(.77)
(.94)
(.98)
(.86)
(.62)
(.92)
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the auditory speech tasks load on verbal AcI, too. Thus, in parts H21AuA is confirmed 
(Speech related auditory ability is expected to show higher correlations with verbal AcI than 
the auditory tonal ability.). Although the full model was not tested (need of an additional 
indicator for auditory speech abilities), the findings clearly indicate that the auditory speech 
tasks have loadings on the AcI domains (verbal content and operations memory and 
reasoning) that are even higher than their loadings on the corresponding auditory factor (see 
Figure 6-8 and Figure 6-9). Beyond the classification as an additional content dimension, the 
auditory tasks form a separate domain when related to the BIS operations. H22AuA claims 
that tonal auditory ability correlates with figural and numerical AcI contents. As mentioned in 
the context of model AcI-AuI4 (see Table 6-28), the correlations of AcI with nonverbal 
auditory ability are all non-significant and highest with the verbal factor. Thus, this hypothesis 
has to be rejected. Interpreting the results of this study, auditory nonverbal ability seems to 
compose a completely new ability. The findings are in line with Lohman (2003) who found in 
analyzing the WJ III test (see chapter 2.5.3) that the auditory tests have exceptional low 
loadings (incomplete words: .30 and sound blending:.42) on the general intelligence factor. 
 
6.4.4 On the Impact of Musical Experience on Auditory Task Performance 
A major objection that could be raised against treating auditory abilities as an intelligence is 
the influence by musical experience. In our study 36.2% (N=46) of our subjects indicated on 
a one-point rating scale to have musical experience. The auditory speech tasks showed zero 
correlations with musical experience (.07 - .08). Likewise did the environmental sounds task 
(-.02). However, the tonal tasks were significantly and moderately related to musical 
experience (.26 - .28.). It seems reasonable that the task chord decomposition is most 
strongly related to a person’s musical experience (r=.44; p<.001). The AIT-P task also has a 
significant relationship to musical experience (.19). The results are in line with Kormann 
(1985), Shuter (1968), and Horn and Stankov (1982). Papenbrock (2005) contrasted musical 
experienced people and laypersons and examined gender differences. She reports that 
musically experienced people are significantly better with regard to tonal/nonverbal tasks (F= 
9.94; df= 96; p=.02) and that there are gender differences in favor of men for general 
auditory abilities (F= 4.20; df=117; p=.04). These results correspond to the findings of Dun 
(2000). She concluded that musical ability is expected to aid performance in some of the 
auditory tasks, particularly chord decomposition and tonal discrimination, but that this 
experience is not necessary for task completion. The level of formal musical education 
showed a correlation of .21 with general auditory ability (Ga, Dun, 2000). According to 
Stankov (1983), experience with music is more strongly related to auditory abilities than 
knowledge about music. In future studies, it should be an objective to find out whether 
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musical experience effects performance on AuI tasks or whether auditorily intelligent people 
are more engaged in gaining musical experience. 
 
6.4.5 Summary of Findings 
The effort we put in the pilot studies paid off. Most of the tasks could be improved 
considerably with respect to their psychometric characteristics. However, there are still some 
modifications that have to be done for at least some of the tasks to enhance their reliability 
but also to save testing time by shortening the scales. The technical problems should be 
controlled for, so that the tasks masked words can complement the scale and serve as third 
indicator of speech related auditory ability. An additional speech task enables us to test the 
two-factor model (including a tonal and a speech auditory component) again with a higher 
reliability. This study revealed one general auditory factor but another study should be 
carried out to confirm this result checking whether there is more than one operational 
domain. The task chord decomposition should be excluded since its relationship with musical 
experience lets assume that this task is rather an indicator of musical ability than of an 
expected basic and underlying auditory intelligence. Besides confirming the results dealing 
with the relationship between AuI and AcI, the correlation between working memory and 
auditory intelligence has to be examined. The question of whether AuI exists even after 
controlling for both AcI and WM, should be subject of further investigation. In the next 
section, I turn to the relationship between auditory social abilities and general auditory 
abilities. 
 
 
6.5 Results - Social and General Auditory Intellectual Abilities 
In order to answer the question of whether social auditory abilities can be differentiated from 
general auditory abilities, intercorrelations between the two ability domains were computed. I 
expected low to moderate correlations as both abilities share the auditory content. 
Nevertheless, they should be distinguishable because they are expected to be parts of 
different intelligence constructs. Auditory speech tasks should show closer relationships to 
social auditory tasks since they are both based on communication with spoken language. 
Table 6-29 presents the result of the correlation analysis. 
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Table 6-29: Correlations Between General and Social Auditory Tasks (First Study) 
 SPa SMa SUa MA1 AIT-P MA3 RH MA4 FES AU 
SPa 1.00          
SMa .09 1.00         
SUa .01 .18* 1.00        
MA1 -.09 -.01 -.14 1.00       
AIT-P -.16 .00 -.08 .51** 1.00      
MA3 -.15 .13 -.13 .51** .38** 1.00     
RH .00 .08 -.06 .37** .38** .34** 1.00    
MA4 -.13 .08 -.12 .64** .54** .53** .33** 1.00   
FES -.15 .15 -.09 .17 .24** .18* .22* .27** 1.00  
AU -.05 .36** .03 .05 .12 .08 .08 .17 .15 1.00 
DS .05 .18* .14 .21* .24** .29** .30** .32** .10 .23* 
Note. Spearman correlations; listwise deletion, N=120; **Correlation is significant at p< 0.01 (2-sided); 
*Correlation is significant at p< 0.05 (2-sided); SPa=Social Perception-auditory; SMa=Social memory-auditory; 
SUa= Social understanding-auditory; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA3= Tonal figures; MA4=Tonal series; 
RH=Rhythm reproduction; AIT-P=Pitch discrimination; FES=Familiar environmental sounds; AU=Audiobook; 
DS=Disarranged sentences; Hypothesis relevant correlations are shaded in grey. The negative correlations with 
SPa are due to the reaction time measure that was applied. The lower the reaction time the better the result. 
 
The correlations that are relevant to answer the question of the relationship between social 
and general auditory abilities, are shaded in grey. It is apparent, that most of the general 
auditory intelligence tasks do not correlate at all with the social auditory intelligence tasks. In 
some cases, the relationships are even negative. Thus, the hypothesis H25SAu (Both 
auditory speech and auditory tonal tasks, are assumed to correlate positively with social 
auditory tasks.) is not attained. The only significant correlations that point into a reliable 
relationship between the two subconstructs are the correlation between social auditory 
memory with audiobook (rSMa-AU=.36) and with disarranged sentences (rSMa-DS=.18). Additional 
correlations that do not reach the significance level but point into the expected direction are 
between social auditory perception (SPa) and AIT-P, MA3, MA4 and FES, between social 
auditory memory (SMa) and MA3 and FES, and between SUa and DS (Note, that the 
negative correlations with SPa are due to the reaction time measure that was applied). In 
summary, the correlations between social auditory intelligence and general auditory 
intelligence are rather low and do not confirm the H23Sau of moderate intercorrelations. 
However, there seem to exist some relationships between parts of the abilities. The highest 
and most frequent correlations can be discovered between memory tasks of both social 
auditory and general auditory intelligence tasks (see SMa with MA3, FES, AU). This 
corresponds to hypothesis H24SAu. Meeting my expectations, auditory speech tasks 
correlate higher with social auditory intelligence tasks than with tonal (nonverbal) tasks (see 
H26SAu). This is particularly true for the task SMa but also partly true for the SUa task. The 
nonverbal auditory tasks are related, even if not significantly, to the auditory perception 
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factor. This is interesting against the background of Carroll (1993), who labelled the 
underlying latent variable for the auditory abilities “broad auditory perception factor”.  
 
The relationship of SMa with MA3 and FES may be attributed to the cognitive operation 
“memory”, the tasks have in common. The reason that we have to search for relationships 
between the two subconstructs can be also explained by the missing correlations within the 
social auditory intelligence subconstruct. I mentioned earlier, that we could not identify a 
homogeneous social perception factor in this study. Neither social auditory memory nor 
social auditory understanding correlated with SPa. The only relationship existed between 
SMa and SUa, correspondent to the relationships within the other content dimensions. 
Therefore, it is doubtful that social auditory abilities emerge as a separate factor besides 
general speech and tonal auditory abilities. Factor analytic results support these 
assumptions. The social auditory tasks do not form a homogeneous social auditory ability 
factor and therefore cannot be contrasted against general auditory abilities. We also have to 
consider, that three of the general auditory intelligence tasks, namely AIT-P, RH, and FES 
have (minor) distribution problems. At this point, the results should be used for task selection 
and modification but it is worthwhile to address the question of the relationship between 
general auditory abilities and social auditory abilities again in the second study.  
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7 Modification and Completion of the Tests 
7.1 General Modifications and Principles of Task Completion 
The results of the first study were taken to modify the existing SI and AuI tasks. The following 
changes were implemented for all tasks: (1) Items that proved to be reliable and useful were 
selected. Items that did not meet the requirements of item-total correlation, did not reach 
chance level, and did not fit in with regard to difficulty were excluded. We tried to find 
theoretical reasons for the items that were excluded. (2) The items were re-ordered 
according to their difficulty values of the first study (AuI tasks). (3) We modified and 
shortened the instructions for all tasks to ensure a better understanding and to save time. In 
addition to the instruction that is presented on the computer screen, an additional instruction 
sheet was provided containing the most important information for each task. In the following 
chapters, the improved version of the language-based and the scenario SIM tasks and their 
modifications compared to the first study that have been made beyond the mentioned 
general changes will be described. 
 
In addition to the task modifications, new tasks were developed in order to represent each 
operation-content cell with two tasks, except for written social memory. Since written social 
memory already includes two parts (single person scripture and correspondence), we did it 
without developing a second task that would have taken too much testing time. Tasks were 
completed in order to represent either whole social situations (e.g., in social auditory 
perception, SPa1, subjects have to react during an ongoing conversation; I written social 
perception, subjects have to react on social/emotional terms in text extracts) or more specific 
aspects (e.g., perception of social/emotional words in single sentences, memory for couples, 
memory for voices). For each type of material both kinds of tasks (whole situation and 
specific aspects) should be represented. 
 
 
7.2 Social Understanding Scenario Tasks  
The scenario task is described in chapter 6.2.2. After the first study, the following 
modifications were implemented: (1) We focused on rating scales since they proved to be 
most reliable and economical (see chapter 6.3.1). Some of the MC items and open-ended 
questions were converted into rating scales. (2) We altered the six-point rating scale to a 
seven-point rating scale, in order to allow the choice of a middle category. A seven-point 
rating scale instead of a five-point rating scale was chosen to cover the answer in finer 
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gradation. We tried to keep information loss from visual scale as low as possible (Deviation 
measures were most reliable and exact.) at the same time striving for economy and not 
overtaxing our subjects with to many different gradations. (3) The task was practiced with an 
example scenario. (4) At the end, subjects are asked to rate their similarity to the target 
person as well as the sympathy they felt for that person. This information should be used as 
control variables. (5) Four additional scenarios were recorded in order to increase 
heterogeneity, reliability and validity. This time, we recorded comparably older target persons 
with different professions. (6) We professionalized our recordings and task development by 
generating more concrete situation specific questions and restricting our recordings to less 
material (as we did not need as much of the material we recorded in the first four scenarios). 
Table 7-1 presents an overview of our target persons including information about their age, 
gender and profession. In italics, you will find the scenarios that were newly developed for 
the second study.   
 
Table 7-1: Overview of the Scenario Target Persons (Second Study) 
Target person Gender Age Profession Education Number of 
items 
Renate (RF) female 24 medical-technician non-academic 73 
Bringfried (BS) male 43 internal medicine doctor academic 73 
Conny (CK) female 41 owner of an billiard and dart café (gastronomy) 
non-
academic 75 
Christoph (CP) male 23 student (law) academic 64 
Katharina (KL) female 26 student (psychology) academic 83 
Friedrich (FB) male 69 real estate salesman non-academic 60 
Hannah (HR) female 60 special education teacher academic 75 
Matthias (MM) male 33 dancing teacher with an own dancing school 
non-
academic 73 
 
The target persons live in different parts of Germany (Berlin, Bavaria, Palatinate, Rhineland, 
Saxony, Lower Saxony and Westphalia). That is why in some conversations, persons speak 
a dialect. We tried to select only conversations that could be understood by people who are 
not familiar with the specific dialect. Moreover, empirical results show that dialect has no 
predictive power for trait judgments when subjects are provided with cues to the social 
location of the speaker (Foon, 1986). 
 
The personality profiles of the target persons are heterogeneous with respect to all Big Five 
personality dimensions (NEO-FFI). In the interpersonal circumplex dimensions (IIP-C), 
profiles are more similar. The target persons we chose were active rather than passive, and 
they were characterized by a middle level of closeness and cooperation. However, even in 
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those rather similar dimensions, scores within the categories zero and four range between 
.38 to 2.13 (close), .38 to 2.13 (passive) and 1 to 3.13 (cooperative). The figures of both the 
NEO-FFI and the IIP-C profiles are illustrated in appendix A.3 . 
 
 
7.3 Language-based Social Memory Tasks 
7.3.1 Task Modification  
a) Memory for correspondence (Social memory-written, SMw 1 & 2)  
Within the correspondence memory task, subjects have to memorize social information in 
text extracts as accurately as possible in order to recognize/recall it afterwards. The 
recognition/recall part of the task consists of both MC questions (two thirds of the items) and 
open-ended questions (one third of the items). MC items have five answer alternatives. One 
of them is completely correct, the others either completely wrong or partly wrong (scored with 
half points). The task consists of six text extracts each followed by six to ten questions. The 
first three texts are one-sided correspondence and the next three texts are two-sided 
correspondence. The task material varies the setting (privat vs. public) and the content of the 
situation (interpersonal circumplex, see chapter 4.1.2) systematically. 
 
These are the modifications that were implemented after the first study: 
Two texts were added, one monologue in public context, one dialogue in private context. For 
the construction of MC alternatives, answers being given to the open-answer questions of 
the first study were used. Time to answer questions was raised to reduce the speed 
component. The task contains 25 items in three monologues (8/25 open-ended questions) 
and 23 items in three dialogues (8/23 open-ended questions). 
 
b) Memory for conversations (Social memory-auditory, SMa1) 
Subjects have to memorize social information in sound sequences as accurately as possible. 
Each sound file is presented only once. The time to answer open-ended (one-third) and MC 
questions (two-thirds) after the sound presentation is limited. MC items include five answer 
alternatives, one of them being completely correct, the others either completely wrong or 
partly wrong (scored with half points). The task consists of six sound files with four to nine 
questions for each conversation. The number of people heard in the sound sequences 
(single others, dyads, small groups), the setting (private vs. public), and the content of the 
situations (interpersonal circumplex, see chapter 4.1.2) are varied systematically.  
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These are the modifications that were implemented after the first study: 
Similar to social auditory perception, the most reliable three conversations were selected and 
modified for the second study. Three additional conversations were recorded. Again, 
answers to open-ended questions of the first study test version were used to develop MC 
items. The time to answer questions was extended in order to reduce the load on the AcI 
speed factor. The task contains 36 items (one-third are open-ended questions). 
 
7.3.2 Test Completion 
c) Memory for voices (Social memory-auditory, SMa2) 
In this task, subjects listen to conversations with two, three, or four persons and have to 
memorize their voices as accurately as possible. In the following, they hear five different 
voices; only one of them was presented in the conversation displayed before. This voice has 
to be identified. Subjects have about 20 seconds to choose one of five alternatives. The 
context differs between the conversations and the answer alternatives to ensure that a voice 
is not only chosen because of the context information that is provided. The number of 
persons (voices), the setting (privat vs. public) and the situation content (interpersonal 
circumplex) are varied systematically. The task is practiced with one item and contains 12 
test items. 
 
This is the idea behind the task: 
This task deals with the more specific aspects whereas the other social auditory memory 
task refers to the whole social situation. Within the social auditory memory tasks both the 
verbal/speech auditory content and the paralinguistic/nonverbal part should be represented. 
Since SMa1 covers the content, I constructed this task (SMa2) as a measure for nonverbal 
aspects (voices discrimination and recognition). 
 
Some important information in the context of voices recognition: 
In order to understand the test principle, I will summarize some main findings and 
assumptions known in voice recognition research. The proportion of recognition of a voice 
can vary between 96% with a constant intonation (tone of voice) and chance level when tone 
of voice changes from emotional loaded tone of voice to a neutral conversation tone 
(Hammersly & Read, 1990). Performance of recognition improves significantly as a function 
of the number of words that are presented (one word: 14% recognition; eight words: 69%; 33 
words: 90%). Recognition of voices is much harder than recognition of faces. This is an 
example: On the phone, we are used to saying our name even when we talk to familiar 
conversation partners. This behavior would be quite strange if we were in a face-to-face 
interaction. Voice is strongly associated with the context. Characteristics of gender and 
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accent are not very helpful if a voice has to be identified outside the context in which it was 
heard. This is particularly true for people with whom we are not familiar (Hammersly & Read, 
1990). The number of possible persons influences the recognition rate, a smaller number of 
persons resulting in a higher recognition rate (Goldstein & Chance, 1985). The voice of a 
person is remembered more often when it is relevant to the listener (e.g., when the listener 
has to judge the person’s personality). The duration of the original presentation of a voice is 
not important for its recognition if the presentation of the voice exceeds the length of a 
sentence at least for two seconds (Clifford, 1980; Hollin & Clifford, 1983). However, the 
probability of right recognition rises when the listener hears the voice one minute or longer. 
Recognition performance is best, when the listener tries to remember the voice actively. 
Recognition rate decreases with an increasing number of voices in a conversation, such as 
from five to ten and from ten to twenty voices (Hammersly & Read, 1990). Consequently, in 
the voice memory task (SMa2) the conversations have a length of about half a minute (27-36 
seconds). To guarantee that subjets identify the correct voice rather than the surrounding 
social context, the five voices (answer alternatives) including the target were recorded in a 
context different from the one in which the conversation took place. However, this is also 
expected to make the task difficult. Since the possibility of correct recognition decreases with 
an increasing number of people talking in a conversation, I limited the number of people in a 
conversation to two to four persons. 
 
 
7.4 Language-based Social Perception Tasks 
7.4.1 Task Modification 
a) Perception of social target stimuli in text extracts (Social perception-written, SPw1) 
Socially relevant stimuli (i.e., names, expressions of feelings, person descriptions, and social 
events) have to be perceived as quickly and accurately as possible in text extracts. The 
stimuli subjects have to react on, are presented a short time before the relevant text extract 
appears. The task contains two parts differering in the level of difficulty, with 30 items each. 
Each part is divided into two equivalent blocks and contains 15 items. Between the two 
blocks within one part of the task, participants are allowed to make a short break to keep 
concentration on a high level. Each part is practiced with two example trials. The level of 
difficulty is varied through the number of aspects (one or two) subjects have to monitor at the 
same time. The right solution can be found word by word in the text extract. Subjects have 
20 seconds maximum to complete an item. The task material varies according to the setting 
(privat vs. public) and according to the content (interpersonal circumplex, see chapter 4.1.2, 
Figure 4-1). “Yes” and “no” answers are equally distributed. An earlier version of this task 
was tested in the first study. 
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These are the modifications that were implemented after the first study: 
The part of the task that dealt with questions worked better than the part dealing with 
statements (see chapter 6.3.1). Therefore, in the second study, only questions were used as 
task material. Items were simplified to reduce the reasoning and memory load of the task. 
Ambiguous wordings of the items were made clearer. The task includes 4 (2 x 2) practice 
trials and 60 test trials (4 x 15). 
 
b) Perception of social facts in conversations (Social perception-auditory, SPa1) 
In the conversation perception task, subjects have to react as quickly and accurately as 
possible to certain social facts in sound files (i.e., names of persons, the voice of a child, 
rejection, and laughter) by pressing a key on the keyboard. The task is practiced with two 
example conversations (16 reactions) and seven test conversations (82 reactions). 
Complexity varies according to the kind of stimulus (simple vs. complex), to the setting 
(private vs. public), to the amount of speakers (1-6), and to the number of stimuli (one or two) 
that have to be monitored. Speakers differ from one conversation to another. Females and 
males are represented in equal proportions. 
 
These are the modifications that were implemented after the first study: 
Two practice conversations and three test conversations of the task applied in first study 
were maintained and shortened. The stimuli “correction” and “answering” were excluded (see 
chapter 6.3.1). Four new conversations were included containing more complex stimuli such 
as reactions to questions and reactions to different interaction partners. Additional job related 
conversations were included since in the first study most of the conversations dealt with 
private life. Simultaneous monitoring and reaction to three stimuli did not work well. 
Therefore, test takers only have to monitor and react to one or two stimuli in the modified 
task version. The task contains two practice conversations (including 16 reactions) and 
seven test conversations (including 82 reactions). 
 
7.4.2 Test Completion 
c) Perception of social content in text extracts (Social perception-written, SPw2) 
Test subjects have to judge sentences according to their social and emotional content. The 
task consists of two parts, containing 30 items each. The items of each part are split up into 
two comparable blocks with 15 items. In the first part, sentences with social/emotional 
content have to be distinguished from sentences without social/emotional content. In the 
second part, subjects have to decide whether positive social/emotional content is expressed 
or whether the expressions are negative. The subjects have 12 seconds to work on each of 
the sentences. Every part is introduced and practiced with four example trials. The task 
material is unambiguous and varies according to the setting (private vs. public) and the 
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situation content (interpersonal circumplex). This task parallels the auditory social perception 
task (SPa2) described next. 
 
d) Perception of social cues/emotions in voices (Social perception-auditory, SPa2) 
Subjects have to indicate as quickly as possible which of the two emotions/social paraverbal 
cues is presented in a short sound sequence (1 to 4 seconds) that was extracted from real-
life conversations. Test takers are instructed to react as soon as the sequence starts. The 
time to answer is limited. The task consists of three blocks (positive vs. negative emotions, 
irony vs. anger; emotional vs. neutral), each containing ten sound sequences and two 
practice trials. Subjects are instructed to concentrate on the tone of voice (how things are 
said) and to ignore the content of the conversation (what is said).  
 
This is the idea behind the task: 
Since, in judging other people, both verbal and nonverbal cues are important (O’Sullivan et 
al., 1985), the task concerns nonverbal, paralinguistic aspects of social auditory perception, 
whereas SPa1 deals with both verbal (i.e., names) and paraverbal aspects (i.e, laughter, 
voices). In order to classify a sentence as objectively as possible, 68 sentences were rated 
by seven experienced people. I extracted only sentences all raters agreed upon. The 
remaining 30 sentences built the final task. The sentences were aligned with the easily 
measureable objective parameters (e.g., intensity, falling/rising contour, pitch; see chapter 
2.6). Confusion patterns (see chapter 2.6.5) were used in order to group emotions that are 
comparatively easily discriminable. Scherer (1996) argues correctly that the ability of 
discriminating between emotions does not mean that the person actually recognizes them 
correctly (see also chapter 2.6.4). However, this task is a speed test rather than being a 
power measure of emotion identification (typically applied in emotion research). This task 
should measure the speed with which an emotion can be classified correctly in one of two 
categories. The use of natural rather than acted sentences does justice to Scherer’s claim 
(1996) that it would be worthwhile to carry out studies with natural utterances and compare 
them to acted samples. The verbal content of the task is not masked which is also a 
difference compared to the tests commonly used in emotion research. Although problems 
may emerge concerning the interference of content and tone of voice, research has shown 
that possibly understanding the verbal content is a crucial precondition for the correct 
interpretation of prosodic features (see chapter 2.6.4). 
 
Complementing Task Constructed of the GVEESS Material 
The emotion perception in voices task (SPa2) was applied in combination with three blocks 
of emotional meaningless sentences taken from the Geneva Vocal Emotion Expression 
Stimulus Set (GVEESS). The stimulus set is based on research conducted by Scherer, K., 
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Wallbott, H., Banse, R., and Ellgring, H. (for detailed information, please see Banse & 
Scherer, 1996). I tried to build pairs of emotions as objectively as possible. Test takers 
should be able to identify emotions easily so that the reaction time of recognizing an emotion 
is decisive for the performance instead of the recognition itself. In order to make recognition 
easy, I considered information available through confusion matrices (see Banse & Scherer, 
1996) in grouping the emotions. Confusion matrices inform us about the likelihood with which 
an emotion will be confused with another one. Consequently, for example, pride was not 
grouped together with interest but with boredom. Emotions showing a similar parameter 
recognition pattern belong to the same emotion family and are more likely to get confused. 
Further selection criteria concern the representation of a wide spectrum of different speakers 
(several sentences in the GVEESS are spoken by the same speaker), intensity (sentences 
had to be naturally loud enough to be selected), and agreement upon six raters about the 
correct classification.  
 
 
7.5 Auditory Intelligence Tasks 
7.5.1 Task Selection  
Time constraints allowed us to include only six of the AuI tasks in the second study. First, the 
six tasks were selected with the aim of maintaing both content domains (tonal and speech) 
and the operation domains (discrimination, memory and reasoning) although the latter could 
not be confirmed in our first study. Second, tasks were selected according to their reliability. 
Among tasks with similar reliability, those which required less time in duration were favored. 
Third, items with a middle degree of difficulty were chosen (see Table 6-21). Factor analysis 
and correlation matrices were used to analyze convergent and discriminant validity. The 
verbal domain was only represented by one task for the memory and the reasoning cell so 
that there were no possibilities to choose. Although the task audiobook has a rather low 
reliability value (.60), we included an improved version in the battery of the second study 
(see information later on). In the perceptual speech domain, there was the choice between 
Detection of repeated voices and masked words. I decided to include masked words 
because of its promising reliability value and short duration in a subsample of 57 students. 
Detection of repeated voices had not only a low reliability value but also a relationship to SI 
with regard to its content. With respect to the nonverbal/tonal domain, I chose detection of 
repeated tones representing perception/discrimination because the AIT-P took too much 
time, was not well accepted by our participants, and judged as being uncomfortable. In 
addition, usually many subjects have severe problems in making the pitch discrimination at 
any duration. In a study of Brand and Deary (1982), over 20% of the subjects could not meet 
the training criterion of the task. Only 42.4% of the subjects were able to make the pitch 
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discrimination reliably enough for their data to be included in the analysis (Deary, Head, & 
Egan, 1989). In the memory domain, I decided to include rhythm reproduction because of its 
high reliability and short duration. This task contributes to representativeness since it covers 
an important aspect of auditory ability that is different from the other auditory tasks (manual 
reproduction of a rhythm). The task tonal series was chosen to represent the reasoning 
domain because of its similarity (correspondence) to the BIS tasks number series and letter 
series. Other reasons concern the low reliabilities of tonal analogies (.43) and chord 
decomposition (.54). The reduced matrix is represented in Table 8-3. The selection of 
nonverbal auditory intelligence tasks includes two tasks identified as marker tests by Dun 
(2000). Detection of repeated tones serves as a marker of temporal tracking. Tonal series 
can be regarded as a marker of auditory cognition of relationships (see also Stankov & Horn, 
1980). 
 
7.5.2 Task Modification  
In the following, the major modifications implemented in the selected tasks beyond the 
changes already mentioned in chapter 7.1. are listed. 
 
a) Masked words 
The dimensions of the task were retained in 27 selected items. Each combination of the 3 x 3 
x 3 matrix with the dimensions “loudness of the background noise” (quiet – middle – loud), 
loudness of the spoken word (quiet – middle – loud), and word frequency (one syllable – two 
syllables frequent – two syllables rare) was represented once. 
 
b) Audiobook 
The spoken text of the audiobook was only presented once. Besides saving testing time, the 
single presentation of the text should increase the difficulty of the task. Open-ended 
questions were converted into MC items (five alternatives, one correct option). Answers to 
open-ended questions to the first study were used to develop wrong alternatives. Five 
additional items were developed so that the task contains 19 items. 
 
 
7.6 Additional Modifications 
7.6.1 Berlin Intelligence Structure Test 
In the task meaningful text (memory verbal) of the BIS test, test takers have to remember 
characteristics of peoples’ descriptions. After a limited amount of time, they are asked to 
recall the relevant information provided in the peoples’ descriptions. This task is quite similar 
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to the written social memory task (SMw1) and is assumed to require social memory instead 
of academic memory. In order to exclude social content, we developed a new task, 
equivalent in item number and length, that deals with different types of soil (see appendix 
A.2.3). 
 
7.6.2 Questionnaires 
In order to get more detailed information, in the second study, participants had to rate their 
musical experience on a five-point rating scale instead of using a one-point rating scale (first 
study). Participants had to judge their musical ability as being very low to very high compared 
to people of their age. In addition, subjects should specify their musical ability (school of 
music, kind of instrument, choir etc.) and indicate how long they have already been engaged 
in their musical activities.  
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8 Second Study 
8.1 General Aims and Hypotheses 
The second study aimed at evaluating the task modifications. I expect increased reliabilities 
with respect to almost all tasks that did not already show high reliability values (e.g., the task 
rhythm reproduction). Data is expected to be improved in reliability and validity since we 
improved the instructions. In addition, the newly developed tasks have to undergo a first 
critical evaluation. This study should be confirmative with regard to the results that were 
obtained on the SI and on the AuI structure. Confirmation also concerns the investigation of a 
representative adult sample different to the student sample that was tested in the first study 
(aspect of generality across samples, see condition 3, chapter 1.2). The following 
hypotheses will be examined with respect to the internal structure of SI and AuI, their 
relationship to AcI, and the relationship among each other (see Table 8-1).  
 
Table 8-1: Hypotheses of the Second Study: Confirmation of First Study Findings 
Internal structure 
H27S The factors social understanding and social memory can be confirmed. They are moderately intercorrelated. 
H28S The SI structure is valid for both target and consensus scoring. 
H29Au Auditory intelligence splits into two content factors, nonverbal and speech auditory intelligence. 
Relationship to academic intelligence 
H30SA Social understanding is independent from academic intelligence. 
H31SA Social memory is related to all BIS factors, academic intelligence memory, reasoning and speed. Nevertheless, it has its unique parts. 
H32AuA Nonverbal auditory ability is independent from academic intelligence. 
H33AuA Speech auditory ability is strongly related to academic intelligence. 
Relationship between social auditory and general auditory abilities 
H34SAu Social auditory abilities show only marginal relationships to auditory intelligence. 
H35SAu Social auditory memory is related to auditory intelligence tasks that require memory. 
Note. H=hypothesis; S=Social Intelligence; A=Academic Intelligence; Au=Auditory Intelligence 
 
In addition, new questions that arise from the findings of the first study are summarized in 
Table 8-2. The question of whether social perception can be measured as a homogeneous 
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subconstruct will be examined with newly developed social perception tasks and the modified 
versions of the old tasks including items with higher complexity. Another aim is the 
investigation of auditory nonverbal intelligence controlled for working memory (WM). Since 
WM usually is strongly related to reasoning and the AuI factor remained stable when 
reasoning was partialed out (see chapter 6.4.3), I expect nonverbal auditory ability to be 
stable, when controlled for WM. Empirical results provided evidence for the independence of 
emotion perception from other social/emotional abilities (see Roberts et al., 2006). Moreover, 
I expect them to be independent from general auditory intelligence. 
 
Table 8-2: Hypotheses of the Second Study: Newly Generated Expectations 
H36S  There is a common reliable variance between (at least nonverbal) social perception tasks. 
H37Au  There is an auditory nonverbal intelligence when working memory variance is partialed out.  
 
H38SAu 
 
Social/emotion auditory perception forms a separate ability with respect to 
both general (nonverbal) auditory intelligence and social intelligence factors 
(SU and SM). 
Note. H=hypothesis; S=Social Intelligence; A=Academic Intelligence; Au=Auditory Intelligence 
 
 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Participants 
In the second study, 191 subjects participated. After exclusion of participants with a lack of 
commitment, participants outside the age-range of 23 to 40 years, and drop-outs during the 
study, 182 complete data sets remained. The mean age of our participants was 28.69 years 
(SD=5.57); 58.8% of the test takers were female. With regard to education, 56.6% finished 
with a high school degree, 17% with a middle school degree, 6% with a subject specific high 
school degree (Fachhochschulreife), and 20.3% already finished their university studies. The 
participants covered a broad spectrum of different professions that can be classified in 21 
different groups. The largest groups were clerical and commercial occupations (N=24, 
13.19%); health care (N=14; 8%), occupations in engineering science (N=11; 6%); and social 
sciences (N=10; 5%). Seven participants indicated having severe hearing problems (partially 
hard of hearing, i.e., inner ear or deaf one ear, need of hearing aid, tinnitus). They were 
excluded from all analysis concerning the auditory tasks. The N for analysis including 
auditory tasks is therefore reduced to 175 persons. Only one person was not German native 
speaker but was very familiar with the German language. Concerning the self-assessment of 
musical abilities, compared with their age group, 6.6% indicated having very low musical 
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abilities, 15.6% indicated having rather low musical abilities, 46.7% chose the middle 
category, 23.6% judged themselves to have rather good musical abilities and 7.1 indicated 
being musically very good compared to their age group. 
 
8.2.2 Overview of Materials 
Compared to the tasks of the first study, additional questionnaires, such as empathy and 
emotional intelligence, were administered. We applied three adaptive working memory tasks 
(Oberauer et al., 2003) to examine their influence on AuI. Furthermore, the Profile of 
nonverbal sensitivity (PONS, Rosenthal et. al., 1979) was applied. In the following, short 
descriptions of the remaining SI tasks (pictorial and video-based) and of the other 
instruments that have not already been described in the context of the first study or in the 
modification chapter 7 will be presented. Table 8-3 presents an overview of the tasks that 
were administered. This table includes only the performance-based tasks. 
 
Table 8-3: Overview of the Task Material of the Second Study 
  Methods 
 Subconstruct written (w) auditory (a) pictorial (p) video-based (film) (f) 
Social understanding 
(SU) Scenarios 
Social memory (SM) SMw1+2 SMa1SMa2
SMp1
SMp2 SMf1+2 SI
M
 
Social perception 
(SP) 
SPw1 
SPw2 
SPa1 
SPa2 
SPp1 
SPp2 
SPf1 
SPf2 
  verbal (v)  figural-spatial (f) numerical (n) 
Reasoning (R) 
B_WS 
B_WA 
B_TM 
 
B_AN 
B_CH 
B_AW 
B_RD 
B_ZN 
B_SC 
Memory (M) 
B_WM 
B_ST (“soils”) 
B_PS 
 
B_WE 
B_OG 
B_FM 
B_ZZ 
B_ZP 
B_ZW 
B
IS
 
Processing speed 
(S) 
B_UW 
B_TG 
B_KW 
 
B_ZS 
B_BD 
B_OE 
B_SI 
B_XG 
B_RZ 
W
M
 
ta
sk
s 
 
Working memory Word span (WM_WSp)  
Dot span 
(WM_DSp) 
Memory 
updating 
numerical 
(WM_MUn) 
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Table 8-3: Overview of the Task Material of the Second Study, continued 
 Subconstruct Methods 
  written (w) auditory (a) pictorial (p) video-based (f) 
Auditory Reasoning 
(AR)  
Tonal series 
(MA4) 
Disarranged 
sentences (DS) 
  
Auditory Memory 
(AM)  
Rhythm repro -
duction (RH) 
Audiobook (AU) 
  
A
uI
T 
Auditory Perception 
(AP)  
Repeated tones 
(MA1) 
Masked words 
(MW) 
  
Em
ot
io
n 
Te
st
s Social/emotion 
perception/ 
understanding 
 
GVEESS 
(see Banse & 
Scherer, 1996) 
 
PONS 
(Rosenthal et 
al., 1979) 
 
 
a) Memory for couples (SMp1, Weis & Süß, 2007) 
Subjects regard pairs of heterosexual couples and pairs of colleagues. After the presentation 
occurring in blocks, subjects have to choose the correct partner of a presented target person 
(multiple choice).  
 
b) Memory for social situations-pictures (SMp2) 
Subjects are asked to memorize social information about a situation that is presented 
through meaningful sequences of pictures. Afterwards, subjects have to answer questions 
given in MC and open-ended format. 
 
c) Memory for situations in videos (SMf1 & 2; Weis & Süß, 2007) 
Subjects are instructed to memorize social information that is presented in videos as 
accurately as possible. Immediately afterwards, they have to answer questions that are 
presented in MC and open-ended format. 
 
d) Person perception in pictures (SPp1) 
Subjects have to click on the head of a target person presented in pictures as quickly as the 
person has been identified. The target person is previously presented in close-up. In the test 
items, the target person is shown in different settings wearing different clothes. 
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e) Interaction perception in pictures (SPp2)  
Subjects have to perceive previously presented social facts that become obvious through 
observing the body language of the presented people (e.g. decide whether in several 
pictures, people have eye contact or not). 
 
f) Person perception in videos (SPf1) 
Subjects are instructed to react by pressing the space bar as soon as they recognized a 
previously presented person in video sequences. Equal to SPp1, persons are shown in 
different settings and wearing different clothes. 
 
g) Interaction perception in videos (SPf2) 
Subjects are instructed to react to certain social facts in body language as quickly and 
accurately as possible. The social fact (e.g. reacting on expressions of joy) is presented in 
advance of the test items.  
 
8.2.3 Working Memory Tasks  
We administered three working memory tasks (WM tasks) in order to answer the question of 
whether systematic variance that is explained with the AuI tasks is due to working memory or 
not. Three tasks representing different contents (verbal, numerical, figural) were adapted 
from the Oberauer et al. (2003) battery. Oberauer et al. (2000, 2003) base their model on 
facet theory and differentiate working memory theoretically along the dimensions content 
(kind of material: verbal, numerical, figural) and function (cognitive resources: simultaneous 
storage and transformation, coordination, monitoring). The verbal and numerical content and 
the functions simultaneous storage and transformation and coordination could not be 
differentiated empirically. The tasks we used in our study can be classified in the 
simultaneous storage and transformation domain applying the different kinds of material (see 
content facet). However, we did not administer all of the WMC tasks in the original version 
such as described in Oberauer et al. (2003; see also Süß et al., 2002) but instead used the 
two of the tasks, memory updating numerical (WM-MUn) and wordspan (WM_WSp), with the 
changes introduced by Sander (2005, see task description). Additional changes concern an 
adaptive version, which was programmed to save test time, since the standard version takes 
about 45 minutes for each task. We only had about this time available for three tasks. The 
algorithm we chose required subjects to answer three of five items correctly to proceed to the 
next level. In the case of failing, they went down to the next lower level. Successful 
completion (=answer at least three and at most five items correctly) promoted them to the 
next higher level. If they once went down, they did not have the possibility to get up again. 
The completion of each task took about 10 to 20 minutes depending on the best performing 
participant. The higher the level reached by the best person the longer the test took for the 
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whole group since the tests were administered in groups. The three tasks are described in 
the following. 
 
a) Memory updating numerical (WM_MUn; Sander, 2005; adapted from Salthouse, 
Babcock, & Shaw, 1991) 
A nine cell (3 x 3) matrix appears on the screen. Each item uses a certain number of active 
and inactive cells. The inactive cells in an item circle are shaded in grey. Task difficulty 
increases with the number of active cells. Within the active cells, numbers (1 to 9) appear 
successively. Following this initial number presentation, numerical operations are indicated 
by arrows appearing and disappearing in the cells where the numbers were presented 
previously. An arrow pointing upwards indicated that subjects have to add “+1” to the number 
that appeared previously, an arrow pointing downwards advises subjects to subtract “-1” from 
the previously presented number. The result has to be memorized and applied as a new 
value for the cell serving as the starting point for the next operation. After the end of a 
number-arrow sequence, a question mark appears in each of the previously active cells. 
Subjects are instructed to type in the number representing the current value of the cell. 
Presentation time for initial elements and for numerical operations is fixed at 1000 ms. The 
interval between presentations of elements lasts for about 1500 ms. Level ranges from 
dealing with only two active cells (level 1) to up to seven active cells (level 6). 
 
b) Word span (WM_DSp; Sander, 2005; adapted from Craik, 1986, Alpha span) 
Words were presented sequentially. One word was visible for 1800 ms. After the sequence 
of words had been completed, the first letters of the words had to be repeated in the order of 
their physical size. That differed from the original task (Craik, 1986), which required subjects 
to repeat letters of words in alphabetical order. Subjects had the possibility to correct the last 
letter when they recognized being wrong with their answer. After each letter they had to 
press the “return” bar. Correction of letters was then not possible. The task intended to 
measure simultaneous storage and processing (or coordination) with verbal material. Levels 
ranged from memorizing three words (level 1) up to nine words (level 7). 
 
c) Dot span (WM_DSp; Oberauer, 1993; see also Oberauer et al., 2000; Süß et al., 
2002) 
Dots appeared sequentially in cells of a 10 x 10 matrix for one second each. The inter-
stimulus interval took 500 ms. Subjects were instructed to remember the position of the dots 
as accurately as possible. After the presentation of dots was completed, they were instructed 
to imagine the pattern of the dots that would appear as if they were all visible at the same 
time. They had to indicate whether that pattern was a) vertically symmetrical, b) horizontal 
symmetrical or neither of both. The second task was to click with the mouse in the cells of 
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the matrix where the dots appeared previously. Levels ranged from memorizing two points 
(level 1) to six points (level 5). 
 
8.2.4 Baseline Measures 
As baseline measure for social perception tasks requiring the keyboard, Simple Reaction 
Time (SRT), described in chapter 6.2.2 was used. Mouse speed was used as a reference 
and baseline instrument for social perception tasks requiring the mouse (see chapter 6.2.2, 
first study). Since the readspeed measure we applied in the first study was problematic in 
terms of the combined score (reading comprehension measured through three questions at 
the end of the text combined with the speed of reading each word), and motoric speed 
played a major role (for each word a key had to be pressed), I decided to use an alternative 
readspeed task. This task should serve as a baseline measure for the social perception tasks 
dealing with written material (e.g. judgment whether the sentence is emotional/social or 
neutral or whether it contains specified socially relevant words). The new readspeed task 
leaned on WM tasks (see Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Turner & Engle, 1989) and was also 
used in WM research (see Oberauer et al., 2000; Sander, 2005). Sixty sentences and an 
additional four example sentences from the reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; 
Turner & Engle, 1989) were selected and simplified when they were judged as being too 
complex. They were shortened in case they were too long. The sentences contain 8 to 22 
syllables. Subjects had to decide for each sentence whether it was true or false. However, in 
contrast to the task used in WM research, in this study, subjects had to judge the sentences 
only by pressing a key as soon as they identified the sentence as wrong or correct. In the 
WM task they had to write down the last words of the sentences in their presentation order. 
The reaction time for each judgment was recorded. The judgment should guarantee reading 
comprehension.  
 
8.2.5 Complementary Materials  
Questionnaire of Personal Data 
The biographical questionnaire of the first study was improved and complemented through 
questions concerning the family background (e.g. number of children and their age), the sight 
abilities, and hearing abilities (selected questions of the questionnaire we applied in the first 
study). Questions with respect to hearing abilities concerned normal hearing ability vs. 
restricted hearing ability. If hearing ability was judged as restricted then detailed information 
should be provided. Subjects were instructed to rate their musical ability and to specify in 
which kind of music (singing, playing an instrument, musical school) they have been 
engaged in and for how long. 
8  Second Study 
 
 240 
Self-report Questionnaires 
We applied a number of self-report questionnaires. In addition to the instruments that were 
applied in the first study (Questionnaire of Computer Experience, see Süß, 1996; NEO-FFI, 
Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993; and the SI self-report Prototypical Acts on SI, Amelang et al., 
1989; see also chapter 6.2.2), in this study subjects also had to work on the Schutte 
Emotional Intelligence Scale (SEIS, Schutte et al., 1998), an empathy scale (see Enzmann, 
1996), a depression questionnaire (Alter & Muff, 1979), and an altruism questionnaire 
(Fahrenberg et al., 2001). Four times during the study they had to complete a three-item 
strain questionnaire.  
 
Long-term Memory 
At the end of the second test session, a long-term memory test was administered with 
questions concerning information that was presented in each scenario, in either self-
presentation or scenes. Questions were representative concerning method (written, auditory, 
pictorial, film) and contents of questions (cognition, emotion, relationship). Questions had to 
be answered in MC and open-ended format. In addition, we presented extracts of scenes of 
each modality, and subjects had to indicate of which scenario these were part. We provided 
help presenting the faces of the target scenario persons with the data projector. 
 
8.2.6 Implementation 
Equipment 
The equipment was the same as in the first study (see chapter 6.2.3). This time we tested 
only in the computer pool of the Institute of Psychology, University of Magdeburg. With the 
exception of the questionnaires and the BIS test, for the presentation of all tasks the software 
program WMC (latest optimized version 0.18, using EWX 0.22). Again, reaction times were 
recorded by the program. The answers of the video-based and the written memory tasks 
were collected with answer sheets (paper-pencil), as were the SMa1 and the SMp2. The self-
presentations of the target persons in our scenario tasks were shown with PowerPoint XP as 
the WMC program did not allow tone and video to be presented simultaneously. The data 
projector was used to make the target persons self-presentation available to all subjects 
without restrictions. The tone was boosted by speakers (Logitech Z3 M/N S-0085B; 50-
60Hz). 
 
Procedure 
The application of all tests took about 12 hours. The time was split into two test sessions, 
each one lasting six hours including breaks. Session 1 always occurred before session 2. 
The test takers could choose between different possibilities (different days and times of day) 
8  Second Study 
 241
of being tested. Subjects were tested in groups of up to 15 people each session. The 
sessions were conducted by different investigators (altogether six women). With the 
exception of sessions with only five participants or less, in every test session, two instructors 
were present. Instructors received a training on how the test was to be administered. They 
were all familiar with the test and the technical equipment. After having finished the second 
test session, each participant could choose a reward of either 60 Euro or 30 Euro together 
with a detailed written feedback of the test results. Again, psychology students had the 
possibility to record hours as test participant (see chapter 6.2). Each session was subdivided 
into four blocks including three ten-minute breaks between the blocks. During the breaks, 
subjects had the possibility to recover, to refresh with some drinks and snacks, and to go 
outside the building to get some fresh air. To ensure motivation and change, the tasks of 
different types of material, different abilities, and the questionnaires were varied. Perception 
tasks, WM tasks, and parts of the Berlin Intelligence Structure Test that required the most 
focused attention were administered at the beginning of the blocks. The detailed schedule is 
presented in the appendix A.5.  
 
 
8.3 Results-Social Intelligence 
8.3.1 Social Understanding Tasks (SU) 
Table 8-4 addresses the psychometric properties for both target-scored and consensus-
scored scenario scales. Psychometric properties are indicated for a selected number of items 
(see scale construction, chapter 7). The unreduced number of items is reported in 
parentheses, as is the reliability value for the complete unreduced scale. 
 
Table 8-4: Psychometrics: Social Understanding (Second Study) 
Cronbach’s Alpha
Scale 
Item 
number1) 
Item mean 
(SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 2) 
Range 
(min.–
max.) 
rit-range
2nd study 1ststudy 
Target scores 
written 37 (115) -2.87 (.48) -.08/-.37  -4.07 to -1.78 .14 - .48 .77 (.44) .80 
auditory 61 (152) -2.26 (.42) -.35/-.20  -3.40  to -1.33 .12 - .48 .80 (.61) .73 
pictorial 37 (113) -2.26 (.50) -.32/-.05  -3.53 to -1.08 .13 - .37 .73 (.47) .69 
video-
based 74 (124) -2.15 (.40) -.57/1.19  
-3.60 to 
-1.29 .12 - .42 .84 (.72) .77 
perso-
nality 55 (72) -2.35 (.51) -.43/.26  
-4.01 to 
-1.20 .15 - .45 .84 (.79) .71 
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Table 8-4: Psychometrics: Social Understanding, continued 
Cronbach’s Alpha
Scale 
Item 
number1) 
Item mean 
(SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 2) 
Range 
(min.–
max.) 
rit-range
2nd study 1ststudy 
Consensus scores 
written 53 (115) .23 (.03) -.47/.42  .15 - .30 .10 - .35 .76 (.58) .72 
auditory 97 (152) .24 (.02) -.74/1.81 .14 - .29 .12 - .34 .83 (.74) .69 
pictorial 64 (113) .23 (.03) -.67/.71  .15 - .30 .12 - .36 .80 (.73) .58 
video-
based 85 (124) .23 (02) -.82/.84   .15 - .28 .11 - .42 .83 (.79) .60 
perso-
nality 67 (72) .26 (.03) -.61/.46  .16 - .33 .10 - .39 .83 (.82) .69 
Note. N=175; 1) In parentheses, unreduced item number (without selection); 2) Skewness is presented first; the 
second value represents curtosis, SE (Skewness): .18; SE (Curtosis): .37; rit range= Item- total correlation range; 
SUpconsensus, SUfconsensus, SUpkconsensus and SUatarget are trimmed because of outliers. 
 
On average, the written items are the most difficult (significant on p<.001 with respect to all 
other scales). The video-based items are the easiest for the subjects (significant on p<.01 
with respect to all scales). These difficulty differences are not equally obvious for the 
consensus scores; the item mean is almost the same for all scales. In interpreting this result, 
one should not ignore that consensus scoring contributes to homogeneity. Reliability could 
be improved for all scales except for the target-scored written SU scale. All in all, the results 
prove evidence for a successful scale modification and confirm the choice of using only 
rating scales. However, the larger amount of items that were included in the scales may be a 
reason for the reliability differences (see Table 6-4). In the first study, the auditory SU scale 
using target scoring included only 21 items, the pictorial 15 items and the video-based 41 
items. On the contrary, the written SU scale (weighted difference scores) with 19 items had a 
higher reliability than the same scale with 37 items in the second study. Thus, item number is 
not the only reason for better internal consistency values. Table 8-5 shows the correlations 
between the SU scales including both scoring methods. 
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Table 8-5: Correlations Between Social Understanding Scales (Second Study) 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. writt_t 1.00         
2. audi_t .27** 1.00        
3. pict_t .34** .55** 1.00       
4. film_t .49** .43** .60** 1.00      
5. pers_t .62** .43** .46** .49** 1.00     
6. writt_c .16* .49** .44** .40** .37** 1.00    
7. audi_c .34** .69** .57** .59** .43** .60** 1.00   
8. pict_c .32** .45** .61** .60** .41** .53** .62** 1.00  
9. film_c .33** .50** .60** .78** .45** .53** .67** .66** 1.00 
10. pers_c .20** .28** .39** .51** .36** .50** .48** .64** .65** 
Note. t=target scores; c=consensus scores; **The correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *The 
correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); listwise deletion 
 
Target- and consensus-scored scales correlate moderately to highly and thus confirm the 
findings obtained in the first study. These results are not in line with the correlations around 
chance level that have been reported in the literature (see chapter 2.2.3). An explanation for 
the results of this study may be yielded by the selection of task material and of the related 
questions. In order to avoid individual biases, we chose only material when a group of six to 
seven experienced people agreed. With this procedure, although involving only a small 
number of people, we relied on a consensus as well. This may be a reason for the moderate 
to high relationship of target and consensus scores. In addition, I want to direct the attention 
to two values (bold numbers). First, the written consensus score and the written target score 
correlate only with .16 (see Table 8-5, bold number). This means that the score built 
according to the target person’s answers does not measure the same as the score reflecting 
the common opinion of the group does. A possible reason may be that written material does 
not provide as much information (socially relevant cues) as do the remaining materials. 
Therefore, the subjects may be more in danger to interpret something in a different way 
compared to the target person. Dynamic material, particularly video-based and auditory 
material, should yield more cues that can be interpreted much more clearly. On the one 
hand, this assumption confirmed by the difficulty values of the scores (the written scale is the 
most difficult, see Table 8-4) resulting in lower correlations between consensus and target 
scores. On the other hand, in the first study the written SU scores measured with different 
scoring methods correlated with .82. However, taking the same selection of items for each 
score reduces the correlation to .37 (orientated on the target score selection) and .28 
(orientated on the consensus score selection). Second, the correlation between the auditory 
and the written scale, both target scores, is surprisingly low. Again, this may stem from 
differences in answering written items compared to the more social cues containing scores, 
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including the auditory score. Another interesting result becomes apparent when comparing 
the correlations between the personality scale and the SU material scales. In the first study, 
we had zero correlations between these scales and wondered why (see Table 6-6 and Table 
6-7). In this study, we find moderate to high correlations between the personality judgment 
and the SI material scales. The differences between the studies may be either due to the 
sample or to the selection of material being in agreement with the target persons’ personality 
self-report. 
 
As a next step, the selected items (target scores) were used to examine the content of the 
questions (cognition, emotion, and relationship to other people). The scores were calculated 
for each material scale separately but also summarized in a combined score. The scores and 
their psychometrics are shown in Table 8-6. 
 
Table 8-6: Content Scores of Social Understanding (Second Study)  
 
Item 
number 
Item 
mean 
(SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis1) 
Range 
(min.-max.) 
rit-range Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Emotion scores 
written 15 -2.92 (.60) .05/.03 
-4.36 to 
-.95 .10 - .52 .65 
auditory 31 -2.32 (.52) -.53/-.01 
-3.94 to 
-1.17 .12 - .44 .73 
pictorial 16 -2.50 (.69) -.25/-.37 
-4.18 to 
-.98 .12 - .39 .67 
video-based 21 -2.12 (.52) -.43/.06 
-3.90 to 
-1.02 .10 - .37 .67 
total 66 -2.31 (.47) -.38/-.13 
-3.66 to 
-1.27 .08 - .53 .85 
Cognition scores 
written 14 -2.98 (.62) -.19/-.81 
-4.59 to 
-1.83 .18 - .45 .63 
auditory 15 -2.35 (.58) -.41/.04 
-3.95 to 
-1.06 .10 - .34 .54 
pictorial 10 -2.33 (.67) -.45/-.13 
-4.42 to 
-.88 .12 - .24 .48 
video-based 22 -2.48 (.53) -.54/.88 
-4.15 to 
-1.01 .11 - .38 .65 
total 46 -2.72 (.50) -.21/.28 
-4.22 to 
-1.44 .11 - .52 .82 
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Table 8-6: Content Scores of Social Understanding, continued 
 
Item 
number 
Item 
mean 
(SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis1) 
Range 
(min.-max.) 
rit-range Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Relationship scores 
written 6 -2.32 (.67) -.06/-.43 
-4.02 to 
-.73 .16 - .26 .42 
auditory 9 -1.71 (.61) -.40/-.09 
-3.56 to 
-.43 .12 - .28 .45 
pictorial 4 -1.82 (.95) -.39/.18 
-4.75 to 
.00 .28 - .47 .57 
video-based 22 -1.81 (.48) -.79/1.55 
-3.94 to 
-.87 .12 - .41 .66 
total 40 -1.73 (.43) -.97/1.62 
-3.51 to 
-.97 .09 - .39 .77 
Note. rit- =Item-total correlation; 1) Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis, SE 
(Skewness): .18; SE (Curtosis): .37 
 
Test takers found it easier to judge the relationship to others and most difficult to assess the 
cognition of the target persons. In all three content scales, judging written material was the 
most difficult. The reliability of the total scales was sufficient, with the emotion scale being the 
most reliable. Table 8-7 addresses the intercorrelations between the social understanding 
content scales, namely emotion, cognition and relationship, and the personality judgment 
scale. The scales correlate moderately to highly. On average, the correlations between the 
content scales and the personality score are comparable to those values found between the 
material scales and the personality score.  
 
Table 8-7: Correlations Between Social Understanding Content Scales (Second Study) 
  Emotion Cognition Relationship  
Emotion 1.00   
Cognition .64 1.00  
Relationship .38 .56 1.00 
Personality .53 .68 .38 
            Note. All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); listwise deletion; N=175 
 
Table 8-8 (material specific intercorrelations of the content scales) shows in closer detail the 
reason for the low correlations between the auditory scale and the written scale, which 
seems to be due to the written emotion items. They show zero correlations with both the 
auditory cognition and the auditory relationship scale. Also obvious, content scales did not 
correlate higher than scales with different content. People who are good at judging a target 
person’s emotions were also good at judging his or her cognitions and relationships to other 
people, and were able to make a general judgment about their personality. These results 
including the intercorrelations between material scales indicate a homogeneous ability. 
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Table 8-8: Correlations Between Social Understanding Content Scales - Material Specific 
 Emw Ema Emp Emf Cgw Cga Cgp Cgf Rew Rea Rep 
Ema -.02           
Emp .10 .48**          
Emf .23** .44** .37**         
Cgw .45** .23** .31** .43**        
Cga .03 .55** .39** .35** .23**       
Cgp .10 .41** .40** .45** .21** .32**      
Cgf .40** .20** .37** .52** .42** .29** .46**     
Rew .25** .20** .23** .40** .48** .26** .23** .29**    
Rea .08 .35** .33** .33** .31** .21** .25** .33** .25**   
Rep .15* .16* .15* .32** .25** .12 .27** .27** .26** .28**  
Ref .23** .19* .32** .47** .22** .12 .42** .60** .18* .44** .33** 
Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
listwise deletion N=175; Em= Emotion content scale; Cg=cognition content scale; Re=Relationship content scale; 
a= auditory; w=written, p=pictorial; f= film/video 
 
 
8.3.2 Social Memory Tasks (SM) 
Memory for Conversations (Social Memory-Auditory, SMa1) 
SMa1 was already administered in the first study; the descriptive statistics of the modified 
version are shown in Table 8-9. Neither the total scale nor the subscales are normally 
distributed. The following reasons for the distribution problem can be excluded: (1) This is not 
a perception task in which non-normality usually is more common; (2) There are no sample 
specific problems. (3) Figure 8-1 illustrates that there are neither outliers that cause the 
skewed distribution. The distribution can be attributed to the fact that 43.5% of the test takers 
got a score between 60% and 70% correct, but there are also some participants who have 
rather low values in the task. 
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Table 8-9: Psychometrics of the Task Memory for Conversations (SMa1) 
Conversations 
Mean 
(SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis  1) 
Range 
(min.-max.) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
1. conversation .70 (.20) -.69/.16 .00 - 1.00 .19 - .31 .48 (6 items) 
2. conversation .71 (.22) -.85/.22 .10 - 1.00 .23 - .46 .56 (5 items) 
3. conversation .58 (.25) -.29/-.64 .00 - 1.00 .17 - .28 .39 (4 items) 
4. conversation .62 (.19) -.32/-.41 .14 - 1.00 .13 - .31 .45 (7 items) 
5. conversation .49 (.17) -.19/.43 .06 - 1.00 .12 - .43 .57 (9 items) 
6. conversation .59 (.21) -.26/-.04 .00 - 1.00 -.01 - .17 .20 (5 items) 
Total score 
 
Reduced total 
score 
.61 (.13) 
 
.62 (.14) 
-.55/.07 
 
-.58/.13 
.21 - .88 
 
.20 - .91 
.11 - .45 
 
.17 - .44 
.78 (36 items) 
 
.79 (32 items) 
Note. 1)Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis. SE (Skewness) is .18; SE (Curtosis) is 
.37 
 
Although the task was rather easy (with the exception of the fifth conversation), the full range 
of scores is represented (see column ”range”). The single conversations have rather low 
reliability values, which is not surprising because each contains only a few items. The total 
score of the memory task has a good reliability value (often in memory tasks we reach only 
reliabilities around .60). With half the items, we reached the same reliability score as in the 
first study and saved further test time through converting open-ended items into MC items. 
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Figure 8-1: Distribution of the Total Score of the Task Memory for Conversations (SMa1) 
 
Table 8-10 shows that most of the conversations intercorrelate moderately, indicating that 
they measure a common underlying ability. Higher correlations may not be reached because 
of the different contents of the conversations, which are expected to produce intra- and 
interindividual differences (for context effects see e.g. Fiedler, 1991). 
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Table 8-10: Correlations Between the Conversations of Memory for Conversations (SMa1) 
 1. conv. 2. conv. 3. conv. 4. conv. 5. conv. 
2. conv. .33** 1.00    
3. conv. .17* .23** 1.00   
4. conv. .27** .34** .19* 1.00  
5. conv. .39** .39** .29** .38** 1.00 
6. conv. .26** .22** .15 .12 .26** 
Note. conv.=conversation; Spearman correlations, listwise deletion, N=175; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Memory for Voices (Social Memory-Auditory, SMa2) 
Psychometrics for the second social auditory memory task are displayed in Table 8-11. None 
of the scales are normally distributed but deviations are only minor. The test is not reliable 
enough, even when the least reliable items are excluded. 
 
Table 8-11: Psychmetrics of the Task Memory for Voices (SMa2) 
Scores 
Mean 
(SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 1) 
Range 
(min.–max.) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Total score 
example 
included 
.50 (.15) .06/-.42 .17 - .83 -.02 - .13 .20 (13 items) 
Total score 
without 
example 
.52 (.14) -.04/-.29 .15 - .85 .00 - .14 .20 (12 items) 
Reduced score .52 (.25) -.11/-.70 .00 - 1.00 .09 - .19 .30 (5 items) 
Note. The 13 items: example included¸; rit range=item-total correlation; 1) Skewness is presented first; the second 
value represents curtosis. SE (Skewness) is .18; SE (Curtosis) is .37 
 
 
Reliability analysis was performed again involving only high performer on this task. This 
avoids error variance that may be caused by guessing the answer by low performers. 
However, reliability does not improve when splitting up the sample. The reason of the low 
reliability is not yet clear. The minutes we took during the investigations as well as my 
personal memories indicate that subjects were particularly attentive during their work on this 
task. The task difficulty does not seem to be the problem neither regarding the mean value 
(M=.50) nor the standard deviation (SD=.15); both are almost ideal. Conclusively, the items 
do not form a uniform scale but seem to measure something different. Some subjects seem 
to be better in recognizing voices in dyads, others in small groups, others in male, female or 
mixed groups. There is no logical pattern. According to Ambady and Rosenthal (1992, 1993), 
nonverbal behavior of half a minute duration allows observers to form an impression of a 
person’s affective state and interpersonal attitudes that is highly correlated with objective 
criteria or long-term observation judgments. Thus, it should not have an effect giving more 
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time to listen to the target voice in the conversation. A possible reason for the problem may 
be that the conversations are so interesting that test takers pay more attention to the content 
than to the voices. This hypothesis contradicts the good performance test takers showed in 
their reaction on paraverbal cues in the SPa1, which also applies to quite interesting 
conversations. However, whether or not the content of the interesting social conversation has 
an influence on the task performance could be examined using neutral (e.g., technical, 
science) topics. Another reason for the findings may be that several abilities get mixed up: 
First, subjects have to identify several voices presented in a conversation; Second, they have 
to keep them in mind; Third, they have to compare each of the presented voices with each of 
the five distractors. Thus, discrimination, encoding, working memory and comparison are 
required in one task. One could try to distinguish the mentioned abilities, break down the task 
in separate units, and investigate the performance of each step. Further suggestions concern 
the application of this task with more items of each type, and to test the effect complexity has 
(to many different voices that are displayed). The systematic testing with a reduced number 
of distractors seems to be worthwhile, too, accepting a higher chance level. Another 
interesting study concerns the introduction of a baseline measure, presenting only single 
voices of a length between 30 and 60 seconds and then different numbers of distractors. 
This procedure excludes the interference that is produced through hearing different voices in 
a conversation. 
 
Memory for Correspondence (Social Memory-Written, SMw1 & SMw2) 
The written social memory task is a combined task (see chapter 7.1): part one deals with 
one-sided correspondence, part two with two-sided correspondence. Table 8-12 gives an 
impression of the psychometric properties for each of the two parts, for a total score, and for 
each single correspondence. 
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Table 8-12: Psychometrics of the Written Social Memory Tasks (SMw1+2) 
Scale 
Mean 
(SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 1) 
Range 
(min.-max.) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Corres 1 .83 (.14) -1.21/2.45 .17 - 1.00 .07 - .36 .46 (9 items) 
Corres 2 .85 (.12) -1.32/2.60 .30 - 1.00 .06 - .42 .44 (11 items) 
Corres 3 .69 (.18) -.34/-.28 .08 - 1.00 .14 - .23 .35 (6 Items) 
Corres 4 .69 (.17) -.19/-.47 .25 - 1.00 .02 - .36 .38 (6 Items) 
Corres 5 .78 (.18) -1.25/ 1.66 .07 - 1.00 .24 - .40 .58 (7 Items) 
Corres 6 .67 (.16) -.43/-.18 .15 - .95 .13 - .35 .51 (10 Items) 
SMw1 
 .80 (.11) -1.19/2.36 .32 - .98 .09 - .48 .67 (25 items) 
SMw2  
 .71 (.14) -.66/.07 .26 - .98 .04 - .40 .74 (23 items) 
Total score 
SMw .76 (.11) -.86/1.20 .30 - .97 .02 - .43 .81 (48 items) 
Reduced 
total score 
SMw 
.74 (.12) -.92/1.50 .23 -  .96 .15 - .41 .81 (42 items) 
Note. SMw1=part 1, one-sided correspondence; SMw2 = part 2, two-sided correspondence; N=175; 1) Skewness 
is presented first; the second value represents curtosis, SE (Skewness) is .18; SE (Curtosis) is .37; corres= 
correspondence; reduced score: exclusion of unreliable items 
 
 
The total score (with and without reduction) is normally distributed whereas none of the 
single scales and excerpts follow the normal distribution. Comparable to SMa1, this task is 
rather easy; in each conversation test taker’s performance is above average. Single 
correspondence seems to be even easier than two-sided correspondence. In the first study, 
test taker’s mean value was .49 (SD=.13, range: .17; .93). Conversion of two-thirds of the 
items to MC items and increasing the time subjects have to answer the questions, seem to 
have reduced the task difficulty. The worst result on average is around 25% correct. The 
reliability of the total score could be improved from .74 (selected items of first study scale) to 
.81 (see Table 8-12). Part 1 (one-sided correspondence) and part 2 (two-sided 
correspondence) correlate with .57 (N=175, Spearman correlations). The intercorrelations 
between the single correspondences are presented in Table 8-13. The six one-sided and 
two-sided correspondences correlate moderately to highly and indicate a common underlying 
factor. There are no differences in the strength of correlations within one-sided and two-sided 
correspondence and in correlations across different types of correspondence.  
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Table 8-13: Correlations of the Correspondences of Written Social Memory (SMw1+2) 
  corres1 corres2 corres3 corres4 corres5 
corres1 1.00     
corres2 .29 1.00    
corres3 .32 .32 1.00   
corres4 .33 .33 .36 1.00  
corres5 .24 .47 .26 .38 1.00 
corres6 .28 .44 .37 .42 .55 
Note. Spearman correlation; All correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); listwise deletion; 
N= 175; corres=correspondence 
 
8.3.3 Social Perception Tasks (SP) 
The psychometric properties of the language-based perception tasks will be presented for 
the original tasks and for the baseline corrected task scores. As I will show later, the baseline 
measures relevant for the language-based tasks (readspeed and simple reaction time) are 
correlated with AcI. Consequently, baseline correction eventually subtracts substantial 
variance. Therefore, analysis is done first without the use of corrected values. The 
relationship between baseline measures, SI and AcI will be addressed in chapter 8.3.4. 
Analysis was done for both reaction time measures and accuracy scores. Reaction time 
values were trimmed according to the steps described in chapter 5.2.3. 
 
Perception of Social Facts in Conversations (Social Perception-Auditory, SPa1) 
The trimmed values correlated at least .92 with the original mean values. Most of them 
correlated with more than .98 justifying the use of the trimmed values. Table 8-14 presents 
mean values and standard deviations of reaction time values for the scales and gives some 
information about the distribution, internal consistency, and item-total correlation. In some 
cases, practice items were included in the analysis after ensuring that they were not different 
in mean reaction time and proportion of mistakes.  
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Table 8-14: Psychometrics of Perception of Social Facts in Conversations (SPa1) 
Scales N 
Number 
of items 
Mean 
(SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 1) 
Range 
(min.-max) rit range 
Cronb. 
Alpha 
laughter 175 9 574.82 (91.74) .48/-.21 
404.33 - 
835.00 .20 - .52 .72 
names 175 12 615.13 (79.24) .30/-.19 
439.33 - 
820.00 .25 - .58 .77 
agreement 175 7 804.70 (160.98) .36/.14 
416.33 - 
1230.00 .25 - .55 .72 
voices 175 11 581.68 (118.86) 1.00/1.15 
353.91 - 
955.00 .46 - .71 .89 
rejection 173 5 617.41 (108.53) .53/.03 
403.40 - 
950.00 .25 - .48 .65 
filling words 172 7 803.41 (226.34) 1.12/1.02 
433.00 - 
1550.00 .55 - .74 .86 
change of 
gender 175 19 
695.74 
(85.75) .01/-.23 
493.88 - 
905.00 .15 - .47 .70 
questions 166 41) 1415.43 (259.40) -.62/-.15 
700.00 - 
1912.00 .46 - .61 .72 
different 
interaction 
partners
175 9 980.59  (192.49) .27/.22 
543.00 - 
1550.00 .32 - .72 .78 
Total scale 171 93  00 (.55) .28/-.22 -1.24 - 1.59 .05 - .52 .89 
Reduced 
total scale 163 85 00 (.60) .36/-.04 -1.33 - 1.79 .17 - .52 .90 
Note. 1) One item was excluded because of bad reliability (16_40); Cronb. Alpha=Cronbach’s Alpha; 1)Skewness 
is presented first; the second value represents curtosis. SE (Skewness) is .18; SE (Curtosis) is .37 
 
Reactions to questions took the longest time followed by stimuli of recognizing a person 
switching from one interaction partner to another. These two conversations were assumed to 
be the most complex, too. The easiest task was to react on laughter or on a single (baby) 
voice. This seems to indicate that reactions are fastest to easy paraverbal stimuli. However, 
in the first study results were quite different. Reaction to laughter took comparatively longer 
(see Table 6-11) whereas test takers reacted fastest to filling words (mean=555.44, 
SD=102.80) and agreement (mean=646.26, SD=74.23). Without including the two very 
complex conversations just mentioned reactions to these two scales, filling words and 
agreement took the longest. The differences may be due to the sample. All Cronbach’s Alpha 
values are satisfactory, particularly with regard to the low number of items that is included in 
some of the scales. The total scale shows a high reliability value. High internal consistencies 
are common to speed tasks. However, reacting to complex auditory stimuli within 
conversations is different from reactions to easily discriminable, highly predictable stimuli we 
are used to with AcI tasks. The reduced total score excludes the questions scale and some 
other items that do not show sufficient reliability in the total scale. Total and reduced score 
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correlate with .98. Data indicate that the question scale is different to all other scales. A 
reason may be that only in reacting to questions, anticipation is required (i.e., react as soon 
as they recognize a person asking a question). Whether the person actually rises a question 
is only clear when the question is finished. The non-normality of the filling words scale seem 
to be due to the long reaction times of some test takers which becomes evident in a 
positively skewed distribution. I decided to maintain these longer reaction times in the single 
scales because variance should not be reduced until summarized to a total score. The 
diagram of the distribution is presented in the appendix C.5. As far as the subscale filling 
words will be included in analysis, we will take attention to the results concerning this scale. 
Table 8-15 shows the intercorrelations between the subscales of the auditory perception 
task. 
 
Table 8-15: Correlations Between Subscales  of the Task Perception of Social Facts in 
Conversations (SPa1)  
  laughter names agree voices reject filling gender quest 
laughter 1.00        
names .19* 1.00       
agree .11 .31** 1.00      
voices .22** .50** .34** 1.00     
reject .20* .45** .29** .41** 1.00    
filling  .13 .23** .30** .25** .18* 1.00   
gender  .19* .47** .35** .48** .28** .29** 1.00  
quest .14 .01 -.02 .05 -.12 -.08 -.01 1.00 
interact .20** .31** .22** .17* .11 .10 .31** .03 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); 
listwise deletion, N=163; agree=agreement; reject=rejection; filling=filling words; gender=change of gender 
talking; quest=rising questions; interact=communication with different interaction partners 
 
With the exception of the question scale and some single correlation values (interaction 
scale, filling words, and laughter), Table 8-15 shows a pattern of moderate to high 
intercorrelations, indicating common systematic variance. The correlations with the question 
scale confirm the findings being revealed through reliability analysis. Therefore, in the 
following analysis the reduced total score of SPa1 is used. In the future, further improved, 
accuracy scores of the tasks may provide additional interesting information, especially with 
respect to the scales which show sufficient reliability, namely dealing with names, 
agreement, and the reaction to different interaction partners (see appendix C.1.3).  
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Perception of Social Cues/Emotions in Voices (SPa2) and GVEESS Sentences 
Table 8-16 presents the psychometric properties of the second social auditory perception 
task (SPa2) and the selection of sentences taken from the Swiss data bank of auditorily 
expressed emotions (GVEESS, see chapter 7.4.2). The descriptive statistics of SPa2 are 
presented on the top of the table, the GVEESS data below. The statistics concern the scales 
after item selection (see chapter 5).  
 
Table 8-16: Psychometrics of the Task Perception of Paraverbal Social Cues/Emotions in 
Voices (SPa2) and the GVEESS Sentences 
Scales 
Number 
of items 
Skewness/
Curtosis1) 
Range  
(min.–max.) Mean (SD) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
SPa2 
emotional
vs. neutral
7 .06/-.69 579.25 – 
2900.00 
1800.91 
(528.30) 
.32 - .58 .74 
positive vs. 
negative
9 .51/-.25 480.00 – 
1910.00 
1124.63 
(329.95) 
.58 - .74 .87 
irony vs. 
anger
6 .31/.01 631.25 – 
3042.00 
1596.11 
(450.43) 
.46 - .66 .79 
Total real 22 .29/.40 -2.07 
–  2.26 
.00 (.74) .33 - .73 .91 
GVEESS 
joy vs. anger 9 .70/-.08 220.00 – 
1235.00 
633.58 
(238.55) 
.41 - .62 .79 
boredom vs. 
pride
10 .96/.74 270.00 – 
1580.00 
776.29 
(283.10) 
.57 - .70 .88 
contempt vs. 
interest
10 .62/.00 420.00 – 
1900.00 
984.47 
(342.36) 
.46 - .62 .82 
Total fictive 29 .75/.26 -1.53 – 2.42 .00 (.85) .42 - .75 .92 
Total scale 51 .63/.51 -1.57 – 2.16 .00 (.70) .32 - .71 .94 
Note. N=174, item-total correlations and alpha values belong to selected values (unreliable items excluded, see 
number of items), mean values concern total scales including all items; 1) Skewness is presented first; the second 
value represents curtosis. SE (Skewness) is .18; SE (Curtosis) is .37. Trimmed values correlate with original val-
ues at least with .96. 
 
Interestingly, reactions to emotions displayed in realistic sentences (SPa2) take much longer 
than reactions to emotions presented in acted sentences (GVEESS sentences). This 
difference in time is probably due to the much clearer expressions that are made in acted 
situations (see e.g. chapter 2.6.4). The GVEESS sentences worked quite well; only one item 
had to be eliminated. With regard to the SPa2 task, the most difficult decision was between 
emotional and neutral sentences. This is in line with Noller (2001), who reports that neutral 
messages were more often incorrectly decoded compared to emotional messages. However, 
the relatively lower recognition rate may also be due to getting used to a new task as this 
was the first part. Reliability is sufficient for the subscales and very good for the total scales. 
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Some of the SPa2 items had to be excluded since they did not differentiate well between test 
takers and reactions were outside of the allowed time interval (see chapter 7.4.2). Total RT 
scores of SPa2 and GVEESS correlate with .56. The SPa2 scales show accuracy values 
between 69% correct and 77% correct, the GVEESS scales proportion correct is between 
82% and 89%. This confirms the results obtained in other studies that also led to focus more 
on acted than on natural sentences. Natural conversation extracts mainly include not only 
one distinct and clear emotion but contain several emotions in different proportions. 
Therefore, it should be much more difficult to identify or recognize a natural emotion than an 
acted one. However, what we need in our daily interactions with other people is the ability to 
deal appropriately with that emotion mixture. An overview of the accuracy values of both 
tasks SPa2 and the GVEESS, can be found in appendix C.1.4. Table 8-17 addresses the 
intercorrelations of the scales. The GVEESS scales correlate stronger with one another than 
the SPa2 task (see shaded cells, Table 8-17). Reasons for the differences may be that the 
GVEESS acted emotions are comparably less ambiguous and thus produce less 
interference. The intercorrelations between SPa2 and GVEESS indicates that both tasks 
measure parts of the same underlying ability.  
 
Table 8-17: Correlations Between Subscales of the Task Perception of Social 
Cues/Emotions in Voices and GVEESS Scales 
  
emotional vs. 
neutral 
positive vs. 
negative 
irony vs. 
anger 
joy vs.  
anger 
boredom vs. 
pride 
emotional 
vs. neutral 1.00     
positive vs. 
negative .37** 1.00    
irony vs. 
anger .22** .40** 1.00   
joy vs. 
anger .31** .47** .47** 1.00  
boredom 
vs. pride .19* .39** .35** .60** 1.00 
contempt 
vs. interest .26** .38** .34** .50** .63** 
Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
listwise deletion, N=174 
 
 
Perception of Social Target Stimuli in Text Extracts (SPw1) 
Table 8-18 presents an overview of the descriptive statistics of the reaction time scores. 
Subscales were formed with regard to the two levels of difficulty (reaction to one cue=level 1 
vs. reaction to two cues=level 2). Paying attention to two aspects (reaction to two questions) 
takes more time on average. Therefore, a combined score was built of the mean value of the 
z-standardized scores of the two levels. Reliability values of the RT time scores indicate a 
successful scale modification, since, in the first study, the total mean of the statements part 
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had an Alpha of .83, the questions part of .80. The reaction time level scores correlate with 
.82 (p<.0001). The descriptives of the accuracy scores can be found in the appendix C.1.1. 
Total RT and accuracy scores correlate with zero (r=-.08). Being fast seems to have nothing 
to do with being accurate in the task. Thus, there does not seem to be a speed-accuracy 
trade-off. 
 
Table 8-18: Psychometrics of the Task Perception of Social Target Stimuli in Text Extracts 
(SPw1) 
Scales 
Number 
of items
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 2) 
Range 
(min.–max.) Mean (SD) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Level 1 28 1.04/1.39    1694.08 - 8879.74 
3971.91 
(1303.39) .38 - .76 .95 
Level 2 30 .74/.80    2613.10 - 10606.31 
5314.21 
(1515.48) .52 - .77 .96 
Total 58 .76/.63   2178.65 - 9483.61 
4670.40 
(1341.03) .39 - .77 .98 
Total, 
combined 
score
58 .80/.72   -1.76 – 3.43 .00 (.95) --- --- 
Note. N=182; rit range=item-total correlation; 1)Score after item selection. Original score and trimmed score 
correlate with .996. 2)Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis. SE (Skewness) is .18; SE 
(Curtosis) is .36 
 
Perception of Social Content in Text Extracts (Social Perception-Written, SPw 2) 
The descriptives of the SPw2  reaction time scores are presented in Table 8-19. Accuracy 
scores can be found in the appendix C.1.2. On average, test takers need about the same 
time to decide whether a sentence is neutral or emotional and whether it expresses a 
positive or a negative emotion. The scores correlate with .82 (p< .001). Therefore, there is no 
need for building an aggregate of z-standardized values in order to get a total score. 
Reliabilities are all very high. 
 
Table 8-19: Psychometrics of the Task Perception of Social Content in Text Extracts (SPw2) 
Scales 
Number 
of items
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 2) 
Range 
(min.–max.) Mean (SD) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Neutral-
emotional 30 .48/.08 
824.02 – 
4058.83 
2057.66 
(522.20) .53 - .80 .97 
Positive–
negative 30 .33/.19 
869.55 – 
3404.14 
1995.10 
(616.19) .56 - .73 .96 
Total 60 .29/.05 846.40 – 3689.65 
2019.45 
(496.73) .55 - .78 .98 
Note.1)Score after item selection; 2)Skewness is presented first; The second value represents curtosis. SE 
(Skewness) is .18; SE (Curtosis) is .36; rit range=item-total correlation; Original and trimmed values correlate with 
.98. 
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8.3.4 Baseline Correction of Social Perception Tasks 
We used baseline measures to correct the social perception tasks for simple reactions that 
cover the actual performance. The written social perception tasks were controlled by a 
readspeed test. On the auditory SP tasks, the video-based SP tasks, and one of the pictorial 
SP, SPp2, the SRT task was applied as a control measure. Since the SPp1 makes use of the 
computer mouse, we administered a mouse speed test to control for dealing with a computer 
mouse (see chapter 8.2.4). Each score formed by the baseline measures was normally 
distributed and excelled by high alpha coefficients (mouse speed and SRT: alpha=.97; 
readspeed=.98). However, the use of the baseline measures in order to control for unwanted 
variance was problematic in this study since the tasks did not only measure simple reactions 
but were correlated with AcI (see Table 8-20). 
 
Table 8-20: Correlations of Baseline Measures with BIS Scales and Social Perception Tasks 
 SRT Mouse speed Readspeed 
Academic Intelligence (AcI) 
speed -.34** -.13 -.49** 
memory -.13 -.11 -.28** 
reasoning -.18* -.29** -.40** 
verbal -.26** -.15* -.55** 
figural -.25** -.27** -.30** 
numerical -.19* -.16* -.41** 
Social Perception (SP) 
SPw1 .28** .13 .62** 
SPw2 .32** .22** .79** 
SPp1 .39** .48** .19** 
SPp2 .19* .18* .18* 
SPf1 .26** .12 .17* 
SPf2 .23** .11 .15 
SPa1 .43** .14 .25** 
SPa2 -.01 -.02 -.03 
GVEESS -.08 -.00 -.07 
Note. Negative correlations are due to RT measures (baseline measures) and are in the expected direction. 
 
The readspeed task is moderately to highly correlated with all of the BIS scales and thus 
appears to measure not only basic reading speed but intellectual performance that is related 
to each of the BIS scales. Probably, there is an underlying factor of both AcI and readspeed 
that might be working memory capacity (WM). Readspeed correlates with word span 
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(WM_WSp) r=.37 (p<.00, N=175), with memory updating numerical (WM_MUn) r=.17 (p=.02, 
N=175), and with dot span (WM_DSp) with r=.17 (p=.03, N=175). Since the SPw2 and the 
readspeed task correlate r=.79, it does not seem to measure much additional specific (social) 
variance. SPw1 correlates strongly with readspeed, too (r=.62). Although we do not exactly 
know what the readspeed task measures (besides WM), it is obvious that it is not only simple 
speed of reading. Thus, it does not make sense to control for readspeed variance in 
analyzing the written SP tasks. Mouse speed shows low to moderate correlations with the 
BIS scales except for the memory and the speed scale. Although it can be considered as a 
speed task, it does not correlate strongly with speed but is rather related to reasoning. Süß 
(1999) used the mouse task, too, and found it to be related to computer experience. We did 
not expect these relationships since these days most people are very used to the computer. 
The self-reported computer experience in comparison to peers correlates with rSP=.26 
(p=.001, N=175), and the time spent using the computer correlates with rSP=.36 with mouse 
test performance. We can therefore expect that the mouse test measures the skill of dealing 
with the computer, too. Even the SRT task, which only requires the subjects to press the 
space bar as quickly as possible correlates with the BIS scales, except for memory. The 
problem touches on the hypothesis according to which individuals with faster information 
processing are more intelligent (see e.g. Deary, 2000; Jensen, 1982a; Neubauer, 2001). 
However, there are several indices that mental speed is not basic but rather includes various 
types of performance speed (motoric speed, decision time, perceptual speed, etc., see 
Stankov & Roberts, 1997). Besides the relationship to processing speed, simple cognitive 
speed tasks are substantially related to reasoning (gf, see Danthiir, Roberts, Schulze, & 
Wilhelm, 2005), and a little less to other factors of intelligence (i.e., memory and creativity) 
(see Neubauer & Bucik, 1996). Because of the mentioned difficulties, I decided to control 
only for the SRT variance in tasks that require simple or choice reactions. In contrast to 
mouse speed and read speed, the SRT correlation pattern with other constructs seems to be 
rather plausible and comprehensive. In addition, it correlates the least with WM (only with 
WM_WSp r=.16, p=.036). Thus, the danger of reducing important variance through the 
application of the SRT baseline correction is rather low. However, in some analyses, I 
controlled for readspeed and mouse speed as well, in order to investigate the effect these 
variables have on the new tests. In addition to any analysis applying baseline corrections, 
values without correction factor will be reported. With regard to content effects in speed task, 
different views and findings exist. Neubauer and Bucik (1996) report a general mental speed 
factor contradicting the hypothesis of Ceci (1990) who represents the specifity of mind view 
resulting in the expectation of higher correlations between tasks of the same content. I 
decided to control for the visual SRT task also in the auditory tasks. However, the content 
may have an effect since in visual perception tasks, task relevant variance may be partialed 
out.  
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8.3.5 Internal Construct Validity of the Social Intelligence Tasks 
Next, I concentrate on the inner construct validity of SI. First, correlations between the SI 
tasks will be reported. Second, the structure will be examined with EFA and CFA. The 
procedure was described in chapter 5.4.  
 
Intercorrelations Between the Social Intelligence Tasks 
The full correlation matrix of the SI tasks is presented in Table 8-21. It is apparent, that scale 
revision and the new task constructions for social perception were successful. Whereas 
social perception tasks did not correlate at all in the first study, they are now low to 
moderately related. Nevertheless, the pattern of correlations is still quite mixed. The written 
SP tasks both correlate with the auditory SPa1, and also with the pictorial SP tasks. They 
neither show correlations with the emotion perception task SPa2 nor with the GVEESS items 
nor with the video SP tasks. Besides its correlations with the written SP tasks, the auditory 
SPa1 correlates with SPp1 and with both SPf tasks. With the exception of the unreliable 
SMa2 task, the memory tasks intercorrelated moderately. Written social memory (SMw) and 
auditory social memory (SMa) even correlate highly (.61). Interestingly, the SU tasks are not 
at all correlated with the social perception tasks except for some single values with the SU 
personality scale. Written and auditory SM correlate with written SP. The pictorial SM tasks 
correlate with the auditory SP tasks, too. Note that the correlations of SP with SU and SM 
are expected to be negative because the SP scales rely on reaction times (the higher the 
value, the worse the result). SM and SU tasks correlate moderately, SU-pictorial and SM-
written being related the strongest (.27). However, the pattern is mixed. There are also 
several zero correlations especially with regard to SMf. In the same way the voice memory 
task (SMa2) correlates zero with almost all of the other SI tasks. I will deal with it carefully in 
further analysis because of its insufficient reliability. Past studies have shown that 
comparatively unreliable tasks were criterion valid (see Bronfenbrenner, Harding, & Gallwey, 
1958) since heterogeneous scores may be better in representing the criterion behavior. 
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Table 8-21: Intercorrelations Between the Social Intelligence Tasks (Second Study) 
 SPw1 SPw2 SPa1 SPa2 GVE SPp1 SPp2 SPf1 SPf2 SMw SMa1 SMa2 SMp1 SMp2 SMf SUw SUa SUp SUf 
SPw2 .66**                   
SPa1 .12 .21**                  
SPa2 .00 .04 -.01                 
GVE -.07 .01 -.08 .48**                
SPp1 .18* .18* .20* .02 .02               
SPp2 .30** .18* .12 .03 .10 .36**              
SPf1 .12 .09 .23** -.05 -.09 .44** .24**             
SPf2 .13 .13 .46** -.11 -.10 .09 .23** .19*            
SMw -.45** -.46** -.08 -.07 -.03 -.09 .02 -.02 -.06           
SMa1 -.27** -.33** .07 .01 -.14 .03 .10 .02 .01 .61**          
SMa2 -.15 -.10 -.05 -.09 -.04 -.13 .01 -.21** .05 .09 .19*         
SMp1 -.15 -.16* -.21** .07 -.01 -.20* -.12 -.24** -.19* .30** .28** .14        
SMp2 -.14 -.21** -.16* -.03 .11 -.22** .04 -.16* -.08 .44** .39** .08 .34**       
SMf -.10 -.06 .06 -.03 -.02 -.17* .01 -.13 -.05 .35** .42** .03 .14 .34**      
SUw .01 -.02 .06 .03 .06 .09 .06 .10 .07 .12 .11 .12 .08 .04 -.03     
SUa -.03 -.04 -.09 .01 .01 -.08 -.05 -.06 -.06 .13 .16* .11 .15 .07 .00 .26**    
SUp -.07 -.14 -.05 -.09 -.06 -.03 -.04 -.00 -.10 .27** .20 * -.05 .19* .22** -.01 .34** .53**   
SUf -.02 -.06 -.01 -.04 -.06 .03 .01 .15 .05 .17* .11 -.05 .14 .09 -.04 .46** .40** .57**  
SUpk -.07 -.17* .07 -.07 -.04 -.00 -.02 .04 .14 .18* .15 .05 .10 .05 -.12 .60** .40** .44** .42** 
Note. Spearman correlations, listwise deletion, N=175; **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); SPw1=Social 
perception-written 1; SPw2=Social perception-written 2; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SPa2=Social perception-auditory 2; GVE=GVEESS; SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 
1; SPp2=Social perception-pictorial 2; SPf1=Social perception-video-based1; SPf2=Social perception-video-based 2; SMw=Social memory-written1+2; SMa1=Social memory-
auditory 1; SMa2=Social memory-auditory 2; SMp1=Social memory-pictorial 1; SMp2=Social memory-pictorial 2; SMf=Social memory-video-based1+2; SUw=Social 
understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding-auditory; SUp=Social understanding-pictorial; SUf=Social understanding-video-based; SUpk=Social understanding-personality; 
Expected correlations are shadowed. 
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Exploratory Structure Analysis of the Social Intelligence Tasks 
With the exception of SMa2, all SI tasks and the GVEESS scale are entered into EFA in 
order to get a first impression of the SI factor structure of our second study. Parallel analysis 
suggests a five-factor solution (see appendix C.2.1). The corresponding factor analytic result 
is addressed in Table 8-22. The first factor has an eigenvalue of 3.63 and explains 18.14% of 
the variance. It can be clearly interpreted as a social memory factor since with the exception 
of SMp1 all social memory tasks have their highest loading on that factor. The second factor 
can be interpreted as social understanding and has an eigenvalue of 2.74. It explains 
another 13.69% of the variance and subsumes the SU scales. The social perception factor 
does not emerge as a third homogeneous factor but splits into three components. The first 
SP component (= the third factor) explains 9.74% of the total variance (eigenvalue: 1.95) and 
is indicated by the nonverbal pictorial and video-based SP tasks and also includes social 
perception in conversations (SPa1). A possible explanation for the loading of the SPa1 on 
the nonverbal (pictorial/video-based) factor instead of forming an auditory SP factor together 
with the tasks SPa2 and GVEESS may be the comparatively strong relationship with the 
second video-based task (SPf2). Both tasks, SPf2 and SPa1, require reactions within 
dynamic auditory or video-based material. Both tasks deal with different social cues in 
various situations rather than focusing on single aspects such as certain persons or certain 
emotions. The common variance is expressed in their intercorrelation of rSPa1-SPf2=.46 as well 
(see Table 8-21). The second component (=fourth factor) of the social perception factor 
comprises the two “emotion perception in voices” tasks (SPa2 and GVEESS task). They 
seem to measure something different compared to the first SP component (3rd factor). This 
finding is in line with empirical results showing that emotion perception tasks measure 
something different from emotional/social intelligence tasks (see Roberts et al., 2006). It also 
indicates that the two auditory SP tasks should be distinguished (auditory perception of 
emotions vs. auditory perception of content/non-specific emotional paraverbal cues). This 
fourth factor has an eigenvalue of 1.66 and explains 8.28% of the variance. The fifth and last 
factor explains 6.76% of the total 56.60% variance. It has an eigenvalue of 1.35 and 
comprises the written SP tasks. It is not yet clear whether social written perception is a 
separate ability of SI or whether it measures rather general perceptual speed. If the latter is 
true, we can expect a substantial relationship with AcI speed.  
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Table 8-22: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Social Intelligence Tasks (Second Study) 
 Factor 
  1  2 3 4  5  
Tasks SM SU 
SPnv and 
SPa1 Soc/EmPerc SPw 
SMa1 .76  .23  -.15 
SMv1+2 .65 .10 .11  -.35 
SMf1+2 .60 -.11    
SMb2 .57  -.14   
SMa2 .13     
SUpk -.12 .73 .12  -.13 
SUf  .71    
SUp .12 .69    
SUw  .63 .15   
SUa  .60 -.16  .15 
SPb1   .60 .13  
SPf1   .60  -.11 
SPa1   .51 -.11  
SPf2   .47 -.13  
SPb2 .18  .38 .20 .20 
SMb1 .29 .16 -.35   
SPa2    .87  
GVEESS    .61  
SPw1     .82 
SPw2       .73 
Course of 
eigenvalues 
3.63 – 2.74 – 1.95 – 1.66 – 1.35 – 1.19 – 1.01 – 0.82 – 0.81 – 0.76 – 0.60 
– 0.56 – 0.53 – 0.44 – 0.41 – 0.40 – 0.34 – 0.28 – 0.28 – 0.24 
Note.Pattern matrix. SM=Social memory; SU=Social understanding; SPnv=Social perceptio-nonverbal; 
SPa=Social perception-auditory; Soc/EmPerc=Social/Emotional perception in voices; SPw=Social perception-
written; SPw1=Social perception- written 1; SPw2=Social perception-written 2; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 
1; SPa2=Social perception-auditory 2; GVE=GVEESS; SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 1; SPp2=Social 
perception-pictorial 2; SPf1=Social perception- video-based1; SPf2=Social perception-video-based 2; 
SMw=Social memory-written1+2; SMa1=Social memory-auditory 1; SMa2=Social memory-auditory 2; 
SMp1=Social memory-pictorial 1; SMp2=Social memory-pictorial 2; SMf=Social memory-video-based1+2; 
SUw=Social understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding-auditory; SUp=Social understanding-pictorial; 
SUf=Social understanding-video-based; SUpk=Social understanding-personality; Highest loadings of tasks on 
factors are shadowed. Loadings below .10 are suppressed. 
 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Internal Social Intelligence Structure 
Further investigations of the SI internal structure will be done by means of CFA, separately 
for the SM-SU structure and for the social perception structure. Correlation analysis and EFA 
(see Table 8-21 and Table 8-22) indicate that the SI perception tasks are related but that 
they do not form a homogeneous SP factor. Social perception, how it is operationalized, 
seems to be a multidimensional ability itself and rather splits in different components. That is 
why SP will be analyzed separately, which was not possible in the first study since we did not 
have enough indicators for separable SP factors. 
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1) Social understanding and social memory 
I start with the confirmation analysis of the two-factor structure (see first study), 
hypothesizing a social understanding and social memory factor. Including all SU and all SM 
variables resulted in model SUSM1 (see Table 8-23). Doing without the relatively unreliable 
task SMa2 made the fit worse. A model that excludes SUPk and keeps all SM variables fitted 
the data (see model SUSM2, Figure 8-2). Although, in this study, the personality scale is 
positively correlated with the content SU variables, it seems to measure some other aspects. 
Additional elimination of variables, for example SMp1, does not improve the fit either. 
Compared to the correlations we obtained in the first study, the correlations between the two 
SI factors are stronger for the target scored version (.31 compared to .29, see Figure 6-1). 
The same SU–SM models with the only difference that the SU variables are scored 
consensus-based are presented in Table 8-23 as model SUSM1C (full model) and model 
SUSM2C (reduced final model without SUPk). Both models fit the data even better than the 
target-scored models and thus confirm the findings presented in the first study (see chapter 
6.3.2). Again, involving the SUPk in the model with the consensus-based SU scores 
decreases the fit to the data. Thus, we can confirm this structure doing without the SUPk 
scale as being the best independent from the scoring procedure that was applied. Both final 
models, SUSM2 (target-scored) and SUSM2C (consensus-scored, in italics) are illustrated in 
Figure 8-2. 
 
Table 8-23: Models of Social Understanding/Social Memory (Second Study) 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI 
RMSEA  
(CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
Target-scored     
SUSM1 
Complete model 
including all SM 
and all SU 
variables 
90.914 
(43) 
.000 .91 .080 
(.057, .102) 
 
 
.067 4.91 
SUSM2 
Excluding SUPk 46.250 
(34) 
.078 .97 .046 
(.000, .076) 
.056 -21.75
Consensus-scored     
SUSM1C 
same as model 
SUSM1 
63.801 
(43) 
.021 .97 .053 
(.021, .078) 
.050 -22.19
SUSM2C 
same as model 
SUSM2 
43.610 
(34) 
.125 .98 .040 
(.000, .072) 
.049 -24.40
Note. CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean square error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; 
SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual; SU=Social understanding; SM=Social memory; SUPk=Social 
understanding-personality judgment; C=Consensus scored SU variables 
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Figure 8-2: Model of Social Memory/Social Understanding Considering Different Scoring 
Methods  
Note. Target Scores (SMSU2) and Consensus Scores (SUSM2C); Consensus-scored model in italics; 
SMw=Social memory-written1+2; SMa1=Social memory-auditory 1; SMa2=Social memory-auditory 2; 
SMp1=Social memory-pictorial 1; SMp2=Social memory-pictorial 2; SMf=Social memory-video-based1+2; 
SUw=Social understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding-auditory; SUp=Social understanding-pictorial; 
SUf=Social understanding-video-based 
 
To sum up, H27S was confirmed (The factors social understanding and social memory can 
be confirmed. They are moderately intercorrelated.). The same is true for hypothesis H28S 
(The SI structure is valid for both target and consensus scoring.). The loadings are even 
higher and of greater stability compared to our first study. 
 
2) Social perception 
I begin my analysis with the part of social perception forming the largest proportion according 
to the EFA results (see factor 3, Table 8-22). SPa1 is excluded for theoretical reasons even if 
it was also part of this factor in EFA. The parameters of this model SP1 are presented in 
Table 8-24. Although the model fits the data very well, there are some shortcomings: The 
task SPf2 has a relatively low load (.35). This is the task which is most related to the auditory 
SPa1. Testing the other parts of social perception is not as easy as with the nonverbal SP 
factor. The written and the auditory perception factors consist of only two parts. In EFA (see 
Table 8-22) the written SP tasks and the auditory emotion perception tasks, SPa2 and 
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GVEESS, formed two separate factors, not correlating with any other of the SI variables. 
Both factors include only two indicators. Concerning the auditory social/emotional perception 
tasks, I decided to split both the GVEESS and the SPa2 in two parts. They are built of three 
scales each. All scales were normally distributed. Considering criteria of item number, 
intercorrelation and reliability, I aggregated the SPa2 scales 1 and 3 and the GVEESS 1 and 
2 by means of z-transformation. Correlations of residuals were non-significant or on the 
border of being significant.The verbal perception tasks each consist of two parts (see Table 
8-18 and Table 8-19; the SPw2 parts are assumed to be more similar than the SPw1 parts 
since they only differ with respect to the target to which subjects have to react (social/non-
social vs. positive/negative). This gets also evident through the combined score that was built 
for SPw1 using z-values but not necessary for SPw2. Therefore, I decided to split the SPw1 
in two parts (SPw1_1 and SPw1_2). They have reliability values of .95 and .96, respectively. 
Model SP2 (see Table 8-24) includes the two language-based SP factors: emotion 
perception with two GVEESS and two SPa2 variables, and written SP being composed of 
two SPw1 scales and the SPw2 task. Although RMSEA and SRMR are slightly too high, the 
model has an acceptable fit. The two factors intercorrelate moderately with rSPw-SPa=.37. 
Model SP3 combines the language-based factors (see model SP2) with the nonverbal factor 
model (SP1). The three factor model of social perception fits the data satisfactorily. Again, 
RMSEA and SRMS are slightly too high. Note that the loadings are boosted because of the 
task splitting. Including the remaining task SPa1 in factor 1 leads to a worse fit (see model 
SP4). However, the fit is still acceptable. The complete model, involving all social perception 
variables, is shown in Figure 8-3. All SP factors correlate moderately. It may be that there is 
an additional SP factor, composed of SPf2 and SPa1, which is more closely related to the 
nonverbal SP factor than to the language-based SP factors. This should be examined in a 
further study including more variables of this type.  
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Table 8-24: Models of Social Perception (Second Study) 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI 
RMSEA  
(CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
SP1 Nonverbal SP (1 F) (SPp1, SPp2, SPf1, SPf2) 
3.126 
(2) .210 .98 
.057 
 (.000, .171) .032 -.874 
SP2 
Language-based SP (2 F) 
F1: SPa2_1 & SPa2_2, 
GVE1& GVE2; F2: 
SPw1_1 & SPw1_2, SPw2
33.123 
(13) .002 .96 
.095 
(.055, .135) .068 7.123 
SP3 
3 factor model 
F1: see model SP1;  
F2 & F3 see model SP2 
67.871 
(41) .005 .96 
.062 
 (.034, .087) 
 
.065 -14.13
SP4 see SP3 plus SPa1included in F1 
109.384
(51) .000 .91 
.081 
 (.060, .102) .074 7.38 
SP3b 
see SP3 with baseline 
SRT correctioned 
variables, SPp2, SPf1, 
SPf2, SPa2, GVE) 
69.711 
(41) .003 .95 
.069 
 (.036, .088) .064 -12.29
SP4b 
see SP4 with baseline 
SRT correction (SPp2, 
SPf1, SPf2, SPa2, GVE, 
SPa1)  
107.794 
(51) .000 .90 
.080  
(.059, .101) .079 5.794 
Note. SP=Social perception; F1…2…: Factor 1…2…; CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean square 
error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual; SPw1=Social 
perception-written 1; SPw2=Social perception-written 2; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SPa2=Social 
perception-auditory 2; GVE= GVEESS; SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 1; SPp2=Social perception-pictorial 2; 
SPf1=Social perception- video-based 1; SPf2=Social perception-video-based 2 
 
The models SP3b and SP4b can be derived from models SP3 and SP4. Model SP4b 
corresponds exactly to model SP4 except for using baseline corrected variables. The fit of 
the model SP4b (see Figure 8-3; numbers in italics) gets slightly better. The model shows an 
improved fit when doing without the SPa1 score (see model SP3b, Figure 8-3; numbers are 
displayed in bold letters). 
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Figure 8-3: Models of Social Perception (Second Study) 
Note. Basic model SP4; In addition, models SP4b (in italics) and SP3b (bold) are shown. SPw1=Social 
perception-written 1; SPw2= social perception- written 2; SPa1 = social perception- auditory 1; SPa2=Social 
perception-auditory 2; GVE=GVEESS; SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 1; SPp2=Social perception-pictorial 2; 
SPf1=Social perception- video-based 1; SPf2=Social perception-video-based 2 
 
To sum up, common variance is explained through three social perception subfactors being 
moderately intercorrelated. The confirmation of the H36S (There is a common reliable 
variance between -at least nonverbal- social perception tasks.) in this study may have 
several reasons: improved SP tasks yield more reliable and valid results; the comparatively 
higher degree of social complexity plays an important role in revealing the social information 
more clearly; the increased number of SP tasks makes a more reliable measurement 
possible; the different strategy of analysis (task splitting) favors the factor structure. 
 
In the following, the combined structure of social memory, social understanding, and social 
perception will be tested. I start the analysis with the most stable model, including the already 
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established factors of SU, SM and social perception nonverbal (SPnv). This model (SIS2Int1, 
see Table 8-25) fits the data satisfactorily. Excluding one zero correlation between SU and 
SPnv leads to a slightly but not significantly improved fit (ΔChi²=0.036, Δdf=1 < Chi²crit.95 
(df=1) =3.84; see model SIS2Int2, Table 8-25). Doing without the correlation between SM 
and SPnv also does not make the fit significantly worse and leads to a more parsimonious 
and thus preferred model (ΔChi²=2.83, Δdf=1 < Chi²crit.95 (df=1) =3.84; see model SIS2Int3, 
Table 8-25). This shows that social nonverbal perception seems to be almost completely 
independent from both social memory and social understanding. Model SIS2Int4 includes the 
written perception factor in addition. The model still fits the data although the fit slightly 
deteriorates (see higher AIC value). Doing without the relatively unreliable SMa2 and 
including an additional correlation between the two social perception factors, SPnv and SPw, 
leads to a slightly improved fit (see AIC value; see model SIS2Int5). This model is presented 
in Figure 8-4. The model SIS2Int5 remains stable for baseline corrected SP tasks as well 
(see model SIS2Int6, Figure 8-4, bold numbers). The factor intercorrelations in the models 
with and without baseline correction are almost the same (see Figure 8-4). In addition, I 
tested whether the model remains stable when controlling for all baseline measures 
(including readspeed and mouse speed). The SI model is not affected (Chi²=155.06, df=100, 
p<.000; CFI=.91; RMSEA=.056, CI 90%: .038, .073; SRMR=0.069; AIC=-44.94). Although 
we do not exactly know what the baseline tasks measure, it does not seem to have anything 
to do with SI. The only tasks that are strongly affected are the written SP tasks, in particular 
task SPw2. Adding the auditory SP factor leads to a worse fit of the model (see SIS2Int7). 
The factor intercorrelations of the complete SI model are presented in Table 8-26. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8  Second Study 
 269
Table 8-25: Internal Structure of Social Intelligence (Second Study) 
Model Model description 
Chi² 
(df) Prob. CFI 
RMSEA  
(CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
SIS2Int1 3 factor model 
SU, SM, SPnv; 
all factors 
intercorrelated 
113.254
(74) 
.002 .92 .055 (.033, 
.074) 
.071 -34.75 
SIS2Int2 see SIS2Int1; 
but without 
factor 
correlations: 
SU-SPnv 
113.290
(75) 
.003 .92 .054 
(.032, .073) 
.079 -34.75 
SIS2Int3 see SIS2Int1; 
only SU-SM 
correlated 
116.123
(76) 
.002 .92 .055 
(.034, .074) 
.079 -35.88 
SIS2Int4 4 factor model: 
SU, SM, SPnv, 
SPw; factor 
intercorr: SM, 
SU; SM, SPw; 
SM, SPnv 
186.966
(116) 
 
.000 .92 .078 
(.043, .074) 
 
.059 -45.03 
SIS2Int5 4 factor model:  
SU, SM (without 
SMa2), SPnv, 
SPw; factor 
intercorr: SM, 
SU; SM, SPw; 
SPw, SPnv; 
SM, SPnv 
168.258
(100) 
.000 .92 .063 
(.046, .078) 
.072 -31.74 
SIS2Int6 
 
see SIS2Int5, 
with SRT 
baseline 
correction in SP 
tasks 
170.161 
(100) 
.000 .91 (.038, .073) 
.064 
.073 -29.84 
SIS2Int7 complete SI 
model without 
SPa1 
279.932
(163) 
.000 .89 .064 (.051,     
.077) 
.076 -46.07 
Note. CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean square error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; 
SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual; SPnv=Social perception-nonverbal; SPw=Social perception-
written; SU=Social understanding; SM=Social memory; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SMa2=Social 
memory-auditory 2 
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Figure 8-4: Internal Structure of Social Intelligence (Second Study) 
Note: Bold numbers: Model controlled for SRT baseline in the relevant SP tasks. SPw1=Social perception-written 
1; SPw2=Social perception-written 2; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SPa2=Social perception-auditory 2; 
SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 1; SPp2=Social perception-pictorial 2; SPf1=Social perception-video-based1; 
SPf2=Social perception-video-based 2; SMw=Social memory-written1+2; SMa1=Social memory-auditory 1; 
SMp1=Social memory-pictorial 1; SMp2=Social memory-pictorial 2; SMf=Social memory-video-based1+2; 
SUw=Social understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding-auditory; SUp=Social understanding-pictorial; 
SUf=Social understanding-video-based 
 
SU is related to SM only. This is in line with the first study results: the SU variables were 
almost uncorrelated with both SP and AcI. The perception tasks share some common 
variance as already indicated by the SP model (see Figure 8-3). The written social 
perception factor is related more closely to SM than the nonverbal perception factor. This 
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may be due to the common use of written language since answers required in social memory 
tasks are often verbal. The strongest correlation among the social intelligence factors 
emerges between social memory and written social perception. This is probably due to the 
common written variance. All other correlations are low to moderate. The factor 
intercorrelations are only weakly affected by the SRT baseline correction and remain stable, 
except for the correlation between SPnv and SPa, and the correlation between SPa and SPw 
(decrease). Controlling for readspeed and mouse speed variance, in addition, leads to 
reduced correlations between SM and SPw between SPw and SPnv and between SPa and 
SPw (second value in parentheses). 
 
Table 8-26: Latent Factor Intercorrelations-Common Social Intelligence Model 
 SM SPnv SPa 
SU .27 (.27; .32)   
SPnv .16 (.16; .13)   
SPa .19 (.16; .16) .29 (.11; .10)  
SPw .48 (.48; .27) .35 (.32; .17) .37 (.25; .13) 
Note. In parentheses baseline corrected values: first value: SRT-correction, second  
value: SRT, readspeed, and mouse correction) 
 
 
Social Intelligence Contents 
At least three social intelligence content factors were expected: a nonverbal factor, including 
video-based and pictorial tasks, an auditory factor, and a written factor. Neither of the factors 
emerged in CFA. Models assuming this factor structure do not fit the data. The same is true 
for a two-factor model, assuming a nonverbal factor (pictorial and video-based) and a 
language-based factor (written and auditory material). A four-factor structure separating all 
four contents does not fit either. These confirm results of the first study and EFA of this 
study. Once again, we can expect that the content variance is covered by the comparatively 
stronger SI operational variance (see chapter 6.3.4). Testing the full MTMM model did not 
result in meaningful findings if only because some methodological problems emerged 
(constraints at lower/upper bound; degrees of freedom, etc.). A parceling technique (see 
Jäger, 1982, 1984) cannot be applied to examine whether an underlying content structure 
becomes apparent since we still do not have enough tasks. However, a proof for the 
existence of content specific variance and thus an evidence of the correctness of the 
hypothesis of three content factors is indicated through the findings concerning social 
perception (SP). The SP factor splits into a nonverbal component (pictorial and video-based), 
an auditory component (GVEESS and SPa2), and a written component containing the social 
written perception tasks SPw1 and SPw2. 
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8.3.6 Relationship Between Social Intelligence and Academic Intelligence 
In order to investigate the relationship between AcI and SI, a procedure similar to that 
applied in the first study will be used applying EFA and CFA. 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis of BIS Cells and Social Intelligence Variables 
All SIM variables were involved in the analysis. Social understanding scales were included 
as target-scored variables. Social perception tasks were used without baseline correction. In 
addition, the GVEESS score and the PONS score were included in the analysis as they are 
expected to be related to SI and may serve as reference instruments. 
 
Parallel analysis suggests a six-factor structure (see appendix C.2.2). The result of the factor 
analysis is presented in Table 8-27. The first and strongest factor can be interpreted as a 
general memory factor as it includes both social memory and BIS-memory. Even the 
unreliable SMa2 task (voice memory) loads clearly on this factor. The only memory task that 
cannot be classified unambiguously in factor 1 is SMp1 which could be already shown in the 
previous chapter. The second factor contains the social understanding scales. It shows only 
minor correlations with the other factors. The third factor can be interpreted as BIS-
reasoning. The fourth factor comprises of the nonverbal social perception tasks SPp1, SPp2, 
SPf1, SPf2, and the social auditory perception task (SPa1), and, as already mentioned, the 
SMp1 task. Like in the internal SI structure analysis (see chapter 8.3.5), the two auditory SP 
tasks split into different factors. Emotion perception (SPa2) forms a factor together with the 
GVEESS tasks (see factor 5). The two emotion perception tasks do not have any subsidiary 
loadings on one of the other factors, thus showing their uniqueness. Factor 6 summarizes 
the BIS speed tasks and contains the written SP tasks (SPw1 and SPw2). These findings 
provide a first hint that the written SP tasks may measure AcI speed rather than parts of SI. 
Note that the different signs of the tasks are due to their different poles since the SP tasks 
are reaction time measures whereas the BIS speed task score is built of the sum of correctly 
answered items. The PONS test cannot be clearly assigned to any of the factors. It shows 
minor loadings on each factor except for factor 5 (emotion perception) and factor 6 (speed). It 
appears that with including the AcI scores and the PONS, the SI structure remains stable 
(see Table 8-27). 
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Table 8-27: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Social Intelligence, Academic Intelligence, the 
GVEESS, and the PONS 
  Factor 
Variables 
1 
Memory 
2 
SI-SU 
3 
AcI-Reas 
4 
SI-SP 
5 
Emotion 
perception 
6 
Speed 
SMa1 .74   .26  -.14 
SMw .64 .11    -.22 
SMf2 .59      
P_mem1 .58  -.36    
SMp2 .57      
P_mem3 .56  -.25 -.13   
P_mem2 .53  -.16 -.10   
SMa2 .20   -.13 -.12  
SUf  .73    -.12 
SUp .16 .71  -.10   
SUpk  .69 -.13    
SUw  .62  .12   
SUa  .59  -.12  .13 
PONS  -.21 -.13 -.16   
P_reas1   -.80 .13  -.11 
P_reas2  .13 -.72   -.17 
P_reas3   -.70   -.15 
SPf1    .57   
SPp1    .55 .10 .15 
SPa1   -.10 .52 -.11 .15 
SPf2    .51 -.11  
SPp2 .18  .17 .42 .26  
SMp1 .34 .19 -.15 -.37  .19 
GVEESS     .78  
SPa2    -.11 .62  
P_speed2      -.70 
P_speed1   -.14  .12 -.69 
P_speed3 .13     -.69 
SPw2 -.15   .19 .16 .52 
SPw1 -.18   .19 .14 .44 
Explained 
variance 
(%) 
20.84 9.73 7.75 6.85 5.65 4.72 
Course of 
eigenvalues 
6.25 - 2.92 - 2.32 - 2.05 - 1.70 - 1.42 - 1.27 - 1.17 - .99 - .94 - .91 - .88 - .74 - 
.68 - .62 - .55 - .53 - .47 - .42 - .41 - .38 - .37 - .32 - .30 - .29 - .27 - .25 -.21 - 
.20 - .17 
Note. Pattern matrix. Highest loadings of tasks on factors are shadowed. Loadings below .10 are suppressed. 
AcI=Academic Intelligence; SPw1=Social perception-written 1; SPw2=Social perception-written 2; SPa1=Social 
perception-auditory 1; SPa2=Social perception-auditory 2; GVE=GVEESS; SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 1; 
SPp2=Social perception-pictorial 2; SPf1=Social perception-video-based 1; SPf2=Social perception-video-based 
2;SMw=Social memory-written1+2; SMa1=Social memory-auditory 1; SMa2=Social memory-auditory 2; 
SMp1=Social memory-pictorial 1; SMp2=Social memory-pictorial 2; SMf=Social memory-video-based1+2; 
SUw=Social understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding-auditory; SUp=Social understanding-pictorial; 
SUf=Social understanding-video-based; SUpk=Social understanding-personality; P_reas=BIS Parcel reasoning; 
P_spee=BIS Parcel speed; P_mem=BIS Parcel memory; Factor intercorrelations: F1, F2 (.09); F1, F3 (-.23); F1, 
F4 (-.24); F1, F5 (-.10); F1, F6 (-.23); F2, F3 (-.09); F2, F4 (.06); F2, F5 (.00); F2, F6 (-.14); F3, F4(.15); F3, 
F5(.03); F3, F6(.37); F4, F5(.05); F4, F6(.15); F5, F6(.01) 
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Factor analysis focusing on the contents (taking BIS content parcels instead of using 
operation parcels) results in operation factors, too. Six factors emerge: the first factor is 
formed through BIS parcels (AcI); the second consists of social understanding variables (SI-
SU); the third is made up by social memory scales; the fourth contains nonverbal and in parts 
auditory SP tests; the fifth subsumes emotion perception tests; and the last factor includes 
two of the verbal AcI parcels and the written SP tasks. As only the order of the factors is 
different from the solution presented in Table 8-27, I do not present this solution separately. 
All in all there seem to be SI factors that are separable from academic intelligence. 
 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Social and Academic Intelligence 
1) Relationship to academic intelligence (AcI) 
The CFA will be done with the SRT baseline corrected SP tasks, SU target scores, and BIS 
parcels. The PONS test is not analyzed as it does not belong to our test battery and did not 
show any meaningful relationship to the SI variables in EFA (see Table 8-27). The GVEESS 
will be included. 
 
The basic model SIAcIS2_1 (see Table 8-28) includes the BIS factors and the already 
established SI factors, SU and SM. This model serves the confirmation of first study results 
(see H27S, see chapter 8.1). It is obvious, that the model did not show an excellent fit to the 
data. However, it is sufficient to confirm the first study results. The difference compared to 
the first study analysis is that the model presented here (see SIAcIS2_1) includes the BIS-S 
factor in addition to the BIS-R and BIS-M factor (see chapter 6.3.3). The introduction of the 
BIS-Speed factor has negative effects on the model fit compared to the model doing without 
BIS-S (Chi²=161.295, df=100, CFI=.94, RMSEA=.059; SRMR=.073). Model SIAcIS2_2 
extends the structure by including the SP factors, SPnv and SPw. This model is presented in 
Figure 8-5. The fit gets worse introducing these additional factors. However, making up two 
additional paths (see model SIAcIS2_3) results in a fit not too different from the basic model 
(SIAcIS2_1). The model SIAcIS2_4 examines the influence of an additional covariance 
between BIS-R and SU. This model however is not better compared to the model SIAcIS2_2 
(ΔChi²= 1.07, Δdf=1 < ΔChi²95%=3.84). For reasons of parsimony one would do without this 
additional path. This path including the covariance value is also indicated in Figure 8-5 with a 
dashed line. Model SIAcIS2_5 includes the task SPa1 in addition and makes the model 
again worse. The effect is illustrated in Figure 8-5, too (fasciated box). 
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Table 8-28: Models of Social and Academic Intelligence (Second Study) 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI 
RMSEA 
(CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
SIAcIS2_1 BIS-R, BIS-M, 
BIS-S, SU, SM, 
(reason: First 
study) without SP 
239.050 
(146) 
.000 .92 .061 
(.046, .074) 
.091 -52.95 
SIAcIS2_2 
(see 
Figure 8-5) 
BIS-R, BIS-M, 
BIS-S, SU, SM, 
SPnv, SPw 
464.096
(286) 
.000 .90 .06 
(.050, .069) 
.084 -107.90
SIAcIS2_3 see model 
SIAcIS2_2 and 
two additional 
path between 
(SPp1; BIS-S) 
and (SMp1; 
SPnv) 
426.763 
(283) 
.000 .92 .054 
(.043, .064) 
.072 -139.24
SIAcIS2_4 see model 
SIAcIS2_2 and 
additional BIS-R-
SU path 
463.026
(285) 
.000 .90 .06 
(050, .069) 
.082 -106.97
SIAcIS2_5 SIAcIS2_3, 
additional task 
SPa1 in factor 
SPnv 
472.629 
(309) 
.000 .91 .055 
(.045, .065) 
.075 -145.37
Note. CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean square error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; 
SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual; AIC=Aikaike’s information criterion; SPw1=Social perception-
written 1; SPw2=Social perception-written 2; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 
1; SMp1=Social memory-pictorial 1; SM=Social memory; SU=Social understanding; BIS-R=BIS reasoning; BIS-
S=BIS speed; BIS-M=BIS memory 
 
To sum up, hypothesis H30SA (Social understanding is independent from academic 
intelligence.) can be confirmed. In both studies, SU proved to be an ability that is separable 
from AcI. Again, social memory is related to all BIS factors, BIS-memory, BIS-reasoning, and 
BIS-speed (see H31SA). The relationship to AcI is stronger than to SI. Nevertheless, it 
explains some unique variance as it can be predicted by the BIS factor with the following 
equation: SM=-.003*BIS-Speed+.675*BIS-Memory+.056*BIS-Reasoning+.710 D1 (R²=.495). 
The regression model fits the data excellently (Chi²= 135.672, df=84; p<.000; CFI=.95; 
SRMR=.057; RMSEA=.059 (CI: .040; .077)). SM is mainly predicted through BIS-Memory. 
BIS–Speed and BIS–Reasoning contribute nearly anything to the explanation of SM. The 
strongest correlation within SI exists between SM and SPw. Written SP is related to all BIS 
factors. Probably the common written/verbal variance causes this relationship. SPw is also 
stronger correlated with BIS-S than with SPnv. Both social perception tasks are related to 
BIS-R, and that may be a consequence of the task modifications in the direction of a higher 
degree of complexity (see chapter 7.4.1).  
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Figure 8-5: Social Intelligence and Academic Intelligence Model (Second Study) 
Note. Basic model: SIAIS2_2; modified models: SIAIS2_4 (dashed line) and SIAIS2_5 (fasciated box); 
SPw1=Social perception-written 1; SPw2=Social perception-written 2; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; 
SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 1; SPp2=Social perception-pictorial 2; SPf1=Social perception-video-based1; 
SPf2=Social perception-video-based 2; SMw=Social memory-written1+2; SMa1=Social memory-auditory 1; 
SMa2=Social memory-auditory 2; SMp1=Social memory-pictorial 1; SMp2=Social memory-pictorial 2; SMf=Social 
memory-video-based1+2; SUw=Social understanding-written; SUa=Social understanding-auditory; SUp=Social 
understanding-pictorial; SUf=Social understanding-video-based; P_reas=BIS Parcel reasoning; P_spee=BIS 
Parcel speed; P_mem=BIS Parcel memory; SPnv=Social perception-nonverbal; SPw=Social perception-written; 
SM=Social memory; SU=Social understanding; BIS-R= BIS reasoning; BIS-S=BIS speed; BIS-M=BIS memory 
 
 
2) Social intelligence without academic intelligence 
The following models examine the structure of social intelligence when controlled for 
academic intelligence variance. The analysis will be performed for the SU-SM model and for 
the SP model separately. Model SI-BIS1 controlling for BIS variance in the SU-SM model, 
has an excellent fit to the data (see SI-BIS1, Table 8-29). The SI components SU and SM 
remain stable independent from partialing out AcI variance.  
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Table 8-29: Models of Social Intelligence Controlled for BIS Variance (Second Study) 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI 
RMSEA 
(CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
SI-BIS1 SU, SM 43.409 (34) .129 .97 
.04 
 (.000, .072) .055 -24.59
SISP-BIS Social perception without BIS 
94.853 
(51) .000 .91 
.071 
 (.048, .092) .074 -7.147
Note. CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean square error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; 
SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual;SI=Social Intelligence; BIS=Berlin Intelligence Structure; 
SP=Social perception; SU=Social understanding; SM=Social memory 
 
Model SI-BIS1 is presented in Figure 8-6. As a reference, the structure without controlling for 
BIS variance is presented with numbers in italics. Concerning loadings and intercorrelations, 
the model remains stable and almost the same compared to the model without controlling for 
BIS variance and thus confirms the first study results with another sample. Again, the core 
factor, social understanding, is not at all affected by the BIS factors. 
 
Figure 8-6: Social Understanding/Memory Model With and Without Controlled for Academic 
Intelligence Variance (Second Study) 
Note. Basic model SI-BIS1; in italics without controlling for BIS variance. SMW=Social memory-written1+2; 
SMA1=Social memory-auditory 1; SMA2=Social memory-auditory 2; SMP1=Social memory-pictorial 1; SMP2= 
Social memory-pictorial 2; SMF=Social memory-video-based1+2; SUW=Social understanding-written; 
SUA=Social understanding-auditory; SUP=Social understanding-pictorial; SUF=Social understanding-video-
based; SU=Social understanding; SM=Social memory 
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The social perception model without the BIS variance fits the data as well (see Table 8-29), 
indicating that there is a social perceptual ability independent from AcI. Figure 8-7 shows 
both models, with and without controlling for BIS variance. The model controlled for BIS 
variance is presented in italics. SPw2 and SPp1 are the tasks that are most affected by 
partialing out BIS variance. Nevertheless, the model remains stable, including loadings and 
correlations.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-7: Social Perception With and Without Controlling for Academic Intelligence 
Variance (Second Study) 
Note. Values controlling for BIS variance are presented in italics (see model SISP-BIS). SPw1=Social perception-
written 1; SPw2=Social perception-written 2; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SPa2=Social perception-
auditory 2; SPp1=Social perception-pictorial 1; SPp2=Social perception-pictorial 2; SPf1=Social perception-video-
based1; SPf2=Social perception-video-based 2; SP=Social perception 
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8.4 Results - Auditory Intelligence 
8.4.1 Psychometric Properties of the Auditory Intelligence and the Working Memory 
Tasks 
Psychometrics: Auditory Intelligence Tasks 
I turn to the presentation of the psychometric properties of the AuI tasks (see Table 8-30). In 
the first three rows, the nonverbal tasks MA1, RH, and MA4 are presented. In the bottom 
part, the three speech tasks are shown. 
 
Table 8-30: Psychometrics of the Auditory Intelligence Tasks (Second Study) 
Task 
Number 
of items 1) Scale 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis2) 
Difficulty 
mean 
(SD) 
Range 
(min.–max.) rit -range
1) Cronbach’s Alpha 1) 
MA1 
N=175 15 (13) 
8 point 
scale .36/-.50  .43 (.19) .00 - .91 
.19 - .49 
(.24 - .48) .75 (.75) 
RH
 N=175 19 (19) 
repro-
duction .36/-.01  .42 (.18) .05  - 1.00 
.14 - .56 
(.24 - .56) .80 (.80) 
MA4
N=173 15 (11) 
4 point 
scale 
-.04 (.19)/ 
-.51  .51 (.23) .00 - 1.00 
.10  - .49 
(.31 - .50) .74 (.76) 
MW 
N=175 26
2 (14) open 
.15/-.38  
Reduced: 
.08/-.43  
.38 (.14) 
.44 (.20) 
.05 - .73  
(.00 - .93) 
.07 - .47 
(.22 - .44) .68 (.70) 
AU
 N=174 19 (16) 
MC 5 
alter-
natives 
-.63/.71  
Reduced: 
-.75/.69  
.69 (.15) 
.71 (.18) 
.21  - 1.00 
(.08  - 1.00)
.01 - .40 
(.17 - .35) .59 (.61) 
DS
N=175 16 (13) open 
-.47/.71  
Reduced: 
-.36/.40  
.70 (.14) 
.67 (.15) 
.19 - .97 
.15 - 1.00 
.11 - .33 
(.20 - .36) .62 (.61) 
Note. 1)in parentheses: reduced item number after item selection (items with rit <.20 are excluded); 2)Skewness is 
presented first; the second value represents curtosis. SE (Skewness) is .18; if not reported, SE (Curtosis) is .37; rit 
-range=Item total correlation range; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; RH=Rhythm reproduction; MA4=Tonal 
series; MW=Masked words; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences  
 
The tasks MA1 and AU are not normally distributed. However, the deviation is not severe for 
neither of the two tasks (see Figure 8-8a and Figure 8-8b). There are problems neither 
concerning the sample nor concerning the calculation with reaction times. The task detection 
of repeated tones (MA1) had a gap in its distribution. There are no subjects reaching a value 
of .50. Moreover, the task does not differentiate well at values around .30. The distribution of 
the task audiobook (AU) was slightly skewed on the left hand side. There were few test 
takers who got a very low score on the task. As the deviations are not severe, the tasks will 
be used for further analysis.  
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Figure 8-8a: Histogram of the Task                     Figure 8-8b: Histogram of the Task      
Detection of Repeated Tones                               Audiobook 
 
Regarding the average difficulty of the AuI tasks, the values of the tonal tasks, MA1 and 
MA4, and the task masked words are rather low. On the contrary, the remaining speech 
tasks are comparably easy. Compared to the first study, the task disarranged sentences was 
easier in the second study, whereas rhythm reproduction, masked words and audiobook 
remained nearly unchanged. Performance in the tonal tasks was better in the first study, 
probably due to the well-educated student sample.  
 
In summary, the modifications of the auditory tasks that were implemented after the first 
study were quite successful. Concerning rhythm reproduction, tonal series and detection of 
repeated tones, the reliability values were even better than anticipated (see Table 6-21). The 
selected items proved to work well, especially with regard to the tonal tasks detection of 
repeated tones (MA1) and tonal series (MA4). However, the result of the promising task 
masked words (MW) was a little disappointing. In the first study, with data of only 57 test 
takers, psychometric values were better compared to those values presented here. Possibly, 
the differences between the groups (students vs. mixed group of adults) are responsible for 
the findings. With respect to the task audiobook (AU), the conversion of open-ended 
questions into multiple choice items and the development of additional items did not lead to 
an improved reliability value. The disarranged sentences (DS) score with selected items did 
not reveal an improved reliability but shows correspondence to the anticipated value reported 
in Table 6-21. For further analysis reduced mean values of the tasks AU, MW and MA4 will 
be used. With regard to the remaining tasks, I will deal with the unreduced scores. Reduced 
and original values correlated at least with .96 except for the task audiobook (.85).  
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Psychometrics: Working Memory Tasks 
In the first study, the hypothesis emerged that working memory (WM) may be the underlying 
component of the AuI factor. Whether WM explains systematic variance on the AuI tasks, will 
be examined in the next section. Before the adaptive WM tasks will be related to the AuI 
tasks, their psychometric properties will be reported. Two performance scores were 
computed for each WM task. The first is described through the highest level that was 
completed successfully (Level score); the second combines this value with the percent of 
correctly answered items at the next higher level (Combined score). The following table 
displays the psychometric properties of both values for all three tasks. 
 
Table 8-31: Psychometrics of the Working Memory Tasks 
Task Score Mean (SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 
Range 
(min. – max.) 
Level 2.10 (.86) .40/-.22 0 - 4 WM_WSp 
(max. level: 7)
Combined 
2.65 (.85) 
 
2.66 (.84) 
.31/-.14 
 
.41/-.34 
0.16 – 4.76 
 
1.00 – 4.76 
Level 2.52 (.92) .15/.16 0 – 5 
WM_MUn 
(max. level: 6) Combined 
3.13 (.92) 
 
3.14 (.90) 
.12/.17 
 
.30/-.17 
0.44 – 5.71 
 
1.35 – 5.71 
Level 1.64 (1.22) .24/-.87 0 – 5 
WM_DSp 
(max. level: 7) Combined 
2.16 (1.25) 
 
2.15 (1.24) 
-.24/-.73 
 
.18/-.92 
0.14 – 5.85 
 
0.14 – 5.00 
Note. N=182; scores corrected for outliers (trimmed distribution) are presented in italics. SE (Skewness) is .18; if 
not reported, SE (Curtosis) is .37; WM_WSp= Word span; WM_MUn=Memory updating numerical; WM_DSp=Dot 
span 
 
Whereas in the task dot span (WM_DSp), some subjects achieved the final level, in the tasks 
“word span” (WM_WSp) and memory updating numerical (WM_MUn) test takers did not 
attain the final levels. As far as the task wordspan (WM_WSp) is concerned, subjects were 
able to deal with six words in remembering and ordering their first letters. This result is in line 
with findings reported by Anderson (1996) that a person is only seldom able to process more 
than seven units at the same time (see also Horn, 2006). In WM_DSp, participants 
succeeded in indicating symmetry and remembering the position of six dots. None of the 
working memory tasks follows a normal distribution no matter which score we take. Even so, 
a closer look shows that we can take the tasks for further analysis. Exemplary, the 
histograms for both scores of the task WM_MUn are presented in Figure 8-9a and Figure 
8-9b. 
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Figure 8-9a: Memory Updating Numerical            Figure 8-9b: Histogram Memory  
                      -level score                                          Updating Numerical-combined score 
 
You will find that the level score follows an even distribution, similar to the bell-shaped 
normal distribution curve (see Figure 8-9a). However, a closer look at the more precise 
combined value (see Figure 8-9b) reveals the difficulties of the score. Several single 
distributions seem to form one complete, each with a different modal value. This becomes 
clear by considering the adaptive algorithm we applied (see section 8.2.3). The single 
“distributions” seem to be due to the different levels achieved by the participants. On each 
level, there are differences on how many extra percentage points subjects reach of the next 
higher level. This inevitably leads to this kind of distribution. This is equally true for the other 
two WM tasks, dot span (WM_DSp) and word span (WM_WSp). Since this seems to be the 
reason for the distribution, despite these problems, the combined scores, containing more 
detailed information compared to the level scores, will be taken for further analysis. Table 
8-32 shows that the WM tasks are moderately intercorrelated, indicating that they share 
systematic common variance although operating with different kinds of material. 
 
Table 8-32: Intercorrelations Between Working Memory Tasks 
 
  WM_WSp WM_MUn 
WM_MUn .32  
WM_DSp .25 .37 
Note. All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). listwise deletion; N= 182 
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Since we developed an adaptive version of the working memory tasks described in Sander 
(2005), we can only determine a reliability value by means of Item Response Theory (IRT) 
that should be a future aim for item and test analysis. In this thesis, in order to indicate 
reliability in addition to the task intercorrelation, I will refer to data that was obtained with the 
standard version of the task in past investigations. 
 
Sander (2005) reports internal consistency values (Cronbach’s Alpha) of .76 (WM_WSp), .83 
(WM_MUn), and .81 (WM_DSp). Each of the three standard version tasks contains 18 items. 
In his study, 182 students (68.69% male; mean age: 24.5 years, SD=5.3) participated. 
Compared to our study, the intercorrelations between the three tasks are lower but are in the 
same order, with WM_DSp and WM_MUn correlating highest and WM_WSp and WM_DSp 
lowest. Oberauer (2002) applied the tasks WM_DSp (Alpha=.70), WM_MUn (Alpha=.82), 
and “Reading span” (verbal indicator) in order to assess WM. The 135 participants were 
mainly students (56% were male; mean age: 25.8, SD=3.8). WM_DSp and WM_MUn 
correlated with r=.50. In an earlier study reported in Oberauer (2000), 128 students (mean 
age: 26.2, SD=5) worked on WM_MUn (Alpha=.81) and Dotspan (Alpha= .75) that correlated 
with r= .51. 
 
To summarize, the reliability of the standard version of the WM tasks we applied was proved 
to be reliable in several studies. The correlations between the WM tasks are, although not as 
high as in the results obtained with the standard version, comparable. The relatively lower 
correlations may be due to the adaptive procedure, since every person works on different 
items, some work on only a few whereas others get nearly the whole battery. Individuals 
differ in their ability to deal with verbal, numerical and figural material. Therefore, we would 
even expect lower intercorrelations between the tasks. 
 
8.4.2 Relationship Between Auditory Intelligence and Working Memory 
One of the second study aims was to control systematic variance that is produced by AuI for 
the influence of WM. Table 8-33 shows the correlations between the AuI tasks with and 
without controlling for working memory. First, as expected, the nonverbal tasks (MA1, MA4, 
RH) show significant correlations indicating a common underlying factor. The correlations 
between the speech tasks are not in the assumed strength. The task MW is only weakly 
related to the other speech tasks. With regard to the operational domains, only the reasoning 
tasks seem to share variance. Similar to the first study, the discrimination and memory 
domain lack significant correlations between the speech and the nonverbal tasks. Taking into 
account the working memory influence, it is apparent that the intercorrelations between the 
auditory nonverbal intelligence tasks decrease only marginally. However, some correlations 
between speech (in particular AU and DS) and tonal tasks decrease remarkably. The task 
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MW seems to be nearly completely uninfluenced by working memory, indicating that it 
measures something different that is neither explained by WM nor by the AuI tasks we 
applied. 
 
Table 8-33: The Effect of Working Memory on the Intercorrelations Between the Auditory 
Intelligence Tasks  
 MA1 RH MA4 MW AU 
RH .40** .37** 1.00    
MA4 .47** .43** 
.28** 
.20** 1.00   
MW .11 .12 
.04 
.01 
.01 
.02 1.00  
AU .13 .05 
.08 
-.01 
.10 
-.02 
.08 
.10 1.00 
DS .12 .02 
.15 
.00 
.21** 
.06 
.10 
.12 
.30** 
.19* 
Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
Significance starting with .16; listwise deletion N= 172; Bold: correlations controlled for working memory; 
Expected correlations within content variables (nonverbal vs. speech) are shaded in dark grey, within operation 
variables (discrimination, memory, and reasoning) in light grey.; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; RH=Rhythm 
reproduction; MA4=Tonal series; MW=Masked words; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences 
 
 
8.4.3 Internal Construct Validity of the Auditory Intelligence Tasks 
Additional examination of the internal relationship between the auditory tasks occurs with 
EFA and CFA. Parallel analysis indicates a two-factor structure (see also appendix C.2.3). 
The result of the EFA is presented in Table 8-34. The two factors can be interpreted as a 
nonverbal auditory factor (factor 1) and a speech auditory factor (factor 2) and in combination 
explain 53.27% of the variance. The first factor subsumes the tonal tasks MA1 and MA4, and 
the rhythm task. It has an eigenvalue of 2.00 and explains 33.41% of the variance. The 
second factor explains 19.86% of the variance (eigenvalue: 1.19). The two-factor structure is 
confirmative for the results of the first study (see chapter 6.4.2) and also proves hypothesis 
H29Au (Auditory intelligence splits into two content factors, nonverbal and speech auditory 
intelligence.; see chapter 8.1). By means of CFA, I will examine whether these results can be 
justified. 
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Table 8-34: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Auditory Intelligence Tasks (Second Study) 
  Factor 
 Task (1) nonverbal (2) speech 
MA1 .86  
MA4 .57  
RH .49  
DS  .65 
AU  .48 
MW  .19 
Course of eigenvalues 2.00 – 1.19 – 0.93 – 0.74 – 0.67 – 0.46 
Note. Pattern matrix. MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction; 
AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Auditory Intelligence Tasks (Internal Structure, S2) 
First, I will test the two internal structure models of AuI I already examined in the first study in 
order to see whether the structure is stable using different samples (see chapter 6.4.2). 
Therefore, a general auditory factor model (model AuInt1) and a model suggesting two 
content factors, speech and nonverbal auditory ability (model AuInt2), are tested. Since there 
are only two indicators for each cognitive operation, I will not be able to test the operational 
structure again. The two models are presented in Table 8-35. 
 
Table 8-35: Models of Auditory Intelligence(Second Study) 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI 
RMSEA  
(CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
AuInt1 One general 
auditory factor 
21.080 
(9) 
.012 .88 .089 
(.039, .138) 
.066 3.080
AuInt2 Two content 
factors, speech 
and nonverbal 
auditory ability 
6.693 
(8) 
.570 1.00 .000 
(.000, .079) 
.029 -9.307
AuInt3 Two-factor model 
without WM 
3.664 
(8) 
.886 1.00 .000 
(.000, .042) 
.026 -12.34
AuInt4 Two-factor model 
without WM and 
BIS 
6.173 
(8) 
.6279 1.00 .000 
(.000, .075) 
.036 -9.83 
Note. CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean square error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; 
SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual; BIS=Berlin Intelligence Structure; WM=Working memory capac-
ity 
 
The CFA results are another proof for the validity of the two content domains. As 
hypothesized (H29Au, see chapter 8.1), the two-factor model fits the data excellently and 
much better than the general factor model. The two factors correlate with rnonv-speech=.39 
(p<.01) which is a little lower than in the first study. The task MW does not really fit in well, as 
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already indicated by correlational and exploratory factor analysis. Correlation analysis (see 
chapter 8.4.2) indicates that concerning nonverbal auditory ability, the correlations remain 
stable even when controlled for WM. In order to confirm this result, I controlled for working 
memory variance in the auditory tasks and examined the two-factor structure model again 
(see model AuInt3). The model remains stable and its fit even improves. The correlation 
between the two factors decreases. Controlling for AcI variance in addition to working 
memory decreases the fit slightly but the model remains still stable (see AuInt4), the factors 
correlating with r=.14. This implies that AuI can be stably measured besides AcI and WM and 
confirms for hypothesis H37Au (There is an auditory nonverbal intelligence when working 
memory variance is partialed out.) as well. All three models are presented in Figure 8-10. 
Numbers in italics belong to the model controlled for WM (model AuInt3). The model 
controlled for WM and the BIS variance is shown in bold numbers (model AuInt4).  
 
 
Figure 8-10: Internal Structure of Auditory Intelligence With and Without Controlling for 
Working Memory and Academic Intelligence 
Note. Numbers controlling for working memory capacity are presented in italics. Bold letters represent the model, 
which is controlled for both WM and the BIS. MA1= Detection of repeated tones; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm 
reproduction; AU=Audiobook; DS= Disarranged sentences 
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8.4.4 Relationship between Auditory Intelligence and Academic Intelligence  
In the following, the auditory intelligence tasks will be related to academic intelligence. First, 
Table 8-36 addresses the correlations between the auditory intelligence tasks and the BIS 
cells, namely speed, memory and reasoning, each relying on figural-spatial, numerical and 
verbal material. 
 
Table 8-36: Correlations Between the Auditory Intelligence Tasks and the BIS Cells 
  B_Sf B_Sv B_Sn B_Mf B_Mv B_Mn B_Rf B_Rv B_Rn 
MA1 .11 .17* .09 .15 .03 .00 .16* .22** .14 
RH .11 .10 .04 .18* .06 -.01 .21** .22** .06 
MA4 .18* .18* .20** .23** .12 .12 .36** .27** .30** 
MW -.07 -.01 .10 -.02 .13 .11 .08 .08 .02 
AU .19* .29** .29** .27** .30** .34** .21** .40** .23** 
DS .07 .20** .31** .07 .29** .14 .26** .51** .31** 
Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
Significance starting with .16; listwise deletion; N=172; Expected correlations are shadowed; MA1=Detection of 
repeated tones; RH=Rhythm reproduction; MA4=Tonal series; MW=Masked words; AU=Audiobook; 
DS=Disarranged sentences; B_=BIS; Sf=Speed figural; Sv=Speed verbal; Sn=Speed numerical; Mf=Memory 
figural; Mv=Memory verbal; Mn=Memory numerical; Rf=Reasoning figural; Rv=Reasoning verbal; Rn=Reasoning 
numerical 
 
The AuI tasks correlate particularly with BIS reasoning. An exception is the task MW that 
correlates with none of the BIS cells. Note that this task neither shows correlations with the 
other auditory tasks nor with working memory. MA1 and RH also do not correlate significantly 
with reasoning numerical which indicates that these tasks do not require a cognitive 
numerical operation. This is a little surprising considering that rhythm involves counting and 
MA1 is expected to require some counting, too. Similar to the first study results, the task AU 
correlates with almost all of the BIS cells, indicating that it shares a great deal of variance 
with AcI. DS correlates with less of the BIS cells but consistent moderate to high with the 
reasoning cells. It is apparent that, even if we had applied three tasks for each operation, 
these domains would not have emerged with these tasks. There are two explanations for this 
result that stand to reason: First, with these AuI tasks it is not possible to measure AuI 
operations. Second, it may be that these kinds of operations indeed do not exist in AuI.  
 
In EFA, AuI tasks will be contrasted with both the BIS contents and the BIS operations. With 
regard to the relationship between AuI and the BIS content domains, parallel analysis 
indicated a two-factor structure (see appendix C.2.4) whereas the Kaiser-Guttman rule 
suggested a four-factor structure. Orientating on the findings obtained in the first study, a 
four-factor structure was expected. Both solutions can be considered in Table 8-37. 
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Table 8-37: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Auditory Intelligence with BIS Contents (Second 
Study) 
Two-factor solution Four-factor solution 
Task 
Factor1
 
AcI 
Factor2 
 
AuI Task 
Factor 1 
 
verbal 
Factor 2 
 
auditory 
Factor 3 
 
figural 
Factor 4 
 
numeric 
P_num1 .82 -.19 P_ver2 .83  -.12  
P_num2 .81 -.23 P_ver3 .66    
P_num3 .75  P_ver1 .61  -.23 .16 
P_ver1 .71 .13 DS .44 .13   
P_ver2 .64  AU .44   .10 
P_ver3 .60  MA1  .83 .15  
P_fig2 .55 .26 MA4  .58  .24 
P_fig3 .52 .20 RH .11 .51 -.20 -.19 
AU .47  P_fig1 .21  -.64 .14 
P_fig1 .42 .26 P_fig2  .13 -.56 .46 
DS .40  MW .14  .14  
MW .15  P_num3    .76 
MA1  .64 P_num2 .20 -.13  .71 
RH  .61 P_num1 .26 -.12  .64 
MA4 .18 .55 Parcel fig3  .18 -.21 .53 
Explained 
variance (%) 35.41 11.26 
Explained 
variance (%) 35.41 11.26 8.63 6.74 
Course of 
eigenvalues 
5.31 - 1.69 - 1.29 - 1.01 - .91 - .79 - .73 - .62 - .50 - .45 - .42 - .38 - .32 - .31 
- .26 
Note. N=172; Pattern matrix; AcI=Academic Intelligence; AuI=Auditory Intelligence; P_num=BIS Parcel numerical; 
P_ver=BIS Parcel verbal; P_fig=BIS Parcel figural; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA4=Tonal series; 
RH=Rhythm reproduction; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences; MW=Masked words; Intercorrelations 
within the four-actor solution: F1, F2 (.31); F1, F3 (-.08); F2, F3 (-.18); F2, F4 (.23); F3, F4 (-.17), F1, F4 (.59). 
The two factors of the two-factor solution correlate with .34. 
 
Although we applied only six auditory tasks in this study, the result of the EFA is almost 
equal to the corresponding factor analysis of the first study (see Table 6-26). The two-factor 
solution indicated a separation between AuI and AcI. Once again, it becomes evident that the 
AuI tasks measure something different compared to AcI and that the auditory speech tasks, 
DS and AU, have their highest loading on AcI rather than on AuI. The nonverbal auditory 
tasks seem to be specific to the auditory ability. This is the same with respect to the four-
factor solution. However, the task MW did not fit at all in the structure and confirms the result 
obtained in correlation analysis. It seems to measure something different from both AcI and 
AuI. Subsidiary loadings of the figural BIS parcels on the auditory factor (two factor solution) 
indicate that for completion of the auditory tasks, figurative abilities may be needed. The 
analysis also reveals that the BIS structure does not seem to be clear in this study: the figural 
parcels split. Parcel 1 and 2 are negatively related to parcel 3.  
 
With regard to the classification of auditory intellectual ablities within the BIS operations 
parallel analysis indicates a two-factor structure (see appendix C.2.5), whereas the Kaiser-
Guttman rule suggests a five-factor structure. Both solutions could approach the empirical 
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structure taking into account that the Kaiser-Guttman rule is rather liberal and parallel 
analysis is rather conservative (see Table 8-38).  
 
Table 8-38: Exploratory Factor Analysis with Auditory Intelligence Tasks and BIS Operations  
 
Two-factor 
solution  Five-factor solution 
Task 
Factor1 
 
BIS-R/ 
AuI 
Factor2 
 
 
BIS-M/S 
 
 
 
Task 
Factor 1
 
 
BIS–R 
Factor 2
 
AuI-
nonv. 
Factor 3
 
 
BIS-S 
Factor 4 
 
 
BIS-M 
Factor 5
 
AuI-
speech 
P_reas1 .63 -.22 P_reas1 .79     
P_reas3 .62 -.19 P_reas2 .72   .14  
P_reas2 .61 -.32 P_reas3 .69  -.13   
MA4 .59  MA1 -.19 .92   .12 
MA1 .53 .13 MA4 .22 .51    
DS .43 -.11 RH  .47    
RH .40 .10 P_spee1   -.86   
MW .11  P_spee2   -.78   
P_mem3  -.77 P_spee3   -.65  .30 
P_mem2 -.15 -.75 P_mem2    .85  
P_mem1  -.75 P_mem3    .70  
P_spee2 .24 -.47 P_mem1 .13   .70 .12 
P_spee1 .28 -.44 AU    .23 .49 
AU .13 -.40 DS .32    .38 
P_spee3 .36 -.39 MW     .21 
% Expl. 
var. 33.50 11.74 
% Expl. 
var. 33.50 11.74 8.73 7.85 6.90 
Eigen-
values 
5.03 - 1.76 - 1.31 - 1.18 - 1.04 - .87 - .76 - .63 - .48 - .44 - .38 - .36 - .30 - .27 
.21 
Note. N=172; Structure matrix; Highest loadings are shadowed in grey, subsidiary loadings in light 
grey.AuI=Auditory Intelligence; P_reas=BIS Parcel reasoning; P_spee=BIS Parcel speed; P_mem=BIS Parcel 
memory; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction; AU=Audiobook; 
DS=Disarranged sentences; expl. var.=explanation of variance; Intercorrelations of the two-factor solution: F1, F2 
(-.40); Intercorrelations of the four-factor solution: F1, F2 (.36); F1, F3 (-.44); F1, F4 (.34); F1, F5 (.41); F2, F3 (-
.21); F2, F4 (.13); F2, F5 (.24); F3, F4(-.42); F3, F5(-.32); F4, F5(-.30)  
 
The two-factor structure is made up of two groups: a first factor with loadings of the 
reasoning and of the auditory tasks (except for AU), and a second factor comprised of the 
BIS memory tasks, the BIS speed tasks, and the audiobook. The audiobook probably found 
its place in the second factor because of its strong memory component. The strong 
relationship between reasoning and the auditory tasks was already shown in the correlation 
analysis (see Table 8-36), and it was already demonstrated that WM does not influence the 
correlation pattern between the auditory nonverbal tasks considerably (see chapter 8.4.2). 
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The five-factor structure meets almost exactly my expectations (see H20AuA and H21AuA, 
chapter 3.2.3 and chapter 8.1). First, we got a reasoning factor, explaining the largest 
proportion of variance. Second, a nonverbal auditory factor emerged. The third and fourth 
factors subsumed the BIS speed and memory tasks, respectively. The fifth factor comprised 
the auditory speech tasks. However, corresponding to earlier results, MW only had a low 
loading on that factor. In addition, there were subsidiary loadings of the auditory speech 
tasks: AU loaded on the BIS-M factor, whereas DS had a subsidiary loading on the BIS-R 
factor. MA4 loaded on BIS-R thus pointing to the correctness of classification into the 
reasoning domain. 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis of Auditory Intelligence, BIS Operations, and Working Memory 
Including WM into an EFA in addition to the auditory tasks and the BIS parcels again resulted 
in two different structures depending on the extraction criterion: Parallel analysis suggested a 
three-factor structure (see appendix C.2.5), whereas according to the Kaiser-Guttman rule, 
five factors would be extracted. The result is addressed in appendix C.6. Both factor 
solutions indicate a strong relationship between working memory and BIS reasoning. In the 
three-factor solution, the auditory tasks loaded on the first component, too, that contained 
WM and BIS-R. In the five-factor solution both auditory nonverbal and auditory speech 
abilities formed factors that were clearly separable from WM and BIS-R. In the five-factor 
solution, the task MW showed a (low) loading on the intended auditory speech factor. The 
two additional auditory speech tasks loaded on the AcI factors: in the two-factor solution, AU 
had its highest loading on the memory factor, and in the five-factor solution, DS had its 
strongest loading on the reasoning/working memory factor. 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Auditory Intelligence and Academic Intelligence 
In the following analysis, the two-factor AuI model is contrasted with BIS contents and 
operations. In both models, the auditory tasks are controlled for WM. 
 
Table 8-39: Auditory Intelligence and Academic Intelligence Contents (Second Study) 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI RMSEA  (CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
AuI-AcI1 two AuI contents and 
three AcI contents, all 
factors correlated 
126.189 
(82) 
.001 .94 .056 
(.035, .075) 
.064 -37.81
AuI-AcI2 see AuI-AcI1; but 
double assignment of 
AU; no corr. between 
AuI-speech & AcI-fig 
and AuI-nv&AcI-num 
120.382 
(81) 
.003 .97 .053 
(.032, .072) 
.059 -41.62
Note: In all models, I controlled for WM variance. AuI=Auditory Intelligence; AcI=Academic Intelligence; 
fig=figural; num=numerical; nv=nonverbal; CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean square error of 
approximation; Prob.=Probability value; SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual 
 
The AuI factors can be clearly separated from the BIS content factors. The basic model 
allowing all factor intercorrelations fit the data satisfactorily (see AuI-AcI1; Table 8-39). The 
refined model excluded the correlations between the auditory speech factor and the figural 
BIS factor, as well as the relationship between the numerical BIS factor and the auditory 
nonverbal abilities. It also assumed a double assignment of the audiobook to the verbal BIS 
factor besides its loading on the auditory speech factor (see model AuI-AcI2, Table 8-39). 
This model showed an even better fit to the data. The model refinement was done in steps 
introducing each change separately thus improving the model continuously. However, for 
reasons of limited space, I only present the basic and the final model here. In model AuI-
AcI2, the task AU is closer related to verbal AcI than to AuI. MW again has a low loading on 
the auditory speech factor. The factor intercorrelations showed the auditory nonverbal factor 
not very related to any other factor of the model. As expected, the auditory speech factor had 
its strongest relationship with the verbal BIS factor. The BIS contents correlated strongly 
making their common variance apparent that is different from the AuI variance. Model AuI-
AcI2 is illustrated in Figure 8-11. 
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Figure 8-11: Model of Auditory Intelligence and BIS Contents (Second Study) 
Note. P_verb=BIS Parcel verbal; P_num=BIS Parcel numerical; P_figur=BIS Parcel figural; MA1=Detection of 
repeated tones; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences 
 
 
Concerning the classification of the AuI tasks within the BIS operations, I first suggested a 
model allowing for all factor intercorrelations (see Model AuI-AcI3). Removing some of the 
zero correlations between the auditory nonverbal factor and BIS-M, BIS-R, BIS-S, and the 
auditory speech factor, resulted in a better fit and more parsimonious models (AuI-AcI4 and 
AuI-AcI5). An additional assignment between the audiobook and the memory factor of the 
BIS improved the fit again (see model AuI-AcI6). This model is presented in Figure 8-12. 
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Table 8-40: Models of Auditory and BIS Operations (Second Study) 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI RMSEA  (CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
AuI-AcI3 all intercorrelations 
allowed 
108.888 
(80) 
.018 .96 .046 
(.020, .066) 
.052 -51.11 
AuI-AcI4 without correlations 
of: (BIS-M, AuNv); 
(AuNv, AuSp) and 
(AuNv, BIS-R) 
111.101
(83) 
.021 .97 .044 
(.018, .065) 
.056 -54.89 
AuI-AcI5 see AuI-AcI4 but 
without correlation 
between (BIS-S, 
AuNv) 
112.163 
(84) 
.022 .97 .044 
(.018, .064) 
.058 -55.84 
AuI-AcI6 see AuI-AcI5, but 
double assignment 
of audiobook; AuSp 
uncorrelated with 
BIS-M 
107.752
(84) 
.041 .97 .041 
(.009, .061) 
 
.057 -60.24 
Note. I controlled for working memory variance in all models. CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean 
square error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual; 
AuI=Auditory Intelligence; AcI=Academic Intelligence; BIS-S=BIS speed; BIS-M=BIS memory; BIS-R=BIS 
reasoning; AuSp=Auditory speech; AuNv=Auditory nonverbal 
 
The model presented the auditory nonverbal factor as completely independent from AcI. 
Although the auditory speech factor was related to AcI, it also seemed to include a unique 
part of variance being unrelated to the auditory nonverbal ability. The task audiobook may be 
rather considered as an AcI task (memory, verbal) than an AuI task suggested by both the 
content model (Figure 8-11) and the operation model (Figure 8-12). This is in line with the 
remarks made in chapter 2.5, since audiobook contains larger speech units instead of single 
ones and thus requires verbal comprehension as a part of verbal AcI as well. 
 
In summary, nonverbal auditory ability was proved to be independent from AcI operations 
(see H32AuA), whereas the auditory speech factor was related to the BIS contents and BIS 
operations (see H33AuA, both hypotheses see chapter 8.1). With respect to the operation 
domains, auditory speech tasks correlated low to moderate with BIS-reasoning and with BIS-
speed. Despite these relationships, they explain unique variance. However, this variance did 
not appear to be specific auditory since the auditory nonverbal factor was not related to the 
auditory speech factor. Concerning the relationship to the BIS contents, the auditory speech 
factor had its strongest correlation with the verbal BIS factor (.54). In addition, it was related 
to the numerical factor indicating that some crystallized ability (see chapter 2.1) was 
assessed. The auditory nonverbal factor showed a lower correlation with the verbal factor, a 
slightly stronger relationship with the BIS figural factor (.19), and no correlation at all with the 
numerical factor. 
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Figure 8-12: Auditory Intelligence Related to BIS Operations (Second Study) 
Note. The auditory tasks are controlled for working memory. P_R=BIS parcel reasoning; P_S=BIS Parcel speed; 
P_M=BIS Parcel memory; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction; 
AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences; MW=Masked words 
 
 
8.4.5 Relationship Between Musical Experience and Auditory Intelligence 
Subjects had to judge their musical skills in comparison to peers on a five-point rating scale 
(1=extremly good; 5= extremely bad). 6.3% (N=11) indicated to have extremely well 
developed musical skills compared to their peers; 16.6% (N=29) rated their skills with a “2”; 
45.7% (N=80) judged themselves as being in the middle; 24% (N=42) indicated to have 
rather poor and 7.4% (N=13) to have extremely poor musical skills when compared to their 
peers. This variable correlated significantly moderate to high with the nonverbal auditory 
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intelligence tasks (correlations for MA1: r=.50; RH: r=.30; MA4: r=.28, for all p<.001) and thus 
confirmed the results of the first study (see chapter 6.4.4 above). The auditory speech tasks 
did not correlate at all with the musical skills self-assessment. Future studies should address 
the question of whether the nonverbal auditory tasks measure an auditory ability which 
serves as a precondition to acquire musical skills or whether it actually represents a musical 
ability that is unique for musically gifted people. There were no gender differences in the AuI 
tasks, indicating that the performance differences in favor of men that were found in the first 
study (see chapter 6.4.4) are due to a sample effect (high proportion of mathematicians). 
Empirical results support the positive relationship between mathematical abilities and musical 
giftedness (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2006). 
 
 
8.5 Results - Social Auditory and General Auditory Intellectual Abilities 
The correlation matrix between social auditory and general auditory intelligence tasks is 
presented in Table 8-41. In italics, the correlations with baseline correction are shown. 
 
Table 8-41: Corrrelations Between Social and General Auditory Abilities (Second Study) 
  MA1 RH MA4 MW AU DS 
.06 .13 .14 .04 .04 .01 SPa1 .01 .06 .10 .07 .00 .03 
.07 .08 .22** .06 .21** .17* SPa2 .01 .03 .17* .03 .18* .16* 
.01 .09 .19* .07 .13 .12 GVEESS .08 .02 .15 .07 .10 .12 
.07 .18* .18* .17* .38** .41** SMa1 .07 .18* .18* .17* .38** .41** 
.07 .08 .12 -.03 .11 .12 SMa2 .07 .08 .12 -.03 .11 .12 
-.03 .08 .10 .02 .20** .21** SUa -.03 .08 .10 .02 .20** .21** 
Note. listwise N=171; in italics (correlations with baseline correction); MA1=Detection of repeated tones; 
MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction; AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences; MW=Masked words; 
SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SPa2=Social perception-auditory; GVEESS=Geneva Emotion Expression 
stimulus set; SMa1=Social memory-auditory1; SMa2=Social memory-auditory 2; SUa=Social understanding-
auditory 
 
The pattern of intercorrelations between social auditory and general auditory tasks is rather 
inconsistent: there are zero correlations, low correlations, and some moderate correlations. 
Although the correlation patterns appears inconsistent, correlations do exist, and H34SAu 
(Social auditory abilities show only marginal relationships to general auditory abilities.) has to 
be rejected in particular with respect to auditory speech tasks. With the exception of MA1 
(which is zero correlated with all of the social auditory tasks), all AuI tasks are significantly 
related to SMa1. This partly confirms H35SAu (Social auditory memory is related to general 
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auditory intelligence tasks that require memory.). Relationships to SI are stronger for auditory 
speech tasks, probably because both use spoken language (see also chapter 6.5). However, 
when the AuI tasks are controlled for working memory, the correlations decrease. Only the 
relationships between SMa1 and audiobook and distracted sentences (speech tasks) remain 
significant (r=.34 and r=.31 respectively). Thus, common variance between auditory 
nonverbal and social auditory memory seems to be due to working memory whereas the 
relationship between the auditory speech tasks and social auditory memory does not seem 
to be affected by working memory. The task MA4 (auditory cognition of 
relationships/reasoning) is related to both social auditory perception (SPa2, GVEESS) and 
social auditory memory (SMa1). When working memory is partialed out these correlations 
also decrease (.11 to .13). The strongest relationship remains between MA4 and SMa2 (.13, 
p=.08). The task masked words is only significantly related to SMa1 (.17). Note that MW was 
neither related to AcI nor to the nonverbal auditory ability tasks. The two auditory speech 
tasks (AU and DS) are both related to auditory SP in realistic sentences, to SMa1 and to 
SUa. These are the tasks in which auditory communication by language is most important. In 
addition, the content may play an important role: the GVEESS task deals with meaningless 
sentences and the task SMa2 with voice recognition. Both focus on the paraverbal features 
(tone of voice) rather than concentrating on the conversation content. However, when 
controlled for working memory in the general auditory tasks, correlations between the 
auditory speech tasks and social auditory tasks decrease as well. The relationships to SMa1 
remain significant. Additional correlations close to reaching significance are between MW 
and SMa1 (.14, p=.07) and between distracted sentences and SMa2 (.13). The 
comparatively higher correlations between the auditory speech tasks and social auditory 
tasks can be taken as a first confirmation of hypothesis H26SAu (see chapter 3.3).  
 
Since the cognitive operations could not be established for AuI, the hypothesis of whether 
the two memory domains of the social and general auditory abilities are closer related than 
the remaining domains (i.e., discrimination/perception and reasoning) cannot be investigated 
(H24SAu). Moreover, it is doubtful whether there is indeed a relationship between the 
nonverbal auditory ability factor and the social auditory abilities. There seems to be no 
relationship to social auditory understanding, but some single relationships to SMa1 and 
SPa2, both dealing with realistic conversations/sentences and having to do with detecting 
and memorizing social cues. Remember that SMa2 is rather unreliable; applying a reliable 
task might reveal additional relationships with social auditory memory. Examining the 
structure with EFA uncovers three factors (parallel analysis, see appendix C.2.6), that are 
addressed in Table 8-42.  
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Table 8-42: Exploratory Factor Analysis of General and Social Auditory Intelligence Tasks 
 Factor 
Task
(1) memory (2) social/emotion 
perception 
(3) nonverbal 
auditory 
SMa1 .77   
AU .52   
DS .52   
SUa .30   
SMa2 .24   
MW .15   
GVEESS  .89  
SPa2 -.16 .55  
SPa1  .21  
MA1  .10 -.94 
MA4 .10 -.15 -.53 
RH   -.46 
% Explained  
variance 20.97 12.69 11.70 
Eigenvalues 2.52 - 1.52 - 1.40 - 1.08 - 1.07 - .88 - .77 - .71 - .66 - .56 - .46 - .38
   Note. Pattern matrix; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction;  
AU=Audiobook; DS=Disarranged sentences; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SPa2=Social perception-
auditory; GVEESS=Geneva Emotion Expression stimulus set; SMa1=Social memory-auditory1; SMa2=Social 
memory-auditory 2; SUa=Social understanding-auditory 
 
The three factors were interpreted as follows: The first factor summarized the social auditory 
as well as the auditory speech tasks and appears to be a “general spoken language factor.” 
The factor included mainly memory tasks but also the MW task and the SUa task. Again, 
emotion perception tasks formed a separate second factor and so did the nonverbal auditory 
tasks (3rd factor). Controlling for verbal intelligence, a first nonverbal auditory factor emerged 
(explaining 17.25% of the variance, eigenvalue: 2.07). The second component was formed 
by the emotion perception tasks GVEESS and SPa2, and by SPa1 and was interpreted as 
an auditory SP factor (eigenvalue: 1.55, variance explained: 12.95%). The third component 
contained the language-based social auditory and general auditory tasks (eigenvalue: 1.49, 
variance explained: 12.41%), except for MW which did not load on any of the factors. The 
three-factor structure remained stable even when verbal intelligence was partialed out. 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
In performing CFA, analysis started with the two factors that were expected to be identified 
easiest according to the findings obtained in correlational analysis and EFA. Therefore, the 
first two models (model SAuI-GAuI1 and SAuI-GAuI2) presented in Table 8-43 contrast the 
general nonverbal auditory factor (GAuI-nv) including the tasks RH, MA1 and MA4 with the 
auditory SP factor (SPa) containing the GVEESS, the SPa2 and the SPa1. I used SRT 
baseline corrected social perception tasks. The model SAuI-GAuI1 fits the data very well. 
However, the two auditory factors are not significantly related (r=.04, p=.10). Model SAuI-
GAuI2 excludes these intercorrelations and did not fit the data worse (∆Chi²=0.114, ∆df=1 < 
Chi²crit95%= 3.84). The model is presented in Figure 8-13. The GVEESS and the SPa2 had to 
be included as splitted variables. Taking their aggregates led to constraints at the lower 
bound. Integrating the additonal auditory tasks in the model as an auditory spoken language 
based factor made the fit worse but fit was still attained (see SAuI-GAuI3). Doing without the 
zero correlation between the auditory nonverbal factor and the auditory perception factor 
again resulted in a better fit (model SAuI-GauI4, see also Figure 8-13). 
 
Table 8-43: Models of Social Auditory and General Auditory Intelligence 
Model Model description Chi² (df) Prob. CFI RMSEA  (CI 90%) SRMR AIC 
SAuI-
GAuI1 
two factors: GAuI-nv 
and SPa, 
intercorrelation: .04 
26.895 
(19) 
.107 .97 .049 
(.000, .089) 
.056 -11.11
SAuI-
GAuI2 
see SAuI-GauI1; but 
without factor 
intercorrelation 
27.009 
(20) 
.135 .97 .045 
(.000, .085) 
.059 -12.99
SAuI-
GAuI3 
three factors: 
GAuI_nv, SPa, and 
language-based 
auditory (Au_lang) 
intercorr: F1,F2:-.06; 
F1,F3:.34; F2,F3:.18 
103.067 
(74) 
.014 .92 .048 
(.022, .069) 
.064 -44.93
SAuI-
GAuI4 
see SAuI-GAuI3; but 
without correlation 
between F1, F2 
103.373 
(75) 
.017 .92 .047 
(.021, .068) 
.066 -46.63
SAuI-
GAuI5 
see SAuI-GAuI4; but 
without the tasks 
SPa1, MW, SUa 
60.408 
(42) 
.033 .94 .051 
(.015, .078) 
.063 -23.59
Note. CFI=Comparative fit index; RMSEA=Root mean square error of approximation; Prob.=Probability value; 
SRMR=Standardized root mean square residual; SauI=Social auditory intelligence; GauI=general auditory 
intelligence; nv=nonverbal; SPa=Social auditory perception; Au_lang=Auditory language-based; MW=Masked 
words; SUa=Social understanding-auditory 
 
Figure 8-13 presents two models, the complete three-factor model SAuI-GauI4 including a 
spoken language factor besides a social/emotional perception factor and a nonverbal 
auditory factor. In addition, the two-factor model SAuI-GAuI2 is illustrated. It is evident in 
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Figure 8-13, that SPa1 (factor auditory SP) and the tasks MW and SUa did not fit in the 
structure since they are not memory tasks. The model characteristics without the mentioned 
tasks are presented in Table 8-43 (see model SAuI-GauI5). This model provides a better fit 
to the data. The factors can be interpreted as (1) nonverbal auditory ability, (2) auditory 
emotion perception, and (3) auditory memory (social and general). Factor 1 and 3 correlate 
with .33, factor 2 and factor 3 are related with .21. This result also confirms H38SAu which 
formulates the expectation of an independent social/emotion auditory perception factor 
separable from both general (nonverbal) auditory intelligence and social intelligence factors 
(SU and SM) (see also Roberts et al., 2006). 
 
Figure 8-13: Model of General Auditory and Social Auditory Abilities 
Note. Two-factor model (GAuI-SAuI2); three-factor model (GAuI-SAuI4): in italics, including a spoken language 
factor; MA1=Detection of repeated tones; MA4=Tonal series; RH=Rhythm reproduction; AU=Audiobook; 
DS=Disarranged sentences; SPa1=Social perception-auditory 1; SPa2=Social perception-auditory; 
GVEESS=Geneva Emotion Expression Stimulus Set; SMa1=Social memory-auditory1; SMa2=Social memory-
auditory 2; SUa=Social understanding-auditory 
Spoken
language
SMa1
SMa2
SUa
0.51*
0.82*
Soc./Em. aud.
perception
0.97
0.52* SPa2_1
0.85
0.54*
SPa2_2 0.84
GVEESS1
0.58
AuI-
nonverbal
0.59* 0.81
0.49* 0.87
SPa1
RH
MA4
GVEESS2
0.68*
0.74
0.56
MA10.82*
0.33*
0.17
0.69
0.96
0.94
0.97
0.85
0.84
0.59
0.78
0.85
0.72
0.63
0.35*
0.73*
0.27*
0.81*
0.52*
0.55*
0.63*
0.52*
0.70*
0.78*
MW
AU
DS
0.98
0.85
0.82
0.57*
0.21*
0.53*
0.23*
0.23*
9  Discussion 
 
 300 
9 Discussion 
This chapter discusses the results of the two studies, focusing on the three aims of this 
dissertation: assessing the usefulness of (1) social intelligence (SI), and (2) auditory 
intelligence (AuI), and (3) determining how the two hypothesized constructs are related. In 
addition, it addresses some special questions relevant for SI research, scoring and the 
nature of the material. In addition to some criticism, this chapter will provide some 
suggestions for further test improvement, give some information about the conditions of test 
application and make some remarks about possible test extensions. The chapter finishes 
with recommendations for future work on the topic and related research questions. 
 
 
9.1 Are Auditory Intelligence and Social Intelligence Useful Constructs? 
9.1.1 First Objective: Examination of the Internal Construct Validity  
The first objective of this dissertation is to examine aspects of validity in auditory and social 
intelligence (see chapter 1.2). Despite the difficulties we encounter when dealing with 
construct validity (e.g. no numerical index, results depend on the measurements and the 
conditions of data collection, see chapter 1), this dissertation aims to approach this question 
using a framework of Süß (1996, 2001) which specifies conditions that have to be fulfilled in 
order to speak of a useful ability construct. The following discussion goes through each of 
these conditions that were examined in the context of the two studies. 
 
Development of Performance Measures Requiring Only Basic Knowledge 
Two tests, one assessing SI (Social Intelligence Test – Magdeburg, SIM) the other AuI 
(Auditory Intelligence Test, AuIT) were developed, composed, and completed by more than 
300 test takers in order to meet the first condition of the Süß (1996, 2001) framework 
(empirical foundation with test data, see chapter 1.2). The two tests are both performance 
measures, thus fulfilling the second condition (see chapter 1.2). Tasks of the SIM and the 
AuIT were developed requiring the least possible knowledge and experience (see condition 
3, chapter 1.2). This is constrictive with respect to the auditory test since musically 
experienced test takers showed better results in the nonverbal auditory tasks than subjects 
without this sort of experience. There are different possibilities of interpretation: First, the 
nonverbal auditory tasks depend on knowledge/experience; second, an underlying auditory 
ability predisposes musically experienced people to engage in musical activities and to 
acquire music knowledge. The relationship between auditory intellectual abilities and musical 
skills and abilities should be addressed in future investigations.  
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Generality 
The fourth condition (generality/operationalizing the construct across different tasks) was 
supported for social memory (SM) and social understanding (SU) since these abilities were 
found to be independent of the kind of material (auditory, written, pictorial, video-based) that 
was applied. However, concerning SU, homogeneity may be overestimated because 
questions using different materials can be expected to influence one another. Social 
perception (SP) split into three minimally to moderately correlated parts: social written 
perception (SPw), social/emotional auditory perception (SPa), and social nonverbal 
perception (SPnv; pictorial and video-based) and thus appears to measure content-specific 
abilities. The findings let me assume that the three subfactors rely on different latent 
variables (e.g., abilities specific to the senses) instead of being part of one common social 
perception factor. As far as the content structure of social intelligence is concerned, further 
research working with a larger number of SI tasks is needed in order to be able to apply 
parceling technique. In this thesis the content structure of the four types of material was not 
identified, which corresponds to Noller (2001), who does not report relationships between the 
visual and auditory channels. 
 
With respect to auditory intelligence a nonverbal auditory latent variable was indicated by 
different kinds of tasks (e.g., rhythm and tonal series). This is not unambiguous for the 
auditory speech factor, which will be discussed in further detail when dealing with the 
nomological network. In all the content domains, the operation structure (discrimination, 
memory, and reasoning) failed to emerge. It remains unclear whether the operation domains 
could not be justified in auditory intelligence because they do not exist or whether there are 
other reasons, such as the selection and development of task material. 
 
Interrelations Between Subconstructs 
This section deals with the interrelations of the subconstructs of both, social and auditory 
intelligence, and forms an important part of the construct validity evaluation (see condition 5). 
Concerning social intelligence, the SM and the SU factor were found to be moderately 
correlated. This correlation was higher using SU consensus-scores than applying target-
scores. SU was not related to SP whereas SM was moderately to highly correlated with SPw 
(.48, see chapter 8.3.5), and minimally to SPa and SPnv. The relatively stronger relationship 
between SPw and SM may be due to the common written/verbal variance. The minimal 
correlations between SM and SPa and SPnv were also reflected in exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). It is rather doubtful whether SPnv and 
SPa and the other social intelligence variables (SM and SU) are indicators of the same latent 
variable. The correlation among the nonverbal and auditory perception subfactor was also 
rather low. The result of perception factors different from other social intelligence variables is 
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in line with Stankov’s (2000) view, which regards emotion perception as separate from the 
other emotional/social intelligence variables. However, Stankov (2000) attributes this 
assumption to the different scoring modi (objective scoring criteria in case of perception), 
which cannot be applied to our test since SM and SP are both scored completely objectively 
and the SU variables are target-scored. Similar results have been obtained with scores on 
the facial expression subtest that did not correlate with other facial expression measures 
(O’Sullivan, 1982) or with other social skill tests such as the Interpersonal Perception Task-
15 (see Hall, 2001). In a recent article Roberts et al. (2006) also found emotions measures 
(i.e., PONS) and EI measures (MSCEIT, emotion perception) loading on different factors. 
The authors attribute this to a validity problem with the MSCEIT, as its first branch intends to 
measure emotion perception. Like Stankov (2000), the authors see additional explanations 
for the missing correlations in different scoring methods (correct vs. incorrect in the emotions 
measures vs. consensus-based scoring in the MSCEIT); differences in the number and kind 
of stimuli (stimuli of emotion perception measures are more specific and contain more items); 
differences in instructions (EI research: rate of the emotional intensity of a series of emotions 
vs. emotion measures: select the primary emotion in a stimulus), quickness of emotion 
measures in contrast to EI measures; the duration of the stimulus presentation; spontaneous 
or acted emotions as stimuli; the relevant channel (face, body, voice); and in the criterion and 
chance level. Another reason could be the convergent validity problems that were often 
discovered with emotion measures (see Ambady, LaPlante, & Johnson, 2001; Hall, 2001; 
Scherer, 2003). The measures may tap different cognitive operations. The PONS, for 
example, requires the subjects to judge a short video scene whereas in other instruments 
subjects are instructed to recognize the appropriate emotion in social/emotional stimuli. 
Despite these divergent findings, Bänziger et al. (2005) recently gained some convergent 
validity proof and reported coefficients of about .50 (N=72) for correlations between the 
PONS, the JACFEE (Biehl, Matsumoto, Ekman, Hearn, Heider, Kudoh, 1997), the DANVA 
(Nowicki & Duke, 1994), and the MERT (see chapter 2.6.5). Scherer (in press) mentions 
common variance between emotion recognition measures using different modalities (r=.24 
between Facial I and Vocal I). Austin (2004, 2005, Austin & Saklofske, 2006; see chapter 
2.3.1) found a visual emotion perception factor that was correlated with the Faces Test 
(Ekman, 2004). Both were nonverbal perception tasks without the use of language. There 
seems to be a clear difference in judging audio and video cues (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; 
Rosenthal et al., 1979). The effects produced by the auditory modality differ from those we 
know from dealing with vision. Additional differences between the sensory channels (hearing, 
sight, olfaction, gustation, touch) are reported in Danthiir et al. (2001), who found olfaction to 
be clearly distinguishable from auditory tasks. Similarly, Stankov (2001) found no relationship 
between factors of tactile and kinesthetic abilities. The view of social perceptual abilities as 
being rather basic and peripheral (see Radex, Marshalek et al., 1983) is similar to how 
“simple” sensory abilities are defined in inspection time research (e.g. Deary, 2000; Raz et 
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al., 1987; see chapter 2.5.5). In a similar way, sensory abilities are described in the context 
of the psychology of aging (see Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Li, Jordanova, & Lindenberger, 
1998; Lindenberger, Scherer, & Baltes, 2001). 
 
Social memory takes a middle position in the SI structure. It correlates with both social 
perception abilities and social understanding. I can imagine that SP is a precondition for 
social memory, which itself has to exist to be able to judge a person’s feelings, behaviors, 
cognitions, and relationships correctly. A good social memory also favors the acquisition of 
social knowledge, which is also expected to influence SU (see chapter 9.5.2).  
 
Regarding the within structure of auditory intelligence, we found the auditory nonverbal factor 
to be moderately related to the auditory speech factor (r=.39). However, when controlled for 
WM variance the correlation dropped to r=.14. As in case of social perception, it is doubtful 
whether the two factors belong to the same construct. The two AuI factors seem to have less 
auditory variance in common than variance that distinguishes the factors. These findings are 
comprehensive against the background of the outcomes resulting from high auditory abilities 
or skills. Auditorily gifted people may have advantages in learning foreign languages since 
their discrimination  and memory abilities in dealing with sounds are favourable for learning 
the correct pronunciation and wording. In addition, they may also develop musical skills 
because of their comparatively better ability to discriminate and memorize sounds and tones 
and their sense of how these tones or sounds may be related to build a “whole.“ Further 
research is needed in order to see whether and how auditory and musical abilities can be 
distinguished.  
 
9.1.2 Second Objective: Examination of the Relationship to Other Constructs  
The second objective is to contribute to the clarification of the position of auditory and social 
intelligence within the nomological network of human intellectual abilities (see Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955). This corresponds to the sixth condition (see chapter 1.2) Süß (1996, 2001) 
demands for construct validity. The well-established academic intelligence (AcI) was chosen 
as a reference construct for SI and AuI in order to examine the degree of autonomy in the 
nomological network. AcI was measured by the Berlin Intelligence Structure Test (BIS, Jäger 
et al., 1997), which is based on the Berlin Intelligence Structure Model (see Jäger, 1982, 
1984).  
 
Social Understanding 
Two studies with different groups of people found social understanding (SU) to be completely 
autonomous from academic intelligence. The results we obtained with the SI core dimension 
are in line with the findings of Lee et al. (2000), who did not find AcI and SI to be related. 
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There are several possibilities to explain the independence of SU from AcI, in particular from 
the corresponding reasoning operation: First, according to an audacious hypothesis of Tooby 
and Cosmides (1992), empirical findings indicate that reasoning is a product of a collection of 
functionally specified evolved mechanisms, most of which are content dependent. Thus, 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) argue for specialized, domain-specific, and highly adapted 
mechanisms that are activated specifically and differently for threat, social exchange, etc., 
rather than assuming a general underlying mechanism for human reasoning activities. In 
their opinion, all content features of the human mind are socially constructed or 
environmentally developed. Thus, for the reasoning domain, Tooby and Cosmides (1992) 
argue in the opposite direction as compared to Willingham (2005), who assumes a general 
underlying latent variable for meaningful memory. An example of Tooby and Cosmides’ view 
on reasoning is provided by the application of the well-known Wason selection task (see 
Wason, 1968). In this task, the subject gets four cards, each of which is labelled with a 
different number or letter. The subjects are asked to check an abstract rule (e.g. If one side 
of the card has a vowel, then the other side should show an even number) by turning as few 
cards as possible. Studies described in Cosmides and Tooby (2005) revealed that only about 
20% of the test takers turned the correct cards. However, when the same task is embedded 
in a social context the performance of subjects increases to 76% (e.g., “Teenagers borrowing 
their parent’s car have to fill up the tank with gas”; subjects have to find out whether this is 
true by turning only the cards that are absolutely necessary). The sceptical reader may argue 
that this result is affected by the concreteness (vs. abstractness) of the material. However, 
another concrete but not social example (“If you spray lacana tea on your flowers, deer will 
stay out of your yard.") also including a short introduction story is completed correctly by only 
26% of subjects (see Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). Social material/social context appears to 
tap different cognitive processes (see also chapter 8.3.6). The effect of the social/emotional 
material is also mentioned by Blanchette and Richards (2004), who claim that reasoning 
about emotional statements is much more likely to be logically invalid than reasoning about 
neutral statements. 
 
A second explanation for the findings lies in the type of scenario task that was used for the 
assessment of SU and the influencing variables in building an impression from the target 
person (see also issues of generality). How a person answers the items of the scenario task 
(e.g. about the emotion of the target person in a conversation) is based on the impression 
that is formed while working on former questions and materials. In addition, forming an 
impression may be strongly affected by a person’s personality. However, in the first study 
none of the SU scales correlated with the NEO-FFI scales and in the second study 
correlations between the NEO-FFI and the SU variables were also rare. The SU language-
based tasks correlated only with conscientiousness and agreeableness of the NEO-FFI 
(r=.18 - .25, p=.01 - .00) (The presentation of detailed results in this dissertation was not 
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possible because of the limited number of pages.). The relatively rare correlations between 
personality and SI may be due to the different kinds of measures (self-report vs. performance 
test). Although one may argue that there is no need to measure personality with an ability 
test since it is not an ability construct, the differences in the measurement procedure 
inevitably produce different kinds of variance. It would be interesting to invent a personality 
measure that is less susceptible to social desirability and dependence on own imaginative 
power required for the interpretation, for example, of one-sentence written statements used 
in the NEO-FFI. Such a personality assessment could be operationalized with a computer-
based test applying video scenes with sound that deal with various situations. Instead of 
judging the behavior of other people presented in the scenes, the test taker’s task could be to 
imagine himself in the presented situation. One of several possible answer alternatives 
(presented auditorily and video-based) has to be chosen, serving as an indicator of the 
degree to which a certain personality variable is present. Besides the personality, the 
similarity and the sympathy the test taker feels for the target person may affect the result. In 
the second study, we asked the subjects to indicate on a seven-point rating scale the degree 
of similarity and the sympathy they felt for the target person. Only in three of eight scenario 
tasks was the sympathy for the target person related to the performance in the 
corresponding scenario (.18-.37; p<.05); in one of eight scenario tasks the test takers 
estimated similarity with the target person affected the test result (scenario Friedrich: .30, 
p<.001). The scenarios with the described effects on first sight only have in common that the 
target people are all males. 
 
A third aspect that requires mention with respect to the zero correlations between SU and 
AcI is the level of complexity which is crucial for intelligence in that it may lead to different 
degrees of relationships between latent variables (see chapter 2.1.3). Dealing with 
complexity is itself a complex issue (see Suedfeld, 1994) and has several perspectives. At 
this point, I refer to the complexity of cognitive processes required for information processing. 
They may vary depending on 1) the task material and 2) personality characteristics such as 
knowledge, working memory, and academic intelligence. Literature indicates that SI involves 
more complex processing compared to AcI (e.g., Frederiksen et al., 1984; Kaiser, 1998). 
This may be due to the characteristics social situations have in common with problem-solving 
tasks. Often they do not have a clear starting point or goal, and they are often not 
transparent but integrated in a complex and dynamic network (Kaiser, 1998). Gigerenzer 
(1997) concludes that SI is special and cannot be subsumed under “general intelligence” 
together with AcI.  
 
Social Memory (SM) 
Although we found a partial independence of SM from AcI, the factor intercorrelations 
between SM and BIS-Memory are higher than the correlation of SM with SU (first study: 
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r(SM, SU)=.28; r(SM, BIS-M)=.38; second study: r(SM, SU)=.21; r(SM, BIS-M)=.69). 
Nevertheless, specific parts of SM could be shown in the regression model (see Figure 6-3). 
The question of whether SM can be justified as unique ability has to be further examined in a 
criterion validation study figuring out the incremental variance SM has beyond AcI and the 
remaining SI subfactors. Possible reasons for the difficulties in separating SM from the BIS 
factors may also lie in the type of SM tasks we used. Despite trying to include paraverbal 
aspects, most of our memory tasks required an answer sheet presented in written language. 
With the exception of SMa2 (second study), the social memory tasks correlated highly 
significantly with BIS-verbal (between r=.20 and r=.58). One should do a comparable study 
again, replacing the memory tasks with a high verbal part through nonverbal tasks (e.g., an 
improved version of the voice memory task; a social emotions task with movies and voices). 
A computer-based presentation of answer alternatives (auditorily or with video extracts) 
should help to minimize the verbal part. Another explanation for the particularly strong 
relationship between SM and BIS-M is a result known from the field of musical psychology. 
According to Bruhn (2003), areas of the cortex that are responsible for long-term memory are 
connected with all senses and interchange information with areas responsible for reasoning. 
Social (as well as auditory) memory according to his view should be related to other kinds of 
memory (Bruhn, 2003), too. In line with this statement, Willingham (2005) proclaims that 
most memories are stored in terms of meaning instead of being stored in a modality specific 
manner. This may yield an explanation for the relationships that were almost always highest 
between the memory domains of the different constructs. According to Willingham (2005), 
(modality) specific memory systems help to store the part of information that is independent 
from content meaning (e.g., what is said), such as the sound of voice in auditory memory 
(e.g., how something is said). This may explain the differences between the two auditory 
memory tasks, SMa1 (memory for conversations) as a content based task, and SMa2 
(memory for voices). Their relationship should be investigated again with improved reliability 
of the voice memory task. A good voice memory also contributes to the acquisition of the 
sound of a foreign language (Willingham, 2005). This may connect paraverbal, social 
aspects to academic learning abilities that may be reflected in subjects dealing with different 
languages. 
 
Social Perception-Component of Intelligence or Sensory Ability?  
The relationships among the suggested social perception factors remained stable even when 
BIS variance was partialed out (see Figure 8-7). The written social perception factor (SPw) 
was most closely related to academic intelligence. If we model it separately from the other 
perception factors, it cannot be distinguished from BIS-speed. In contrast, the social 
nonverbal perception (SPnv) and social auditory perception (SPa) factors could be clearly 
distinguished from AcI. A model relating the SPnv factor to the BIS variables showed a good 
fit to the data (Chi²=85.351, df=59; p=.014; CFI=.97; SRMR=.057; RMSEA=.051; CI: 023, 
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.073). SPn correlated with .29 with both BIS-speed and BIS-memory and did not show any 
relationship to BIS-reasoning. The auditory social perception factor (SPa) was not at all 
related to academic intelligence measured by the BIS. A model relating SPa to the BIS 
variables without allowing an intercorrelation fitted the data very well (Chi²=82.645, df=59, 
p=.023; CFI=. 973; SRMR=.054; RMSEA=.048, CI: .019, .071). Surprisingly, the SPa factor 
did not correlate with general auditory intelligence either (see Figure 8-13).  
 
The special role perception abilities take was emphasized by Stankov (1999), who applied 
several emotion perception measures (for further information, see Davies et al., 1998) and 
found emotion perception not to be linked to personality or ability traits. It correlated only 
marginally with gf (r=.15) and showed zero correlation with gc (r= .05). Conclusively, Stankov 
considers emotion perception as the most likely candidate for pure EI measurement. 
 
A possible explanation and approach for further examination may yield findings obtained in 
the psychology of aging (see Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Li et al., 1998; Lindenberger et 
al., 2001). Researchers of this branch found an increasing covariation between intelligence 
and sensory functioning depending on age. The source of the decline of intelligence together 
with a decline of sensory functioning in older participants appears to be due to either sensory 
speed or sensory discrimination or both (Li et al., 1998). On the contrary, the reduction of 
(auditory) acuity does not have an effect on standard cognitive performance (Lindenberger et 
al., 1998). These results may provide an explanation for our findings: In contrast to social 
written perception which shares common variance with AcI through both verbal crystallized 
components and sensory speed, social auditory perception tasks may have something in 
common with auditory acuity rather than affecting sensory discrimination or sensory speed. 
In this context again empirical findings discovered by Stankov (1999, 2000) may be useful. 
Stankov describes the appearance of a strong general intelligence factor as soon as sensory 
and psychomotor abilities are excluded from analysis. In contrast, the general intelligence 
factor is rather weak if sensory and psychomotor abilities are included in the analysis of 
intellectual ability tasks (see also Danthiir et al., 2001). Thus, the inclusion of a broad variety 
of tasks varying in terms of difficulty and complexity tends to produce a weaker general factor 
(first principal component not more than 20% of total variance) than studies that are based 
on a narrower sampling of tasks (see Roberts, Pallier, & Goff, 1998). In our studies, this 
assumption is confirmed. Including social perception tasks in the exploratory factor analysis 
together with SU and SM tasks as well as AcI tasks leads to a first component explaining not 
more than 20.84% of the total variance. With respect to the internal structure of SI (2nd 
study), the first component explains only 18.14% of the variance.  
 
How can the results be explained? The differences that have been found between abilities 
that stem from the five senses and their relationship to AcI can be traced back to the early 
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works of Galton (1883) who assumed individual differences in the five senses (visual, 
auditory, tactile, olfactory, and taste) to result in individual differences in the power of the 
mind. However, instead of the expected considerable relationship between sensory abilities 
and intelligence, elementary sensory processes relate only at a very low level to the 
reasoning, acquisition, and retention processes of human intellect (see Horn, 2006). Cattell 
(1998), in his triadic theory, speaks of provincial factors when mentioning the so-called 
“sensory centers” and differentiates them from the two classes, general capacities (e.g., fluid 
intelligence, gf) and agencies (narrow abilities in different areas of cultural content such as 
inductive reasoning or word fluency). Taking up Cattell’s (1998) perspective, the low 
correlations between the SP-factors and their relationship to AcI can be attributed to 
discarding principles of symmetry (see Wittmann, 1988). Perceptual (sensory) abilities 
appear to be arranged on a lower hierarchical level compared to the remaining SI factors and 
compared to AcI factors. In terms of the facet theoretical radex approach suggested by 
Marshalek et al. (1983), the sensory specific social perception factors can be classified in the 
periphery. The more peripheral in a radex, the larger the distance between tests (see 
Marshalek at al., 1983). The lower the complexity level (=number of relatively simple 
ingredient steps; Stankov, 2000), the less the factors seem to be related to each other and 
load on a common “general factor”. 
 
Auditory Intelligence 
Nonverbal auditory intelligence proved to be independent from academic intelligence. This 
was also true when controlled for working memory variance. We have to take a different 
perspective with respect to the auditory speech tasks. These appear to measure quite similar 
aspects to those assessed with AcI tasks (especially verbal AcI, reasoning and memory 
operations). Apparently, there are some relationships between the auditory general factor 
and AcI, particularly with reasoning. Therefore, another explanation for the failure to prove 
the operational structure of AuI is that the auditory intelligence tasks require a combination of 
AcI operations and specific auditory parts. Additional auditory ability tasks are needed to 
examine this question in further detail. An additional explanation comes up when considering 
that auditory intellectual abilities are comparatively basic perceptual/sensory and serve as a 
precondition for higher order processes (see remarks in the context of SP, this section). The 
perceptual nature of auditory intellectual abilities is emphasized by Carroll (1993) who talks 
of a “broad auditory perception factor”. However, restricting auditory abilities to the 
perception domain does not seem correct, since undoubtedly some tasks such as tonal 
series should be related to reasoning rather than to perception. And this is what results 
confirm (see chapter 6.4.3 and 8.4.4). 
 
Findings of our two studies show that the auditory modality has specific characteristics: It not 
only appears to be harder for auditory tasks to reach high reliability values, but also the tasks 
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seem to measure something different compared to AcI and SI. The special role auditory 
abilities take was already discovered by Atkin et al. (1977), who found a listening test clearly 
standing apart from all other cognitive measures. However, individual differences in children 
on the listening comprehension test were causally related to later intellectual development, 
thus forming an important precondition for high AcI. Possibly, attention is a moderating 
variable between auditory processing and intellectual level, since learning and development 
is only possible with a sufficient amount of attention. The auditory tasks demand a lot of 
attention. In contrast to tests of AcI, it is impossible to look again at the test material after 
having listened to the relevant excerpts. In order to control for effects of attention, such a 
measure should be included in further investigations. Another difference between the 
auditory and AcI tasks is the proportion of speed and level measures. Whereas the indicators 
of all cognitive operation factors are strictly limited in time, the auditory tasks are not 
restricted in time. We asked subjects to work quickly, but also waited for the test takers who 
took longer. For the time restricted tasks (e.g. the audiobook) enough time was provided so 
that everyone could finish the task without hurrying. By contrast, BIS tasks are designed in a 
way that almost nobody will complete every item. This fact may lead to common speed 
variance between the BIS factors, whereas the auditory modality is not affected by speed to 
this extent.  
 
9.1.3 Third Objective: Relating Social Auditory and General Auditory Intelligence 
In a factor model including social and general auditory ability tasks, three factors emerged: 
an auditory language-based factor (speech auditory and social auditory SM and SU), an 
auditory nonverbal factor, and a social auditory perception factor. Whereas the social 
auditory perception factor was independent of the other two factors, the language-based and 
the auditory nonverbal factor co-varied with .33 (see Figure 8-13). Thus, general speech 
auditory abilities tasks and social auditory memory and understanding tasks could be 
subsumed under one factor. The close relationship between social and non-social language-
based abilities fits with a statement of Ford (1994), in whose opinion in some contexts (e.g. 
involving teaching, public speaking or social persuasion) language production skills may 
account for a significant proportion of the variance in the assessment of SI. In addition, 
Zeidner, Matthews, Roberts, and MacCann (2003) point out that individual differences in 
emotional learning seem to be strongly linked to individual differences in verbal ability. I take 
the view that people who are able to deal effectively with other people train their language 
skills (e.g., talking more, talking to different people in different ways, etc.), which may also 
affect social knowledge (learning how to behave in certain situations, cultures, etc.; see 
chapter 9.5.2). These assumptions are similar neuropsychological results dealing with the 
relationship between auditory language-based and auditory nonverbal abilities (see Koelsch 
& Siebel, 2005; Patel, Peretz, Tramo, & Labreque, 1998). In several studies, language and 
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music were found to be related since they are both means of communication and both use a 
certain syntax (e.g. music: tonic, subdominant, supertonic, dominant; German language: 
subject-verb-object). Even more they both serve social functions. Music is one of the oldest 
and most basic socio-cognitive domains of the human species. A review points into the 
direction that human musical abilities played a key phylogenetic role in the evolution of 
language and that music-making behavior covered important functions such as 
communication, cooperation, social cohesion, group coordination as well as social and 
emotional development (see Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2006; Zatorre & 
Peretz, 2001). From a developmental perspective it is known that infants’ first steps into 
language are based in large part on prosodic information (see Jusczyk, 1999) such as 
speech melody, metre, rhythm, timbre, and pitch relationships. Maternal music is thought to 
play an important role in the emotional, cognitive, and social development of children (see 
Trehub, 2003). Making music in a group affects the whole brain (perceptual, memory, social, 
emotional etc. processes, see Koelsch & Siebel, 2005). Even people without any musical 
training show sophisticated abilities to acquire knowledge about musical syntax and to 
understand music, which indicates the existence of an underlying natural ability (see Koelsch 
& Siebel, 2005), which may be auditory intelligence. The assumption of an intimate 
connection between music and speech is corroborated by the findings of overlapping and 
shared neural resources for music and language syntactic processing (e.g., Koelsch, 
Gunther, Wittfoth, & Sammler, 2005). The processing of both musical and linguistic syntax 
requires the activation of neural resources that mediate the processing of complex, 
regularity-based sequential information (Koelsch et al., 2005). ERP (Event-related potential) 
studies provide evidence for shared neural resources. In addition to syntax, semantics was 
found to be a basic dimension of language: The semantic processing of words can be 
influenced systematically by advance presentation of musical information. The human brain 
seems to process music and language similarly (see Koelsch, 2004). Both make use of the 
broca and wernicke regions of the brain (Magnet-Resonanz-Tomographie, MRT; functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI). This is true not only for musically experienced people 
but also for people without any prior knowledge of music (Koelsch, 2004). Jenschke, 
Koelsch, and Friederici (2005) showed that musical training can improve language abilities in 
children. Against this background, the link between language and musical abilities via syntax 
is especially relevant, assuming a common underlying auditory resource basic to both 
language and music (see Bundesministerium für Bildung and Forschung, 2006). A first 
confirmation of this assumption is obtained by Anvari, Trainor, Woodside, and Levy (2002) 
who examined the relationships between phonological awareness, music perception, and 
early reading in a sample of 100 four- and five-year-old children. Two moderately 
intercorrelated (.33 - .59) factors emerged, music perception and phonological awareness. 
Music perception skill predicted reading even after the variance shared with phonemic 
awareness was removed. The findings are interpreted such that phonemic awareness and 
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music perception ability have basic auditory abilities in common that are needed for reading 
but additionally tap unique processing skills (Anvari et al., 2002). The differences between 
language and music should not be ignored from the neuropsychological perspective: 
linguistic syntax is more lateralized to the left hemisphere, whereas processing of musical 
structure is more lateralized to the right hemisphere.  
 
Interestingly, within the auditory domain, social perception was related neither to SM nor to 
SU, nor to language-based general auditory abilities. This is particularly surprising since all 
tasks worked with auditory material and used language. In order to obtain such a result, the 
auditory and social common variance has to be minor, whereas the different (maybe 
operational) variance has to be predominant. One of the differences between the social 
auditory tasks (SU and SM vs. SP) is the apparent focus on paraverbal aspects of language 
in social auditory perception tasks, whereas the SU and SM tasks contain both paraverbal 
and verbal aspects, or even completely focus on verbal aspects. The other difference is the 
focus on emotions in the social perception tasks, whereas the other social auditory tasks 
concentrate on the interactive components. Whether there is indeed an emotional 
intelligence component separable from social intelligence perception should be further 
investigated with additional indicators for both constructs. Measurement issues may be 
responsible for the results, too, since analysis in the perception tasks is done with reaction 
times, whereas in the SM and SU tasks accuracy scores are used. The social auditory 
perception tasks were clearly separable not only from other social and speech auditory 
abilities but also from nonverbal auditory abilities. Thus, the auditory common part of SPa 
and AuI-nv seems to be subordinate. Conclusively, auditory is not equal auditory. Paraverbal 
aspects (here emotions) seem to tap another underlying latent variable compared with 
abilities that focus on the content of language, even when using the same (auditory) material. 
 
9.1.4 Interrelation Between the Examined Constructs: A Summary 
Figure 9-1 presents the modified perspective I take with respect to the constructs that have 
been the subject of research in this dissertation. Findings revealed four different constructs: 
the “old” academic intelligence, social intelligence, auditory intelligence, and social/emotional 
perception, the latter probably being sensual rather than intellectual. The four constructs 
overlap in important parts, particularly with respect to AcI and SI memory, with respect to AcI 
verbal and AuI speech, and with respect to SPw and AcI speed and memory. Taking AcI as a 
reference construct, the following subconstructs could be identified as reliable and useful 
candidates for different novel intelligences (on condition that additional proof, in particular 
incremental criterion validity, can be shown) in two studies with different subjects: social 
understanding, nonverbal auditory ability, and social/emotional auditory perception.  
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Figure 9-1: Relationship between Academic, Auditory, and Social Intelligence, and 
Perception of Nonverbal Social Cues/Emotions 
 
9.1.5 A Comment on Validation Frameworks and General Questions Concerning 
“Intelligence” 
In this dissertation, I focused on the conditions for ability constructs suggested by Süß (1996, 
2001). However, some researchers mention divergent conditions for the establishment of 
construct validity. Austin and Saklofske (2006) claim that three conditions have to be fulfilled 
in order to be able to speak of a valid ability construct: (1) convergent and discriminant 
construct validity, (2) criterion and predictive validity, and (3) genetic and biological 
foundations comparable to academic intelligence. In summary, the framework of Süß (1996, 
2001) is much broader (see chapter 1.2) but does not explicitly include the third criterion 
mentioned by Austin and Saklofske (2006). However, the Süß conditions are based on a 
cognitive theory instead of a biological one. If the Süß conditions are completely fulfilled, high 
stability (retest reliability) included, one could infer genetic causes. Nevertheless, it is always 
worthwhile to get further support from other research disciplines. This may include 
neuropsychology and/or also social or developmental psychology (see e.g., 
neuropsychological links below).  
 
I already mentioned that in almost all condition catalogues “positive manifold” is considered 
as an essential condition for a valid ability construct (see also Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 
1999). Austin and Saklofske (2006) deal with the positive manifold in the context of their first 
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criterion, the convergent and discriminant construct validity. According to their view, a new 
intelligence construct should be classified within the hierarchical structure of Carroll’s (1993) 
Three-Stratum Model of intelligence and show correlations with corresponding group and 
specific factors. The positive correlations of the new construct with the already established 
constructs (the authors even speak of “existing”) should be not too high in order to make a 
unique contribution to established intelligence constructs. Austin and Saklofske (2006) 
suggest classifying EI, SI and PI within the second stratum of Carroll’s Three-Stratum Model. 
It is evident that Austin and Saklofske start from a very narrow perspective that assumes (1) 
that Carroll’s model is “true”, (2) that new intelligence constructs cannot exceed the scope of 
the already well-established academic intelligence (they can belong to the second stratum!), 
and (3) that every new intelligence construct, in order to deserve the label “intelligence”, has 
to be positively correlated with academic intelligence. The latter perspective (see 3) is shared 
for example by Carroll (1993); Mayer et al. (1999); Schulze, Wilhelm, and Kyllonen (in press); 
and Wilhelm (2005) who all seem to assume that there is one underlying factor that relates 
the sub- or lower order factors to one another. In the same way, broad auditory perception 
ability in Carroll’s model and in the CHC theory is subsumed under a general intelligence 
factor (see Carroll, 1995). However, we could show in two studies that auditory abilities 
formed a reliable but separate domain from AcI when related to both content domains and 
operation domains. The same happened with SU. Aren’t these constructs ability/intelligence 
constructs because they are not related to the other already defined constructs of AcI? This 
would be the view most researchers (e.g., Austin & Saklofske, 2006; Carroll, 1993; Lee et al., 
2000; Mayer et al., 1999; Schulze, in press; Wilhelm, 2005) would take since they regard a 
moderate correlation with the already established AcI as a precondition to be treated as an 
intelligence. But who limits the virtual space of constructs to the already investigated ones? 
Why should we exclude the possibility of discovering completely new variance? I take the 
position that a new intelligence construct can also be an intelligence if it is not correlated with 
AcI at all (see e.g., SU, SPa, AuI-nv) in the case that all of the mentioned conditions (see 
Süß, 1996, 2001) are fulfilled. One could argue whether a label different from the term 
“intelligence” then would be more appropriate for constructs being not related to the “old AcI.“ 
However, whatever label we chose, it seems to be evident that reliable and useful ability 
constructs do exist that are different from AcI. How we label them will not make a difference 
as to their existence. In the following, I will argue that in spite of being independent from AcI, 
SU is a promising candidate for a useful intelligence construct. First, the possible 
explanations for the SU results do not exclude the possibility that SU is a factor of 
intelligence. On the contrary, SU may just tap different reasoning processes, seems to be 
rather unrelated to personality variables, and may be characterized through a different 
degree of complexity. Second, the positive manifold is not sufficient (see Horn, 1998). 
Instruments that do not measure cognitive abilities nevertheless correlate with intelligence 
tests (e.g., assessments of ego-strength and law abidance). Third, the intercorrelations 
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between measures often result in a general factor which cannot be generalized as soon as a 
different composition of measures was applied. The critical proof of whether SU indeed is a 
useful ability construct able to explain incremental variance compared to AcI has to be 
examined by means of a criterion validation study using relevant symmetrical criteria (see 
Wittmann, 1988; see chapter 9.6.1). Figure 9-2 summarizes my perspective on intelligence 
and the different (sub-) constructs that have been examined within this dissertation. The 
figure illustrates that SU and AuI-nv are within the “circle of intelligences” despite being 
unrelated to AcI. 
 
 
Figure 9-2: Model of Intelligences 
Note. SU=Social understanding; AcI=Academic intelligence; AuI=Auditory intelligence; AuI-nv=Auditory nonverbal 
intelligence 
 
 
9.2 Discussion of the Use of Social Material and Scoring Procedure 
9.2.1 The “Concern” of Social Task Material  
During the two studies, all examiners reported that test takers behaved differently working on 
the social intelligence tasks compared to the academic intelligence tasks. They not only gave 
the impression of better concentration while working on the SI tasks but also seemed to 
identify themselves with the characters (target persons) of our social understanding tasks. 
The material can be expected to have an intervening effect since the test takers have to 
argue with the target persons. They need to compare their own view and reflect their own 
perspective with that of the presented characters.  
 
Not only in our social understanding tasks but also in the social memory and perception 
tasks, the social nature of the material affects performance. In both studies, we got the 
impression that our test takers performed better in the social memory tasks compared to the 
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academic memory tasks. With the exception of recognition of numbers with M=100.94 
(SD=.911), all academic memory tasks had a mean standard value below the average (91.34 
to 99.68) (average is M=100). By contrast, in the tasks regarding social auditory memory for 
conversations (SMa1) and social written memory for correspondence subjects performed 
above average (SMa1: 61% correct; SD=.13; SMw1+2: 76%, SD=.11). These results have to 
be interpreted with caution since the absolute performance values are not directly 
comparable. For a more profound result a study with two parallel tasks, one applying social 
information, the other using academic information, should be carried out. Nevertheless, 
literature yields some confirmation for the presented assumption. Rummer and Engelkamp 
(2000) report a study wherein pleasant social/emotional content was remembered better than 
unpleasant content; both were better remembered than neutral content. Bower and Forgas 
(2001) also mention that emotional/social events remain in memory for a longer time. At the 
end of the test session (2nd study), we asked the test takers to complete a long-term memory 
test containing questions about the target scenario persons and their private and public life. 
We were impressed with the amount of information they remembered even after several 
weeks. Why do social tasks appear to be easier than academic tasks? Subjects may be 
better at remembering socially relevant details because these concern their own person. 
When we hear or read about other people we quickly form a picture, evaluate the 
information, and compare it to our own perspective and experience. Similarly, perception of 
social vs. academic content provokes differences in the speed of reaction. Rummer and 
Engelkamp (2000) found that emotionally unpleasant words were recognized more slowly 
than neutral words. Pleasant words were recognized the fastest.  
 
9.2.2 Issues of Scoring 
In the analysis of results I focused on target scoring. The scales formed with this technique 
proved to be reliable (see Table 6-4 and Table 8-4). Compared to consensus scores, the 
target scores were even more reliable in the first study. In the second study they showed 
slightly better reliability values with respect to the auditory and the pictorial scale. Compared 
to consensus-scored values, target scores have several advantages: The main pro is 
certainly independence from common sense and from the selected sample, since they rely 
on an external criterion. In addition, target scores are more similar to the scoring (one right 
answer) that is commonly applied in intelligence research. To score an ability measure 
according to common sense does not fit in the tradition of intelligence testing (see also Van 
Rooy, Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005). Moreover, people high on the crucial ability would be 
punished when the “empirically correct” score and their own answer diverge from common 
sense. Mac Cann et al. (2004) could show, that various procedures of consensus-based 
scoring do not necessarily converge. In a reliable test, consensus scores result in highly 
negatively skewed scores (MacCann et al., 2004b) and in a lower score for a person with an 
9  Discussion 
 
 316 
exceptionally high ability who completed a task differently compared to the majority. 
“Consensus or stereotypic accuracy has gone from a bias to be avoided (Cronbach), to an 
error to be controlled or identified (Kenny), to a potential source of information about 
understanding people in the absence of specific information (Funder), to the criterion for 
accuracy (Sternberg), not only for items for which no veridical criterion is available, and 
therefore consensus is a stop-gap measure (Nowicki) or a desirable one (Mayer), to 
arguments that consensus scoring is actually superior to known truth as the criterion for 
accuracy test items (Legree). (see O’Sullivan, in press, p. 451). 
 
Nevertheless, models using consensus scores fit the data better than those applying target 
scores (see Table 6-17 and Table 8-23). Another difference is the slightly higher correlation 
consensus-based models reveal between SU and SM in both studies (see Figure 6-1 and as 
Figure 8-2). The similarities we find between models making use of different scoring 
procedures indicate that consensus scores do not necessarily produce results completely 
different from those found when using an external criterion. The consensus and target score 
scales correlated between .69 and .82 in the first study (see table 2-7) and, except for the 
written score (.16), between .61 and .78 in the second study (see table 4-3). These findings 
provide some justification for the utilization of consensus scores since this way of scoring 
was often regarded as problematic (see Roberts et al., 2006, p. 667, see chapter 2.2.3 and 
2.7.2). However, the strong relationships between the two scoring methods may also be due 
to item selection that was done by a small group of women, who only included items with 
which everyone in the small group agreed.  
 
With respect to target scores, we discovered methodological and economical problems with 
the scaling. First, targets had the preference to select an extreme answer category (e.g. 1 or 
7). The problem with these answers is that they have the possibility of deviance only in one 
direction. This deviance can cause a higher difference score than a target person’s answers 
located in the middle of the scale (e.g. “3” which can deviate only 4 points). In item selection, 
we paid attention to select items representatively with regard to the distribution of deviation 
points. Moreover, target scores were weighted according to the maximum possible deviation 
in one item. Second, the simple problem of using rating scales also produces unsystematic 
variance with respect to the individual answer tendency: some of the subjects may have a 
preference for extreme answers (severity or leniency effect), whereas others may tend 
towards choosing the middle category. I standardized the items in order to reduce these 
influences. In addition, a successful but lavish way to avoid these problems may be to 
develop some reference questions applying the same scale to try to get an impression of 
individual preferences. Furthermore, the assessment of self-description ability (see Damarin, 
1970) and the inclusion of context manipulation checks may be useful to control for 
systematic biases (e.g. with respect to frequencies) and context dependency in human 
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judgment (for further information see Schwarz, 1999). Approaches in order to deal with social 
desirability are, for example, provided in Furnham (1986) and Paulhus (1991). Paulhus 
mentions factor-analytic and covariate techniques during test construction and recommends 
using a forced-choice format and control questionnaires (for an overview see Paulhus, 1991) 
in order to control for response biases such as careless, consistent, extreme, and social 
desirable responding. In reaction time tasks the RTs of wrongly answered items can also be 
used as indication for response styles. A MTMM design may be used in order to investigate 
whether answer tendencies (response biases) in subjects are due to method effects or to 
personality characteristics of the subjects. Third, the emotions that have to be judged in the 
scenario tasks were considered as independent items (e.g. test takers had to rate boredom 
and joy in one specific situation). One might argue, that certain emotions will probably not 
occur together (e.g. anger and joy) and thus, items should not be treated as independent. 
Future investigations should take confusion patterns into account such as mentioned in 
chapter 2.6.4. Fourth, compared to consensus scoring a target-oriented scoring procedure is 
very costly and time intensive and therefore only rarely applied. Besides our SIM test, only 
the EARS (Emotional Accuracy Research Scale, Mayer & Geher, 1996), the CARAT 
(CARAT = Communication of Affect Receiving Ability Test, Buck, 1976), and the IPT-15 (see 
section 2.2.3) make use of target scoring. Future research should evaluate the criterion 
validity of both scoring methods. 
 
Besides the two scoring procedures that have been applied in the two studies there are 
alternative ways of scoring. I already mentioned that we started to collect peer ratings to get 
some validation data for the target persons’ answers. Moreover, the collection of expert 
ratings of the single scenes and items may yield interesting additional information. With 
respect to consensus-based scoring, future studies on the SIM and the AuIT should take into 
account Mac Cann et al.’s (2004) advice. They suggest to use Euclidean distance scoring or 
Mahalanobis scoring in order to treat all responses based on one stem as one multi-part 
item. This technique was used in tacit knowledge research, for example by Hedlund et al., 
(2003), who computed a squared Euclidean distance of the incumbent’s responses from the 
experts’ answer means corrected by the variability of the experts’ ratings. 
 
9.3 Criticism of the Studies 
There are several points that have to be criticized with regard to the studies that have been 
carried out in the context of this work. First, the conditions of testing have to be criticized. Our 
first study was split up in two sessions taking five hours each, the second study consisted of 
two sessions with a duration of six hours each. Although we took breaks and provided 
refreshments, testing time was too long. Concentration is expected to be reduced, which has 
an impact on the task performance, in particular with respect to the latter tests. This result is 
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confirmed by the strain questionnaires that were applied at the beginning and at the end of 
each test session. Motivation decreased considerably and strain increased during test 
performance. It was difficult to reduce the test time since we wanted to gain as much 
information as possible to make reliable statements about the validity of the measures. 
Moreover, the new tests were in a preliminary form, implying that more items were needed 
for each task. For the second study we considered splitting the test time in three instead of 
two parts. However, the test takers preferred being tested in two sessions as this reduced 
the effort with regard to the journey and departure.  
 
Another critical point concerns the choice of the general auditory intelligence tasks. The 
attentive reader may have wondered why I did not choose more specified tasks with respect 
to the preliminary model I suggested in Figure 2-10 (see chapter 2.5.6). That would have 
focused more on actual auditory intelligence part instead of including tasks from the 
transition areas to musical and spoken language abilities. To answer this question I cite 
Loevinger (1957), who recommended choosing items and test tasks from a broader area 
than the trait expected to be measured. When possible, the items of the pool should be 
chosen so as to sample all possible content which might comprise the putative trait according 
to all known alternative theories of the trait (p. 659). For this stage of test development and 
exploration I decided to use this strategy rather than focusing on specific tasks that I actually 
subsumed under “auditory intelligence.“ 
 
The selection of target persons for the scenario task can be criticized with respect to 
representativeness. In order to ensure reliability of the target person’s answers, we chose 
people whom we personally knew and who were open to tell us about their feelings, thoughts 
and relationships. Consequently, despite the fact that the target persons were selected 
representatively with respect to age, gender, and education/profession, they did not form a 
representative selection as far as self-disclosure and openness are concerned.  
 
 
9.4 Some Suggestions for Test Improvement 
9.4.1 Suggestions for the Magdeburg Social Intelligence Test (SIM)  
This section will provide some suggestions for future modifications on the SIM. I will 
concentrate on some of the tasks that need most improvement or seem to be most important 
to discuss since the space in this dissertation is limited. 
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Scenario Task 
With respect to the scenario task there is a need to shorten the single scenarios, as without 
shortening the test would take too long to be an attractive measure for use in the practice. 
Shortening can be done in different ways. First, single items that did not prove to be reliable 
or valid with respect to the SU subconstruct can be deleted. That may include single emotion 
judgments. Second, one could exclude whole scenes. A third possibility is in doing without 
covering all cells of our taxonomy in one scenario but instead trying to represent the cells 
with items across scenarios. The latter approach has been used in a recent study in 
cooperation with the German Aerospace Center (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und 
Raumfahrt). The data of this study has not yet been analyzed.  
 
In the long run, an English version of the scenario task is needed to open the test for the 
international public. The problem is more with the auditory than with the written, pictorial and 
video-based material, since the latter can either be translated or does not rely on spoken 
language. However, we can expect that cultural differences exist in general and affect the 
scenes, in both private and public contexts, so that it will be worthwhile to do the complete 
recordings again in another cultural context. This project would profit from a refinement and 
further improvement of the already existing rationale of the recordings. In the second study 
we used interviews in addition to the written information we collected with visual scales. 
These interviews proved to be successful in getting as much information about the target 
person’s feelings, cognitions, and relationships as possible. The future rationale should keep 
this method of data collection including specifying questions in the actual situation as well as 
encouragement of the target persons to mention mixed feelings and very specific cognitions. 
In addition, other people involved in the recordings might be interviewed to maximize 
information gain. 
 
It would be worthwhile to investigate the differences between the test taker’s own judgment 
of the target person and the view the subjects take when evaluating emotions, cognitions, 
and relationships in light of the target person’s view (which corresponds to the original 
scenario task). The latter includes the ability to take a distance from one’s own view, which I 
assume to be a necessary component in order to make true social understanding possible. I 
tried to get an impression of the effect the perspective change has in making judgments from 
both the own and the target person’s perspective with a small group of students in a seminar. 
The students reported to have had much difficulty distinguishing between the two 
perspectives. A detailed change of instructions could assist in a better differentiation between 
the two perspectives, for example with questions like: “Imagine, you are Renate, how do you 
think she would answer the question about her feelings in this situation?” versus ”How would 
you think she feels in the situation?” In the first question the view of the target person is 
central, whereas in the second question the own perspective is decisive.  
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Another interesting question to deal with is the correlation between a judgment of the target 
person’s personality after viewing a simple self-presentation and after completing the whole 
scenario (like we did in our studies). Several studies indicate that forming an opinion about a 
person takes only a few seconds (e.g. Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992, 1993; see also Borkenau, 
Mauer, Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 2004). It would be worthwhile to study in how far this 
opinion can be modified through the acquisition of additional information during completion of 
the scenario task. There are some indications that the degree of acquaintance looms large in 
the correspondence of judgments between target and consensus as well as self- and other 
(Funder & Colvin, 1988; Paunonen, 1989; Stinson & Ickes, 1992). A systematic study could 
yield interesting results. 
 
A related question concerns the self-awareness of the test takers. The more expert a person 
is in knowing him- or herself and being aware of his or her own reactions, feelings and 
thoughts, the easier it should be to evaluate the feelings, thoughts, and relationships of 
others and to differentiate between them and his or her own. An additional questionnaire may 
be applied to investigate this effect. The same is true for additional bias effects, such as the 
halo effect (forming a general impression of goodness or badness of a scenario person and 
judge the person globally instead of in detail) or logical errors (certain conceptions of judges 
what traits go with what other traits). For a detailed description of the effects see Obermann 
(1992). In addition, taking role behavior into account could also refine and improve the test. 
Possible questions may be how far carrying out certain roles affects the social understanding 
of a particular target person e. g., a mother with two children or a doctor), whether the 
number of roles a person holds is an important variable (e.g., father, husband, head of 
department, member of a sports club). Stereotypic views may also influence the subject’s 
answers to the scenario task questions and may be controlled. Social knowledge is expected 
to play a major role and should be examined as far as possible (see section 9.5.2). 
 
Voice memory 
The voice memory task (SMa2) was not sufficiently reliable, although it correlated 
significantly with some of the social intelligence tasks (e.g., with SPf1: r=.21; see Table 8-21). 
There may be several reasons for these problems (see also chapter 8.3.2). First, the 
conversations may be so interesting for the test takers that they pay more attention to the 
content of the audiofiles than to the tone of voice. Contradicting this hypothesis is the good 
performance test takers showed in their reaction on paraverbal cues in the perception of 
auditory cues within conversations (SPa1). Whether the content of the social conversations 
has an influence on the task performance could be examined using neutral (e.g., technical, 
science) topics in a parallel test version. The comparison between the results of the two 
versions (social vs. non-social content) could indicate whether the subjects pay more 
attention to the social content than to the paraverbal voice aspects (superiority of language) 
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or not. A second reason for the findings with SMa2 may be that in this task several abilities 
get mixed up: subjects have to identify different voices, presented in a conversation, which 
have to be remembered afterwards. In a next step, they have to compare each of the 
presented voices with five answer alternatives. Thus, discrimination, encoding, working 
memory, and comparison are needed. One could try to break down the task into separate 
units and investigate the performance for each step. Furthermore, the effect of complexity 
should be the subject of future research. More items of each type are needed to examine the 
effect the number of people in a conversation, the context, and the number of distractors 
have on the task performance. The effect of the number of distractors could, for example, be 
examined by introducing a baseline measure, presenting only single voices of 30 to 60 
seconds followed by different numbers of distractors. That would exclude the interference 
that is produced through the different voices involved in a conversation. Additional 
information could be acquired by asking subjects, during the time they take the test for each 
item, how they decide and what makes them to decide in this way (thinking aloud protocols).  
 
Auditory Social/Emotions Perception (SPa2) 
Scherer (in press) notes that it is surprising that established tests of nonverbal emotion 
recognition ability based on performance accuracy (e.g., for the voice, Banse & Scherer, 
1996; Scherer, Banse, Wallbott, & Goldbeck, 1991), are not used more frequently in the area 
of social and emotional intelligence. In our second study, we made use of sentences of the 
GVEESS that are also part of the VOCAL-I (see Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001). One of 
the aims was to relate fictitious content masked sentences to realistic sentences. Both tasks 
loaded on the same latent variable and correlated with .56.  
 
Most of the so-called emotion recognition tasks require discrimination rather than recognition 
(Scherer, 1996). However, being able to discriminate between alternative emotions does not 
automatically mean that the person is able to recognize the particular emotion or social cue 
correctly. In the task I developed, subjects have to decide which of two previously mentioned 
emotions or social cues correspond better to the sound sequence in question. In the present 
work, social perception measures were operationalized as speed tasks correspondent to 
perceptual speed in AcI but recording reaction times. This guideline made it difficult to 
develop a task requiring recognition of the actual emotion or social cue. A recognition test is 
an open answer test or a test with much choice possibility which requires the subject to be 
quite sure about the right answer. This would have exceeded the effort of this dissertation. 
An alternative task for the future would be an open answer test of emotional/social cue 
recognition including a concrete and critically evaluated rationale for scoring both target and 
expert answers. A different possibility is to use actors such as was done for the GVEESS 
and the VOCAL I. On the one hand, working with actors will certainly lead to clearer 
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emotions. On the other hand, we do not know exactly how far these judgments can be taken 
as indicators for realistic situations.  
 
Objective Measurement in Social/Emotional Auditory Tasks  
In chapter 2.6.4 and 2.6.5, some information about the objective assessment of social 
cues/emotions in voices was provided. In the future, objective data about the emotion which 
was present in a certain sound sequence may reveal useful information and enhance validity 
in addition to the methods we applied (e.g. SPa2: rating in order to ensure that the 
classification of an item is unambiguous; SU: target person’s answer to indicate the emotion 
that was present in a certain situation). Recently I had the opportunity to talk to an expert in 
voice analysis3 who works with an objective and experience-driven approach in order to 
identify the voice of a person blackmailing, to attain proofs about the culprit of a crime 
situation, etc. The following recommendations for emotion identification stem from analysis 
with that criminal psychologist considering F0, intensity, tempo, pitch, additional spectral 
parameters (analyzed with Adobe Audition 1.5.), the typical way of speaking of a person, and 
decades of experience in our sound sequences. (1) Sound sequences should last for at least 
seven seconds, recommended are 15 - 20 seconds minimum. (2) The stimulus sequences 
should involve the emotion eliciting event (particularly important to the short SPa2 excerpts). 
In addition to the actual stimulus material, an excerpt of monotonous talking should be taken 
in order to discover the individual standard excitation. (3) One has to be also cautious in 
misinterpreting accentuating (e.g. by increasing voice intensity) as the occurrence of an 
emotion. (4) Important information is revealed by (a) The use of phrases (e.g., meaningless 
confirming phrases such as ”isn’t it” are only possible with slight states of excitement not with 
strong agitation) (b) repetitions (e.g., if someone often gets stuck in a sentence and is not a 
stutterer, nervousness is indicated), (c) continuation of a conversation (e.g., after an angry 
outburst, naturally, conversations do not continue like nothing happened). (5) Recordings 
should take place in quiet and furnished rooms to avoid echo and disturbance. (6) The use of 
headsets is recommended. (7) Overlapping voices should be avoided. (8) Emotion 
identification is more reliable in statements and exclamations than in questions. (9) It should 
be ensured that speakers are not drunk since alcohol accentuates the characteristics of a 
voice that may lead to misinterpretations. (10) One should not use voices of persons 
speaking different dialects, since emotion expression may differ and lead to uncertainty when 
one is not familiar with the specific dialect. (11) Noise reduction filter should not be used as 
important information is reduced or modified. Despite that all these suggestions appear 
useful, some of them (e.g. overlapping) are almost impossible in natural settings. 
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9.4.2 Suggestions for the Auditory Intelligence Test (AuIT)  
 
As for the SIM, further test developments and task improvements can be suggested for the 
AuIT. 
 
Auditory Nonverbal Tasks 
a) Auditory Inspection Time 
The auditory pitch discrimination inspection time task (AIT-P) was only applied in the first 
study since it has an adverse impact on the test takers mood, took too long (about 20 
minutes minimum), and had the problem that some of the subjects were not able to make the 
pitch discrimination at any duration (see also Brand & Deary, 1982; Deary, Head, & Egan, 
1989; see also chapter 2.5.5). For the future, I would therefore recommend using an auditory 
inspection time task similar to the one developed by Parker, Crawford, and Stephen (1999). 
This AIT task deals with sound localization and thus is more similar to visual inspection time 
(VIT) tasks which also deal with localization and thus are expected to share common 
operation processes. According to Parker et al. (1999), the task was easy enough for all 
participants and did not have the problems that were encountered with pitch and loudness 
discrimination. 
 
b) Tonal tasks 
Musically experienced subjects showed better results in the tonal tasks. This may be due to 
better auditory abilities of musically skilled people or, alternatively, to the task demands of 
the tonal tasks selected for this study that measure rather musical than auditory ability. 
Which of the two alternatives is true, or whether a third option is correct, should be examined 
on the basis of a detailed evaluation of the tonal tasks wherein characteristics of both 
auditory intelligence tasks and musical tasks, are specifically detailed. Then, the two 
concepts should be related. One of our musically skilled students looked again at the score 
of the tonal series task taken from Stankov and Horn (1980). She found three of the fifteen 
items have a diverging logical and musical solution to the corresponding task. The answers 
have to be unequivocally either musical or logical everything else may have confused the 
musically skilled test takers. 
 
The auditory tasks were administered as power tests, whereas the academic intelligence 
tasks are pure speed tests or time-limited power tests concerning the reasoning and the 
memory tasks. Future studies should examine whether the conditions of testing have an 
effect on the relationship between auditory and academic intelligence. Therefore, an auditory 
test version that corresponds to the BIS test in that it also includes a time limitation would be 
                                                                                                                                        
3 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Gerd Böttger, department of criminal psychology (Landeskrimi-
nalamt Brandenburg) 
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worthwhile to develop. A subject should be able to hear one item as often as needed to find 
an answer. As in academic intelligence tests, subjects should be able to skip an item. After a 
specified amount of time, the right answers are scored. 
 
Similarly to the voice memory tasks, further research is needed to determine the appropriate 
number of answer alternatives (we increased the number from 3 to 4 in some of the tasks 
described in Stankov & Horn, 1980). With two or three options, we have to deal with the 
problem of an increased chance level. If we offer too many options, we may measure 
working memory or something else instead of auditory nonverbal ability. Additional related 
questions concern the time distance with which the alternatives follow the target sequence of 
tones and the interval between the answer alternatives. If the interval is too long, the trace 
will get lost. If the sequence continues too quickly or if the tones are played quickly one after 
another, the rules of gestalt psychology will make subjects group the tones instead of 
distinguishing between them. Experimental studies are required in order to determine the 
optimal features of the tasks. 
 
Auditory Speech Tasks 
The tasks (particularly audiobook and dissected sentences) can be evaluated as being 
indicators of verbal intelligence rather than of auditory ability. Hithero, attempts to improve 
reliability (multiple choice items, reduction of ambiguity) have not been successful (see 
audiobook, Table 8-30, chapter 8.4.1). For future examinations of the task masked words it 
would be recommended to make use of results obtained by Li, Daneman, Qi and Schneider 
(2004) as well as by Li, Qi, He, Alain and Schneider (2005). These researchers worked with 
the perceived separation of stimuli from background masking noises and the precedence 
effect. Separating the perceived location (not the physical location) of the masker from the 
target speech sequence produced an improvement in performance. Applying this knowledge 
can be especially useful for the improvement of items that were difficult to recognize for most 
of the participants. Putting theory into practice, one should introduce a delay into the noise 
lasting not longer than 15 ms (longer delays cause an echo effect). This gap in the noise is 
perceived as occurring in the leading (target) stimulus and the lagging stimulus is heard as 
continuous noise without a gap. 
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9.5 Test Application and Test Extension 
9.5.1 Applying the Social Inteligence Test and the Auditory Intelligence Test: Formal 
Questions and Further Research Need 
Who Can Take the Test? 
In addition to the mentioned modifications, it is important to specify exactly for which groups 
of people the tests can be applied. Two different samples worked on the SIM and on the 
AuIT. The first group was a student sample, the second was a mixed sample including many 
different professions and differences in the education level. Despite its variety, the group can 
be considered as a selected sample, too, since the subjects participated voluntarily. Although 
people were educated differently, we lacked those with a very low education level. Future 
studies should include samples with less educated people. We can be quite sure that this will 
have an effect on the results of the test since during the second study, all examiners 
including myself noticed that it took much longer to explain the tasks to the mixed sample 
than to the homogeneous student sample. There were tremendous differences in the speed 
people worked on the tasks. However, the dispersion was much lower in the first students 
sample compared to the second heterogeneous group. In addition, the representativeness of 
the models and tests for different cultures have to be investigated. It is not evident whether a 
group of test takers of a different culture would answer the questions in a similar way. The 
validity of a test and model has to be proved before using them in countries other than 
Germany. 
 
Calibration of the Test 
Calibration concerns questions such as: How much of a difference is needed to say that a 
person is socially intelligent? How much of a difference is needed to make a noticeable 
difference, for example, in people’s everyday social interactions? Since the validity 
coefficients of psychological measures are at best on the order of a difference of about one 
standard deviation (SD) on a measurement score, we can expect that more than one third of 
a SD is required to be reflected in a behavioral change (see Sechrest, McKnight, & 
McKnight, 1996). This is confirmed by Ozer (1993), who states that a very large difference is 
required between test scores in order to be observable. Calibration is not only relevant 
against external criteria but also against other measures intended to measure the same 
construct. Sechrest et al. (1996) recommend using standard measures serving as a 
reference for other measures. Many standards become so by convention, accident, 
availability or ease of use. New and creative developments should be related to these 
standard instruments. Linking measures via calibration should result in a database of 
methods to relate findings from disparate measures so that one does not only have to rely on 
statistical significance or effect size estimation to equate outcomes. However, neither in the 
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field of social intelligence nor in the domain of auditory intelligence there are such standard 
measures as suggested by Sechrest et al. (1996). The authors’ recommendation in these 
cases is to relate the newly developed tests to the existing non-standards (since they e.g. 
include only parts of the construct) and to wait for further calibration until new measures will 
be available (email correspondence with Patrick McKnight, April 3rd, 2007). 
 
Who Can Administer the Test? 
The test should only be administered by psychologists who have a special training. All our 
examiners received training on how to prepare the test session, handle the computer 
software, administer the tests, and react appropriately in difficult situations (for example a 
crash of the system or program). 
 
How Short Should the Test Be? 
Our social understanding test with eight scenario tasks took about three hours, an example 
task included. The language-based memory tasks (written and auditory) took about an hour, 
and the language-based perception tasks took 50 minutes. Another hour and 40 minutes 
were required for the pictorial and video-based tasks. The complete SIM thus takes about six 
and a half hours, which is definitely too long. One of our future aims is to make testing more 
economical. However, a valid diagnosis of all domains will probably not be possible within 
one hour. Thus, people have to accept a longer testing time. Shortening is expected to be 
most difficult for the scenario tasks since the presentation of the material alone takes 
significant time (for suggestions see chapter 9.4.1). Despite several possibilities, the more 
the information about a target person is reduced, the more difficult it is to put oneself into that 
person and to provide a reliable personality estimation at the end.   
 
9.5.2 Additional Social Intelligence (SI) Dimensions 
The SI test was developed in order to cover social understanding, social memory and social 
perception. In addition, the model described in Süß et al. (2005; see also Weis and Süß, 
2005) includes social knowledge and social flexibility. We did not include these suggested 
subconstructs, as this would have exceeded the scope of the project. However, for the future 
it would be worthwhile to develop measures of these subconstructs for the test. Some ideas 
and information will be provided below. 
 
Social Knowledge 
At first sight, the inclusion of social knowledge seems to contradict the nature of intelligence, 
since it is culturally dependent (see chapter 2.2) and can increase/develop through learning 
and experience. It appears to be incompatible with the Süß (1996, 2001) conditions of an 
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ability construct (see chapter 1.2) and the conceptualizations that were made in chapter 1.3. 
The special status of social knowledge compared to the cognitive SI dimensions has already 
been emphasized in chapter 2.2. I take the perspective that social knowledge is not part of 
cognitive SI but immediately relevant and related to it and should be controlled in order to 
measure the SI potential of a person. I expect the SI potential to influence the acquisition of 
social knowledge: A person who is socially intelligent (i.e., has the potential to judge another 
person’s behavior, relationship to others, cognitions, and emotions) with a sufficient 
motivation should be able to acquire a more elaborate social knowledge than a person 
without this potential. Thus, SI and social knowledge are confounded and it will be hard if not 
impossible to separate them adequately. Social knowledge is particularly important with 
respect to the SU scenario task. In some of the scenes, certain roles (e.g. the role of a 
doctor) have a major impact. It may be that subjects answer the questions according to their 
experiences (e.g., appointments with a doctor) or to their knowledge (e.g., of how a doctor 
typically behaves). Then, social knowledge instead of social understanding is measured. 
There have been some attempts to assess social knowledge (see chapter 2.2 and Table 2-
6). The Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers (TKIM, Wagner & Sternberg, 1991) and the 
Social Etiquette Test (Wong et al., 1995) have already been mentioned. The problem of 
knowledge tests is that they are domain specific. Knowledge of how a doctor behaves is 
different from knowing how to deal with a five-year-old hyperactive child. In the same way, 
the mentioned tests are very specific: the TKIM is a specific situation questionnaire in the 
domain of management; the Social Etiquette Test measures the knowledge of specific rules 
of etiquette. The development of a reference instrument for our scenario task should include 
knowledge questions corresponding to the selected scenes. A more general approach would 
be to use the taxonomy of possible social situations described in chapter 4-1 (see Figure 4-1) 
taxonomy and develop situation descriptions dealing with single others, dyads, or groups 
(inter-)acting in private or public life in situations with different topics (see Wiggins, 1979). 
This corresponds to the perspective that is taken in social cognition research: social 
knowledge is regarded as knowledge of persons (including self) and groups. Social 
knowledge is assumed to have an associative structure (see e.g. Greenwald, Banaji, 
Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Rosier, 2001). In addition, Kang, Day and Meara (2006) 
suggest a differentiation between knowledge about oneself and knowledge about others. 
Social knowledge is not only expected to influence social understanding but also to affect 
social perception (e.g., Tagiuri, 1969). The sensitivity to certain social cues appears to 
depend on the knowledge and experiences available about a topic, situation, or person. For 
example, if a person has knowledge about certain nonverbal cues, this person will be more 
likely to perceive the cues when paying attention to them. In a similar way, preceding events 
with a certain valence (e.g., good or bad) are expected to increase sensitivity to certain cues. 
This should have implications for training and development issues as well (see also chapter 
9.6.2). Whereas SI is assumed to be rather stable, social knowledge may be trained (e.g., 
9  Discussion 
 
 328 
through providing straight information or through experience within certain situations) and 
may influence performance in SI tests. In addition, social knowledge clearly depends on the 
culture, whereas SI is expected to be less affected by it.  
 
Social Flexibility  
Social flexibility is the analogue to creativity in the BIS, dealing with the flexible application of 
knowledge (see Jones & Day, 1997) or the ability for a flexible production of ideas that can 
be used for the interpretation, solution or management of social situations (see Weis et al., 
2006 and chapter 2.2.2). The operationalization of social flexibility in addition to SU, SM, and 
SP would have required an immense effort, especially with respect to scoring. The answers 
to such a measure have to be evaluated with regard to the number of inventive ideas. 
Although the inclusion of social flexibility would have exceeded the scope of this work, for the 
future, integrating tasks of this dimension appears worthwhile. Possible tasks would present 
a short conversation or a short video scene. Afterwards, the test taker would be asked to 
generate possible outcomes. Another idea is to present an outcome and require the subjects 
to invent scenes that may have occurred before.  
 
The issue of social knowledge and social flexibility is relevant in relationship to the theory of 
crystallized and fluid intelligence (see e.g. Cattell, 1963, 1987; Horn & Noll, 1997; see also 
chapter 2.1). Kang et al. (2006) distinguish between social and emotional knowledge as 
components of crystallized intelligence and regard social and emotional flexibility as 
components of fluid intelligence. Whether this classification is useful still has to be examined 
empirically. Figure 9-3 presents a revised conceptualization of social intelligence 
summarizing and integrating the results of the two studies and the expected arrangement of 
additional dimensions (social knowledge and flexibility) and the overlap and distinctiveness 
with respect to other constructs (e.g., AcI). 
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Figure 9-3: Revised Conceptualization of Social Intelligence and its Overlap with Related 
Constructs 
Note. The frame marks the SI domain. The figure attempts to illustrate relationships rather than 
absolute proportions (of the framed field and also with respect to the boxes). Distances between 
boxes do not indicate the closeness of their relationships. The boxes with a lighter shadow represent 
hypotheses since SI knowledge and SI flexibility were not examined within this thesis. AcI and 
knowledge were not meant to be the same but were combined to make the figure more 
comprehensive. SPa=social perception-auditory; SPw=social perception–written; SPnv=social 
perception-nonverbal 
 
 
Using Video and Audio Together 
The combined use of video-based and auditory material would be interesting and realistic. 
We did not include this type of task in our research design since as a first step we wanted to 
examine the influences/effects the separate materials have. According to Ekman, O’Sullivan, 
Friesen, and Scherer (1991) deceit detection was much more accurate using body language, 
tone of voice, and facial expressions together than applying only one of the three methods. 
Borkenau and Liebler (1992) showed that self-stranger agreement is stronger if strangers 
view a sound film than if they view a silent film or a still picture of targets. Thus, we can 
expect that the judgment of a target person’s feelings, thoughts, and relationships is more 
accurate when relying on combined video-based and auditory material (but see divergent 
findings reported by Archer & Akert, 1980; chapter 2.7.2). Moreover, this type of combined 
task serves as a more economic marker variable of social intelligence, since material- and 
channel-specific disadvantages may be reduced. 
 
9.5.3 Additional Auditory Intelligence (AuI) Dimensions 
Besides the already mentioned issue of clarifying the overlap and distinctiveness of auditory 
and musical intelligence, it would be worthwhile to add further tasks dealing with natural 
(e.g., birdcalls, animal voices, wind and water sounds) and artificial environmental sounds 
(appliance noise, noise produced by engines, telephones, and factories) to the test battery to 
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complement the memory task “recognition of environmental sounds.” A perceptual task 
relying on environmental sounds could use several similar sounds such as birdcalls, which 
have to be distinguished by the test takers (i.e., corresponding to the task detection of 
repeated tones, see chapter 4.2.1 and 6.2.2). Reasoning with environmental sounds could 
be assessed by tasks in which environmental sounds have to be sorted and arranged 
according to a logical sequence, for example in daily activities like teeth brushing (e.g. turn 
on the faucet to get some water for the tooth paste ? brush teeth ? rinse the mouth? rinse 
the washbasin). Analogies (e.g., sounding one’s horn is related to noise of engines such as 
the signal when the dryer is finished is related to the dryer’s noise while working) and sound 
classification (e.g., identify the sound which does not belong to the others: e.g., three animal 
sounds and one sound produced by an appliance) can be operationalized with environmental 
sounds as well. In a second step, these tasks could be related to both auditory nonverbal 
and auditory speech tasks.  
 
Figure 9-4 presents a revised conceptualization of AuI summarizing the results obtained in 
the two studies and the hypothesized structure, overlap, and distinctiveness with respect to 
related constructs. 
 
Figure 9-4: Revised Conceptualization of Auditory Intelligence and its Overlap with Related 
Constructs 
Note. AuI=Auditory intelligence; AcI=Academic intelligence; AuI is indicated by the frame. The box 
with a lighter shadow presents a hypothesis that is not yet examined. The relationship/overlap/ 
distinctiveness between musical and auditory intelligence still have to be explored. 
 
 
 
 
 
auditory nonverbal
environmental sounds
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Musical ability?
Academic Intelligence
Auditory Intelligence
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9.6 Evidence That Needs to Be Furnished  
In this dissertation, with the exception of two, the conditions of the Süß (1996, 2001) 
framework (see chapter 1.2) were investigated successfully. Evidence of the fulfilment of the 
remaining conditions, namely, (6) the stability of the construct across time, and (7) the 
evidence of incremental criterion validity when compared to established constructs, still has 
to be furnished. Thus, future aims include a criterion validation and a retest study for the SIM 
and the AuIT. Since there is not much to say with respect to a retest study, I focus on the 
criterion validation in the following section and provide some ideas with respect to stability, 
training, and change across lifespan in chapter 9.6.2. 
 
9.6.1 Criterion Validation 
Predicting Socially Intelligent Behavior  
Investigating the criterion validity of social intelligence is not as easy as validation studies 
that have been carried out to provide predictive criterion evidence of AcI. Criteria in the 
evaluation of AcI have mainly been training and proficiency success evaluated by school 
grades, teachers’ ratings, supervisors’ ratings, work sample tests, etc. “G” measured by 
classical intelligence tests was sought to be sufficient for prediction of these criteria. 
Differences in the predictive validity were interpreted as a consequence of method effects 
such as restriction of range and reliability problems (see Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). I take a 
different position from researchers (e.g., Austin & Saklofske, 2006) who suggest validating 
new constructs against the criteria used with AcI. It does not appear appropriate to do the 
criterion validation for the SI construct with the same criteria used in validating AcI. In the 
past, the lack of correlation between social/emotional intelligence and training/proficiency 
success was considered to be a proof that the constructs are not incrementally valid with 
respect to AcI (see e.g. Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). Job success was often globally 
defined instead of classifying jobs as “social” vs. “nonsocial” (I know that transitions are 
smooth.). I plead for using appropriate social criteria (real-life criteria, see also Süß, 2006) for 
the criterion validation of social intelligence orientating on the principles of symmetry (see 
Wittmann, 1988). Immediate application (and criteria) of the SIM may be the prediction of the 
effect of the company of nurses with patients measured by patients’ ratings, or the prediction 
of a waiter’s tip. The number of relevant criteria is unlimited. Every additional proof of validity 
supports the usefulness of a construct (see Süß, 2006). A test is never generally valid but 
only valid with respect to specified aims (see American Educational Research Association, 
American Psychological Association & National Council on Measurement in Education, 
2000). Findings of Ford and Tisak (1983) support the importance of selecting appropriate 
symmetrical criteria. They found incremental validity of social intelligence compared to 
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academic intelligence in the effectiveness of socially intelligent behavior in an interview. SI 
could explain 18% of the variance compared to 13% explained by AcI. 
 
In the next few sections, I mention some challenges we encounter when dealing with 
criterion validation. First, in a criterion validation study it is important to define “success” in 
detail: Is it the assessment of the supervisor, the salary someone earns, or the healthy 
growing up of one’s children? In the view of Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000b) we have to 
define success, then carefully develop good criteria for success. However, I would query 
whether this is actually possible: success at one point of time may be turned into failure later 
on. A lying doctor my have immediate success after he is revealed to be a liar who did not 
take his proficiency seriously, he will be in trouble. Who evaluates success in the defined 
criterion of social behavior? Is there a “hard” evaluation criterion or do we have to deal with 
ratings?  
 
Second, SI cannot be understood outside its cultural context (see also Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2006, p. 37). There are vast differences between cultures, such as the relatively 
higher emphasis on social aspects of intelligence in African and in Asian cultures contrary to 
Western cultures (Azuma & Kashiwagi, 1987; Lutz, 1985; White, 1985). Also, the problem of 
context specification can be encountered within one culture (e.g., different roles of a single 
person). Assume an employee works in computer programming (information technology, IT) 
and does not have much contact with colleagues and supervisors (“non-social” job). Carrying 
out a criterion validation study with different groups (e.g., social vs. non-social jobs), one 
might expect that employee to have a lower social intelligence value than the secretary who 
is in daily touch with supervisors and employees. Now imagine that the programming IT 
employee in his private life spends time with his wife, his children and a large network of 
friends, that he is engaged in social activities etc., whereas the secretary holds a single 
person household and prefers engaging in artwork to dealing with other people. It would be 
not surprising, if the test result did not match the predictions. Evaluating the test as a bad 
measure would be a premature mistake. Therefore, the private as well as the professional 
context has to be examined or at least controlled for, which is difficult if not impossible 
because of the many interacting variables which have to be considered. 
 
What are possible methods and criteria for validation of the SIM? In this thesis, I do not want 
to develop complete scenarios of criterion validation but instead provide some general ideas 
with respect to methods, criteria and context of application. A possible technique to be 
applied is the “peer nomination technique” suggested and described in Moreno (1934). An 
example is the nomination of a specified number of classmates according to certain social 
criteria (Whom do you like best? Whom would you trust most/tell your problems to, etc.?). 
This approach can be applied in a variety of settings, such as with teachers’ evaluations, in 
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the assessment of nurses (e.g., ask patients: Whom would you most like to look after you? 
With whom would you feel most comfortable?), or with colleagues (e.g., With whom would 
you start a new project? Whom would you like to have in your team?). Alternatively, one 
could borrow from approaches used in social psychology (e.g. the dyadic interaction 
paradigm, see Ickes, 2001; Snodgrass, 2001): While two people interact in various tasks, 
they complete questionnaires on which they rate their own thoughts and feelings, the other 
person’s thoughts and feelings according to the own view, and the expected thoughts of the 
other person about the own thoughts and feelings. The ratings are correlated afterwards. 
With respect to criteria, objective criteria seem to be particularly useful, such as the tone of 
voice (e.g. firm, dominant, but also friendly language in convincing someone to buy the own 
products), the mimic and body language (e.g. a teacher dealing with a student who did not 
do his homework), and the content of what is said (e.g. number of encouraging words in an 
email or conversation dealing with cheering up a friend). It is important to keep in mind that 
the aims should be fixed in advance. Is the aim in a certain situation to assert oneself, to help 
a person, to acquire sympathy, etc.? Only with specified goals can a certain behavior be 
evaluated using predefined and appropriate criteria. 
 
Predicting Auditorily Intelligent Behavior 
The general issues of criterion validation remain the same concerning auditory intelligence; 
the circumstances, the context, and the criteria have to be adapted. One may imagine 
evaluating auditory discriminative abilities through the acquisition of pronunciation 
competence in foreign languages and in studies with speech therapists. Another field is that 
of musical ability (which has to be still differentiated from auditory ability). The combined 
abilities defined by the SI and the AuI construct may deal with call center agents who have to 
have good auditory but also good social intelligence, for example with respect to their tone of 
voice. 
 
9.6.2 Issues of Training and Development  
The question of whether social intelligence and auditory intelligence can be trained/improved 
will be discussed against the background of the conceptualization of intelligence (see chapter 
1.3) and with respect to psychological intervention programs for the training of social 
perception, memory, and understanding. In the view of Mayer et al. (1999), a condition to 
apply the label “intelligence” is that development and increase with age in the crucial ability 
are possible. On the contrary, I regard intelligence as a stable precondition and underlying 
potential that can result in certain skills, competencies, and knowledge which in turn can be 
trained (see chapter 1.3 and chapter 9.5.2). The position I take is that if conditions of 
variables such as sufficient motivation and an appropriate context (e.g., possibility of getting 
in touch with different kinds of people) are fulfilled, a person with a high social intelligence 
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potential may train communication skills to a very high expert level, whereas a person with 
minor SI will never reach that level. For the latter, improvement by training is also possible, 
but to a lesser extent. If training results in increased knowledge I assume performance to be 
increased, too. However, I do not expect the actual cognitive dimensions to be changeable 
by training. 
 
Associated with the training and development of social skills is the relationship to wisdom 
and age. In academic intelligence research, changes in academic performance have been 
found across the lifespan (see Schaie, 1994). In the same way, Cattell and Horn (Horn, 
1970; Horn & Cattell, 1966) as well as Baltes (1990) found different development processes 
across the life span for gf and gc and for mechanic and pragmatic respectively (see chapter 
2.2 and references). Similarly, such changes are expected to occur with regard to the 
performance in SI and AuI tests. A person’s knowledge in social situations and experience in 
dealing with different people increases with age, which is expected to have an impact on the 
modification of socially intelligent behavior (see Kaiser, 1998). This also indicates that in the 
mentioned boundaries an improvement in social skills is very likely since the knowledge 
about social situations and different people increases. On the other hand, when people get 
older changes of perspective are sometimes more difficult (e.g., putting oneself into a much 
younger person’s place), which may be a consequence of both generation changes (e.g., 
different conditions of growing up) and age distance. It would be interesting to know whether 
the improvement of auditory or social skills influences the performance in an auditory or 
social intelligence test. 
 
With respect to the training of SI-perception and SI-memory, I expect modifications to be 
minor as these two dimensions seem to be more basic. It could be shown that social memory 
is correlated with academic memory. Effects of age and training known in combination with 
academic memory should be related to so-called social memory as well. With respect to 
social perception, we can expect that reduced sensory functions in advanced age affect 
performance in perception tasks. However, stability may be high even against the 
background of reduced performance, since the ranking of persons may remain the same. 
Studies on social intelligence across the life span would be recommended since, in later life, 
social intelligence may be even more important than cognitive abilities (Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2006).  
 
Similarly, I regard auditory intelligence as a potential, which cannot be modified. In particular, 
sensory abilities are hard to train since they are expected to be strongly linked with 
anatomical and physiological structure. I assume these abilities to be a necessary but not 
sufficient precondition to develop excellent language skills, musical skills, and skills in 
detection of changes in the voice (e.g., emotion changes). The existence of these 
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preconditions determines the degree to which these skills can be trained. There is some hint 
in the literature that there are resources in dealing with auditory material common to all 
human beings since even people without any formal musical training and experience were 
able to process and understand musical syntax and semantics (Koelsch, 2004). However, 
similar to SI, musically skilled people with increased knowledge about tones and sounds and 
their relationship may perform better in auditory tests. This is expected to be due to 
increased knowledge rather than increased underlying cognitive abilities. As in the SI 
domain, perception and discrimination abilities, which rely on sensory functioning, are 
assumed to decrease across the lifespan and in turn do not affect the ranking of a person’s 
performance within a reference group of the same age. 
 
 
9.7 Concluding Comments 
I started my thesis with a comment on the “inflation of intelligences” and mentioned some 
arguments why auditory and social intelligence are candidates for viable constructs instead 
of being illusory. It could be shown SI and AuI are indeed promising constructs that do not 
have to be subsumed under the label of inflationary constructs. However, the unique 
components of the constructs, social understanding, nonverbal auditory intelligence, and 
auditory social/ emotion perception are narrower than expected.  
 
In this work, the often neglected auditory abilities have been included side by side with the 
visual abilities. For the future we should not ignore other senses such as the tactile, olfactory, 
and kinesthetic sensory modality (e.g. Danthiir et al., 2001; Li et al., 1998; Roberts, Stankov, 
Pallier, & Dolph, 1997; Stankov, 2001). It has been found that tactile sensory information 
processing is related to cognitive functioning (see, e.g. Stankov, 2000). The strength of the 
tactile-cognitive link is compatible to the strength of the auditory-cognitive and the visual-
cognitive links. Researchers in the psychology of aging assume that neural functioning of the 
brain is an underlying variable of both sensory functioning and cognitive information 
processing (see Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997). On the basis of theoretical argumentation and 
empirical findings, we have to evaluate whether individual differences in perceptual abilities 
are rather due to sensory functioning than to factors of intelligence. 
 
We started to relate measures of emotion research tradition to measures applied in 
differential and diagnostic psychology. I would strongly recommend continuing research in 
this direction in the future. The fact that several research traditions (e. g. emotion research, 
diagnostic psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, and neuropsychology) 
examine SI without knowing and including findings from one another has to be changed. 
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Sharing findings, knowledge, and instruments could contribute to a deeper knowledge of the 
construct. The same is true with regard to AuI: the results obtained in the context of our 
research project should be combined with findings obtained in neuropsychology, musical 
psychology, and audition research. 
 
In the past, there was a tendency to overemphasize the role of the general factor at the 
expense of broad and primary factors, leading to an impoverished view of human cognition 
and ignoring a large body of contrary evidence. If researchers want to predict and 
understand what happens with people in their lives, academic intelligence scores on their 
own are clearly inadequate, and as they grow older they become less important (Stankov, 
1999). Assuming a simple ”g-factor” underlying each kind of cognitive functioning although 
parsimonious, is too easy (see also Stankov, 2000). The variety of underlying abilities that 
seem to be partly dependent but also completely different from one another widens our 
horizon with respect to interindividual differences. Again, it becomes clear that in the same 
way as the underlying cognitive factors complement each other, we complement each other 
with our unique blend of capabilities. Constructs are our inventions; their structure and 
relationships are more complex than we would expect. In the laws of nature “such a superior 
reason is revealed that every meaningful human thinking and grouping/arrangement is only a 
void reflection.“ (Einstein, 1953, p. 21). God in heaven alone can presume to know which 
kind of ability constructs and processes determine our cognitive functioning. Most likely, we 
would be very surprised if we knew how our mind worked indeed. 
 
Now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. 
Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known. 
(1. Corinthians 13:12; Holy Bible, New International Version) 
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Appendices 
A Preparation and Implementation of Studies 
 
A.1 Computer Settings 
 
• Deactivate anti-virus programs; without deactivation, the software will be susceptible to 
interruptions 
• Additional audio settings required for the task “masked words”: deactivate 1 sterical; set 
ups and downs to second line on the right 
• Mouse speed: set to middle speed 
• Screen: set to 16 Bit 
 
 
A.2 Pilot Study Modifications 
 
A.2.1 Task Modifications: Nonverbal Tasks 
 
Task Changes for first main study 
Tonal figures • Answered alternatives were presented more slowly in sequence. 
Tonal  
analogies 
 
• Presentation mode was adapted according to breaks between tones and 
speed of presentation. 
• Whereas optional answers were presented after listening to the two basic 
tones and the third tone as single tone, after modifications the third tone 
was included in each alternative in order to provide a clearer impression of 
the interval. 
 
Rhythm 
reproduction  
• Clearer instruction when to begin and what has to be attended to 
• Feed-back after each item was changed into a summary feed-back at the 
end of the task (except for the test trials which still included a separate feed-
back after each item)  
Note: Tasks not listed in this table were modified only with regard to instructions, item difficulty, 
changes in item order, or modification/exclusion of unreliable items. 
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A.2.2 Task Modifications: Speech and Environmental Sound Tasks 
 
Task Changes for first main study 
Recognition 
of familiar 
environmental 
sounds 
• Increased number of items (distractors) from 45 to 55  
• Same length of noise sequences 
• Grouping of distractors and targets should make the task more difficult. 
(e.g. one of four ring-tones served as a target, the others as distractors 
(other examples: mist/rain/heavy rain/thunderstorm; car sounds like drive-
away/ brake sharply/slow down 
Audiobook  
 
• Selection of audio-book 2  
• Changes in item formulation 
• More time to answer the (open) questions 
Masked 
words  
 
• Adaptation of the loudness of the background noise and the speaker’s 
voice in order to attain better recognition rates 
• Different degrees of difficulty were made more obvious 
• Resulting matrix: 3 x 3 matrix with factors: loudness of background noise, 
loudness of speaker and frequency of words 
Detection of 
repeated 
voices  
• clearer voices were recorded to replace items that did not work well 
AIT • AIT-loudness (AIT-L) was replaced through AIT-pitch (AIT-P) 
• Reasons: 
     - Subjects had severe problems in solving the tasks 
     - AIT-L tasks, after a first enthusiasm were not well received in research 
       (see chapter 2.5.5) 
Disarranged 
sentences 
• Added to test battery in order to have a representative selection of tasks 
for the verbal reasoning domain (for a description see above)  
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A.2.3 BIS Task Meaningful Text 
Questions: 
 
• Welchen Boden lieben Gärtner? 
 
• Welche Böden eignen sich zum Bauen? 
 
• Bei welchem Boden ist es schwierig, die Baugrube auszuheben? 
 
• Welche Schwierigkeiten können beim Bau mit der Gründung geschehen? 
 
• Was muss bei der Gründung beachtet werden, wenn es sich um sehr frostempfindlichen 
Boden handelt? 
 
• Welche DIN Norm beschreibt die Einteilung der Böden als Baugrund? 
 
• In welche Bodenarten sind Böden nach der Norm einzuteilen? 
 
• Welche drei Hauptbestandteile enthält ein Boden?  
 
 
• Wie nennt man einen Boden, der alle Bestandteile in gleicher Menge enthält? 
 
• Worüber geben Bodenklassen Auskunft? 
 
• Was ist für den Hobbygärtner der entscheidende Bodenfaktor? 
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A.3 Personality Profiles of the Target Persons 
 
 
Note. N=Neuroticism; O=Openness; A= Agreeableness; C=Conscienciousness; E=Extraversion 
 
Note. IIP-C: Inventory of interpersonal problems- Circumplex scales 
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A.4 First Study Minutes 
 
 
First Test Session 
 
1st investigator: ___________________ 2nd investigator: _________________ 
 
Date:  ______________________ 
 
Start of examination (time): __________ 
 
End of examination (time): __________ 
 
Number of subjects (N): __________ 
 
Number Subtest/Test Planned 
time 
Actual time 
needed 
Notes 
1 Welcome and general 
instructions 
5   
2 Simple Reaction Time - Baseline 10   
3 Social Perception–written  15   
4 Detection of repeated tones 
(MA1) 
10   
5 Social Memory–auditory (Part 
one) 
15   
6 Recognition of familiar 
environmental sounds 
15   
7 Chord decomposition 15   
8 Break 10   
9 BIS–part 1 15   
10 Social Memory–video-based 15   
11 Scenario 1 15   
12 Masculinity/femininity 10   
13 Hearing ability questionnaire 5   
14 Break 10   
15 Mouse speed baseline 10   
Appendices 
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Number Subtest/Test Planned 
time 
Actual time 
needed 
Notes 
16 Tonal analogies 10   
17 Social Perception–pictorial 15   
18 Social Memory–auditory (part 2) 15   
19 Distracted sentences 15   
20 Break 10   
21 BIS-part 2 15   
22 Scenario 2 15   
23 Prototypical Acts on SI (Amelang 
et al., 1989) 
15   
  285   
 
 
Second Test Session 
 
Number. Subtest /Test Planned 
time 
Actual time 
needed 
Notes 
1 Social Perception–auditory 
(part1) 
15   
2 NEO-FFI (Borkenau & 
Ostendorf, 1993) 
10   
3 Tonal figures 15   
4 Rhythm reproduction 15   
5 Detection of repeated voices 10   
6 AIT-P 25   
7 Break 10   
8 Social Memory-pictorial 15   
9 BIS – part 3 15   
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10 Scenario 3: Renate 15   
11 Social Memory–written 
20
  
12 Break 10   
13 Social Perception–video-based 15   
14 Masked words 15   
15 Computer experience 5   
16 Tonal series 15   
17 Audiobook 10   
18 Social Perception-auditory (part 
2) 
15   
19 break 10   
20 Readspeed 5   
21 BIS – part 4 15   
22 BIS – part 5 15   
23 Scenario 4: Christoph 15   
  300   
 
 
BIS-Minutes 
 
1st session Task Instruction Test Notes 
VS 0:40 1:30
SI 0.20 0.50
FA 0:30 3:30
WM 0:55 1:30
RD 0:40 3:20
Part 1: 15:50 
 
ZZ 1:15 0:50
SV 1:30 1:30
WE 0:50 0:40
WS 0:30 1:00
OE 0:30 0:30
TL 0:20 5.00
Part 2: 15:55 
OG 1:55 1:40
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2st session Task Instruction Test Notes 
ZN 0:50 3:50
KW 0:15 0:30
AN 1:00 1:45
XG 0:50 1:00
WA 1:00 1:30
Part 3: 16:50 
 
ZP 2:20 2:00
TM 1:00 1:00
BD 0:20 0:50
SC 1:30 2:45
TG 1:20 0:40
RZ 0:45 0.50
Part 4: 15:10 
 
SL 2:30 1:40
AW 1:10 2:15
PS 1:20 1:15
BR 1:00 3:30
BG 1:45 2:10
 
Part 5: 17:30 
 
FM 1:35 1:30
 
 
A.5 Second Study Minutes 
 
First session 
Subtest/Test Planned 
time 
Actual time 
needed 
Notes 
General instructions; Personal data 10   
Simple Reaction Time (Baseline) 6   
Word span (WM) 10   
Social Perception-video 1 13   
Detection of repeated tones (MA1)  12   
General instructions social under-
standing; Example scenario Birger 
20   
Scenario 1 (Renate) 25   
Strain questionnaire (1) 1   
Sum (first block) 97   
Break  5   
General instruction BIS 
BIS part 1 
17   
Social Perception – auditory 1 12   
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Subtest/Test Planned 
time 
Actual time 
needed 
Notes 
Social Memory-pictorial 1 13   
Social Perception-video 2 10   
Memory updating numerical (WM)   
Scenario 2 (Bringfried) 20   
Sum (second block) 87   
Break 20   
BIS part2 15   
Masked words 8   
Social Memory-written 1 14   
Dissected sentences 12   
Scenario 3 (Conny) 20   
Empathy questionnaire 5   
Questionnaire of feeling 5   
Sum (block 3) 79   
Break 10   
Readspeed (baseline) 10   
Social Perception-written 2 8   
Social Memory-pictorial 2 20   
Scenario 4 (Christoph) 20   
NEO-FFI 10   
Strain questionnaire (2) 1   
Break (block 4) 69   
Total sum (without breaks) (breaks 
included) 
332
367
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Second session 
Subtest/Test Planned 
time 
Actual time 
needed 
Notes 
Mouse speed (baseline) 6   
Social Perception-pictorial 1 8   
Social Memory-auditory 2 20   
Profile of nonverbal sensitivity 
(PONS) 
12   
Dot span (WM) 10   
Scenario 5 (Katharina) 20   
Strain questionnaire (3) 1   
Sum (block 5) 77   
Break 10   
BIS part 3 25   
Rhythm 6   
Social Memory-written 2 13   
Social Perception-auditory 2 13   
Tonal series (MA4) 10   
Scenario 6 (Friedrich) 20   
Sum (block 6) 87   
Break 20   
BIS part 4 22   
Social Memory-auditory 1 15   
Social Perception-pictorial 2 12   
Audiobook 9   
Senario 7 (Hannah) 20   
Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale 
(SEIS) 
7   
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Subtest/Test Planned 
time 
Actual time 
needed 
Notes 
Sum (block 7) 85   
Break 10   
Social Perception-written 1 14   
Scenario 8 (Matthias) 20   
Social Memory-video 1+2 22   
Prototypical Acts on Social 
Intelligence (Amelang et al., 1989) 
Altruism questionnaire 
10   
Long-time memory social 
understanding 
15   
Strain questionnaire (4) 1   
Break (block 8) 82   
Total sum (Without break) 
(breaks included) 
331
367
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B Additional Results and References - First Study 
 
 
B.1 Accuracy Scores of Social Perception Tasks (S1) 
B.1.1 Written Social Perception 
  
Mean in % 
correct (SD) 
Skewness/ 
Curtosis1) rit - range  
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Total mean  
(32 items)2) 
.77 (.10) 
[.55; .98] -1.10/.89  06.- .47 .80 
Reduced 
mean  
(24 items) 
.76 (.10) 
[.55; .93] 
-1.19/1.08  
 .20 - .65 .82 
Note: N=109; rit: item-total correlation; 1) Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis, SD 
(Skewness): .22; SD (Curtosis): .43 
2)accuracy for selected item total score (32 item). Since one item had to be excluded because of lack of variance, 
31 items remained for analysis 
 
B.1.2 Auditory Social Perception 
Scales 
Number 
of items
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 2) 
Range 
(min.-max)
Mean 
(SD) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
laughter 8 (5) -2.34/7.35  .17 – 1.00 .92 (.13) -.19 - .33 (.28 - .42) .05 (.51) 
names 111) (8) -2.13/3.61   .11 – 1.00 .85 (.22) -.10 - .83 (.15 - .88) .74 (.86) 
agreement 7 -.58/-.90  .00 – 1.00 .59 (.31) .25 - .65 .78 
voices 101) (9) -2.63/10.05  .30 – 1.00 .94 (.10) .03 - .51 (.19 - .51) .45 (.55) 
rejection 5 -1.83/5.25  .00 – 1.00 .86 (.18) .17 - .27 .40 
filling words 7 -.28/-.83  .00 – 1.00 .54 (.28) .18 - .47 .65 
change of 
gender 19 -1.75/4.68  .00 – 1.00 .76 (.15) .13 - .49 .70 
questions 5 -.10/-.79  .00 – 1.00 .51 (.27) .11 - .43 .45 
different 
interaction 
partners
9 -.91/.62   .00 – 1.00 .61 (.20) .32 - .72 .78 
Note. N=175; rit range= item-total correlation range; 1) one item of the scale had zero variance and had to be 
removed; in parentheses= reduced values: exclusion of items with negative and zero item-total correlation; 2) 
Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis. SD (Skewness) is .18; SD (Curtosis) is .37 
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B.2 Parallel Analysis: First Study (S1) 
B.2.1 Internal Structure of Social Intelligence  
B.2.2 Social Intelligence and Academic Intelligence Structure  
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B.2.3 Internal Structure of Auditory Intelligence  
 
B.2.4 Auditory Intelligence and Academic Intelligence Contents 
 
B.2.5 Auditory Intelligence and Academic Intelligence Operations 
Note. EV=Eigenvalue; S1=first study 
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B.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the BIS Model 
 
B.3.1 Operation Structure  
 
 
Note. Model characteristics: Chi²=42.25, df=32, p=.106; CFI=.97; SRMR=.050; RMSEA= .052; CI(90%): (.000, 
.091) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P_R1
P_R2
P_R3
P_R4
BIS-R
P_M1
P_M2
P_M3
BIS-M
P_S1
P_S2
P_S3
BIS-S
0.64*
0.77
0.66* 0.76
0.79*
0.62
0.79*
0.61
0.65*
0.76
0.71* 0.70
0.62*
0.79
0.41*
0.80*
0.60
0.65* 0.76
0.68*
0.73
0.68*
0.48*
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B.3.2 Content Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Model characteristics: Chi²=26.065, df=24, p=..34987; SRMR=..047; RMSEA= .027; CI (90%): (.000, .081) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P_V1
P_V2
P_V3
BIS-V
P_N1
P_N2
P_N3
BIS-N
P_F1
P_F2
P_F3
BIS-F
0.75*
0.67
0.74* 0.67
0.63*
0.77
0.76*
0.65
0.84* 0.54
0.73*
0.68
0.63*
0.76*
0.65
0.61* 0.79
0.55*
0.83
0.46*
0.64*
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C Additional Results and References - Second Study 
 
 
C.1 Accuracy Analysis of Social Perception Tasks (S2) 
 
C.1.1 Perception of Social Target Stimuli in Text Extracts (SPw1) 
Scales 
Number 
of items
Skewness/ 
Curtosis2) 
Range 
min. – max. Mean (SD) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Level 1 ACC 19 -1.10/1.53  .60 – 1.00 .88 (.08) .10 - .38 .60 
Level 2 ACC 19 -1.26/ 3.05  .67 – 1.00 .92 (.06) .12 - .61 .66 
Total ACC1 39 -1.85/6.08   .60 - .98 .90 (.06) .11 - .59 .73 
Note. N=182; rit range=item-total correlation; 1) Score after item selection. Original score and trimmed score 
correlate with .996. 2) Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis. SD (Skewness) is .18; 
SD (Curtosis) is .36 
 
 
C.1.2 Perception of Social Content in Text Extracts (SPw2) 
 
Scales 
Number 
of items
Skewness/ 
Curtosis2) 
Range 
(min.–max.) Mean (SD) rit range 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Neutral-
emotional 
ACC
29 -2.62/7.51  .47 – 1.00 .97(.10) .13 - .61 .86 
Positive -
negative 
ACC
10 -1.05/.67  .83 - 1.00 .94 (.04) .14 - .28 .40 
Total ACC1) 36 -2.27/5.75  .70 – 1.00 .96 (.06) .12 - .63 .86 
Note.1)Score after item selection; 2) Skewness is presented first; the second value represents curtosis. SD 
(Skewness) is .18; SD (Curtosis) is .36; rit range=item-total correlation; Original and trimmed values correlate with 
.98.; RT=reaction time; ACC=accuracy 
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C.1.3 Perception of Social Facts in Conversations (SPa1) 
 
Scales 
Number 
of items
Skewness/ 
Curtosis 
Range 
(min.-max.)
Mean 
(SD) rit range 
Cronbach’s
Alpha 
laughter 8 (5) -2.34/7.35  .17 – 1.00 .92 (.13) -.19 - .33 (.28 - .42) .05 (.51) 
names 111) (8) -2.13/3.61   .11 – 1.00 .85 (.22) -.10 - .83 (.15 - .88) .74 (.86) 
agreement 7 -.58/-.90  .00 – 1.00 .59 (.31) .25 - .65 .78 
voices 101) (9) -2.63    10.05  .30 – 1.00 .94 (.10) 
.03 - .51 
(.19 - .51) .45 (.55) 
rejection 5 -1.83  5.25  .00 – 1.00 .86  .17 - .27 .40 
filling words 7 -.28  -.83  .00 – 1.00 .54 (.28) .18 - .47 .65 
change of 
gender 19 
-1.75   
4.68  .00 – 1.00 .76 (.15) .13 - .49 .70 
questions 5 -.10  -.79  .00 – 1.00 .51 (.27) .11 - .43 .45 
different 
interaction 
partners
9 -.91   .62   .00 – 1.00 .61 (.20) .32 - .72 .78 
Note. 1) one item of the scale had zero variance and had to be removed; 2) Skewness is presented first; the 
second value represents curtosis. SD (Skewness) is .18; SD (Curtosis) is .36; in parentheses= reduced values: 
exclusion of items with negative and zero item-total correlation, N=175; rit range= item-total correlation range 
 
 
C.1.4 Emotion perception in voices (SPa2) 
Internal consistency of the SPa2 accuracy scores ranges from .25 to .48 (total scale .56). 
The GVEESS accuracy scales show alpha values between .39 and .57 (total scale .68). As 
the scales reliability is reduced in particular for SPa2 and the number of items included in the 
scales limited, further analyses with the exception of the following correlation table 
concentrate on the reaction time scores.  
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Intercorrelations Between Accuracy Subscales of the Task Perception of Social Paraverbal 
Cues/Emotions in Voices (SPa2) and the GVEESS 
  
emotional 
vs. neutral 
positive vs. 
negative 
irony vs. 
anger 
joy vs.  
anger 
boredom vs. 
pride 
emotional 
vs. neutral 1.00     
positive vs. 
negative .11 1.00    
irony vs. 
anger .19* .25** 1.00   
joy vs. 
anger .16* .21** .16* 1.00  
boredom 
vs. pride .15* .15** .18* .21** 1.00 
contempt 
vs. interest .10 .17** .15 .25** .40** 
Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); 
listwise deletion, N=174 
 
 
 
C.2 Parallel Analysis: Second Study (S2) 
 
C.2.1 Internal Construct Validity: Social Intelligence  
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C.2.2 Structure of Social Intelligence, Academic Intelligence, GVEESS and PONS 
 
C.2.3 Internal Structure of Auditory Intelligence 
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C.2.4 Structure of Auditory Intelligence and BIS Contents 
 
C.2.5 Structure of Auditory Intelligence, Academic Intelligence and Working Memory 
 
C.2.6 Structure of Social Auditory vs. General Auditory Abilities 
 
 
Note. EV=eigenvalue; S2=second study 
 
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
EV
1
EV
2
EV
3
EV
4
EV
5
EV
6
EV
7
Random
Empirical
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
EV
1
EV
2
EV
3
EV
4
EV
5
EV
6
EV
7
Random
Empirical
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
EV
1
EV
3
EV
5
EV
7
Random
Empirical
Appendices 
A-22 
C.3 BIS Model Second Study (S2) 
C.3.1 Operation Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Model characteristics: Chi²= 37.66; df= 24; p= .038; CFI= .98; SRMR=.041;  
  RMSEA= .057; CI (90%)= (.014, .091) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P_R1
P_R3
P_R4
BIS-R
P_M1
P_M2
P_M3
BIS-M
P_S1
P_S2
P_S3
BIS-S
0.83* 0.55
0.87* 0.50
0.74*
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C.3.2 Content Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. ML estimation; Model characteristics: Chi²= 63.171; df= 24; p= .000; CFI= .94; SRMR=.059;  
RMSEA= .097; CI (90%)= (.068; .126) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P_V1
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P_V3
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0.62
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0.68*
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C.4 Exploratory Factor Aanalysis: Content Structure With SIM-Variables, 
GVEESS, and PONS 
 
 
Total variance explained 
Eigenvalues 
Sum of squared factor loadings of 
extraction 
Rotated 
sum of 
squared 
loadings 
Factor Total % of variance Cumulated % Total % of variance Cumulated % Total 
1 6.54 21.79 21.79 6.080 20.267 20.267 4.624
2 2.96 9.86 31.64 2.416 8.055 28.322 2.672
3 2.11 7.02 38.67 1.541 5.138 33.459 2.960
4 1.98 6.59 45.26 1.501 5.005 38.464 2.020
5 1.74 5.81 51.06 1.236 4.120 42.584 1.270
6 1.55 5.16 56.22 1.041 3.471 46.055 3.714
7 1.16 3.85 60.08      
8 1.05 3.50 63.57      
9 1.00 3.32 66.90      
10 .95 3.16 70.05      
11 .91 3.04 73.10      
12 .77 2.58 75.67      
13 .76 2.53 78.20      
14 .73 2.43 80.63      
15 .60 2.00 82.63      
16 .54 1.81 84.44      
17 .48 1.60 86.04      
18 .47 1.56 87.60      
19 .45 1.51 89.11      
20 .42 1.40 90.51      
21 .40 1.32 91.83      
22 .39 1.28 93.12      
23 .32 1.07 94.19      
24 .31 1.04 95.23      
25 .30 1.00 96.23      
26 .28 .93 97.16      
27 .24 .79 97.95      
28 .22 .72 98.67      
29 .21 .70 99.37      
30 .19 .63 100.00      
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Pattern matrix 
Factor 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
P_num3 .81        
P_fig2 .75    -.21    
P_num2 .64    .14 .13 -.19 
P_num1 .63    .16  -.22 
P_fig3 .61   -.12     
P_fig1 .56    -.19    
P_verb1 .52   -.24 .15 .11 -.23 
SUf   .73      
SUp -.13 .73 -.18 -.12    
SUpk   .69 .12     
SUw   .62  .10    
SUa   .59 -.12 -.15  .12 
PONS   -.21  -.13    
SMa1     -.72 .28  -.22 
SMf2     -.60     
SMw   .11 -.57 .13  -.38 
SMp1 .10   -.55     
SMa2     -.26 -.14 -.10   
SPf1     .15 .59  -.13 
SPp1 -.28    .57 .11   
SPa1      .47 -.15 .16 
SPp2 -.13   -.16 .43 .25   
SPf2 .11    .43 -.17 .22 
SPp1   .16 -.28 -.31    
SPa2       .81   
SPa2       .60   
SPw2      .14  .77 
SPw1      .14  .69 
P_verb2 .20 .11 -.17   -.60 
P_verb3 .24      -.51 
 
 
 
 
Factor intercorrelations 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.00 .12 -.29 -.14 .00 -.37 
2 .12 1.00 -.07 .10 .02 -.12 
3 -.29 -.07 1.00 .16 .03 .27 
4 -.14 .10 .16 1.00 .02 .14 
5 .00 .02 .03 .02 1.00 -.06 
6 -.37 -.12 .27 .14 -.06 1.00 
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C.5 Distribution of the Scale Filling Words 
 
 
 
C.6 Exploratory Factor Analysis with Auditory Intelligence Tasks, BIS Opera-
tions, and Working Memory 
 
 
Total variance explained 
Eigenvalues 
Sum of squared factor loadings of 
extraction 
Rotated 
sum of 
squared 
loadings 
Factor Total % of variance Cumulated %   Total % of variance 
Cumulated 
% 
1 5.90 32.76 32.76 5.47 30.37 30.37 4.36
2 1.87 10.38 43.15 1.45 8.03 38.41 3.15
3 1.40 7.77 50.92 1.02 5.68 44.09 3.27
4 1.27 7.04 57.96 .87 4.86 48.94 2.27
5 1.12 6.25 64.20 .44 2.47 51.41 1.23
6 .90 5.01 69.21      
7 .81 4.48 73.69      
8 .66 3.68 77.38      
9 .65 3.59 80.97      
10 .62 3.43 84.40      
11 .54 2.97 87.37      
12 .46 2.55 89.92      
13 .40 2.22 92.14      
14 .38 2.11 94.26      
15 .31 1.72 95.97      
16 .28 1.54 97.52      
17 .25 1.39 98.91      
18 .20 1.09 100.00      
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Pattern matrix 
Factor 
  1 2 3 4 5 
P_reas1 .82      
P_reas2 .72  .16    
P_reas3 .68  .20    
WM_DSp .63      
WM_MUn .48 -.24  .13 -.13 
DS .46    .30 
WM_WSp .39   .13 .21 
P_mem2 -.11 -.85   -.11 
P_mem3   -.72     
P_mem1 .11 -.69   .17 
P_speed1    .83    
P_speed2    .78    
P_speed3    .66  .22 
MA1 -.17   .92 .12 
MA4 .22   .49   
RH     .47   
AU   -.27   .42 
MW      .29 
 
 
Matrix of intercorrelations 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1.00 -.40 .40 .42 .25 
2 -.40 1.00 -.39 -.16 -.17 
3 .40 -.39 1.00 .19 .27 
4 .42 -.16 .19 1.00 .15 
5 .25 -.17 .27 .15 1.00 
 
 
 
D Examples of the Test Tasks 
 
The whole test batteries (SIM and AuIT) are deposited in the Insitute of Psychology 
(Department of Methods, Psychodiagnostics, and Evaluation Research) of the Otto-von-
Guericke University of Magdeburg.  
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